Re: [tor-bugs] #33969 [Archived/Nyx]: NYX Unused configuration entry: password

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33969: NYX Unused configuration entry: password
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 nyx --version
 nyx version 2.0.4 (released November 5, 2017)
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #33969 [Archived/Nyx]: NYX Unused configuration entry: password

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33969: NYX Unused configuration entry: password
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Archived/Nyx
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 if i run nxy as root(sudo) i do not need to give it a password it is not
 asking for password interactively for local tor node.
 but it does warn, it is no good practice.
 {{{
 [NYX_NOTICE] Nyx is currently running with root permissions. This isn't a
 good
idea, nor should it be necessary.
 }}}
 if i follow this advise and run it as usr. i need provide controller
 password.
 according to
 [documentation(https://nyx.torproject.org/index.html#configuration)]

 i added appended line to
 {{{
 ~/.nyx/config
 }}}


 {{{
 password Torcontrollerpassword
 }}}

 When running nxy without root it still prompt me again for password:


 {{{
 nyx --interface 127.0.0.1:9901 --config ~/.nyx/config
 Tor controller password:
 }}}
 if i provide it the nyx log welcomes me with telling me password config
 unused :(


 {{{
 [NYX_NOTICE] Unused configuration entry: password
 }}}

 excuse me if im missing something, but i cant see why the config does not
 apply.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33968 [Core Tor/Tor]: An option to block Tor2Web traffic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33968: An option to block Tor2Web traffic
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 a singlehop onion client shouldnt announce itself as such. so you cant
 difference between them.
 Tor2Web support was completely deprecated earlier. so you cant at all know
 if it comes from Tor2Web gateways or regular client.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33626 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add TBB project for GeckoView

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33626: Add TBB project for GeckoView
--+---
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I expect we can simply re-use the `firefox` project, but I'll leave this
 open until we get that working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase and squash mobile and desktop patches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31918: Rebase and squash mobile and desktop patches
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-9.5, ReleaseTrainMigration,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #33656   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  sysrqb, gk   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * reviewer:  sysrqb => sysrqb, gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33944 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: unhandled bug in OkHttp

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33944: tba: unhandled bug in OkHttp
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile okhttp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment
 "org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha.04-23.00:37:46.433.27675.issue33944.log.xz"
 added.

 gecko log

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33944 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: unhandled bug in OkHttp

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33944: tba: unhandled bug in OkHttp
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile okhttp |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile okhttp


Comment:

 My assumption was wrong. Just happened out of the blue without recent
 configuration changes. If it's not possibly to catch maybe
 [https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks-android/issues/2297 few can be
 done], report [https://github.com/square/okhttp upstream]?

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[tor-bugs] #33968 [Core Tor/Tor]: An option to block Tor2Web traffic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33968: An option to block Tor2Web traffic
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Major
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 https://github.com/globaleaks/Tor2web/wiki
 http://6zdgh5a5e6zpchdz.onion/blog/security/346-don-t-use-web2tor

 How can I reject Tor2Web traffic to my site?
 A torrc option such as 'HiddenServiceDenyOnehopRequest 1' will be useful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33184: Support for Fenix
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > Here come some release cycle notes I collected
 Thanks for analyzing this.

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > So, based on comment:8 I think what we do is base our fenix nightly
 build on a fixed fenix commit from the master branch and build
 `geckoBetaFenixNightly`. We update the commit a couple of times during a
 release cycle which needs in turn an update for the android-components
 nightly commit we build from (that is is needs to match match the
 respective fenix nightly is currently using). That is turns needs rebased
 patches to the geckoview beta we use.

 Let's see. Let's assume we only maintain Tor Browser "Nightly" and
 "Release" channels in the future. I agree that our nightly builds should
 be based on a "recent" version of `fenixNightly` (and this will probably
 become `fennecNightly`, in the future). I'm fine with beginning with using
 `geckoBeta` for the nightly builds, at least initially. Skipping ahead a
 few weeks, at the end of the current month, our Nightly branch becomes the
 new Beta. We aren't planning on publishing the beta channel at this point,
 but we should continue updating the Fenix commit (from the correct branch,
 along with the new required AC/GV dependencies) as bugs are fixed during
 the beta cycle. We should continue running the tests on this branch
 (`geckoBetaFenixBeta`), despite not releasing it. At the end of the
 following month, the beta branch becomes the new Release. I assume Fenix
 will add a `geckoRelease` in the future. That will lead to building
 `geckoReleaseFenixRelease` on release days.

