Re: [tor-bugs] #30832 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix tor-browser tbb-tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30832: Fix tor-browser tbb-tests
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 Replying to [comment:7 acat]:

 > using a div to measure, instead of a span

 Yeah. ... dcf's unicode glyphs test (which is also used as a base on TZP)
 - https://www.bamsoftware.com/talks/fc15-fontfp/fontfp.html#demo

 From my notes
 // Read the span width, but the div height. Firefox always reports the
 same value for the span's offsetHeight, even if the div around it is
 changing size


 ---

 I don't see a problem with "leaking" the major OS (Win, Mac, Android,
 Linux: we'll never stop that), its the entropy across Linux (and Android
 for now, see below) that worries me. And we should always make it as hard
 as possible for the bastards. The patch is still protecting most/all users
 from alternative measuring - e.g. domrect.

 FWIW: I also see occasional weird measurements, e.g. with textMetrics,
 with various codepoints and/or fonts: still trying to pinpoint exactly
 what it is: but I think it might mainly be to do with right-to-left.

 I'm not sure I see the issue with `Noto Naskh Arabic`: if all users are
 the same, then it's OK. Sure, it's not `19.2`, but it might just be an odd
 outlier (**for everyone**?). If someone is spoofing as English - their
 default font is Times New Roman. And if they're not, then they are already
 different: navigator languages etc - e.g. `TB-fa`. The question is, **is
 everyone the same**?

 #23104 also lacks ~~parity~~ effectiveness in Android (and least on my
 phone): it's doing **something** (toggle RFP) but it sure isn't 19.2
 either. I sent sysrqb an email about it months ago (last December) - it's
 something to with the 19.2 is only returned at certain zoom levels: and on
 my Android phone, the devicePixelRatio is 2.609... and it screws up - so
 it's really a case of this being a symptom of #29563

 ---

 At the end of the day, even once ESR78 is used (or you flip the pref
 early: there's nothing to say you can't do that now), I would still keep
 the patch: because domrect can still measure it

 Keep the test, close this, and re-purpose #29563 to deal with anomalies
 (getting it always 19.2 across the board would neutralize domrect in
 lineheight)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24542 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Improve logging for Exonerator

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24542: Improve logging for Exonerator
+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Yes, these log messages look helpful. I don't know what the coverage would
 be now for helpful log messages (maybe it's complete) now but this is
 certainly a step in the correct direction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32683 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search should be able to handle non-numbers in "as:" parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32683: Relay Search should be able to handle non-numbers in "as:" parameter
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 #8667 is related.

 Relay Search indeed doesn't do any validation of the query before sending
 it. We could return a JSON document along with 400 error codes, to allow
 Onionoo to provide a more detailed message back to the user, but better
 error messages help too.

 It's a bit upsetting that the same error message is in multiple files, I
 should learn more about the template language and see if we can use
 includes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18203 [Metrics/Statistics]: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather than responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18203: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather 
than
responses
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looking at your tasks-18167-and-18203 branch. LGTM.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18167 [Metrics/Statistics]: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18167: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Change seems sensible, no obvious code issues, descriptions also seem to
 match up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Correct 'was not internal' to 'was internal' in test_external_ip()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33839: Correct 'was not internal' to 'was internal' in test_external_ip()
--+
 Reporter:  kimimaro  |  Owner:  kimimaro
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => 043-backport
 * reviewer:   => teor
 * status:  assigned => merge_ready
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.3.x-final


Comment:

 Let's cherry-pick this change to 0.4.3, and merge forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30832 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix tor-browser tbb-tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30832: Fix tor-browser tbb-tests
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by acat):

 * actualpoints:  2 => 3


Comment:

 Thanks for the suggestion. I spent some time playing with
 `getBoundingClientRect()` to find out the `line-height`, but I saw some
 inconsistent behaviour. One of the testscases in `test_tor_bug23104.html`
 has arabic characters, which sets its font to `Noto Naskh Arabic`. That
 one, despite reporting a `line-height` of 19px, when measured via
 `getBoundingClientRect()` it turns out to be 29px (using a div to measure,
 instead of a span, the height of which is not affected by `line-height`).
 I assume that there must be some metric of the arabic font which is
 affecting the actual height of the element, which is different than the
 reported in line-height.

