Re: [tor-bugs] #18504 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Download snapshots from gitweb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18504: Download snapshots from gitweb
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  gitweb   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7126 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multipath consensus integrity verification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7126: Multipath consensus integrity verification
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ key-theft proposal-needed   |  Actual Points:
  tor-auth   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 There are different proposals in this general area, like the CT-like work
 listed above. This particular item is not necessarily how we'd do it, but
 it could improve the resilience of our consensus system to do *something*
 like this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7028 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement Adaptive Padding or some variant and measure overhead vs accuracy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7028: Implement Adaptive Padding or some variant and measure overhead vs 
accuracy
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ research-needed tor-relay   |  Actual Points:
  028-triage mike-can|
Parent ID:  #7027| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)


Comment:

 Adaptive Padding per se, maybe not.  But there have been big advances in
 network padding that we should maybe look at.  I know Mike has been active
 in this field.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18504 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Download snapshots from gitweb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18504: Download snapshots from gitweb
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  gitweb   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 The original rationale still stands.  Please refrain from re-opening this
 again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write proof-of-concept hidden service chat, email, etc applications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6600: Write proof-of-concept hidden service chat, email, etc applications
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this could be revisited a bit, especially in the email area, but a
 lot of this has indeed been tried a lot in the last few years.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19999 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing TorCoreTeam201609  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20267 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20267: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Huh.  It's supposed to be defined in include/openssl/e_os2.h . Maybe they
 messed it up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks for the quick response - I forgot one thing - a changes file.
 Would you like to have a go at doing a changes file for this?

 See "How we log changes" in:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/HACKING/CodingStandards.md

 The relevant commit (using `git blame`) is de4cc12.

 `git describe --contains de4cc12` says `tor-0.2.4.7-alpha` (and then some
 exact commit and branch info that we don't need).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add statistics on time spent on crypto operations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7134: Add statistics on time spent on crypto operations
--+---
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7357 | Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * sponsor:   => SponsorZ
 * keywords:  SponsorZ tor-relay => tor-relay
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.2.???


Comment:

 The tracing stuff is in #13802 and in needs_review which has been used by
 Rob and pastly for KIST measurements.

 We could easily add tracepoints to the crypto subsystem, have some sorts
 of counters and report that data in the extra-info. Most important thing
 here is really to not slow down Tor has that crypto will be on the fast
 path.

 Is this something we need soon-ish/now? And if so, I can take few cycles
 to do this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7106: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-client tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I agree with Nick that this is a great topic to work on. First it would
 help for alternative Tor implementations, but second it would bolster our
 habits of documenting and specifying our assumptions (we're already known
 for trying to be detailed and open and transparent, and this would be a
 great further step), and third I bet we would uncover some surprises that
 would make us think harder about ways to improve our design.

 That said, this is the sort of topic that only a few people can do most
 usefully (e.g. Nick and me), since "think about all the assumptions you
 made while designing those parts of Tor, and try to write them down" isn't
 something a new developer can pick up and do by herself. So we should
 think carefully about the timing of a funding proposal for this one, so we
 don't fall into the trap of having funding for three Nicks and being
 surprised and sad that we only have one Nick.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 One more minor fix to the man page:
 * the maximum prefix is 104 for IPv6 and 16 for IPv4.

 Then we're good to go, and I'll flip it into ready for merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20267 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20267: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 That's weird. I thought that OpenSSL was supposed to define this for us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 can consider in 029

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20247 [Core Tor/Tor]: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20247: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort
-+
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 028-backport ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 In the case where you disable the sandbox, Tor needs to keep CAP_NET_BIND
 in order to bind to low ports (<1024). If not, it can't bind on reload, so
 it stops.

 In the case where you have the sandbox on, we need to allow setsockopt as
 a syscall in the sandbox. However, this might simply be another symptom of
 the above permissions issue on low-numbered ports. I don't know enough
 about the Linux sandbox to tell.