 For our nightly builds, we can think about moving onto geckoNightly later
 this year. Using geckoBeta as a more stable base seems like a safe
 foundation for us, because we'll be dealing with many other moving parts
 and components.

 This means we'll take "snapshots" periodically of the many repositories we
 need (mozilla-beta, android-components, fenix, etc.) and we'll rebase our
 patches on top of the tip/head commit at that point in time (or an older
 commit, if that makes more sense). As we are following all three Fenix
 release trains, we'll need to follow this process for (up to) 9 branches
 (possibly 2 mozilla-beta branches , a mozilla-release branch, possibly 3
 android-components branches, and 3 fenix branches). We may be able to
 simplify this into 1 mozilla-beta branch such that `fenixNightly` and
 `fenixBeta` use the same version of GV for `geckoBeta`. We probably can't
 escape maintaining three patchsets for android-components. However, with
 all of this said, the "release" patchsets should only be rebased and used
 a few times during the month, if there are any point releases - and only
 once in general. So, "9 branches" is really "only" rebasing 5-6 branches
 periodically.

 This process sounds exhausting. We should think about how we can automate
 some of these. We can automate the "snapshot-and-rebase" piece of it (and
 this fits into the auto-rebasing plan we already have), and then we only
 deal with the merge conflicts, as needed. The test suites can be triggered
 when the rebasing is completed, as well.

 > A challenge will be all the Gradle dep updates every time and the
 different set of Gradle deps we now have to maintain for the nightly and
 the stable series.

 It would be nice if we can automate this process, too. And, I suppose,
 this is a prerequisite for automatically running the test suites after
 each rebase, as well.

 Replying to [comment: gk]:
 > We *could* think about building `geckoBetaDebug`

 What does this build? That isn't a valid target, from what I see. Do you
 mean simply `debug` or something like that? I think we shouldn't use non-
 debuggable builds for nightly, at least at the beginning. I prefer
 following Mozilla's lead on this until we're comfortable with our
 configuration and we know what we're doing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:20 cohosh]:
 > I also noticed our documentation is outdated now:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake#HowtorunaSnowflakeproxy
 >
 > We can use this ticket to track those changes after the merge.

 Okay there weren't many edits necessary:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake?action=diff=56

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Merged! We now have two snowflake repos :D

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+-
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 > I'll just wait for an ok from someone before merging.

 lgtm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33594 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fenix Use of Glean

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33594: Fenix Use of Glean
--+
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33184| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58-must
--+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:5 sisbell]:
 > In fenix, app/build.gradle we have options for disabling crash reporting
 and telemetry. They are only disabled for debug builds but I can patch
 this.
 >
 >
 > {{{
 >
 > if (!isDebug) {
 > buildConfigField 'boolean', 'TELEMETRY', 'true'
 > } else {
 > buildConfigField 'boolean', 'TELEMETRY', 'false'
 > }
 > }}}

 I'm concerned about something being added in the future that initializes a
 MetricController (or another piece of Glean) and ignoring this build-time
 flag. In the future, I hope we can use something like the above but only
 after we audit the implementation and ensure it is proxy-safe. Telemetry
 pings over Tor aren't good, but they aren't as disastrous as bypassing the
 proxy.

 I have a patch that changes Glean to a compileOnly dependency. This means
 that it is used at build time, but the dependency is not included in the
 final package. I think this is a relatively clean solution.

