Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
-+--
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * sponsor:  SponsorR => SponsorR-can
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
   Resolution:  |   Keywords:  tor-hs, performance
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  small   |Sponsor:  SponsorR
+-

Comment (by teor):

 Are we also worried about cannibalized 4-hop rendezvous circuits?
 (I think I have them the right way around, it's been a week since I've
 looked at the code.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
   Resolution:  |   Keywords:  tor-hs, performance
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  small   |Sponsor:  SponsorR
+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > Are we also worried about cannibalized 4-hop rendezvous circuits?
 > (I think I have them the right way around, it's been a week since I've
 looked at the code.)

 If I understand correctly your question, you cannot cannibalized a *non*
 General Purpose Circuit so it's not possible to get a 4-hop circuit with a
 rdv purpose.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
   Resolution:  |   Keywords:  tor-hs, performance
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  small   |Sponsor:  SponsorR
+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * points:   => small
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.8.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
   Resolution:  |   Keywords:  tor-hs SponsorR performance
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |
+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs SponsorR performance TorCoreTeam201508 = tor-hs
 SponsorR performance
 * milestone:   = Tor: 0.2.???


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Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16646#comment:2
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Re: [tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
   Resolution:   |   Keywords:  tor-hs SponsorR performance
Actual Points:   |  TorCoreTeam201508
   Points:   |  Parent ID:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs SponsorR performance = tor-hs SponsorR performance
 TorCoreTeam201508


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Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16646#comment:1
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[tor-bugs] #16646 [Tor]: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)

[Tor Bug Tracker Wiki]

#16646: Cannibalized intro point circuits are now 4 hops, instead of 3 (HS-side)
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Keywords:  tor-hs SponsorR performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
-+
 The fix of #16260 makes hidden services establish a 4-hop introduction
 circuit, if they cannibalized during introduction circuit construction.

 This was done mainly to prevent circuit fingerprinting according to the
 latest USENIX paper, but it's unclear whether making only this change
 helps with anything.

 Hence, the performance penalty of 4-hops might be more important here.

 Another question, is how often do introduction circuits get cannibalized?
 It might be that it often happens, since this step is done in the very
 beginning when there are a few internal circuits lying around. But I might
 be very wrong.

--
Ticket URL: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16646
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