 The required setsockopt calls for all sockets are:
 * `setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR`
 And for IPv6:
 * `setsockopt(s,IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY`
 And for transproxy:
 * `setsockopt(s, SOL_IP, IP_TRANSPARENT`
 And for constrained socket buffers:
 * `setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF`
 * `setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write proof-of-concept hidden service chat, email, etc applications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6600: Write proof-of-concept hidden service chat, email, etc applications
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Mike, how much does the Ricochet design resolve your goals here?

 (Several prominent jabber servers now offer onion addresses, but you're
 still using the centralized jabber server even if you're reaching it via
 an onion address.)

 Replying to [comment:2 aagbsn]:
 > And file transfer will work without proxies. Secure, single-click file
 transfer that 'just works' would be a nice feature.

 For this goal there is now onionshare.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20247 [Core Tor/Tor]: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20247: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort
-+
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 028-backport ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  crash 028-backport => crash 028-backport ipv6
 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20247 [Core Tor/Tor]: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20247: crash after closing and opening ipv6 DirPort + OrPort
+
 Reporter:  toralf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.8
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 028-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => crash 028-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20261 [Core Tor]: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20261: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Putting this as High because tbb-needs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20267 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20267: Use -DOPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 on Windows
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, windows  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > That's weird. I thought that OpenSSL was supposed to define this for us.

 Not OpenSSL 1.0.0 on msys (1.0). Perhaps using a later version would help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20261 [Core Tor]: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20261: tor_fragile_assert() when Unix domain socket is used
---+
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #6583 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a Tor Communications Bundle/Tor Platform

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6583: Create a Tor Communications Bundle/Tor Platform
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ-large, needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Mike, I think this is a question for you, around what you originally
 envisioned.

 One answer might be "We have Tor Messenger now" -- is that enough?

 Or is this ticket more about exploring some sort of integrated platform
 that shares one underlying Tor client, yet has Tor Browser, Tor Messenger,
 Thunderbird+Torbirdy, etc available in it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use a better default torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13082: Use a better default torrc
--+--
 Reporter:  saint |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this might be fundable as part of a much larger "relay operator
 usability" thing, but I don't see how it's fundable on its own.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add statistics on time spent on crypto operations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7134: Add statistics on time spent on crypto operations
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7357   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: dgoulet (added)


Comment:

 dgoulet, does your trace stuff help here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7106: Write "how to be nice to the Tor network" spec
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ tor-client tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this could use funding -- especially as part of an initiative to
 support or develop alternative tor implementations.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6769: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.??? => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 We can review in 0.2.9, but my sense is that 0.3.0 is likelier to be the
 right point to merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20270 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20270: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20270 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20270: "Descriptor is missing an ntor curve25519 onion key" message too noisy?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => easy


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[tor-bugs] #20276 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: No sound notifications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20276: No sound notifications
+--
 Reporter:  PZajda  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Hello,

 In the first beta I tested, I had the ability to enable sound
 notifications.
 Now I still have these options, but there are no sound played.
 I haven't found any ticket related to this, sorry if I open another
 duplicate one.

 These notifications are useful if I don't want any displayed events, which
 is sufficient in my case.

 Thanks for your work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20273 [Core Tor/Tor]: consensus weight inaccuracies: 1 --> weight_scale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20273: consensus weight inaccuracies: 1 --> weight_scale
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20271 [Core Tor/Tor]: dirvote.c refs dir-vote sec 3.4.3, should be 3.8.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20271: dirvote.c refs dir-vote sec 3.4.3, should be 3.8.3
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20272 [Core Tor/Tor]: constraint broken in case 1 of consensus weight calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20272: constraint broken in case 1 of consensus weight calculation
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pingl):

 Fixed :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by arma:

Old description:

> When a client has UseBridges set to 1, and it has a cached microdesc
> consensus in its datadir, when it starts up it loads that consensus file
> from disk, and calls {{{networkstatus_set_current_consensus()}}} on it.
>
> That function checks
> {{{
>   if (flav != usable_consensus_flavor() &&
>   !directory_caches_dir_info(options)) {
> /* This consensus is totally boring to us: we won't use it, and we
> won't
>  * serve it.  Drop it. */
> goto done;
>   }
> }}}
>
> and in this case, {{{usable_consensus_flavor()}}} checks
> {{{we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits()}}} which decides
> {{{
> /* If we are configured to use bridges and none of our bridges
>  * know what a microdescriptor is, the answer is no. */
> if (options->UseBridges && !any_bridge_supports_microdescriptors())
>   return 0;
> }}}
>
> That is, if you have bridges but you haven't marked any of them up yet,
> then you default to using the old-flavor consensus, so when you read your
> microdesc-consensus from disk, you quietly discard it. This bug results
> in bridge users always fetching a new consensus at start, even when they
> don't need to.
>
> (Bug reported by skruffy's owner.)

New description:

 When a client has UseBridges set to 1, and it has a cached microdesc
 consensus in its datadir, when it starts up it loads that consensus file
 from disk, and calls {{{networkstatus_set_current_consensus()}}} on it.

 That function checks
 {{{
   if (flav != usable_consensus_flavor() &&
   !directory_caches_dir_info(options)) {
 /* This consensus is totally boring to us: we won't use it, and we
 won't
  * serve it.  Drop it. */
 goto done;
   }
 }}}

 and in this case, {{{usable_consensus_flavor()}}} checks
 {{{we_use_microdescriptors_for_circuits()}}} which decides
 {{{
 /* If we are configured to use bridges and none of our bridges
  * know what a microdescriptor is, the answer is no. */
 if (options->UseBridges && !any_bridge_supports_microdescriptors())
   return 0;
 }}}

 That is, if you have bridges but you haven't marked any of them up yet,
 then you default to using the old-flavor consensus, so when you read your
 microdesc-consensus from disk, you quietly discard it. This bug results in
 bridge users always fetching a new consensus at start, even when they
 don't need to.

 (Bug reported by [a person who was helpful at first but now seems to be
 trying to distract me and prevent me from fixing Tor bugs].)

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12208 [Obfuscation/meek]: Make it possible to use an IP address as a front (no DNS request and no SNI)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12208: Make it possible to use an IP address as a front (no DNS request and no
SNI)
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > > When I tried the same thing in Firefox 29 just now, it simply leaves
 off the server_name extension.
 >
 > Amazon CDN doesn't support for such requests now. Seems like it
 terminates TLS session if ClientHello lack of SNI?

 Thanks for checking this. Could you add a note to
 [[doc/meek#AmazonCloudFront]]?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19999 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing TorCoreTeam201609  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13827: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  pingl
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, easy, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Bug reported by

 Please remove this line. I'm sorry about poking code and report anything
 again. I promise never ever report anything, can't promise I'll stop poke
 code, however, at least for first time.

 -- lurk and surf. be safe

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > -- lurk and surf. be safe

 We no need folks with a tremendously demotivating hobby. go away and never
 come back.
 amen.

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[tor-bugs] #20277 [Core Tor/Tor]: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading" comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20277: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading"
comment
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There's this comment in directory.c:
 {{{
   /* XXX+ Not all bridges handle conditional consensus
 downloading,
* so, for now, never assume the server supports that. -PP
* Is that assumption still so in 2016? -NM */
 }}}

 And you're right, the conditional consensus stuff has been in since Tor
 0.2.1.x.

 So I went to go rip out the special-casing code, but it already got ripped
 out in git commit 7988596f (which went into Tor 0.2.4.2-alpha).

 And then, inexplicably, I seem to have added the stanza back in during git
 commit a8297cdbd3 (which went into Tor 0.2.4.11-alpha).

