Re: [tor-bugs] #25836 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make NoScript work on the highest security level on protected Mozilla websites

2018-08-25 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25836: Make NoScript work on the highest security level on protected Mozilla
websites
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I think we are good here for now and I'll close this as duplicate of
 #26114 which actually flipped the neccessary prefs.

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[tor-bugs] #25836 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make NoScript work on the highest security level on protected Mozilla websites

2018-04-18 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25836: Make NoScript work on the highest security level on protected Mozilla
websites
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1453988 raised awareness for
 a new mechanism to regulate webextension interference with priviledged
 Mozilla sites. We need to clear the whitelist that got implemented in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1415644.
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1453988#c0 gives a good
 introduction about the trade-offs involved and we might think about a
 better solution while preparing our switch to ESR60 (or do so in a follow-
 up bug).

 One idea tjr had was to get a patch developed to make an exemption to that
 whitelist for Mozilla-signed extensions. We could then piggyback on that
 by signing all the extensions we ship which we thought about doing anyway.

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