Re: [tor-bugs] #3555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3555: Pin *.torproject.org's certs in TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  tagnaq|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We track the static ping for aus1 in #29811. Let's close this ticket here.
 All the other pinning got done upstream I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3544 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide Linux users with help for getting Tor Browser icon added to menu (was: Add to menu option for TBB)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3544: Provide Linux users with help for getting Tor Browser icon added to menu
--+--
 Reporter:  phobos|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-parity   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => ux-team, tbb-parity


Comment:

 I think we are good here for Windows and macOS, but I agree Linux users
 could get some help here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent TLS state from accumulating in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2877: Prevent TLS state from accumulating in Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's close this former parent ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2739 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clear Memory-Only Intermeditate Cert Store

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2739: Clear Memory-Only Intermeditate Cert Store
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #2877 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2926 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser Bundle documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2926: Update Tor Browser Bundle documentation
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * version:  Test =>
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We are not concerned with the former Tor Browser Bundle anymore. Thus,
 WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3509 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton won't display as a text box in the add-on bar.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3509: Torbutton won't display as a text box in the add-on bar.
--+--
 Reporter:  katmagic  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Nothing we will fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2739 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clear Memory-Only Intermeditate Cert Store

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2739: Clear Memory-Only Intermeditate Cert Store
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #2877  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  interview, tbb-torbutton, tbb-newnym => tbb-torbutton, tbb-
 newnym


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2542 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problem with downloading attachments in Tor Browser for OS X

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2542: Problem with downloading attachments in Tor Browser for OS X
--+
 Reporter:  keb   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Seems to be a relic of the toggle area. Either way this works for me now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #975 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton prevents PKCS#12 import/export

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#975: Torbutton prevents PKCS#12 import/export
--+--
 Reporter:  kurti |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => new
 * parent:  #2482 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #2482 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TLS issues with Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2482: TLS issues with Torbutton
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 No need for that parent ticket anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #664 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton should not present custom certs if tor is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#664: Torbutton should not present custom certs if tor is enabled
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  None
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * parent:  #2482 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:6 catalyst]:
 > It seems odd to put Password in front of Username, so maybe this can
 also deviate from strict alphabetical order?

 I agree that we shouldn't stick to alphabetical when it makes things
 worse.

 It also seems really easy to just accumulate more items in the future and
 have it all go messy again.

 Maybe that argues for grouping config options by topic? Or for having more
 'areas', where each area is small and alphabetized? Or for writing down
 some heuristics for how we picked the current order, so that when we add
 things in the future we can have a prayer of keeping things organized?

 I don't have any good answers. So I am just here to say that even though I
 wrote 'alphabetized' in a trac ticket eight years ago does not mean that I
 am certain it is the best way to go. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > All these changes look good, but the options are not actually in
 alphabetical order. (There are some cases where word breaks make ordering
 ambiguous, and others where the options are just out of order.)
 >
 > {{{
 > $ head -930 doc/tor.1.txt | tail -701 | grep '\[\[' | cut -d [ -f 3 |
 cut -d ] -f 1 > general_options.txt
 > $ sort general_options.txt > general_options_sorted.txt
 > $ diff -u general_options.txt general_options_sorted.txt
 > ...
 > }}}

 Thanks for the review and checking script! There are far fewer out-of-
 order option names if I do a case-insensitive sort.

 {{{
  Schedulers
 -KISTSchedRunInterval
 -KISTSockBufSizeFactor
 }}}
 swati mentioned to me that this ordering is intentional because it's more
 logical to put the KIST options together with the Schedulers option.

 {{{
 -Socks5ProxyUsername
  Socks5ProxyPassword
 +Socks5ProxyUsername
 }}}
 It seems odd to put Password in front of Username, so maybe this can also
 deviate from strict alphabetical order?

 {{{
  Log
  Log2
  Log3
  Log4
 +LogMessageDomains
 }}}

 This one looks reasonable to move.

 I'll make a revision to move `LogMessageDomains`, and put comments near
 the other out-of-order options explaining why they're intentionally not in
 order.

