Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2019-01-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Thank you! I think all questions in this ticket are already replied.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2019-01-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:21 wagon]:
 > > There are two answers to that question:
 > > 1. Use `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc` gets the
 microdesc consensus.
 > > 2. Tor updates the consensus flavour(s) that it is using or caching at
 random every hour or two.
 > Neither google nor `GETINFO info/names` knows the command `dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus-microdesc`.

 You're right, it is a missing feature. I opened #28982 so we implement it
 eventually.

 You've added a lot of replies to this post, so I'm not sure what else I
 can do to help here.

 Maybe a bug tracker isn't the best way for you to learn about Tor's
 internals.
 You could try the tor-...@lists.torproject.org mailing list, the Tor wiki:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki , or maybe the tor stack
 overflow.
 You might find a wiki helpful, because you can update the wiki as you
 learn more.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Now I think the picture is more clear, so I'll reply to myself and to
 above comments.

 Replying to [comment:18 wagon]:
 > There is a command `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus` which
 returns the same output as the content of the file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. So, it has Tor versions of all nodes. However, output of this
 command is very big, so tools which use `ControlPort` may not behave
 nicely if this command is run often.
 >
 > This command works even if `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0. I don't
 know what this command is exactly doing. Does it query local cache or
 download these "microdescriptors" from network every time it is running?
 In any case, I wonder why it doesn't update the content of the file
 `cached-microdesc-consensus`. Apart from this command there are commands
 `ns/id/FINGERPRINT` and `ns/all`, where the latter prints almost the same
 as `dir/status-vote/current/consensus`, but without Tor versions and
 global headers/footers. The commands `dir/status-vote/current/consensus`
 and `ns/all` mostly duplicate each other.
 >
 > Initially I understood descriptor as a "complete" version of
 microdescriptor, but this doesn't look correct. "Full" descriptors, which
 can be learnt separately by `desc/id/FINGERPRINT` or all together by `desc
 /all-recent`, don't contain final bandwidth and relay flags that
 "microdescriptor" has. I guess, when `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0,
 Tor just continue to use microdescriptors, but stops updating
 microdescriptors local file `cached-microdesc-consensus`. So,
 microdescriptors and descriptors look as mutually complementing each
 other, where microdescriptor mostly has parameters useful for clients,
 while descriptor has parameters mostly useful for relays (I may be totally
 wrong).

 "Descriptor" is mostly what replay publishes about himself. "Consensus" is
 mostly the result of agreement between authorities about a relay. These
 types of information indeed complement each other. In some parts it may be
 counter-intuitive. For example, it looks natural for a relay to decide if
 he wants to be an Exit or a middleman, but actually some flags are judged
 by authorities, also an an Exit flag. Similarly, bandwidth is judged by
 bandwidth authorities. Thus, descriptor (or its reduced version
 "microdescriptor") doesn't have this information just because it comes
 from another source.

 When microdescriptors are used, they are stored in `cached-microdescs*`
 file(s). "Consensus" is stored in `cached-microdesc-consensus`. Similarly,
 when `UseMicrodesriptor` is 0, descriptors are stored in `cached-
 descriptors*` file(s), while "consensus" is stored in `cached-consensus`.
 So, if `UseMicrodesriptor` is 0, relay flags and bandwidth are indeed
 stored at disk, but in `cached-consensus`, not `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`, and `cached-microdesc-consensus` is not updated. Thus, actual
 question would be why Tor now needs to support two different files
 `cached-consensus` and `cached-microdesc-consensus`, when their content is
 mostly the same. I guess the current status quo can be explained by
 historical reasons to get smooth transition from descriptors to
 microdescriptors. #7646 is a more proper ticket for general discussions
 about these things.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:19 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 wagon]:
 > > I don't know what this command is exactly doing. Does it query local
 cache or download these "microdescriptors" from network every time it is
 running?
 >
 > It gets the latest full (ns) consensus which the Tor instance has on
 disk:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/control-spec.txt#n807
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3862
 Spec files don't say it must be stored in disk. It may be also in tor RAM
 memory.


