Re: [tor-bugs] #32324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce Letterboxing to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32324: Introduce Letterboxing to users
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-9.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201912   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 I just closed #32587 as a duplicate of this ticket (another confused and
 concerned user).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32587 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New revision of Tor is broken. When window is resized, the slider bars move away from edge of window.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32587: New revision of Tor is broken.  When window is resized, the slider bars
move away from edge of window.
--+---
 Reporter:  iyyov@…   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Yes, this is actually intentional. It is called "letterboxing", and you
 can read about it in the release announcements, or at
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/maximized-torbrowser-window/

 Closing the ticket as a duplicate of #32324, which also discusses ways we
 should handle this better in the future.

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[tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Start your Tor with
 {{{
 ORPort 9001
 ORPort [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:auto nolisten
 DirPort 9030
 }}}
 and let it start up. Then go to http://127.0.0.1/tor/server/authority and
 check out how it has the line
 {{{
 or-address [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:94
 }}}

 First: How did it pick that number? It's a weird choice for a port.

 Second: If this is actually your ipv6 address, you can leave out the
 nolisten, and that's where things get interesting. Your logs will say
 something like
 {{{
 Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.001 [notice] Opening OR
 listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:0
 Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.002 [notice] Opened OR
 listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:41535
 }}}

 but then your descriptor will still say :94.

 This is happening right now to relay "Testbit": they have set :auto for
 their ipv6 address in their ORPort, they get the above line about how it's
 opened on port 41535, and yet their descriptor says it's on port 94.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32587 [- Select a component]: New revision of Tor is broken. When window is resized, the slider bars move away from edge of window.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32587: New revision of Tor is broken.  When window is resized, the slider bars
move away from edge of window.
--+
 Reporter:  iyyov@…   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by iyyov@…):

 * Attachment "Screenshot_20191123_215928.jpg" added.


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[tor-bugs] #32587 [- Select a component]: New revision of Tor is broken. When window is resized, the slider bars move away from edge of window.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32587: New revision of Tor is broken.  When window is resized, the slider bars
move away from edge of window.
-+--
 Reporter:  iyyov@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 New revision of Tor is broken.  When window is resized, the slider bars
 move away from edge of window.

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[tor-bugs] #32586 [- Select a component]: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32586: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!
-+--
 Reporter:  iyyov@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet!!!  1) many can't
 be read. 2) goes into infinite loop like reCapcha!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32585 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32585: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 RDP is usually on Windows.
 From #32583: "I'm unwilling to lowering sandbox.content.level."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32585 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32585: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 On what platform?

 (See also #32583)

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[tor-bugs] #32585 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32585: No sound "OnMediaSinkAudioError"
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version: |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:  tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Tor-Browser 9.0.1 is unable to play sound on reconnecting via RDP.
 This happens with security.sandbox.content.level > 2
 Mozilla knows about the problem, but doesn't want to fix it :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32578 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion v.3 links doesnt work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32578: Onion v.3 links doesnt work
--+--
 Reporter:  Imprettynew   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * priority:  High => Medium
 * component:  Webpages => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 (not quite sure which component to put this in, but picking Tor Browser
 for now since that's the software the person is using)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32578 [Webpages]: Onion v.3 links doesnt work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32578: Onion v.3 links doesnt work
-+--
 Reporter:  Imprettynew  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 http://7fa6xlti5joarlmkuhjaifa47ukgcwz6tfndgax45ocyn4rixm632jid.onion/
 is an example of a v3 onion service that is often up

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32578 [Webpages]: Onion v.3 links doesnt work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32578: Onion v.3 links doesnt work
-+--
 Reporter:  Imprettynew  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 My first thought is that your clock (or timezone or date) are wrong.

 > I downloaded Tor browser v.9.0.0 and same issue.