 > I suggest that we add a test to make sure the options in the general
 section are actually in order.
 I think you filed #32621 for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32139 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable all dirauth options when those modules are disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32139: Disable all dirauth options when those modules are disabled
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-design, network-team-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  november   |
Parent ID:  #31851   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => teor


Comment:

 I have some initial work here in a branch called `dirauth_config`.  It
 isn't ready for merge, but I've made a PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1607 to see what CI thinks.

 So far, it moves only a single option into a separate dirauth
 configuration object.  Additionally, it makes some changes needed so that
 disableable modules can "own" their own options:
1. Subsystems associated with disabled modules are no longer "missing".
 Instead, they are "stub" subsystems that do nothing, but which still
 declare disabled options.
2. There is support for a flag that marks options as "disabled".

 I'd like some preliminary feedback here if you have time.  What do you
 think of this approach?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31820: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 These jenkins master builds will fail after this ticket merges:
 * jessie: OpenSSL 1.0.1t
 * stretch: OpenSSL 1.1.0
 * xenial: OpenSSL 1.0.2g

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31820 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31820: Drop support for OpenSSL < 1.1.1
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:| Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:   => .3


Comment:

 This ticket can merge after #32240 merges to tor, and #32630 merges to
 chutney.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32722 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the seccomp sandbox work with Ubuntu Xenial and Bionic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32722: Make the seccomp sandbox work with Ubuntu Xenial and Bionic
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-can, BugSmashFund,   |  Actual Points:
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #32240 =>


Comment:

 Un-parenting, so we can close the workaround ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Enable zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32242: Travis: Enable zstd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-should, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #32240   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's do this review in #32240.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32630 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32630: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32240| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32630 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32630: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32240| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * owner:  (none) => teor


Comment:

 See my PR:
 * chutney master: https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/42

 I copied across some other minor updates from fallback-scripts and tor
 Travis, in separate commits. See the child tickets and commit messages for
 details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32758 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Travis: Update the macOS image for chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32758: Travis: Update the macOS image for chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  #32630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's review in #32630.

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[tor-bugs] #32758 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Travis: Update the macOS image for chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32758: Travis: Update the macOS image for chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  chutney-ci
Actual Points:  0 |  Parent ID:  #32630
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32630 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32630: Chutney Travis: Make chutney work on Bionic images
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32240| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Chutney
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32757 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Travis: Update the pypy builds for chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32757: Travis: Update the pypy builds for chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  chutney-ci|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #32630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Let's review in #32630.

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[tor-bugs] #32757 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Travis: Update the pypy builds for chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32757: Travis: Update the pypy builds for chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  chutney-ci
Actual Points:  0.1   |  Parent ID:  #32630
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Now we know how to get pypy 2 and 3 in xenial on Travis, we should do it
 for chutney.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Enable zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32242: Travis: Enable zstd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-should, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #32240   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 Travis CI will fail on this ticket until after #32240 has merged. And
 there are some merge conflicts.

 See my combined PRs for #32240 and #32242:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1602
   * doesn't have #32242, because it only applies to 0.3.5 and later
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1603
   * resolves conflicts in #32240
   * adds #32242
 * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1604
   * resolves conflicts in #32242
 * 0.4.2: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1605
   * resolves conflicts in #32240
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1606
   * resolves conflicts in #32242

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32240: Tor Travis: Make chutney work on Xenial and Bionic images
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, 043-should, |  Actual Points:  0.2
  029-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport,  |
  041-backport, 042-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


Comment:

 See my combined PRs for #32240 and #32242:
 * 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1602
   * doesn't have #32242, because it only applies to 0.3.5 and later
 * 0.3.5: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1603
   * resolves conflicts in #32240
   * adds #32242
 * 0.4.0: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1604
   * resolves conflicts in #32242
 * 0.4.2: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1605
   * resolves conflicts in #32240
 * master: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1606
   * resolves conflicts in #32242

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis: Enable zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32242: Travis: Enable zstd
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 043-should, 035-backport,|  Actual Points:  0.1
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:  #32240   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 This ticket should merge after #32240.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32708 [Core Tor/Tor]: manpage: alphabetize General Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32708: manpage: alphabetize General Options
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation tor-client manpage |  Actual Points:
  easy gsod  |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 All these changes look good, but the options are not actually in
 alphabetical order. (There are some cases where word breaks make ordering
 ambiguous, and others where the options are just out of order.)