 > > Initially I understood descriptor as a "complete" version of
 microdescriptor, but this doesn't look correct. "Full" descriptors, which
 can be learnt separately by `desc/id/FINGERPRINT` or all together by `desc
 /all-recent`, don't contain final bandwidth and relay flags that
 "microdescriptor" has.
 >
 > I think you're confusing microdescriptors and the microdescriptor
 consensus.
 >
 > Microdescriptors are a subset of full descriptors:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1442
 >
 > And the microdescriptor *consensus* is a subset of the full consensus,
 with added microdescriptor hashes:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3261
 Yes, I was wrong. Instead of microdescriptor I had to use something like
 "network consensus".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-21 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:19 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:18 wagon]:
 > > There is a command `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus` which
 returns the same output as the content of the file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. So, it has Tor versions of all nodes. However, output of this
 command is very big, so tools which use `ControlPort` may not behave
 nicely if this command is run often.
 > >
 > > This command works even if `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0.
 >
 > This command gets the full (ns) consensus from disk, so it *only* works
 if one of the following conditions is true:
 > * `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0, or
 > * the Tor instance is a directory cache, or
 > * the Tor instance is a directory authority, or
 > * the Tor instance is using a data directory that previously downloaded
 a full consensus. This full consensus may be outdated.
 I'm not testing it on relay, so only the first and the last options are
 possible. Indeed, `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0, and Tor instance has
 "previously downloaded full consensus", but your explanation doesn't not
 look correct. I compared the output of the command `GETINFO dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus` with the content of the file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. They are not only different, the even have a clear sign of
 this difference: I added `UseMicrodescriptors 0` few days back, when
 `0.3.5.6-rc` wans't released yet, so the file `cached-microdesc-consensus`
 still knows nothing about this new version, while GETINFO command knows it
 and lists it. Thus, I say my initial point  still holds:
 1. Tor knows this consensus.
 2. Tor doesn't store it on the disk and donesn't update the file `cached-
 microdesc-consensus`.
 3. When `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus` is requested, tor
 doesn't read the content of the output from the disk.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > There are two answers to that question:
 > 1. Use `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc` gets the
 microdesc consensus.
 > 2. Tor updates the consensus flavour(s) that it is using or caching at
 random every hour or two.
 Neither google nor `GETINFO info/names` knows the command `dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus-microdesc`. Did you mean `dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus`? Let me tell it in more detailed way:
 1. I added `UseMicrodescriptors 0` to `torrc` few days back. Timestamp at
 file `cached-microdesc-consensus` says it wasn't updated since that time.
 There are also other signs that this file isn't updated for a log time
 now.
 2. During last days I did run many `GETINFO` commands, also `dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus`. However, the file `cached-microdesc-consensus`
 wasn't updated.
 3. Tor was running during last days.
 So, I cannot match your explanation with what I see.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7646 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #24110 => #7646


Comment:

 #7646 is the controller ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-20 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:18 wagon]:
 > There is a command `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus` which
 returns the same output as the content of the file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. So, it has Tor versions of all nodes. However, output of this
 command is very big, so tools which use `ControlPort` may not behave
 nicely if this command is run often.
 >
 > This command works even if `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0.

 This command gets the full (ns) consensus from disk, so it *only* works if
 one of the following conditions is true:
 * `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0, or
 * the Tor instance is a directory cache, or
 * the Tor instance is a directory authority, or
 * the Tor instance is using a data directory that previously downloaded a
 full consensus. This full consensus may be outdated.

 > I don't know what this command is exactly doing. Does it query local
 cache or download these "microdescriptors" from network every time it is
 running?

 It gets the latest full (ns) consensus which the Tor instance has on disk:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/control-spec.txt#n807
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3862

 > In any case, I wonder why it doesn't update the content of the file
 `cached-microdesc-consensus`.

 There are two answers to that question:
 1. Use `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus-microdesc` gets the
 microdesc consensus.
 2. Tor updates the consensus flavour(s) that it is using or caching at
 random every hour or two.

 > Apart from this command there are commands `ns/id/FINGERPRINT` and
 `ns/all`, where the latter prints almost the same as `dir/status-
 vote/current/consensus`, but without Tor versions and global
 headers/footers. The commands `dir/status-vote/current/consensus` and
 `ns/all` mostly duplicate each other.

 "ns" is a backwards-compatible command that used to serve v2 consensuses,
 but now serves v3 consensuses:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/control-spec.txt#n614

 > Initially I understood descriptor as a "complete" version of
 microdescriptor, but this doesn't look correct. "Full" descriptors, which
 can be learnt separately by `desc/id/FINGERPRINT` or all together by `desc
 /all-recent`, don't contain final bandwidth and relay flags that
 "microdescriptor" has.