 I opened a Github Issue requesting feedback:
 https://github.com/mozilla-mobile/fenix/issues/10125

 and the patch:
 https://github.com/sysrqb/fenix/commit/fd426371204f84298c89176f7a58bf6199d9aef0

 Note, with this patch, it still includes glean. We'll need a patch for
 `buildSrc/src/main/java/Config.kt` that flips `includeGlean` from `true`
 to `false`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33929: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times
--+--
 Reporter:  clement   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Ok. I'm going to close this ticket, since it's an ovh bug, or a
 configuration problem, or something else but in any case it is not a Tor
 bug. :) Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33929: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times
--+--
 Reporter:  clement   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by clement):

 Indeed, it seems this way. The issue appears to be on my side, but I don't
 know to fix this, as it is probably my ISP job to do so. I disabled IPv6
 and so far so good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33906 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Fix Tor-Launcher issues for Firefox 75

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33906: Fix Tor-Launcher issues for Firefox 75
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration,TorBrowserTeam202004R|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-can
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration,TorBrowserTeam202004 =>
 ReleaseTrainMigration,TorBrowserTeam202004R


Comment:

 Here is a patch: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug33906-01=df0350fcaedf1bf859872edfead31814ef23b507

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Re: [tor-bugs] #32912 [Applications/GetTor]: Clean up gettor scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32912: Clean up gettor scripts
+
 Reporter:  hiro|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap-2020Q1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  phw |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33967 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33967: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 all done!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33967 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33967: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * owner:  tpa => anarcat
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33475 [Metrics/Cloud]: Remove excessive logging from exitscan py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33475: Remove excessive logging from exitscan py
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 |  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Cloud|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-team-roadmap-2020April,  |  Actual Points:
  irl-roadmap-2020April  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Removed the extra logging line while going through this with irl in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 cloud.git/commit/?id=490a1375cdd68ffc3e61f0cd5a3a4a18dd80d9fa commit
 490a137]. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33666 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33666: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33666 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33666: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cohosh):

 Alright here's a new PR that uses an additive adjustment to the poll
 interval: https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/pull/27

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33698 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update "About Tor Browser" links in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33698: Update "About Tor Browser" links in Tor Browser
--+-
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  task  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202004R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  acat  |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33666 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33666: Investigate Snowflake proxy failures
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:18 dcf]:
 > To me, the 1.B you suggested doesn't match the patch at
 https://github.com/cohosh/snowflake/pull/25. comment:16 makes it sound
 like 1.B is about clients reporting on proxies to the broker, and the
 broker enforcing the limit on proxies; but the pull request looks like the
 proxies noting their own failures and throttling themselves privately, not
 reporting the failure to anyone.
 >
 Whoops. You're right. I meant 1.A in both this comment and the one before
 it >.<

 >  Something to consider instead of discrete thresholds is a more analog
 polling frequency. Something like the additive increase/multiplicative
 decrease of TCP congestion avoidance, say. If a proxy has a failure, it
 multiplies its polling interval by a fixed percentage; if it has a
 success, it subtracts from its polling interval a fixed constant (down to
 some minimum).

 Ah. I like this better actually. The problem with thresholds is that if a
 proxy has a restrictive NAT, then once it succeeds it will start polling
 frequently again right away. With additive or multiplicative increases, we
 also don't need to worry about disabling proxies alltogether just yet.

 I'll work on this and also rip out the disable code for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33953 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33953: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 cohosh]:
 > > 1) Use go mod vendor to vendor in the dependencies and then build with
 -mod=vendor to use the vendor folder with the dependencies.
 >
 > How would this work? Would we have to pull from a separate snowflake
 branch that has this vendor folder checked in? If we're going to pull all
 the dependencies at once, I'd rather do something like option (3), since
 it sounds like there's already a workflow present for something similar.
 Maintaining the vendor directory sounds tricky.

 I think this can be done by adding a `go_mod_vendor` step, which will use
 a container with network enabled and a snowflake source tarball (from the
 same git clone) to run `go mod vendor` and generate a tarball which will
 be used as `input_files` for the snowflake build.

 I have not tested it, and it probably does not work yet, but I think this
 could look like this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 
build.git/commit/?h=bug_33953_go_mod_vendor=5e7c5b88bc22548262744f7ec435210ebfaed221

 With this we will be running "go mod vendor" and creating a `snowflake-go-
 mod-tarball-$git_hash.tar.xz` tarball each time the snowflake commit
 changes. However the tarball will probably not change for each commit, so
 as an alternative we could name it `snowflake-go-mod-
 tarball-$expected_sha256sum.tar.xz` (where $expected_sha256sum is the
 expected checksum of the tarball, assuming building it is reproducible) to
 avoid regenerating it when it is not expected to change.