 I'm not sure if the issue that #23104 tried to fix is still there, and can
 be measured via `getBoundingClientRect` or similar. In any case, the fact
 that the actual height does not match the line-height with some fonts
 (e.g. `Noto Naskh Arabic`) seems to be a different issue. So perhaps we
 can just leave the test as it is for now (using `layout.css.line-height
 .normal-as-resolved-value.enabled = false`) and investigate it later.

 Still, I was thinking that the issues in #23104 and #29563 only allow
 distinguishing platform, but not subplatform, right? If that's the case,
 perhaps we could consider just dropping the patch for #23104, as leaking
 the os (via fonts?) is not something that we can really avoid.

 Replying to [comment:6 Thorin]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 acat]:
 > > * c73bfe7f3b21421c7349267f2abac9f90f503b73: we need `layout.css.line-
 height.normal-as-resolved-value.enabled = false`, otherwise `line-height`
 property is read as `normal` and we cannot get the number in pixels
 >
 > You should update that to fall back to clientRect (which I do on TZP):
 you'll need to anyway once you are based on ESR78 (or rapid release)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33824 [Core Tor/sbws]: relay measures low / high on same network and same server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33824: relay measures low / high on same network and same server
---+
 Reporter:  niftybunny |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33775 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > > | 2020-03-26 14:00:00 |186 | 185.220.101.242 |
 niftyguard33| abuse-cont...@to-surf-and-protect.net  | 0 |
 0 |   16 |
 >
 > Spot-checking this one, it looks promising too.

 For a historical snapshot, here are the current weights at this moment:

 [torflow]
 moria1: 2760
 gabelmoo: 4490
 Faravahar: 1680
 bastet: 2440

 [sbws]
 maatuska: 16
 longclaw: 13

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33824 [Core Tor/sbws]: relay measures low / high on same network and same server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33824: relay measures low / high on same network and same server
---+
 Reporter:  niftybunny |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33775 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [ticket:33824 niftybunny]:
 >  185.220.101.245 | niftyguard36  | abuse-contact@to-surf-and-
 protect.net  | 0 |0 |   27 |

 Ok, with the new torflow instances running, it looks like this relay is
 recovering:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/niftyguard36

 > | 2020-03-26 14:00:00 |186 | 185.220.101.242 | niftyguard33
 | abuse-cont...@to-surf-and-protect.net  | 0 |0 |   16
 |

 Spot-checking this one, it looks promising too.

 My current intuition is that sbws is somehow not giving relays higher
 weights than they currently have in the consensus -- that is, if a relay
 has a tiny number in the consensus, then with sbws it is doomed to stay
 tiny, whereas with torflow it will get a much bigger number if it performs
 well compared to its other tiny peers. This intuition is not based on
 investigating the code or the design though. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33624 [Core Tor/Tor]: Static building tor with openssl does not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33624: Static building tor with openssl does not work
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  build static openssl network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  build static openssl => build static openssl network-team-
 roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33291 [Core Tor/Tor]: Making the tor library size smaller

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33291: Making the tor library size smaller
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-size network-team-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  2020Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-size network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => tor-size network-team-
 roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33712 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a PoW/credential scheme for HS DoS defence

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33712: Design a PoW/credential scheme for HS DoS defence
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2, network-health, research   |
Parent ID:  #31223   | Points:  96
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 96


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33712 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design a PoW/credential scheme for HS DoS defence

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33712: Design a PoW/credential scheme for HS DoS defence
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-   |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2, network-health, research   |
Parent ID:  #31223   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1, network-health,
 research => tor-hs, tor-dos, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2, network-
 health, research


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improving HS availability under DoS (master ticket)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33703: Improving HS availability under DoS (master ticket)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos tor-hs network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-dos tor-hs network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => tor-dos tor-hs
 network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30477: Tor should self-test reachability of TCP listeners exposed by PT's
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:  #31280   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => tor-pt,
 s30-o23a3, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-pt, proposal-|  Actual Points:
  needed, censorship, 040-roadmap-proposed,  |
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q2|
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:
 tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt, proposal-needed, censorship, 040
 -roadmap-proposed,
 =>
 tor-bridge, tor-pt, proposal-needed, censorship, 040-roadmap-proposed,
 network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #30885 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add pluggable transports to Tor's chutney CI job