 I think you're confusing microdescriptors and the microdescriptor
 consensus.

 Microdescriptors are a subset of full descriptors:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1442

 And the microdescriptor *consensus* is a subset of the full consensus,
 with added microdescriptor hashes:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3261

 > I guess, when `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0, Tor just continue to
 use microdescriptors,

 No, Tor stops using microdescriptors for circuits when
 `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0.

 > but stops updating microdescriptors local file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. So, microdescriptors and descriptors look as mutually
 complementing each other, where microdescriptor mostly has parameters
 useful for clients, while descriptor has parameters mostly useful for
 relays (I may be totally wrong).

 It might help to read the parts of dir-spec that I linked above.

 > Thus, technically, as concerns this ticket, Tor versions of relays
 **can** be obtained from `ControlPort`, but I doubt the way, how Tor
 provides it, is convenient for Tor controllers. According to my opinion,
 this ticket is still valid.

 No-one has disagreed with you except yourself.
 We just need to specify how it will work, then implement it:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28676?replyto=18#comment:2

 > > I'd like to build an abstraction layer over all available directory
 documents (like #25999, but inside tor).
 > If there is a ticket about it, write a link, please.

 #27248 would be the first step. There isn't a ticket for updating the
 controller interface.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-17 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 There is a command `GETINFO dir/status-vote/current/consensus` which
 returns the same output as the content of the file `cached-microdesc-
 consensus`. So, it has Tor versions of all nodes. However, output of this
 command is very big, so tools which use `ControlPort` may not behave
 nicely if this command is run often.

 This command works even if `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0. I don't know
 what this command is exactly doing. Does it query local cache or download
 these "microdescriptors" from network every time it is running? In any
 case, I wonder why it doesn't update the content of the file `cached-
 microdesc-consensus`. Apart from this command there are commands
 `ns/id/FINGERPRINT` and `ns/all`, where the latter prints almost the same
 as `dir/status-vote/current/consensus`, but without Tor versions and
 global headers/footers. The commands `dir/status-vote/current/consensus`
 and `ns/all` mostly duplicate each other.

 Initially I understood descriptor as a "complete" version of
 microdescriptor, but this doesn't look correct. "Full" descriptors, which
 can be learnt separately by `desc/id/FINGERPRINT` or all together by `desc
 /all-recent`, don't contain final bandwidth and relay flags that
 "microdescriptor" has. I guess, when `UseMicrodescriptors` is set to 0,
 Tor just continue to use microdescriptors, but stops updating
 microdescriptors local file `cached-microdesc-consensus`. So,
 microdescriptors and descriptors look as mutually complementing each
 other, where microdescriptor mostly has parameters useful for clients,
 while descriptor has parameters mostly useful for relays (I may be totally
 wrong).

 Thus, technically, as concerns this ticket, Tor versions of relays **can**
 be obtained from `ControlPort`, but I doubt the way, how Tor provides it,
 is convenient for Tor controllers. According to my opinion, this ticket is
 still valid.

 > I'd like to build an abstraction layer over all available directory
 documents (like #25999, but inside tor).
 If there is a ticket about it, write a link, please.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-10 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 wagon]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 teor]:
 > > When a tor client is bootstrapping, it does not have a consensus, so
 it does not know the bandwidth of the hard-coded authorities and fallback
 directory mirrors. It uses the hard-coded ratio, which selects fallbacks
 10x as much as authorities.
 > I don't know whether it is needed (or overkill?), but, in principle,
 fallback dirs hardcoded in tor code could be accompanied by their
 respective bandwidths and other necessary parameters. So, clients will
 select fallback dirs not absolutely randomly, but proportionally to their
 bandwidth.

 The original proposal gave FallbackDir entries a selection weight:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/206-directory-
 sources.txt#n39
 But weights complicate our security analysis, and make the tor executable
 larger.

 So we decided to set a minimum bandwidth instead:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py#n220

 Let's leave this conversation here: we're making a mess of this ticket.

 Asking unrelated questions on tickets isn't the best way to get answers.
 Please don't open lots of tickets with design questions, either.
 Tor is an open-source project with a large community.
 You're probably not the first person to ask these questions.

