Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2017-09-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  censorship block ir  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  censorship block => censorship block ir
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Closing this old ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2016-10-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ufd33):

 does it look like normall ?!!

 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.png?start=2016-09-01=2016-10-21=ir=points

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and
> 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on
> 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
>   [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir=off link]
>
> Looking at bridge users, there is an increase right around 2016-08-20,
> the time of the first blocking, then an abrupt return to previous levels
> around 2016-09-03, the time of the second blocking.
>   [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]
>
> Looking at the graph of bridge users by transport, obfs4 continued
> working while obfs3 and vanilla were blocked.
>   [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

New description:

 Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and
 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on
 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
   [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir=off link]

 ''Edit 2016-10-04: the bridge changes below, on further investigation,
 appear to be unrelated to anything done by Iran.''

 Looking at bridge users, there is an increase right around 2016-08-20, the
 time of the first blocking, then an abrupt return to previous levels
 around 2016-09-03, the time of the second blocking.
   [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

 Looking at the graph of bridge users by transport, obfs4 continued working
 while obfs3 and vanilla were blocked.
   [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2016-09-23 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:8 joss]:
 > The drop in ofs3 usage corresponds to a small decrease in the baseline
 number, but doesn't really change that much. I'm more interested in why
 the obsf4 spike was so short-lived. It looks like a clear response to the
 massive drop in direct usage, but doesn't last when direct usage falls to
 almost zero after that small recovery.

 My guess is it went like this:
   Iran blocks direct → users switch to obfs4 → change in bridge authority
 means a fraction of obfs4 bridges stop reporting → apparent but not actual
 end of obfs4 spike.

 When the bridge authority changed, [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /metrics-team/2016-September/000217.html 5/5 default obfs3 bridges stopped
 reporting, while only 3/16 default obfs4 bridges stopped reporting]. That
 may be why obfs3 crashed almost to zero while obfs4 just seemed to retard
 an upward trend.

 > I wonder if this is some kind of doubled event. An initial block on
 direct usage, followed by a minor relaxation in which the direct usage
 climbed again while bridge usage fell, followed by a second block.
 > If I were speculating wildly, it almost looks like a new group of people
 tried bridges after an initial block, then didn't need them when direct
 connections became partially possible again, then didn't try bridges again
 when the block came back.

 My guess is that the first block was a naive one, simply blocking the IPs
 in some snapshot consensus. What looks like a relaxation of blocking is
 just natural churn in relays bringing new, unblocked entry nodes online.
 The second block looks like a continually updated blocklist, updated
 hourly or something.

 > Do we have an AS-level breakdown of connections? Could this be some kind
 of per-network issue?

 No, there's not AS-level breakdown. The stats get aggregated to the
 country level at the bridge, as I understand it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2016-09-23 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by joss):

 It does seem odd behaviour.

 The drop in ofs3 usage corresponds to a small decrease in the baseline
 number, but doesn't really change that much. I'm more interested in why
 the obsf4 spike was so short-lived. It looks like a clear response to the
 massive drop in direct usage, but doesn't last when direct usage falls to
 zero.

 I wonder if this is some kind of doubled event. An initial block on direct
 usage, followed by a minor relaxation in which the direct usage climbed
 again while bridge usage fell, followed by a second block.

 Do we have an AS-level breakdown of connections?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09 (was: Iran blocking of vanilla and obfs3, 2016-08 and 2016-09)

2016-09-22 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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