 {{{
 $ head -930 doc/tor.1.txt | tail -701 | grep '\[\[' | cut -d [ -f 3 | cut
 -d ] -f 1 > general_options.txt
 $ sort general_options.txt > general_options_sorted.txt
 $ diff -u general_options.txt general_options_sorted.txt
 ...
 }}}

 I suggest that we add a test to make sure the options in the general
 section are actually in order.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32721 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Allow chutney users to disable tor's sandbox at runtime

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32721: Allow chutney users to disable tor's sandbox at runtime
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-ci, chutney, BugSmashFund  |  Actual Points:  0.3
Parent ID:  #32240 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm  |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Squashed and merged to master with #32731.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32731 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add __future__ imports to every chutney python file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32731: Add __future__ imports to every chutney python file
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master with #32721.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29210 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute control.c functionality across various modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29210: Distribute control.c functionality across various modules
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-team-roadmap-september,  |  Actual Points:
  042-deferred-20190918  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  23
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All children are closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30984 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30984: Make a key-value line abstraction to output control replies
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  042-deferred-20190918, early-review  |  Actual Points:  8
Parent ID:  #29210   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to master.

 Merged with #32629.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32629 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-enable 1 or 2 more macOS jobs in Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32629: Re-enable 1 or 2 more macOS jobs in Travis
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  consider-backport-immediately, tor-  |  Actual Points:  0.3
  ci, ipv6, macos, 029-backport, 035-backport,   |
  040-backport, 041-backport, 042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and later.

 Merged with #30984.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web Notification API icons get no first party on Windows systems (was: Web Notification API icons get no first party)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15569: Web Notification API icons get no first party on Windows systems
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-parity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability => tbb-linkability, tbb-parity
 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Okay, I did not check mobile but on Linux and macOS this works fine, just
 Windows is affected. Weird.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, memory-safety, security-low  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 Anybody should be able to reproduce the bug with the initial instructions
 -- set two orports and a dirport, and then you can look at your descriptor
 on your local dirport.

 When I set my ORPort to [::2]:auto it still publishes
 {{{
 or-address [::2]:94
 }}}
 in its descriptor.

 Same with [::5] and [::10].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, memory-safety, security-low  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> Start your Tor with
> {{{
> ORPort 9001
> ORPort [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:auto nolisten
> DirPort 9030
> }}}
> and let it start up. Then go to http://127.0.0.1/tor/server/authority and
> check out how it has the line
> {{{
> or-address [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:94
> }}}
>
> First: How did it pick that number? It's a weird choice for a port.
>
> Second: If this is actually your ipv6 address, you can leave out the
> nolisten, and that's where things get interesting. Your logs will say
> something like
> {{{
> Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.001 [notice] Opening OR
> listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:0
> Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.002 [notice] Opened OR
> listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:41535
> }}}
>
> but then your descriptor will still say :94.
>
> This is happening right now to relay "Testbit": they have set :auto for
> their ipv6 address in their ORPort, they get the above line about how
> it's opened on port 41535, and yet their descriptor says it's on port 94.

New description:

 Start your Tor with
 {{{
 ORPort 9001
 ORPort [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:auto nolisten
 DirPort 9030
 }}}
 and let it start up. Then go to http://127.0.0.1:9030/tor/server/authority
 and check out how it has the line
 {{{
 or-address [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:94
 }}}

 First: How did it pick that number? It's a weird choice for a port.

 Second: If this is actually your ipv6 address, you can leave out the
 nolisten, and that's where things get interesting. Your logs will say
 something like
 {{{
 Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.001 [notice] Opening OR
 listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:0
 Nov 24 01:53:42 v4 tor[10988]: Nov 24 01:53:42.002 [notice] Opened OR
 listener on [2a01:238:43e4:2b00:ae5a:a980:1f63:cc5e]:41535
 }}}

 but then your descriptor will still say :94.

 This is happening right now to relay "Testbit": they have set :auto for
 their ipv6 address in their ORPort, they get the above line about how it's
 opened on port 41535, and yet their descriptor says it's on port 94.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Made the change. Setting as needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web Notification API icons get no first party

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15569: Web Notification API icons get no first party
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > I can't reproduce the bug anymore on a Linux box with 9.5a3.
 Because comment:9, heh.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32549 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript makes requests to sync-messages.invalid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32549: NoScript makes requests to sync-messages.invalid
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > I think those messages are gone since 11.0.9
 Of course, they are. And that's why it's fixed. Hilarious!

 > the requests to 255.255.255.255 are not reaching tor
 Sure? (See #32536)

 > Thus, that's another case where the Torbutton log output might mislead
 if not treated with care.
 Torbutton log on Tor gateway machine? Even more hilarious!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Web Notification API icons get no first party

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15569: Web Notification API icons get no first party
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:11 cypherpunks]:
 > Nah.
 > {{{
 > granted web-notification-demo.html:12:15
 > [12-15 02:56:28] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.torproject.org/images/onion.jpg via
 >--unknown--:b6591b4fbd21f7e18e54eaca004ba721
 > [12-15 02:56:28] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3908 NEW 0
 www.torproject.org:443 SOURCE_ADDR=127.0.0.1:58745 PURPOSE=USER
 > [12-15 02:56:28] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3908
 SENTCONNECT 535 www.torproject.org:443
 > [12-15 02:56:28] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3908 REMAP
 535 116.202.120.165:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 > [12-15 02:56:28] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3908
 SUCCEEDED 535 116.202.120.165:443
 > TypeError: this.service is undefined
 > PushComponents.jsm:236:5
 > [12-15 02:56:34] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3908 CLOSED
 535 116.202.120.165:443 REASON=END REMOTE_REASON=DONE
 > TypeError: this.service is undefined
 > PushComponents.jsm:240:5
 > [12-15 02:58:39] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 3900 CLOSED
 536 185.199.110.153:443 REASON=DONE
 > }}}

 Could you please add steps to reproduce your findings? Which operating
 system are you using? Which Tor Browser version?

 I can't reproduce the bug anymore on a Linux box with 9.5a3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32614 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails multiple times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32614: hs-v3: Consider flagging an intro point as bad if rendezvous fails 
multiple
times
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-circuit, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor27-can
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The changes file for #32020 does not mention failing rendezvous points, so
 we need another changelog entry for this ticket:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/changes/ticket32020

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31011 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31011: Make the bridge authority reject private PT addresses when
DirAllowPrivateAddresses is 0
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-september  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31009 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
   |  Sponsor28-can
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: phw (added)


Comment:

 I think we need to know how many bridges are affected by this issue,
 before we can make this decision.

 Replying to [comment:7 cjb]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > > Another option here is to leave the bridge authority alone, and teach
 bridgedb that if there's an internal address in the extrainfo descriptor,
 it should swap it out in favor of the public address in the descriptor.
 > >
 > > Then once the #31009 fix is sufficiently deployed, it shouldn't matter
 anymore.
 > >
 > > (That way we could make use of the current obfs4 bridges even if they
 haven't upgraded yet.)
 >
 > I think I could volunteer to work on this ticket, but it looks like we
 still need to decide what to do.  Options:

 There's a tradeoff here, so maybe we should ask the anti-censorship team
 what they'd like.

 > 1) as in the summary, bridgeauth just refuses descriptors with internal
 addresses

 Rejecting descriptors means we have fewer bridges, until those bridges
 upgrade tor versions.
 But those bridges are more likely to have correct addresses.
 (Changing to an address the operator didn't provide means that port
 forwarding might not be set up.)

 > 2) arma's suggestion, bridgedb transforms internal addresses to external

 This option has the opposite tradeoff: more bridges, fast to deploy,
 potentially wrong data.

 > 3) Could we also consider having bridgeauth itself, rather than bridgedb
 downstream, perform that transformation?  Or perhaps there's a reason why
 that's not a good idea?

 I'm not sure if we can do this, because extra-info descriptors are signed
 by the bridge.

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