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30885: Add pluggable transports to Tor's chutney CI job
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-ci,  |  Actual Points:
  042-deferred-20190918, network-team-roadmap-   |
  2020Q2 |
Parent ID:  #29267   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor28-can
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, tor-ci, 042-deferred-20190918, network-team-roadmap-
 2020Q1 => tor-pt, tor-ci, 042-deferred-20190918, network-team-roadmap-
 2020Q2


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #5304, #29111, #29128, #29245, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #5304, #29111, #29128, #29245, #31103 by gaba:


Comment:
move tickets into the 2020 Q2 roadmap for the network team

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33527 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write walking onions specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33527: Write walking onions specification
-+-
 Reporter:  gaba |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  walking-onions network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  16
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor69
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  walking-onions network-team-roadmap-2020Q1 => walking-onions
 network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #33233, #33236, #33238

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #33233, #33236, #33238 by gaba:


Comment:
Add more s55 tickets to 2020 Q2 roadmap for the network team.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33229 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Prop 311: 6.1. Test IPv6 ORPort Reachability on the Tor Network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33229: Prop 311: 6.1. Test IPv6 ORPort Reachability on the Tor Network
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:  #33048   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  ipv6, prop311 => ipv6, prop311, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor55-must


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #33220, #33221, #33226, #33230

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #33220, #33221, #33226, #33230 by gaba:


Comment:
Add s55 tickets to the 2020 Q2 roadmap for the network team.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33220 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop 311: 3. Allow Relay IPv6 Extends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33220: Prop 311: 3. Allow Relay IPv6 Extends
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2020Q2 |
Parent ID:  #33048   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by gaba):

 * keywords:  ipv6, prop311 => ipv6, prop311, network-team-roadmap-2020Q2


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[tor-bugs] #33839 [Core Tor/Tor]: Correct 'was not internal' to 'was internal' in test_external_ip()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33839: Correct 'was not internal' to 'was internal' in test_external_ip()
--+--
 Reporter:  kimimaro  |  Owner:  kimimaro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 source: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1856

 Fixing a typo in a string that is printed on event of a test failing, in
 `src/test/test_addr.c`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33815 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards with meek - do or don't?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33815: vanguards with meek - do or don't?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  vanguards |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Q4) Btw, here's my best guess of the kind of defense that *would* work in
 the general case. At a minimum, services will need to have a traffic re-
 shaper that makes their traffic patterns look like the reverse of what
 they are - HTTP is an aymmetric protocol in that requests are typically
 much smaller than responses. So some kind of traffic shaping to reverse
 this asymmetry is necessary (see ALPaCA for an example:
 https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/applicationlayer-pets2017.pdf).
 Then some amount of cover traffic would need to be carefully added onto
 this shaped application layer traffic, too. And even then, high volume
 onion services will at best look like high volume web
 crawlers/scrapers/bots, not real users.

 I don't think that this is within reach of service operators. It is still
 an open research problem. See also
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/doc/HACKING/CircuitPaddingDevelopment.md#14
 -other-deployment-constraints and the rest of that doc (which is the place
 for such info, rather than the vanguards doc).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor.framework Unknown type name 'dispatch_queue_t'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33837: Tor.framework Unknown type name 'dispatch_queue_t'
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  042-backport, 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Can somebody paste or link to the complete error here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor.framework Unknown type name 'dispatch_queue_t'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33837: Tor.framework Unknown type name 'dispatch_queue_t'
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, 043-backport,|  Actual Points:
  042-backport, 041-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: tla (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32200: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, Android,|  Actual Points:
  openssl, cipher, TorBrowserTeam202006  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * parent:  #28704 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32993 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Package Tor With Tor Android Service Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32993: Package Tor With Tor Android Service Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * reviewer:  boklm => sysrqb


Comment:

 I wonder why I did that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: LibEvent Build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28765: LibEvent Build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  0.25
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004R => tbb-
 mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, TorBrowserTeam202004


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33702 [Core Tor/Tor]: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33702: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  ner0  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "tor.exe.Manifest" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33702 [Core Tor/Tor]: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33702: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  ner0  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "openssl.dll.Manifest" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33702 [Core Tor/Tor]: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33702: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  ner0  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "EnableExternalManifest.reg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #31499 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31499: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28765 | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  boklm, gk  |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * parent:   => #28765


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28763 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create Tor-Android Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28763: Create Tor-Android Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * parent:   => #28704


Comment:

 Wrong ticket. But as eighthave said, we don't need this piece, so closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32200: only include required bits of OpenSSL in Android builds
-+-
 Reporter:  eighthave|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, Android,|  Actual Points:
  openssl, cipher, TorBrowserTeam202006  |
Parent ID:  #28704   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is not a blocker of #28704

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28763 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create Tor-Android Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28763: Create Tor-Android Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  sisbell
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-rbm, tbb-parity, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * parent:  #28704 =>


Comment:

 This is not a blocker of #28704

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33776 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please change email forwarding for jon@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33776: Please change email forwarding for jon@
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 completed the changes in all the aliases, as per email discussion, in
 9ea4dbb8.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33679: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, prop312, ipv6, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  outreachy-ipv6, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33049   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Awesome, once CI passes, I'll merge. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33679: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, prop312, ipv6, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  outreachy-ipv6, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33049   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by MrSquanchee):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Hii David,

 I made changes requested.
 You can view my Pull request here at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1831

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Re: [tor-bugs] #30941 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30941: Need better instructions for requesting bridges via email
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team, s30-o22a2, anti-|  Actual Points:  1
  censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |
Parent ID:  #31279   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor30
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Roger suggested to abandon the concept of transport `TYPE`s for now
 because we only offer obfs4 anyway. I addressed his suggestion in commit
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/commit/?h=develop=208b49cd91ec64aaff623dfeef08d352beab6785
 208b49c] and deployed the fix. BridgeDB's email response now looks as
 follows:

 {{{
 [This is an automated email.]

 Here are your bridges:

   obfs4 ...
   obfs4 ...

 Add these bridges to your Tor Browser by opening your browser
 preferences, clicking on "Tor", and then adding them to the "Provide a
 bridge" field.

 If these bridges are not what you need, reply to this email with one of
 the following commands in the message body:

   get bridges(Request unobfuscated Tor bridges.)
   get ipv6   (Request IPv6 bridges.)
   get transport obfs4(Request obfs4 obfuscated bridges.)
   get key(Get a copy of BridgeDB's public GnuPG key.)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33779 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix incorrect PublishHidServDescriptors value in logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33779: Fix incorrect PublishHidServDescriptors value in logs
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  044-should, tor-hs easy  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * cc: dgoulet, asn (removed)
 * reviewer:   => asn
 * keywords:  044-should, tor-hs => 044-should, tor-hs easy
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket33779_044_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1855

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33679: Make sure every address function that takes for_listening supports IPv6
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  MrSquanchee
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  extra-review, prop312, ipv6, |  Actual Points:  0.3
  outreachy-ipv6, network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #33049   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Code looks good. The only problem I have is with the git history.

 For instance, I do not know what the fixup commits are against which
 commits? :S

 May I suggest here to just rebase the branch against master, squash most
 of the commits into 2 commits basically, one for the IPv6 functionality
 and second one for the added tests?

 If you need help with this, let me know, I can propose a branch and you
 can tell me if it works for you.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33838: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by acat):

 Here is a patch for that: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-browser-
 spec/commit/21952.

 It's basically
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torspec/blob/21952+1/proposals/ideas/onion-
 location.txt adapted to the tor-browser-spec format.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33838: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec
--+--
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004 => TorBrowserTeam202004R
 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #33838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33838: Update Onion-Location in tor-browser-spec
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam202004
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #21952 I updated the onion-location spec
 (https://github.com/acatarineu/torspec/blob/21952+1/proposals/ideas/onion-
 location.txt) based on
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/asn/torspec.git/commit/?h=onion-
 location=14fc750e3afcd759f4235ab955535a07eed24286. I did not realize
 that this was already in the `tor-browser-spec` repo:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser-spec.git/tree/proposals/100
 -onion-location-header.txt.

