Re: [tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight annoyance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs needs-insight annoyance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * points:  ? =>
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can =>


Comment:

 As stated before, this can happen with a buggy tor client implementation
 so maybe the move is to change this log statement to protocol warning?...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, triage-out-030-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  ?
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+---
Changes (by s7r):

 * cc: s7r (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  ?
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+

Comment (by twim):

 Also #15618 may be related.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  ?
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+

Comment (by twim):

 Just for the record, there might be another scenario to get this. An
 adversary who somehow sniffs/derives/guesses the valid rendcookie and RP
 from a client, may perform a man-on-the-side attack by sending duplicate
 cell to the RP.
 I see neither how this info can be retrieved by an attacker nor what is
 the outcome/benefit of performing such attack [*].

 [*] Attacker still have to know DH share in order to decrypt traffic. It's
 a bit too much.

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[tor-bugs] #20332 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20332: Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  ? |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+
 Seems like people have started receiving this `Duplicate rendezvous cookie
 in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS` warning message on their relays:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2016-October/010535.html

 This might be a logic bug in tor, or it might be that Tor clients (or an
 alt implementation) is reusing the same rend point and same rend cookie
 multiple times, which simply does not work.

 (Meta: Unclear what `Points` should be in this ticket)

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