 >
 > > I think it's worth attempting to exclude go module dependencies that
 are not needed.
 >
 > My thought now is that if we go with options (1) or (3) this might not
 matter so much. Since the dependencies aren't used to build the binary,
 it's not like they are contributing to binary size. It was more a pain
 point from a maintenance and rbm project blowup perspective. It added to
 the size of the rbm repository and increased build time. But if we're
 doing (1) or (3) these aren't a concern anymore if I am understanding
 correctly.

 Yes, I think unneeded dependencies isn't a big concern if we're doing (1)
 or (3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33593 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33593: Create versions and changelogs for Snowflake pieces
-+--
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19409   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:14 arlolra]:
 > The pulls seem fine.  I left comments about some trivial things that
 were missed.

 Thanks! Made these changes. I'll just wait for an ok from someone before
 merging. And then we can move forward with the two separate repos.

 I also noticed our documentation is outdated now:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake#HowtorunaSnowflakeproxy

 We can use this ticket to track those changes after the merge.

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[tor-bugs] #33967 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33967: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please add phw to the tordnsel and check LDAP groups.

 For trac.torproject.org on 2020-04-22.


 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE/ps4MHN0fw3t6AudF4mIfdjVvF0FAl6gXrMACgkQF4mIfdjV
 vF1jzBAAudNFtzSTeNmhGX7CcJmoHensOaWbhf5MH4Ka2TT5vO7ANyAILv1JOAJE
 /MRez7l6T/QGU2HsI1TvTv3lHYTAIiSdNwW/NGsI8nFM6YXwxvRQF6AK5QziLONd
 XAVQWyeeTgsb/bYSD7n0b5018SY5VaqJ+Xf+JLYfI3nTmvyOxz3N2o3S8ccIEcJY
 /5SebNZ41Gxn2+V97Ql8ybbi7d4cXVyVoG2JZdDV5JAZ02IvKswytp5OYF2PNRuo
 Hfgp82CtPC8Gk+avSjTL5v22zVHFtTEnHuy5dzmxHyEJocz8A0ytmS47hwIB28tI
 8QCbUe5xSff702N4qTRZbvFV/eKyuK2KKawnYDmzQn38SwjZTS1RRGTw1fp5X3Qu
 dxA/6Xv4QjtfZgMNjsH6OGVKiW8YIqmtEBTVlzIcQ0njE6BEGAimA6MGR27fGYbP
 ynAU/7LVVfC61m/KB6bMWn9L6324KQUmMs4S7/Y7PQf+9inFP5sfImgpSEESGo/A
 m60oP5NQfuZlZcaPaVekKtYF5RmoVds7swt7wgFOYNMTVcE2HiCCvWEf6720NP+l
 SC1fbMHDj6ru75HWe7axxVXrptYEAq0aCFWz3ijW2nTCHlzRCryKdT/nnR4osZXs
 gAHdWughfn/tGXiC5ZTB+lQtISZOURVSR3PHAiFiYZgIU8Udgn0=
 =v0iy
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33967 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33967: Add phw to tordnsel and check groups
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: metrics-team, phw (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33966 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: Extension error: [Exception... "Component returned failure code: 0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE) [nsIDOMWindowUtils.removeSheetUsingURIString]"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33966: tba: Extension error: [Exception... "Component returned failure code:
0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)
[nsIDOMWindowUtils.removeSheetUsingURIString]"
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile oom anr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 #31572

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33958 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33958: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I have blacklisted openswitch in needrestart. Closing for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33809 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fast-Forward Tor Browser Versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33809: Fast-Forward Tor Browser Versions
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #33808| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 This scheme, with the change suggested by brade (using an additional
 version part for the ${TB_PATCH}) sounds good to me for the releases. For
 the nightly builds however, I think this will make things more complicate
 for the script signing updates (#25102) which currently assumes that
 version numbers are based on the date.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33953 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33953: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 > 1) Use go mod vendor to vendor in the dependencies and then build with
 -mod=vendor to use the vendor folder with the dependencies.