 I just looked around at the code some more and I'm now convinced that
 indeed that code is gone. We should fix the comments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20278 [Core Tor/Tor]: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for certificate types

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20278: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for 
certificate
types
--+-
 Reporter:  patrickod |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 I suggested that Patrick file this ticket, since we want all our specs to
 be in a foo-spec.txt file, rather than relying on text still in a
 proposals document.

 It's possible that this ticket is redundant with some other already filed
 ticket, but I didn't see one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20276 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: No sound notifications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20276: No sound notifications
+--
 Reporter:  PZajda  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting!

 Looks like this was broken in v0.1.0b6 with,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=d4c075474f7943f61668c2475bbebff0b790e9ea

 Fixed by,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=13da29e1067998c38e6376917cadd4bdabda56c5

 A new release should be available soon, but you can also just edit these
 preferences manually in,

 Preferences > Advanced > Config Editor...

 Search for `playSounds` and set them all to `true`, then the toggling in
 the UI should have an effect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20269 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20269: bridge users ignore their cached consensus file on startup
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 go away and never come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20277 [Core Tor/Tor]: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading" comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20277: Confusing "Not all bridges handle conditional consensus downloading"
comment
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 My {{{bug20277}}} branch resolves this ticket.

 (I didn't add a changes/ file since this is just internal code cleanup.
 Maybe your instincts suggest otherwise?)

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[tor-bugs] #20278 [Core Tor/Tor]: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for certificate types

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20278: cert-spec.txt contains incomplete reference / documentation for 
certificate
types
--+--
 Reporter:  patrickod |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The cert-spec.txt [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/cert-
 spec.txt#n93 document references various Certificate types] in a section
 4.2, but there exists no such complete documentation in any of the
 -spec.txt files.

 The section 4.2 that it appears to reference
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/220-ecc-id-
 keys.txt#n438 is in prop 220] which includes specs for each of the cert
 types mentioned:
  * Link key certificate certified by Ed25519 signing key
  * Ed25519 TLS authentication key certified by Ed25519 signing key
  * RSA cross-certificate for Ed25519 identity key

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[tor-bugs] #20279 [HTTPS Everywhere]: wizards.com archives do not behave as expected

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20279: wizards.com archives do not behave as expected
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 archive.wizards.com does not load correct pages when used with Https
 Everywhere.  Can be very confusing as ones first reaction is the archives
 have been removed.

 Example: http://archive.wizards.com/default.asp?x=dnd/arch/ab forwards to
 https://dnd.wizards.com/go/arch/ab , a caught 404 Error.  Manually going
 to https://archive.wizards.com/go/arch/ab results in an uncaught 404
 Error.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6769: Relays (and bridges) don't use microdescriptors
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 My branch {{{bug6769}}} fixes this issue.

 It's built on #20269, so we should resolve that ticket first.

 (I'm running it on moria5 and it seems fine. We might want to wait until
 0.3.0 if we want to be extra conservative here. But I don't think we're
 going to find any issues.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5707 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5707: Use end to end stream timing data to further prune circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ performance needs-research  |  Actual Points:
  tor-client mike-0.2.5  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ra):

 I cannot comment on the sponsor issue. However, I would like to mention a
 paper we published on the ticket's topic - see https://naviga-
 tor.github.io/ for details (pre-print, code, and data).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12208 [Obfuscation/meek]: Make it possible to use an IP address as a front (no DNS request and no SNI)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12208: Make it possible to use an IP address as a front (no DNS request and no
SNI)
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 > When I tried the same thing in Firefox 29 just now, it simply leaves off
 the server_name extension.

 Amazon CDN doesn't support for such requests now. Seems like it terminates
 TLS session if ClientHello lack of SNI?

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[tor-bugs] #20275 [Metrics/Onionoo]: make onionoo available as onion service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20275: make onionoo available as onion service
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 https://onion.torproject.org/

 doesn't list onionoo.tpo.

 Could you setup a hidden service for onionoo.tpo?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pingl):

 I think now it's fixed. I've also added something in the tor man page.

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