 In any case, I think we should update that spec in the upstream tor-
 browser-spec repo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33666 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33666: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 >A weird thing I noticed: the offer SDP has two copies of each candidate
 >line, and two a=end-of-candidates?

 I tracked this down and it turns out it was
 [https://github.com/pion/webrtc/commit/b1bb363bc020f11459685c0b48946e3406b399b8
 fixed recently]. There hasn't been a new version tagged with this fix but
 we should update once there is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33533 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33533: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:  14
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, pospeselr |Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "4234-fixes.txt" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33533 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33533: Rebase Tor Browser esr68 patches on top of mozilla-central
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:  14
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, pospeselr |Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I reviewed the rebased updater patches and some other patches
 that we worked on in the past. Nice work!  Two comments so far:
 1. It looks like the rebased #4234 patch is missing a couple of parts. I
 will attach a fix to this ticket.
 2. We do not need the patch for #31955. Mozilla fixed that issue in a
 slightly different way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33298 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP onion sites do not give a popup warning when submiting form data to non-onion HTTP sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33298: HTTP onion sites do not give a popup warning when submiting form data to
non-onion HTTP sites
---+---
 Reporter:  pospeselr  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam202007  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33827 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor27
---+---
Changes (by pili):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor27-must => Sponsor27
 * parent:  #30025 => #33827


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33342 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disconnect search addon causes error at startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33342: Disconnect search addon causes error at startup
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5a9, TorBrowserTeam202004R  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  brade,mcs |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:11 pili]:
 > I'm a bit confused whether this is reviewed or it needs revisions or can
 be closed (I see a patch was merged already.)
 >
 > Can someone who knows better please update :) Thanks!

 In comment:9, Alex provided a good answer to my question. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defer "PreferIPv6 by default" to 0.4.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33804: Defer "PreferIPv6 by default" to 0.4.4
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dns torsocks ipv6 043-must  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #33796  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Looks good! Thanks.

 Let's merge to **0.4.3 only**, after CI passes.

 We could make a minor tweak to the man page, to say "PreferIPv6" (rather
 than "NoPreferIPv6"). But I don't think it matters that much.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33675 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33675: Search microdescriptor files for relay ed25519 keys
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  anuradha1904
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, prop311, outreachy-ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #33428 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  Sponsor55-can
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Here are the things I need to do when I merge:
 * squash the commits
 * document what "None" means in getNodeDirInfoStatusPattern()

 Here are some things that either of us can do:
 * check TorNet.py for any other comments about microdescs not being
 implemented
 * if md is True, print the values of nickname and ed25519_key in
 getNodeDirInfoStatusPattern()
 * if we are not getting the right value for ed25519_id, move
 _setEd25519Id() into LocalNodeController, so we can use it during
 wait_for_bootstrap()

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33804 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defer "PreferIPv6 by default" to 0.4.4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33804: Defer "PreferIPv6 by default" to 0.4.4
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dns torsocks ipv6 043-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33796  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket33804_043_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1854

 **To be clear, this should be merged in 043 __ONLY__**

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32088: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop310  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 Jaym]:
 > The pull request has been updated.
 >
 > On loading, Tor sets the sampled_idx to the confirmed_idx. That should
 keep older clients to behave the same (and not reordering primary guards).
 On the next state save, the sampled_idx should be made dense.
 >
 > Also, the patch applies now ordering when it seems necessary (a couple
 of redundant orderings have been removed).

 Thanks!

 > Also, I was concerned by the fact that Tor assumes integrity of the
 state when loading it. If some application has write access to this file,
 making the client rotate guards until a chosen one is found shouldn't be
 too much of a hard task. Is that kind of threat relevant?

 An attacker who can modify files on the local system could do many worse
 things. So those attacks are not really part of tor's threat model. To
 defend against those kinds of attacks, people should use an amnesiac
 system like TAILS.

 File corruption is a risk, though. And tor could detect file corruption
 earlier with checksums. But that's a different ticket :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32088: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop310  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop308 => tor-spec prop271 prop310


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32088 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order (was: Proposal 308 - choose guards in sampled order)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32088: Proposal 310 - choose guards in sampled order
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop271 prop308  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18167 [Metrics/Statistics]: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18167: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for the review, dcf!

 I added another graph that contains all reprocessed numbers:

 [[Image(bridge-users-2020-04-07.png, 700px)]]

 Again, the numbers for China and Turkey changed most, but I believe that
 the new numbers are more correct than the old ones.

 I'll leave this ticket in needs_review for a week to see if there are any
 objections and then make the switch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18167 [Metrics/Statistics]: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18167: Don't trust "bridge-ips" blindly for user number estimates
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, metrics-2018  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "bridge-users-2020-04-07.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18203 [Metrics/Statistics]: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather than responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18203: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather 
than
responses
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Thanks for the review, dcf! I added
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 
web.git/commit/?h=tasks-18167-and-18203=7d054ca10665689bd3b3bf796ae3e510ba0d076b
 another commit] to make it clearer where request numbers come from.

 I also added another graph that contains all reprocessed numbers:

 [[Image(relay-users-2020-04-07.png, 700px)]]

 Again, there's no visible change between deployed and patched numbers, but
 we should switch anyway for the reasons stated above.

 I'll leave this ticket in needs_review for a week to see if there are any
 objections and then make the switch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18203 [Metrics/Statistics]: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather than responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18203: Base direct user estimates on responses to directory requests, rather 
than
responses
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "relay-users-2020-04-07.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #32864 [Community/Relays]: Reproduce Arthur's exit failures and then contact or badexit the relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32864: Reproduce Arthur's exit failures and then contact or badexit the relays
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  network-health, network-health-  |  Actual Points:  3.5
  roadmap-2020Q1, GeorgKoppen202003  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 dgoulet]:
 > Good to go.

 Thanks. Merged to `master` (commit
 b40a0e100e8d3e6d1503076ddb6ddfbf05346a59). There are follow-up tickets we
 can work on and then think about setting some infrastructure up to allow
 us doing the badexiting easier. We are good for this ticket, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33702 [Core Tor/Tor]: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33702: RSA_get0_d could not be located in the dynamic link library tor.exe
--+--
 Reporter:  ner0  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @ner0
 "an app folder" != "a current folder"

 and '''if''' "the app folder" == "the current folder" then windows_10
 exclude "an app folder" ("a current folder" is last one)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28158 [Core Tor/sbws]: Vote for relay bandwidths even if the min percentage has not been reached

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28158: Vote for relay bandwidths even if the min percentage has not been 
reached
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128, sbws-  |  Actual Points:
  11x-final-removed-20190312,|
  sbws-110-proposed, changes-version-minor,  |
  sbws-110-removed-20190312  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think this ticket is obsoleted by #28563.

 If there are already 3 stable bwauths, it's safe to vote on a small number
 of relays.

 But if we are starting up a bwauth, and there aren't 3 stable bwauths,
 then this change would be unsafe. Because a small number of relays can
 become Measured, and then all of Tor's traffic would go to them.

 So I'm going to close this ticket as "wontfix".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31634 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check .may_include order and tor subsystem init order are compatible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31634: Check .may_include order and tor subsystem init order are compatible
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  diagnostics, practracker  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Squashed and merged to master.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare, TorBrowserTeamTriaged  |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:168 cypherpunks]:
 > Last known good state:
 > https://codeberg.org/crimeflare/cloudflare-
 tor/src/commit/7c68c0ac0daca778cc2c7aa6a77dd4c1dc43e68f
 >
 > Why the git owners removed all files? It make no sense.


 Do you have partnership ID? Login to fan-club (you know what I'm talking
 about if you have it), "Forum", "New git".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare, TorBrowserTeamTriaged  |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Someone uploaded it again on nix.

 {{{
 I am not the author of this documentation. This is just a reupload after
 it got taken down from Codeberg.
 }}}

 https://git.nixnet.xyz/you/stop_cloudflare

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