 How would this work? Would we have to pull from a separate snowflake
 branch that has this vendor folder checked in? If we're going to pull all
 the dependencies at once, I'd rather do something like option (3), since
 it sounds like there's already a workflow present for something similar.
 Maintaining the vendor directory sounds tricky.

 > I think it's worth attempting to exclude go module dependencies that are
 not needed.

 My thought now is that if we go with options (1) or (3) this might not
 matter so much. Since the dependencies aren't used to build the binary,
 it's not like they are contributing to binary size. It was more a pain
 point from a maintenance and rbm project blowup perspective. It added to
 the size of the rbm repository and increased build time. But if we're
 doing (1) or (3) these aren't a concern anymore if I am understanding
 correctly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33557 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33557: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 platform-tools (android.sdk.configure): no need to use anything different
 from the latest 29.0.6
 sdk-tools: "SDK Tools package is deprecated and no longer receiving
 updates. Instead, please use the new command-line tools package."
 > Another hard requirement is ndk r20
  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1266263#c6
 clang: 10+ anyways
 Everything will be enforced up to 29 by Google (August 1) ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33184: Support for Fenix
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 We *could* think about building `geckoBetaDebug` but maybe that's more for
 devs actually debugging Fenix code than our nightly audience

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33184: Support for Fenix
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 So, based on comment:8 I think what we do is base our fenix nightly build
 on a fixed fenix commit from the master branch and build
 `geckoBetaFenixNightly`. We update the commit a couple of times during a
 release cycle which needs in turn an update for the android-components
 nightly commit we build from (that is is needs to match match the
 respective fenix nightly is currently using). That is turns needs rebased
 patches to the geckoview beta we use.

 A challenge will be all the Gradle dep updates every time and the
 different set of Gradle deps we now have to maintain for the nightly and
 the stable series.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33953 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33953: Provide a way for easily updating Go dependencies of projects
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 One thing to keep in mind here is that the go module system pulls in a lot
 more dependencies than we actually need. This happens regardless of which
 of the 3 options above we go with, since they all use the go module logic
 to figure out what is needed.

 See #33761, where we recently removed a bunch of unnecessary dependencies
 from Snowflake. Upon a quick investigation, these extra dependencies come
 from at least the following places:
 - The dependencies are only needed for running tests
 - They are marked with `// indirect` in the `go.mod` file, meaning they
 are ''tentative'' dependencies. These could be dependencies of
 dependencies that don't have a `go.mod` file, are missing from their
 `go.mod` file, or are the result of an up or downgrade (see
 [https://github.com/golang/go/wiki/Modules#why-does-go-mod-tidy-record-
 indirect-and-test-dependencies-in-my-gomod here]).
 - The dependencies are required only for part of the code that's built
 with an option build constraint. This is what we ran into with Snowflake,
 where the quic dependencies (which are numerous) or only needed for a part
 of pion-webrtc that we don't use and isn't built by default.

 I think it's worth attempting to exclude go module dependencies that are
 not needed. You can see discussion on #33761 and #33745 on why we want to
 remove the quic dependencies for Snowflake specifically. However, this
 would require extra processing scripts for any of the 3 options above we
 decide to go with.

 The script for (2) could use some more work in addition to excluding
 unnecessary dependencies, like automatically mapping versions to git
 hashes, and integration into however we decide to structure the rbm
 projects (e.g., boklm's input_files idea).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33010 [Metrics/Ideas]: Monitor cloudflare captcha rate: do a periodic onionperf-like query to a cloudflare-hosted static site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33010: Monitor cloudflare captcha rate: do a periodic onionperf-like query to a
cloudflare-hosted static site
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health gsoc-ideas  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 found a similar repo for this checks on https://github.com/shawa/cfcheck

 {{{
 Attempted Cloudflare CAPTCHA detection on a given site across sample of
 Tor exits
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33958 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33958: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  anarcat => hiro
 * status:  accepted => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33929: Tor relay appears offline in Metrics after some times
--+--
 Reporter:  clement   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by computer_freak):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > That's strange! Is there anything in your logs to suggest what might be
 happening here?  What platform/OS are you running on?  Did you upgrade or
 change anything about your relay around that time?
 Hi nick,
 this is the corresponding mailing list thread and i am the other affected
 operator.
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-April/018364.html

 On my relay

 {{{
 DAA806E9529D77EF94685FC0E513386EF65B83F8
 }}}
 it happened only once short after i switched them from a non-exit to an
 exit and for
 {{{
 33D88F331408141F2A2CC563239E54E48F7A211B
 }}}
 it seems the reason was an IPv6 problem with OVH.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33958 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33958: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 >  I propose we blacklist openvswitch from being restarted by needrestart.