 If you have further questions about Tor's design, I encourage you to
 search the tor specifications and proposals:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git

 The tor-dev mailing list archives:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/

 And this ticket tracker:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor

 If you can't find an answer to your question, please email tor-
 d...@lists.torproject.org , and someone will point you to the relevant
 discussion, spec or code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-10 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:15 teor]:
 > Sure, please open a ticket.
 #28807.
 > When a tor client is bootstrapping, it does not have a consensus, so it
 does not know the bandwidth of the hard-coded authorities and fallback
 directory mirrors. It uses the hard-coded ratio, which selects fallbacks
 10x as much as authorities.
 I don't know whether it is needed (or overkill?), but, in principle,
 fallback dirs hardcoded in tor code could be accompanied by their
 respective bandwidths and other necessary parameters. So, clients will
 select fallback dirs not absolutely randomly, but proportionally to their
 bandwidth.
 > Yes please.
 #28805.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-09 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:12 wagon]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > > (Authorities don't carry much client traffic at all, but they do serve
 a lot of directory documents.)
 > Now all authorities have `Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1`. I guess this is
 the reason why they are almost never selected for normal circuits. This
 could be done cleaner--as tor options which (1) disable client traffic
 (for usual circuits) at authority and (2) disable use of authority on
 clients when they create circuits.

 Sure, please open a ticket.

 > Requests of consensus, I suppose, just ignore `Bandwidth` option.

 When a tor client is bootstrapping, it does not have a consensus, so it
 does not know the bandwidth of the hard-coded authorities and fallback
 directory mirrors. It uses the hard-coded ratio, which selects fallbacks
 10x as much as authorities.

 When a tor client has a consensus, it uses the bandwidths in the consensus
 to choose directory guards. Then it chooses among those directory guards.

 > > `tor ControlPort 192.0.2.1:9090` works for me.
 > > That's probably another bug, or we might have decided to discourage
 people from using IP addresses.
 > Yes, it should be either documented with proper warnings or disabled
 completely. Moreover, it has another bug: `ControlPort` can be specified
 more than once in `torrc`, and Tor will listen on all these addresses, but
 this behavior is not documented in `man torrc`. All options which can be
 specified more than once are marked with a sentence like (example of
 `SocksPort`):
 > > This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
 addresses/ports.
 > Should we create a separate ticket about `ControlPort`?

 Yes please.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:  arma => (none)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-08 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > (Authorities don't carry much client traffic at all, but they do serve a
 lot of directory documents.)
 Now all authorities have `Bandwidth=20 Unmeasured=1`. I guess this is the
 reason why they are almost never selected for normal circuits. This could
 be done cleaner--as tor options which (1) disable client traffic (for
 usual circuits) at authority and (2) disable use of authority on clients
 when they create circuits. Requests of consensus, I suppose, just ignore
 `Bandwidth` option.
 > `tor ControlPort 192.0.2.1:9090` works for me.
 > That's probably another bug, or we might have decided to discourage
 people from using IP addresses.
 Yes, it should be either documented with proper warnings or disabled
 completely. Moreover, it has another bug: `ControlPort` can be specified
 more than once in `torrc`, and Tor will listen on all these addresses, but
 this behavior is not documented in `man torrc`. All options which can be
 specified more than once are marked with a sentence like (example of
 `SocksPort`):
 > This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
 addresses/ports.
 Should we create a separate ticket about `ControlPort`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-06 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:10 wagon]:
 > > There are millions of tor clients, and they use microdescriptors and
 the microdesc consensus (md) by default. So we need to minimise the size
 of md documents.
 > OK. However, most of these clients download consensus files from mirrors
 on other relays, i.e. not from authorities.

 The tor network is often overloaded. This overload makes tor client
 traffic slow. So we want to reduce the overall directory load on the
 network, because bandwidth that is used for directory mirror downloads
 can't be used for client traffic.

 Smaller directory documents also decrease the client and directory mirror
 load on authorities. (Authorities don't carry much client traffic at all,
 but they do serve a lot of directory documents.)

 > > We have proposals that would create a new consensus flavour (picodesc
 consensus? pd?) with fewer fields. Once all supported Tor versions use the
 pd consensus, we can stop distributing the microdesc consensus.
 > Ok. I see Tor development is moving in opposite direction than that I
 thought about. I hope Tor people make right decisions.

 In this case, network load is more important than simplicity.