 What were you using before trying Tor Browser?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32519 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32519: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 and another is the @tor-tpomember irc group.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32519 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32519: improve user onboard/offboarding procedures
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 "the blog" is another service with its own accounts

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31506 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to it from inside Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31506: Write up comprehensive advice to "Tor unexpectedly exited", and link to 
it
from inside Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 I'll add another one to brade's list:

 * Does the user have a non-ascii character in their tor browser directory
 / path? (#10416)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32558 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: clarify what happens to email when we retire a user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32558: clarify what happens to email when we retire a user
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32519   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 >

 [snip]

 > Option one, we decide our policy is that soon after you stop being an
 employee or stop being a core contributor, by default your email address
 goes away. I think this would be a poor choice. It would mean that folks
 who take a break from working on Tor will see a disruption in their
 contact address -- the email address they used, and likely also the one
 they used in their git commits -- and they will feel less wanted when
 considering whether to return.

 Yes, We really should avoid that scenario if possible. From a project's
 perspective it's important to realize that contributors that come to us
 and want to work with us up to the point that they get a tpo address are a
 very scarce resource (if you don't believe me just look at, say, the last
 couple of years and count how many new people we got during that time).
 Thus, I would not want to alienate any of them with that option.

 > Option two, when we are adding a new email forward, we decide whether
 it's in the "company" or "hacker" category, and we make it clear to the
 person getting it. If it's in the company category, then they know that it
 will go away after they leave, possibly get redirected, and all the things
 that company people expect to happen to their email addresses. If it's the
 hacker category, we'll plan by default to leave it in place unless special
 circumstances make us need to do something else. I think this approach
 would be a fine choice. There are some details still to be worked out,
 like how to handle the existing addresses (I think we could go through and
 categorize them), and how to recognize when a person has shifted category,
 but I think they're solvable.
 >
 > Option three is like option two except the division is "are they a core
 contributor or not". That is, in this policy, if you have been voted in as
 a core contributor, you are like the "hacker" category above. Whereas if
 you have an email address but you didn't get it by being voted in as a
 core contributor, then you're like the "company" category above. I'd be
 fine with this approach too. In many ways it's cleaner than option two.

 I think option three is a good idea to explore, in particular as it
 incorporates the core contributor idea, which we worked hard to establish,
 as the central category for our community part.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32547 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge at the University of Minnesota

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32547: Set up default bridge at the University of Minnesota
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by jvsg):

 Hi,

 I'll be managing the bridge at U of Minnesota

 Bridgeline:

 {{{
 Bridge obfs4 146.57.248.225:9000 10A6CD36A537FCE513A322361547444B393989F0
 cert=K1gDtDAIcUfeLqbstggjIw2rtgIKqdIhUlHp82XRqNSq/mtAjp1BIC9vHKJ2FAEpGssTPw
 iat-mode=0
 }}}
 Here's the relevant stuff from torrc

 {{{
 ORPort 443

 BridgeRelay 1

 ExtORPort auto

 ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/local/bin/obfs4proxy

 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 0.0.0.0:9000

 ContactInfo singh882+torbri...@umn.edu

 Nickname hopperlab

 BridgeDistribution None
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32557 [Core Tor/Tor]: TOR crashes when AvoidDiskWrites and/or DisableAllSwap defined in `torrc`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32557: TOR crashes when AvoidDiskWrites and/or DisableAllSwap defined in 
`torrc`
--+
 Reporter:  Kein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.3-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32557 [Core Tor]: TOR crashes when AvoidDiskWrites and/or DisableAllSwap defined in `torrc`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32557: TOR crashes when AvoidDiskWrites and/or DisableAllSwap defined in 
`torrc`
--+
 Reporter:  Kein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.3-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I'd suggest grabbing the 'expert mode' tor.exe out of
 tor-win64-0.4.2.3-alpha.zip
 in
 https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/9.5a2/
 and with it, you can see tor's output to stdout, including whatever error
 message it is giving you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by perceptron):

 Of course
 switching security.sandbox.content.level to 0 didn't change anything.

 separately switched media.cubeb.sandbox to false
 And now warning with cubeb look like this:


 {{{
 [Child 22393, MediaPlayback #2] WARNING: 7f6508698120 Can't get cubeb
 context!: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 5e83d0a74e4d/dom/media/AudioStream.cpp, line 351
 [Child 22393, MediaPlayback #2] WARNING: Decoder=7f65053acc00
 [OnMediaSinkAudioError]: file /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 5e83d0a74e4d/dom/media/MediaDecoderStateMachine.cpp, line 3639

 }}}
 Also in Tor-browser on youtube.com page (which I use for testing purposes)
 now claims that Pulseaudio isn't installed(browser shows popup message)

 It is like because of sandboxing Browser is unable to detect/communicate
 with Pulseaudio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32558 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: clarify what happens to email when we retire a user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32558: clarify what happens to email when we retire a user
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #32519   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 First and foremost, I think we need to communicate a policy to people when
 they get their @tpo email forward. That is, they should know the expected
 way that we will handle their email address when they move on from Tor.

 Part of the problem we have now is that we haven't been clear to people in
 the past, so I imagine people have a variety of expectations. We're going
 to keep surprising people until we have a policy and we've communicated
 it.

 One of the culture clashes here is between a free software community
 project, where email addresses are tied to a person who is contributing,
 and a company, where email addresses are 'owned' by the company and of
 course you shouldn't expect any email privacy or even to control who gets
 your email now and in the future. And some people are on both sides of the
 line: for example, I became arma@tpo back when it was a free software
 community project, and now I'm an employee and officer.

 One reason this matters is because people will quite reasonably use their
 email addresses in different ways depending on the expected persistence.
 If I knew that we planned to possibly redirect my tpo mail to somebody
 else, or if I knew that our policy is that my tpo email address will be
 unreliable at getting email to me in the future, I would switch to using a
 domain that I know I'll continue to control.

 Ok, with all this in mind, let me try to talk through some concrete
 options.

 Option one, we decide our policy is that soon after you stop being an
 employee or stop being a core contributor, by default your email address
 goes away. I think this would be a poor choice. It would mean that folks
 who take a break from working on Tor will see a disruption in their
 contact address -- the email address they used, and likely also the one
 they used in their git commits -- and they will feel less wanted when
 considering whether to return. If this is our policy, I would get new
 business cards with some other domain, and probably change my git commit
 addresses. People would ask why my Tor card has a freehaven.net email
 address, and it would be embarrassing, both to me and to Tor, when I
 explain why.

 Option two, when we are adding a new email forward, we decide whether it's
 in the "company" or "hacker" category, and we make it clear to the person
 getting it. If it's in the company category, then they know that it will
 go away after they leave, possibly get redirected, and all the things that
 company people expect to happen to their email addresses. If it's the
 hacker category, we'll plan by default to leave it in place unless special
 circumstances make us need to do something else. I think this approach
 would be a fine choice. There are some details still to be worked out,
 like how to handle the existing addresses (I think we could go through and
 categorize them), and how to recognize when a person has shifted category,
 but I think they're solvable.

 Option three is like option two except the division is "are they a core
 contributor or not". That is, in this policy, if you have been voted in as
 a core contributor, you are like the "hacker" category above. Whereas if
 you have an email address but you didn't get it by being voted in as a
 core contributor, then you're like the "company" category above. I'd be
 fine with this approach too. In many ways it's cleaner than option two.

 I also don't have any need to force a permanent email address on people
 who didn't expect it. I'd be fine with an approach for the hacker side
 where, when they become less active, we ask them if they plan to make use
 of the address in the future, and then they can say yes or no.

 And there will definitely be exceptions where we choose to disassociate
 ourselves from a person, e.g. after we fire them or after the community
 council kicks them out of the community. I am talking here about our
 default policy, and exceptional circumstances can and should produce rare
 exceptions.

 Yet another complexity comes from the conflict in how to handle company vs
 hacker for folks who fit into both categories. But if, when people switch
 from the hacker category to the company category, they give up the
 expectation of havi

Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:3 perceptron]:
 > I'm unwilling to lowering sandbox.content.level.

 That might still be a good thing to try, once, to see if it works. You'll
 learn more about the issue either way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32584 [Core Tor/Tor]: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32584: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29826: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch is `ticket29826` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1559

 The replace_c_identifiers.py script made this fast and easy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29826: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix, easy, intro => technical-debt, fast-
 fix
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32584 [- Select a component]: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement. (was: add_c_file.py: bug when doing only one replacement.)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32584: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32584 [- Select a component]: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32584: rename_c_identifier.py: bug when doing only one replacement.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in d9d75d4ae148be

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[tor-bugs] #32584 [- Select a component]: add_c_file.py: bug when doing only one replacement.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32584: add_c_file.py: bug when doing only one replacement.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31531 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31531: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by perceptron):

 Hi,

 '--disallow-module-loading' in Slackware is used only if pulseaudio is run
 in system mode(as root)
 In user mode there is no such restriction.

 I've tried other tips from first link, didn't help. I'm unwilling to
 lowering sandbox.content.level.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 https://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/linux-software-2/no-sound-in-
 firefox-61-a-4175633217/ has some more people struggling with slackware,
 firefox, and pulseaudio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Hm!

 A couple of random google searches for 'cubeb slackware' point me to
 https://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/slackware-14/firefox-in-current-
 alsa-sound-4175622116/
 and
 https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/questions/1209964
 which suggests a possible sandboxing problem.

 That second url has the intriguing statement "pulseaudio is running.
 Removing '--disallow-module-loading' solves my problem. This security
 measure is in Slackware's rc.pulseaudio. I'll tell them about it."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
--+--
 Reporter:  perceptron|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by perceptron):

 * Attachment "tor_log.log" added.

 Startup verbose log

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[tor-bugs] #32583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No sound "failed to init cubeb"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32583: No sound "failed to init cubeb"
+--
 Reporter:  perceptron  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  no_sound cubeb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Tor-Browser 9.0.1 is unable to play sound on Linux.
 GNU/Linux 4.19.85 #1 SMP
 Distribution: Slackware 64 Current

 Pulseaudio 13.0 is installed and running in user mode.

 In standard Firefox 70.0.1 and 68.2.0 ESR there is no such problem.

 Pulseaudio debug output shows no sign of any requests to access to sink.

 Fully replicable on fresh Slackware installation. No configuration changes
 needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31531 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31531: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1558

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32576 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Fix race condition in snowflake broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32576: Fix race condition in snowflake broker
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor28
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Setting `export GOMAXPROCS=1` doesn't seem to have helped. The broker
 crashed again at `2019/11/23 08:24:18` this morning.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29826: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29826: Rename router_status_t to avoid confusion with routerstatus_t
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, fast-fix, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31531 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31531: Make control_event_conf_changed() take a smartlist of config_line_t
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
+--
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some images from Cloudflare don't load up and a 403 Forbidden is returned

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32582: Some images from Cloudflare don't load up and a 403 Forbidden is 
returned
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Try with different exit nodes if you can't reproduce it on the first
 occasion.

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[tor-bugs] #32582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Some images from Cloudflare don't load up and a 403 Forbidden is returned

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32582: Some images from Cloudflare don't load up and a 403 Forbidden is 
returned
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 While using latest Tor Browser, I noticed that on some websites behind
 Cloudflare some images just don't show up, when i open the Network panel I
 see that a 403 Forbidden error is thrown by Cloudflare when the webpage
 tries to fetch them. Try for example this website: `https://youglish.com`

 Please investigate! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32152 [Webpages/Website]: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32152: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I have fixed it on
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/support.git/commit/?id=fdf1bc2417df3acb377eafe66bef76fc1f4e18ce

 maybe we should add this to a list of things to do when releasing a new
 language:

 * Make sure that the TB Manual and Support Portal are published, and if
 not, add a forward to the .htaccess

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32152 [Webpages/Website]: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32152: https://support.torproject.org/mk/tbb/tbb-2/ is giving a 404
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * owner:  hiro => emmapeel
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 oh. we need to add the same forwards like in the manual:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/manual.git/tree/.htaccess#n22

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