 Agreed. hiro, want to look into that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33184 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33184: Support for Fenix
--+--
 Reporter:  sisbell   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Here come some release cycle notes I collected that should help us
 determine which combinations of components we want to base our nightly and
 release builds on:

 The release cycle for mozilla-* code is 4 weeks which means 3 weeks 3
 betas each and one week with 3 rcs (affects GeckoView)

 For Fenix we have beta and nightly versions with geckoview on
 beta/nightly. In particular Mozilla builds

 a) nightly:geckoBeta/fenixNightly and geckoNightly/fenixNightly (only
 latter is published to Google Play)
 b) beta:   geckoBeta/fenixBeta
 c) production: geckoBeta/fenixProducion

 (Yes, the release version of GeckoView is currently not used it seems)

 android-components used on Fenix `master` is updated daily by a bot to the
 latest nightly version

 geckoview used on android-components' `master` is updated daily by a bot
 to the latest nightly version and to the latest beta every 2-4 days (I
 suspect that corresponds to the 3 betas each week above)

 See: `docs/contribute/merge_day.md` for what happens during merge days in
 the android-components repository.

 How does branching and release tagging for Fenix currently look like?

 4.3 release
   - branching off 1 week before release
 (`7f1ef17d8b4b6aa5381819ef7a7ab822668b05c1` merge-base with `master`), no
 beta releases before that and android-components got pinned to a stable
 version for release on first beta which got out 3 days before the final
 release
 4.2 release
   - branching off 1 day before release
 (`301f56d144754e6c26f7e390952f35287185dfd4` merge-base with `master`), no
 beta releases before that and android-components got pinned to a stable
 for release on first beta which got out 1 days before the final release

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[tor-bugs] #33966 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tba: Extension error: [Exception... "Component returned failure code: 0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE) [nsIDOMWindowUtils.removeSheetUsingURIString]"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33966: tba: Extension error: [Exception... "Component returned failure code:
0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)
[nsIDOMWindowUtils.removeSheetUsingURIString]"
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile oom anr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Experienced another OOM and ANR in combination with this trace which
 slipped through so far: shows up repeatedly (5 times each) and happens
 daily according to my logs, also unrelated to ANR:
 {{{
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : Extension error: [Exception...
 "Component returned failure code: 0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)
 [nsIDOMWindowUtils.removeSheetUsingURIString]"  nsresult: "0x80004005
 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)"  location: "JS frame ::
 resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm :: runSafeSyncWithoutClone ::
 line 75"  data: no] undefined 75
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : [[Exception stack
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 runSafeSyncWithoutClone@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm:75:12
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 cleanup@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:403:11
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 close@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:913:14
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : inner-window-
 destroyed@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:998:19
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 observe@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:1016:27
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : Current stack
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 runSafeSyncWithoutClone@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionCommon.jsm:81:9
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 cleanup@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:403:11
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 close@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:913:14
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : inner-window-
 destroyed@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:998:19
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   :
 observe@resource://gre/modules/ExtensionContent.jsm:1016:27
 04-22 01:11:58.547  3810  3840 I Gecko   : ]]

 }}}
 Fixed in Firefox: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1550470
 I have no additional addons installed.

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[tor-bugs] #33965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift 27604: Fix addon issues when moving TB directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33965: Uplift 27604: Fix addon issues when moving TB directory
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ReleaseTrainMigration
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+
 This is https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1429838, which did
 not get much attention by mozilla. But we can try attaching our patch and
 see if there's some progress.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33965 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift 27604: Fix addon issues when moving TB directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33965: Uplift 27604: Fix addon issues when moving TB directory
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by acat):

 * type:  defect => task


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[tor-bugs] #33964 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider uplifting 21537: Mark .onion cookies as secure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33964: Consider uplifting 21537: Mark .onion cookies as secure
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ReleaseTrainMigration
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+
 Assuming that adapting the patch for newer Firefox versions was done
 correctly in #33533, now the patch is just a single
 [https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/53dad612587427817197d6bc2559285cc65ae238 line], which might
 be easy to uplift.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for 5741 (dns leak protection)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33962: Uplift patch for 5741 (dns leak protection)
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by acat):

 * type:  defect => task


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to /tmp"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33961: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to 
/tmp"
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---
Changes (by acat):

 * type:  defect => task


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33960 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for "32414: Make Services.search.addEngine obey FPI"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33960: Uplift patch for "32414: Make Services.search.addEngine obey FPI"
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * type:  defect => task


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33954 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider different approach for "2176: Rebrand Firefox to TorBrowser "

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33954: Consider different approach for "2176: Rebrand Firefox to TorBrowser "
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #33963 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift test for 21321 (Add test for .onion whitelisting)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33963: Uplift test for 21321 (Add test for .onion whitelisting)
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ReleaseTrainMigration
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+
 It's just making sure that `dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions` is set to
 `false`, which should not affect Firefox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19510 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Drop #5741 patch?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19510: Drop #5741 patch?
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201606, tbb-obsolete  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by acat):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think we can close this one in favour of #33962.

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[tor-bugs] #33962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for 5741 (dns leak protection)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33962: Uplift patch for 5741 (dns leak protection)
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ReleaseTrainMigration
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+
 This should probably be under the `--enable-proxy-bypass-protection` flag.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to /tmp"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33961: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to 
/tmp"
--+---
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor58
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Sounds like a good idea. Aiming to have this in ESR 78 seems smart I
 think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31075 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31075: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:7 acat]:
 > Perhaps we can try uplifting this (making sure speculative connects obey
 FPI), and leave trying to enable speculative connects when there is a
 proxy for later.

 +1

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[tor-bugs] #33961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to /tmp"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33961: Uplift patch for "21830: Copying large text from web console leaks to 
/tmp"
--+
 Reporter:  acat  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  ReleaseTrainMigration
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58 |
--+
 Bugzilla is https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1433030. We can
 somehow try to make progress on that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7193 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's sybil protection doesn't consider IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7193: Tor's sybil protection doesn't consider IPv6
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, intro, tor-dirauth, security,  |  Actual Points:
  sybil, network-health, outreachy-ipv6, |
  network-team-roadmap-2020Q1|
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor55-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:38 maurice_pibouin]:
 > Thank you for the review !
 >
 >  * I'm not sure what you mean by new patch : a different PR, branch,
 issue, or just new commits ?

 New commits would be fine.

 >  * I didn't do a PR because I thought it was reserved to "finished"
 patches (ie that include tests), I will use a PR next time

 It's good to have a PR even if it's not ready.  That lets  you get CI
 results, and lets us comment directly on the code.

 >  * Comment removal was a mistake
 >  * I didn't see anything in `CodingStandards.md` about the if-else
 newline, is it just common good practice ?

 It's what we do in the rest of the code, except in a few places where we
 didn't catch it during initial code review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #31075 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31075: Consider dropping browser patch for 26353
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
  ReleaseTrainMigration  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability => tbb-linkability ReleaseTrainMigration
 * sponsor:  Sponsor44-can => Sponsor58


Comment:

 Perhaps we can try uplifting this (making sure speculative connects obey
 FPI), and leave trying to enable speculative connects when there is a
 proxy for later.

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[tor-bugs] #33960 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Uplift patch for "32414: Make Services.search.addEngine obey FPI"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33960: Uplift patch for "32414: Make Services.search.addEngine obey FPI"
-+-
 Reporter:  acat |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ReleaseTrainMigration,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam202004
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor58|
-+-


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[tor-bugs] #33959 [Applications]: file manager sdcard download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33959: file manager sdcard download
+--
 Reporter:  8115130925  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  Applications
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33557 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33557: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004   |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, TorBrowserTeam202004R => tbb-mobile,
 Android, TorBrowserTeam202004


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Re: [tor-bugs] #33557 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33557: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, I started to look over the requirements for the different projects
 we need to build here comes what I have so far and where to find the
 information:

 m-c requirements

 build-tools 29.0.3 (android-sdk.configure)
 platform-29 (android.sdk.configure) (compileSdkVersion, tragetSdkVersion)
 platform-tools(?)
 android ndk r20 (1577220 android.py)
 min android 16 (64bit 21) (android-ndk.configure)
 min sdk 16 (confvars.sh) (minSdkVersion)
 gradle 5.1.1 (gradle-wrapper.properties)
 rust 1.41.1 (mozboot/mozboot/base.py MODERN_RUST_VERSION)
 cbindgen 0.14.1 (moz.configure/bindgen.configure)
 nasm 2.14 (mozboot/mozboot/base.py MODERN_NASM_VERSION)
 clang 9.0.1
 node v10.19 (taskcluster/scripts/misc/repack-node.sh)

 Fenix requiremenets

 platform-28 (app/build.gradle;buildSrc/src/main/java/Config.kt)
 (compileSdkVersion, targetSdkVersion)
 min sdk 21 (buildSrc/src/main/java/Config.kt) (minSdkVersion)
 gradle 5.6.4 (gradle-wrapper.properties)

 android-components requirements

 platform-29 (buildSrc/src/main/java/Config.kt) (compileSdkVersion,
 targetSdkVersion = 28)
 min sdk 21 (buildSrc/src/main/java/Config.kt) (minSdkVersion)
 gradle 5.6.4 (gradle-wrapper.properties)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #33557 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33557: Update Android Toolchain for Fenix
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, Android, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202004R  |
Parent ID:  #33184   | Points:
 Reviewer:  sysrqb   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor58-must
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Another hard requirement is ndk r20 for geckoview. So, let's stick to that
 one instead of r21 assuming other projects don't require r21? (In that
 case we could think about shipping both as well, and then pointing the NDK
 path to the one actually needed for a project).

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[tor-bugs] #33958 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#33958: fsn VMs lost connectivity this morning
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This morning several of our VMs at fsn were without network.

 The instances were still running, and `gnt-console` still got me a console
 that I could log into, but the machines were not reachable from the
 network, nor could they reach the network.  tcpdumping the bridge
 interface on the node did not show any network traffic for the instance.

 Migrating them made them be online again (tried with vineale for
 instance).  Rebooting also helped (tried with everything else).

 Looking at the running openswitch config on a node when its instances did
 not have network looked like this:
 {{{
 root@fsn-node-04:~# ovs-vsctl show
 ce[...]
 Bridge "br0"
 Port vlan-gntinet
 tag: 4000
 Interface vlan-gntinet
 type: internal
 Port "eth0"
 Interface "eth0"
 Port "br0"
 Interface "br0"
 type: internal
 Port vlan-gntbe
 tag: 4001
 Interface vlan-gntbe
 type: internal
 ovs_version: "2.10.1"
 }}}

 When its working, it should look more like this:
 {{{
 root@fsn-node-04:~# ovs-vsctl show
 ce[...]
 Bridge "br0"
 Port "tap3"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap3"
 Port vlan-gntinet
 tag: 4000
 Interface vlan-gntinet
 type: internal
 Port "eth0"
 Interface "eth0"
 Port "tap4"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap4"
 Port "br0"
 Interface "br0"
 type: internal
 Port "tap5"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap5"
 Port "tap1"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap1"
 Port vlan-gntbe
 tag: 4001
 Interface vlan-gntbe
 type: internal
 Port "tap2"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap2"
 Port "tap0"
 tag: 4000
 trunks: [4000]
 Interface "tap0"
 ovs_version: "2.10.1"
 }}}

 My first guess was that migrating somehow had screwed up the network
 config, but that's probably not what happened, as the issue happened again
 shortly afterwards when I was running upgrades.  So:

 My current working theory is that the following happened:
  - In the morning, once automaticallly and once manually, we ran package
 upgrades.
  - Today this included an openssl update.  And openvswitch is linked
 against openssl.
  - `needrestart` restarted openvswitch.
  - restarting openvswitch does not restore the dynamically added VM taps
 into the bridge.

 I propose we blacklist openvswitch from being restarted by needrestart.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
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