 In general, that's why we have a proposals process.

 > > Or, more likely, distribute a md consensus containing no relays.
 > What does it mean? What is the point of having consensus which contain
 no information about relays?

 When we disable a feature in Tor, some really old tor clients have bugs
 that overload the network (#4580). So we give them a fake empty
 replacement for that feature.

 > > You can bind `ControlPort` to a non-local port, but you must have
 authentication on
 > How I can do this technically? I cannot see any option in `man torrc`
 about that. According to `man` page `ControlPort` specifies only port and
 not `IP:port`.

 `tor ControlPort 192.0.2.1:9090` works for me.

 That's probably another bug, or we might have decided to discourage people
 from using IP addresses.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-06 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > There are millions of tor clients, and they use microdescriptors and the
 microdesc consensus (md) by default. So we need to minimise the size of md
 documents.
 OK. However, most of these clients download consensus files from mirrors
 on other relays, i.e. not from authorities.
 > We have proposals that would create a new consensus flavour (picodesc
 consensus? pd?) with fewer fields. Once all supported Tor versions use the
 pd consensus, we can stop distributing the microdesc consensus.
 Ok. I see Tor development is moving in opposite direction than that I
 thought about. I hope Tor people make right decisions.
 > Or, more likely, distribute a md consensus containing no relays.
 What does it mean? What is the point of having consensus which contain no
 information about relays?
 > Please open one ticket per bug. Otherwise, we lose track of bugs.
 Done: #28757, #28760.
 > You can bind `ControlPort` to a non-local port, but you must have
 authentication on
 How I can do this technically? I cannot see any option in `man torrc`
 about that. According to `man` page `ControlPort` specifies only port and
 not `IP:port`.
 > I'm not sure how we could keep a man page and the control spec in sync,
 without it taking a lot of effort.
 Spec was not updated so often until now. However, if you plan to re-
 architect all `ControlPort` internals, it is better to wait until new
 interface will be stable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24110| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #24110


Comment:

 This ticket is a feature request that needs #24110.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-03 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 wagon]:
 > > I'd like to build an abstraction layer over all available directory
 documents (like #25999, but inside tor).
 > I have another idea. We have some trade-off between internal Tor's
 complexity and Tor's network performance. We need some balance which will
 make Tor support and development effective and convenient.
 >
 > Microdescriptors were added to Tor code long time ago (10 years?), when
 internet in general and Tor network in particular were 10-20 times slower
 than now (you can check metrics graphs). Amount of Tor nodes increased
 only 3 times during this period. Now we could remove this redundancy by
 moving to single type descriptors which will be not as small as
 microdescriptors but will be complete. We need de-duplication.

 There are millions of tor clients, and they use microdescriptors and the
 microdesc consensus (md) by default. So we need to minimise the size of md
 documents.

 There are thousands of relays, and a few special clients, authorities, and
 tools. They use the full (networkstatus or ns) consensus and full
 descriptors to get more details about relays. The size of these documents
 does not matter that much, because they only go to a small number of
 machines.

 We have proposals that would create a new consensus flavour (picodesc
 consensus? pd?) with fewer fields. Once all supported Tor versions use the
 pd consensus, we can stop distributing the microdesc consensus. (Or, more
 likely, distribute a md consensus containing no relays.)

 > Then, on top of these simplified descriptors you could make some
 abstraction layer for `ControlPort`. As concerns its current state, there
 are also other issues, e.g. with
 
[[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28300#comment:4|status/version/num-{concurring,versioning}]]
 and with
 [[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28300#comment:6|"Option/*"]]
 values (I'm not sure I have to create separate tickets about that).

 Please open one ticket per bug. Otherwise, we lose track of bugs.

 > P.S. I wonder why `ControlPort` can only be binded to loopback
 interface. Is it a bug or feature? I assume that in some environments,
 where Tor is controlled by a remote machine, it would be convenient to
 bind to another IP than 127.0.0.1 (firewall redirection can be used to
 overcome this difficulty, but direct binding is simpler to setup).

 You can bind ControlPort to a non-local port,  but you must have
 authentication on:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/2b2b97484ad07c91ac410735a96fe8710e60cf23/src/app/config/config.c#L6642
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/2b2b97484ad07c91ac410735a96fe8710e60cf23/src/app/config/config.c#L7376

 > UPDATED: It would be convenient to have `ControlPort` commands explained
 in some man page. Now they are described only in inline help `/help` and
 in `control-spec.txt`.

