Re: [tor-bugs] #18359 [Tor]: Implement "/ssl" option to HiddenService routing.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18359: Implement "/ssl" option to HiddenService routing.
-+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22 |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-hs   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  None
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * sponsor:   => None


Comment:

 Agreed with Yawning here... Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18359 [Tor]: Implement "/ssl" option to HiddenService routing.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18359: Implement "/ssl" option to HiddenService routing.
-+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22 |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * severity:  Normal => Minor
 * component:  - Select a component => Tor
 * priority:  Medium => Very Low
 * version:   => Tor: unspecified
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified
 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * type:  project => enhancement


Comment:

 What's the point, links to HSes are already encrypted/authenticated.
 Beyond that, this feels like feature creep.  If people want to use TLS
 with a HS, the server that they're connecting to should be responsible for
 terminating TLS, not the tor instance.

 IMO `wontfix`, in that it will add a non-trivial amount of code, to do
 something (poorly, since this will scale like crap for now) that
 ultimately shouldn't be the tor daemon's responsibility.

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