 I'm not sure how we could keep a man page and the control spec in sync,
 without it taking a lot of effort.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > I'd like to build an abstraction layer over all available directory
 documents (like #25999, but inside tor).
 I have another idea. We have some trade-off between internal Tor's
 complexity and Tor's network performance. We need some balance which will
 make Tor support and development effective and convenient.

 Microdescriptors were added to Tor code long time ago (10 years?), when
 internet in general and Tor network in particular were 10-20 times slower
 than now (you can check metrics graphs). Amount of Tor nodes increased
 only 3 times during this period. Now we could remove this redundancy by
 moving to single type descriptors which will be not as small as
 microdescriptors but will be complete. We need de-duplication.

 Then, on top of these simplified descriptors you could make some
 abstraction layer for `ControlPort`. As concerns its current state, there
 are also other issues, e.g. with
 
[[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28300#comment:4|status/version/num-{concurring,versioning}]]
 and with
 [[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/28300#comment:6|"Option/*"]]
 values (I'm not sure I have to create separate tickets about that).

 P.S. I wonder why `ControlPort` can only be binded to loopback interface.
 Is it a bug or feature? I assume that in some environments, where Tor is
 controlled by a remote machine, it would be convenient to bind to another
 IP than 127.0.0.1 (firewall redirection can be used to overcome this
 difficulty, but direct binding is simpler to setup).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-02 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 There are a few bugs where Tor has access to different consensus and
 descriptor flavours, but doesn't provide all the information in them. (Or
 accesses different documents in the wrong order.)

 I'd like to build an abstraction layer over all available directory
 documents (like #25999, but inside tor). We already have the node
 abstraction, but it duplicates some data, and modifies other data. So it
 isn't quite what we want.

 We could use the new abstraction internally within tor, whenever we access
 data from a parsed directory document. And we could also use it to
 implement a new control port command, or fix the existing control port
 commands.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > As far as I can see, version is never passed to
 `rounterstatus_format_entry()` when formatting for the control port
 If you set `UseMicrodescriptors 0` in `torrc`, a command `GETINFO
 desc/id/FINGERPRINT` will expose Tor version as part of `platform` value.
 So, you can learn Tor versions, but not with default `torrc` options.

 Interestingly, if you put `UseMicrodescriptors 0` for some time, then
 switch back to default (set it to 1), delete `/var/lib/cached-
 descriptors.*`, and reload Tor's config, Tor will continue to provide
 platform and version through `GETINFO desc/id/FINGERPRINT` until restart.
 I think it is because of some caching in Tor's memory.

 However, I agree, it seems that `ns/id/FINGERPRINT` never shows Tor
 version.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 As far as I can see, version is never passed to
 rounterstatus_format_entry() when formatting for the control port:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/7e9985b75aa69d4572aac739d44d50056ed20e82/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c#L2324

 I wonder if there is some code path that I'm missing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > It should specify an interface too though, and that should come first,
 as a patch to control-spec.txt.
 It seems the exact format is not specified in
 [[https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/control-spec.txt|spec]]
 at all:
 {{{

 "ns/id/" or "ns/name/" -- the latest router
   status info (v3 directory style) for a given OR.  Router status
   info is as given in dir-spec.txt, and reflects the latest
   consensus opinion about the
   router in question. Like directory clients, controllers MUST
   tolerate unrecognized flags and lines.  The published date and
   descriptor digest are those believed to be best by this Tor,
   not necessarily those for a descriptor that Tor currently has.
   [First implemented in 0.1.2.3-alpha.]
   [In 0.2.0.9-alpha this switched from v2 directory style to v3]
 }}}
 dir-spec.txt also doesn't describe what `ControlPort` must return.
 > I'd be glad to take a patch for this.
 Unfortunately, due to lack of knowledge I cannot make it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort

2018-12-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 seems reasonable; I'd be glad to take a patch for this.  It should specify
 an interface too though, and that should come first, as a patch to
 control-spec.txt.  The ns/* commands are already pretty messed up and
 divergent from what's actually in the networkstatus.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28676 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort (was: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accesible through ControlPort)

2018-12-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28676: Tor versions of Tor nodes should be accessible through ControlPort
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs