Re: [tor-bugs] #19251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion links fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19251: TorBrowser might want to have an error page specific to when .onion 
links
fail
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * cc: antonela (removed)
 * keywords:   => ux-team


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[tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gah! Your tab just crashed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Gah! Your tab just crashed
--+--
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  Tor: unspecified  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I keep receiving "Gah! Your tab just crashed" for every web-page I visit
 with Tor Browser 8 (every version up to 8.0.4 and also 8.5a5) under
 Windows 7 64-bit. This does not happen with Tor Browser 7 (7.5.6). I tried
 deleting and reinstalling Tor, disabling antivirus/firewall etc, but with
 no luck. Any advice?

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[tor-bugs] #28821 [Core Tor/Tor]: Introduce timer_is_scheduled() method and replace padding_scheduled_at_us

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28821: Introduce timer_is_scheduled() method and replace 
padding_scheduled_at_us
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,
 Severity:  Normal   |  padding, refactoring
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28637
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This came up during #28142 review:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/461#discussion_r231889687

 When #28142 gets merged, we can do a small refactoring by removing
 `padding_scheduled_at_us` and replacing it with a new timer method that
 returns true if the timer is scheduled, and false if it's disabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28624 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we remember dormant state on restart?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28624: Should we remember dormant state on restart?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:10 eighthave]:
 > >  One of the core ideas of #2149 was for Tor to remember its dormancy
 across restarts. As of the finishing of #2149, Tor will go dormant 24
 hours after startup if it's seen no activity
 >
 > If I'm understanding this correctly, I think Dormant Mode should also
 consider the time scales of 1 minute, 1 hour and 10 hours.  These are very
 relevant in the mobile context.  Reading @arma's description of how this
 dormant mode idea manages state reminds me a lot about how Android and iOS
 expect apps/services to do it.

 It's configurable: see the option DormantClientTimeout.  Right now the
 minimum is 10 minutes, but we could make that lower if mobile devs want
 it.  Open a ticket if so?

 > > (2) ...I was going to use an example here of Tor bundled with an app,
 like Brave or Briar, but I think in this case the app should be
 responsible for making Tor behave politely to the Tor network.
 >
 > About mobile apps that embed Tor, we've put the core idea of "wake on
 use" in NetCipher and Orbot.  The core idea is that whenever an app first
 needs to use tor, it sends Orbot a message to request that Orbot start
 tor.  If that is widely used, then Orbot/tor need only manage going
 idle/dormant, since there is a clear request to start before each use, and
 this request will start the receiving app automatically.  This idea should
 really be fully developed and included in both Orbot and embedded Tor,
 e.g. Tor Proxy Library.  I'm not sure that this concept would work as well
 on Desktop OSes.  I guess with things like dbus, inter-app messaging is
 becoming more common on Desktop as well.
 >
 > > Here's the alternative we'll probably end up deploying:
 > > Tor should behave politely by default. If an app breaks that
 politeness, the app is responsible for managing the breakage. If an app
 breaks when tor is polite, the app is responsible for managing its own
 breakage.
 >
 > This makes sense to me in the Android context.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24803 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate a new fallback list in 2018 and backport it to all supported versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24803: Generate a new fallback list in 2018 and backport it to all supported
versions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, fallback,  |  implemented
  029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  035-backport, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-included-20180405, 034-roadmap-subtask,|
  031-unreached-backport-maybe, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711, 035-can, |
  032-unreached-backport-maybe   |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to 0.2.9 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27735 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tors with cached consensuses can't upgrade to a version that stops supporting a required protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27735: Tors with cached consensuses can't upgrade to a version that stops
supporting a required protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport-maybe, 033-backport-|  implemented
  maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 032-unreached-  |  Actual Points:  .3
  backport-maybe, prop297|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged, and updated torspec as 18fcb9ab42cca4ce963202a22cd1f93f68ecd57c

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28182 [Core Tor/Tor]: spec: Add to control-spec.txt some pluggable transport events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28182: spec: Add to control-spec.txt some pluggable transport events
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-pt, 040-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  subtask|
Parent ID:  #28180   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 nickm]:
 > Does this need to be updated with the K=V format?

 Overall yes, the `STATUS` message is being added as well so we need to fix
 the spec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23764 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23764: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => new
 * sponsor:  Sponsor8-can =>


Comment:

 I'm gonna go on a limb here and say that this is a bit "out of scope" in
 some ways or just too complicated for s8 at this stage.

 I've gone over the thread above (which is kind of old, things have changed
 a bit since then) and what I can say is that the changes would need to
 happen in many places and thus require us to expand considerably our
 reachability unit testing.

 First in `can_client_refetch_desc()` to let the client try to download a
 descriptor without a live consensus.

 The second big part would be in `hs_get_responsible_hsdirs()` which also
 requires a live consensus but also used by the service ... so some split
 to be done.

 Then finaly, make `hs_get_time_period_num()` maybe fallback on the "latest
 consensus" instead of `approx_time()` if the live consensus can't be
 found. The idea here is that for the whole subsystem the same time source
 has to be used. So having code path that use the "latest consensus
 valid_after" time with approx_time is a recipe for reachability issue.

 We had so many issues with timing over the years and ended up realizing
 that whatever we use, the entire subsystem needs to use the same time
 source. In theory, right now, the "live consensus valid_after" should be
 used across the board. Part of my thinks we would benefit from a "HS time
 source" that is updated every time we get a new consensus and then the HS
 subsystem only uses.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24803 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate a new fallback list in 2018 and backport it to all supported versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24803: Generate a new fallback list in 2018 and backport it to all supported
versions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, fallback,  |  implemented
  029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,  |  Actual Points:  0.6
  035-backport, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-included-20180405, 034-roadmap-subtask,|
  031-unreached-backport-maybe, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711, 035-can, |
  032-unreached-backport-maybe   |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 3b5188576f7cbf20284a9f6e292fd2951504242f fixes the changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28768 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback script to match Tor bootstrap changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28768: Update fallback script to match Tor bootstrap changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24838 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm; merged to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18193 [Applications/Tor Browser]: It says "Click on the onion", but that's not a clickable thing.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18193: It says "Click on the onion", but that's not a clickable thing.
--+--
 Reporter:  zooko3|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 As of Tor Browser 8.0, about:tor does not point people to the menu.
 Closing this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28182 [Core Tor/Tor]: spec: Add to control-spec.txt some pluggable transport events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28182: spec: Add to control-spec.txt some pluggable transport events
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-pt, 040-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  subtask|
Parent ID:  #28180   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Does this need to be updated with the K=V format?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28812 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicates of nodes descriptors can be found in consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28812: Duplicates of nodes descriptors can be found in consensus files
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Probably not.  We consider two nodes to be different if they have
 different keys, and the same otherwise.  Apparently a majority of
 authorities voted in favor of both of these identities, which is possible
 if they're both around at slightly different times.  As long as they don't
 stay up longterm or get assigned any important flags, it's not going to
 hurt anything.

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[tor-bugs] #28822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: re-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28822: re-implement desktop onboarding for ESR 68
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff68-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As of Firefox 64, the onboarding extension which we used to implement Tor
 Browser onboarding has been removed. See:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1462415
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1457565

 More research is required, but it looks like Firefox's new onboarding
 experience is integrated into their "activity stream" interface (aka new
 tab page).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28755 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a K/V parser library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28755: Implement a K/V parser library
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #25502| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, dgoulet  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Provided a review. Majority of comments are about leftovers in the code.
 The more important thing is about a test case I tried which failed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2878 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't bootstrap from an old consensus if we're about to replace it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2878: Don't bootstrap from an old consensus if we're about to replace it
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, bootstrap, tor-client,  |  Actual Points:
  s8-performance, s8-errors, 040-roadmap-|
  proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 It's possible we don't actually want to do this.  This ticket is older
 than microdescriptors, older than the onion key rotation changes of
 prop#274 (see #21641) and (I think) older than the live/reasonably live
 distinction.  Most of the microdescriptors from any reasonably live
 consensus should still be usable these days, especially

 The worst case here is when we have a consensus but we shut down before we
 can fetch any microdescriptors for it, and we start up again in the last
 minutes when the consensus is still reasonably live.  I think even then
 the damage should be limited.

 Taylor nodes that some other issues discussed above are variants on the
 jump-to-80% problem (see #22266).

 I say that we should either wontfix, or mark this as needs_information,
 said information being "what is the measurable effect of this issue in
 practice?"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28639 [Core Tor/sbws]: After several days, most of the circuits timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28639: After several days, most of the circuits timeout
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > > This issue is an instance of #27049: sbws does not open any 3-hop
 circuits, so it stalls when all 3-hop circuits time out.
 >
 > I don't understand this sentence.
 > I guess the 3-hop circuits are open by Tor to download descriptors and
 network status documents?.

 1-hop circuits are opened by tor to download descriptors and network
 status documents.

 3-hop circuits are opened by most tor clients to connect to exits and
 onion services.

 > Wouldn't new 3-hop circuits be created when other 3-hop circuits
 timeout?.

 But sbws sets `__DisablePredictedCircuits 1` after bootstrapping, so sbws'
 tor only has its 3-hop circuits from when it bootstraps. When they expire,
 there are no more 3-hop circuits, so tor stops opening circuits.

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[tor-bugs] #28825 [Core Tor]: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28825: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1
+--
 Reporter:  gander2001  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Blocker
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I allowed an update from 8.02 to 8.04 and the browser did not re-open, but
 instead, immediately crashes. I have tried to install from a fresh copy of
 8.04 and get the same behavior.

 The erro message reads: "Tor unexpectedly exited. This might be due to a
 bug in Tor itself, another program on your system, or faulty hardware.
 Until you restart Tor, the Tor Browser will not be able to reach any
 websites. If the problem persists, please send a copy of your Tor Log to
 the support team. Restarting Tor will not close your browser tabs."

 I cannot send you the log as your button doesn't capture anything.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17359 [Core Tor/Tor]: __DisablePredictedCircuits causes bootstrap to hang at "Connecting to Tor Network"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17359: __DisablePredictedCircuits causes bootstrap to hang at "Connecting to 
Tor
Network"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bootstrap sponsor8-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > A workaround is to set:
 > {{{
 > LongLivedPorts
 > PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds
 > LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0
 > }}}
 > But there's no option to reduce the number of hidden service server
 preemptive circuits (see #17360).

 In #17592 in Tor 0.3.1.1-alpha, we replaced PredictedPortsRelevanceTime
 and CircuitIdleTimeout with CircuitsAvailableTimeout.

 So the current workaround is:
 {{{
 LongLivedPorts
 LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0
 # and
 PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds
 # or
 CircuitsAvailableTimeout 0 seconds
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain appveyor image names

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28826: Explain appveyor image names
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  comment, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See my pull request:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/582

 It's based on maint-0.3.5.

 It only changes some comments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28639 [Core Tor/sbws]: After several days, most of the circuits timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28639: After several days, most of the circuits timeout
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:17 juga]:
 > Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > > Can you please paste the full info-level logs in a pastebin?
 > sbws stalled at `Dec 10 15:46:57`, it was started at 11:57:31.
 >
 > Info log since it started until it stalled:
 > https://share.riseup.net/#zPpTz3wTCRdyb2HjaWzUtw
 >
 > The previous log seaching for some words:
 > {{{
 > egrep -wi --color 'No circuits are opened|circ \(length 3|Expiring|live'
 info_stalled_4h.log
 > }}}
 >
 > Now i'll run it enabling predicted circuits and paste the log tomorrow.
 > https://paste.debian.net/hidden/339cfb38/

 I don't see anything wrong with tor in these logs.
 Maybe this stall is on the sbws side?

 If sbws is stalling because of a bug in sbws, then enabling predicted
 circuits probably won't fix it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25011 [Webpages/Blog]: Match blog spacing in article to archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25011: Match blog spacing in article to archive
---+---
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 it seems duplicated - #24440

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24438 [Webpages/Blog]: Change blog "Recent Updates" title line height

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24438: Change blog "Recent Updates" title line height
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 I think it is fixed now. Steph, could you confirm and close this ticket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24440 [Webpages/Blog]: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24440: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 At the post page, `.node--type-article-full .node__submitted` should have
 `margin:0`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28813 [Core Tor/Tor]: confirm hypothesis re PT jump-to-80%

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28813: confirm hypothesis re PT jump-to-80%
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, s8-errors  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks for the additional information!  It does seem like what's going on
 is although we deferred reporting (cached) directory progress in 0.3.5,
 the first successful TCP connection to the local obfs4 proxy caused the
 directory progress reporting to proceed, even though a connection to the
 bridge through obfs4 might not be possible.

 Going to leave this open for a few days and then close it if no
 substantially different information comes in about this scenario.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23764 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23764: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 dgoulet]:
 > I'm gonna go on a limb here and say that this is a bit "out of scope" in
 some ways or just too complicated for s8 at this stage.

 I agree, I don't think we can get this done in a few weeks, but we should
 do it eventually. Because Tor clients can now bootstrap and use exits with
 a reasonably live consensus (or skewed clock), but they can't use v3 onion
 services.

 > I've gone over the thread above (which is kind of old, things have
 changed a bit since then) and what I can say is that the changes would
 need to happen in many places and thus require us to expand considerably
 our reachability unit testing.
 >
 > First in `can_client_refetch_desc()` to let the client try to download a
 descriptor without a live consensus.
 >
 > The second big part would be in `hs_get_responsible_hsdirs()` which also
 requires a live consensus but also used by the service ... so some split
 to be done.

 No, services should also work with a reasonably live consensus. Otherwise,
 people running services on small devices with skewed clocks will be sad.

 > Then finaly, make `hs_get_time_period_num()` maybe fallback on the
 "latest consensus" instead of `approx_time()` if the live consensus can't
 be found. The idea here is that for the whole subsystem the same time
 source has to be used. So having code path that use the "latest consensus
 valid_after" time with approx_time is a recipe for reachability issue.
 >
 > We had so many issues with timing over the years and ended up realizing
 that whatever we use, the entire subsystem needs to use the same time
 source. In theory, right now, the "live consensus valid_after" should be
 used across the board. Part of my thinks we would benefit from a "HS time
 source" that is updated every time we get a new consensus and then the HS
 subsystem only uses.

 Sounds like we need a module that handles onion service time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by monmire):

 Tor Browser 8.0.4 (Apple MacOS) has default screen resolution `1000 Wide x
 1000 High` with all browser settings affecting screen resolution in their
 default-standard settings.[[BR]]

 After selecting `View/Toolbars/Bookmarks Toolbar`, the screen resolution
 changes to `1000 Wide x 0990 High`.[[BR]]

 I first noticed a similar regression, `1000 Wide x 0998 High`, in Tor
 Browser 8.0. [[BR]]

 Neither the previous regression `1000 Wide x 0998 High`, nor the current
 regression `1000 Wide x 0990 High` existed in Tor Browser 7. See comment:5
 [[BR]]

 Screen resolutions in Tor Browser 7 and Tor Browser 8 with identical
 configuration `View/Toolbars/Bookmarks Toolbar`:[[BR]]

 `1000 Wide x 1000 High` — Tor Browser 7.5.6[[BR]]
 `1000 Wide x 0998 High` — Tor Browser 8.0, 8.0.1, 8.0.2, 8.0.3[[BR]]
 `1000 Wide x 0990 High` — Tor Browser 8.0.4[[BR]]


 Let's fix this regression so that when Tor Browser has configuration
 `View/Toolbars/Bookmarks Toolbar`, the screen resolution will be `1000
 Wide x 1000 High`, identical to screen resolution `1000 Wide x 1000 High`
 in Tor Browser 7.5.6 with the same configuration  `View/Toolbars/Bookmarks
 Toolbar`.

 Platform: Mac OS X 10.10.5 Yosemite on Apple iMac24 Intel desktop pc.

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[tor-bugs] #28826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Explain appveyor image names

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28826: Explain appveyor image names
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  comment, fast-fix
Actual Points:  0.1   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Appveyor images are called "Visual Studio 2015", but we only care about
 the Windows versions. (We use MinGW to build tor.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28113 [Core Tor/Tor]: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28113: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-systemd, 029-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035|
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Hello71):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


Comment:

 unfortunately it seems that it does not actually work, I still get tor
 killed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28701 [Core Tor/sbws]: Try enabling predicted circuits in sbws

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28701: Try enabling predicted circuits in sbws
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28639 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > We can set these options to reduce the number of circuits that tor
 builds:
 > {{{
 > LongLivedPorts
 > PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds
 > LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0
 > }}}
 > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17359#comment:1

 The following options aren't supported by all Tor versions, we should try
 them in this order, and allow them to fail:
 {{{
 PredictedPortsRelevanceTime 0 seconds
 CircuitIdleTimeout (sbws' circuit timeout)
 }}}
 {{{
 CircuitsAvailableTimeout (sbws' circuit timeout)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by testcy):

 I am using Comodo Internet Security 11. If I set
 browser.tabs.remote.autostart to false and restart, Tor crashes when
 visiting a web-page with the following error:

 Problem signature:
   Problem Event Name:   APPCRASH
   Application Name: firefox.exe
   Application Version:  60.4.0.6609
   Application Timestamp:
   Fault Module Name:msvcr100.dll
   Fault Module Version: 10.0.40219.325
   Fault Module Timestamp:   4df2be1e
   Exception Code:   4015
   Exception Offset: 0008d6fd
   OS Version:   6.1.7601.2.1.0.256.1
   Locale ID:1032
   Additional Information 1: 2dcc
   Additional Information 2: 2dcca317a17a2c66073f6e8fed21493a
   Additional Information 3: 4450
   Additional Information 4: 4450de00666339552ac8275512186653

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[tor-bugs] #28824 [Core Tor]: Thor Is Being Hacked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28824: Thor Is Being Hacked
-+--
 Reporter:  Valientthor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Hi There, Tor is not connecting. Itll show as connceted , but the Tor
 website shows  that I'm not connected . I'm also not able to bridge
 directly to Tor. I know for a fact the best Hackers / agencies in the
 world don't want me connecting to Tor. Is there anything I can do to
 securly connect?


 Also,I'm using Android. Email Is waldbr...@gmail.com

 Thanks!

 Very best,
 John

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24438 [Webpages/Blog]: Change blog "Recent Updates" title line height

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24438: Change blog "Recent Updates" title line height
---+
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by steph):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28730 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduced availability of HS v3 services compared with that of v2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28730: Reduced availability of HS v3 services compared with that of v2
--+--
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 No action items on this ticket. However, we are aware of the possible
 stability/reachability issue so it will be looked in for sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28787 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug 3.5.5: src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.c:278: cdm_diff_ht_check_and_note_pending

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28787: Bug 3.5.5: src/feature/dircache/consdiffmgr.c:278:
cdm_diff_ht_check_and_note_pending
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => 035-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28824 [Applications/Orbot]: Thor Is Being Hacked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28824: Thor Is Being Hacked
+---
 Reporter:  Valientthor |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * owner:  (none) => n8fr8
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Orbot
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8 (was: Gah! Your tab just crashed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * keywords:   => tbb-crash


Comment:

 What antivirus/firewall software are you using? Does the crashing stop if
 you set `browser.tabs.remote.autostart` to `false` and restart? If that
 helps does it help as well if you let that pref set to `true` but adjust
 the `security.sandbox.content.level` to a lower level than you have right
 now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23022 [Webpages/Blog]: Increase lead image bottom spacing; reduce top spacing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23022: Increase lead image bottom spacing; reduce top spacing
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 `field--name-field-image picture img` should have `padding: 1.5em 0;`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28639 [Core Tor/sbws]: After several days, most of the circuits timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28639: After several days, most of the circuits timeout
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:
 > Can you please paste the full info-level logs in a pastebin?
 sbws stalled at `Dec 10 15:46:57`, it was started at 11:57:31.

 Info log since it started until it stalled:
 https://share.riseup.net/#zPpTz3wTCRdyb2HjaWzUtw

 The previous log seaching for some words:
 {{{
 egrep -wi --color 'No circuits are opened|circ \(length 3|Expiring|live'
 info_stalled_4h.log
 }}}

 Now i'll run it enabling predicted circuits and paste the log tomorrow.
 https://paste.debian.net/hidden/339cfb38/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24440 [Webpages/Blog]: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24440: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 I think it is fixed now. Steph, could you confirm and close this ticket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24440 [Webpages/Blog]: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24440: Match blog title post spacing to archive post title spacing
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 `.node .node__content ul li` should have `margin-bottom: 0;` or maybe we
 can remove it at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24187 [Webpages/Blog]: Reduce bullet spacing on blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24187: Reduce bullet spacing on blog
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 `.node .node__content ul li` should have `margin-bottom: 0;` or maybe we
 can remove it at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce binary size for client-only tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21814: Reduce binary size for client-only tor
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-roadmap-subticket,   |
  035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 => Sponsor8


Comment:

 I think this is a great ticket to work on, but it is not in the critical
 path to getting the anti-censorship team back up and going, so I'm going
 to remove the Sponsor19 tag.

 This change doesn't mean we should not do this ticket -- just that we
 should decide on its priority compared to all the other tickets we also
 think we should do to make Tor better.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28824 [Core Tor]: Thor Is Being Hacked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28824: Thor Is Being Hacked
-+
 Reporter:  Valientthor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by Valientthor):

 * Attachment "Screenshot_2018-12-11-11-41-46.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24805, #25169, #25414, #25436, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24805, #25169, #25414, #25436, #25798, #27737 by teor:


Action: resolve

Comment:
The new fallback whitelist is merged, so these tickets are done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by monmire):

 After installing and using Tor Browser 8.0.4 for a short period, the
 height of the Bookmarks Toolbar and/or the height of the Address Bar
 and/or the height of the Tab Bar apparently contracted by a combined total
 of  `10 pixels` with no configuration input from me, resulting in a most
 ideal change in the browser screen resolution, changing from `1000 Wide x
 990 High` to `1000 Wide x 1000 High`, with configuration
 View/Toolbars/✓Bookmarks Toolbar.[[BR]]

 I suspect gk, boklm, and/or the tbb team might deserve credit for this
 screen-resolution fix/correction. Whoever might deserve credit, I
 respectfully and sincerely thank you all.[[BR]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Full i18n in preference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1969: Full i18n in preference
--+--
 Reporter:  pen9u1n   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  i18n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Seems to be fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23880 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23880: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Nightly builds!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28591 [Core Tor/Tor]: Accept a future consensus for bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28591: Accept a future consensus for bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap, clock-skew, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  usability, ux, s8-errors, 035-roadmap- |
  subtask, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  s8-bootstrap   |
Parent ID:  #23605   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 catalyst]:
 > Thanks! Mostly looks good, but I haven't tested it yet. I left a minor
 comment on the pull request about a build failure that I get. When you fix
 that, I can try to do some manual tests. I can also try to fix it up
 myself later if you don't have the time.

 I fixed the build failure by making the code simpler.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28812 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicates of nodes descriptors can be found in consensus files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28812: Duplicates of nodes descriptors can be found in consensus files
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > Probably not.  We consider two nodes to be different if they have
 different keys, and the same otherwise.
 They cannot be different if they claim that they are using the same IP and
 the same ports. These two different tor instances cannot serve any useful
 purpose. Two different processes cannot listen on the same IP and port.
 > As long as they don't stay up longterm or get assigned any important
 flags, it's not going to hurt anything.
 How client can select which of them to use if both of them are on the same
 IP and port? Tor client doesn't know which of these duplicate keys the
 node in question is using in particular time moment.

 If you say that such nodes cannot work in network anyway, why they are
 included in consensus and distributed to clients? If you say that such
 nodes can work, we are in trouble again, because most probably they are
 unusable because of what I've said before.

 How it can be not a bug? Meanwhile, I caught it again with another node
 (Tue Dec 11 03:59:04 UTC 2018):

 {{{
 r default Iw3aijlAo3wtwMPpS81P+jXWBXM 2018-12-11 02:07:48 218.221.211.72
 42958 0
 m kP1vdWn7duAfwAsWDXy1WEQWMFYf0AHhw03vmCUepdM
 s Running V2Dir Valid
 v Tor 0.3.5.5-alpha
 pr Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1-2 HSDir=1-2 HSIntro=3-4 HSRend=1-2
 Link=1-5 LinkAuth=1,3 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=1-2
 w Bandwidth=0 Unmeasured=1

 r default nvcZXCZwkee2bTJUZEBI9zpju40 2018-12-11 02:32:31 218.221.211.72
 42958 0
 m PhWgGNtH2OHFrkO4YA18a9OqKm/491SwRwUYY+lCC/o
 s Running V2Dir Valid
 v Tor 0.3.5.5-alpha
 pr Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1-2 HSDir=1-2 HSIntro=3-4 HSRend=1-2
 Link=1-5 LinkAuth=1,3 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=1-2
 w Bandwidth=0 Unmeasured=1
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28805 [Core Tor/Tor]: ControlPort has undocumented behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28805: ControlPort has undocumented behavior
---+--
 Reporter:  wagon  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control,easy, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > doc added; tor-doc removed
 I take relevant keywords from
 [[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/process/TorOnTrac|trac
 wiki]]. If they are obsolete now, wiki suggestions should be updated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


Comment:

 I rebased and squashed neel's branch in:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/583

 I also edited the changes file to say what the patch does (not how it is
 implemented).

 Thanks neel!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 This branch passes all our current chutney tests.

 It also passes the IPv6 v3 onion service test in chutney. So maybe the
 test is wrong, or this branch is choosing IPv4 addresses?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1966 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Need to handle non-ISO-639-1 language codes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1966: Need to handle non-ISO-639-1 language codes
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Is there something doable?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28807 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Ask authority operators to set `MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 0` in their torrcs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28807: Ask authority operators to set `MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 0` in their 
torrcs
-+
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-dirauth, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by wagon):

 > So I'm not sure this is a big problem.
 You know it better than me. I created this ticket only because you
 
[[http://ea5faa5po25cf7fb.onion/projects/tor/ticket/28676#comment:15|suggested]]
 it.
 > Authorities are only chosen as middle nodes, because they don't have any
 other relevant flags.
 What forbids DA to become guard? As I know, usual fast relay with big
 uptime doesn't have an option to continue to be just a middleman, i.e., to
 not get guard flag.
 > Only one of the 10 (dizum) has the Fast flag. So the others will be
 ignored by most clients.
 Good point. As I remember, nodes without Fast flag are not used for data
 transfer. Do you mean there can be some old clients which behaves
 differently?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24213 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ORFOX - No Tor related settings/addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24213: ORFOX - No Tor related settings/addon
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28824 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Thor Is Being Hacked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28824: Thor Is Being Hacked
--+--
 Reporter:  Valientthor   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17968 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot fails to start with `java.io.FileNotFoundException: armeabi/tor.mp3`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17968: Orbot fails to start with `java.io.FileNotFoundException: 
armeabi/tor.mp3`
+
 Reporter:  strugee |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23764 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23764: hs-v3: No live consensus on client with a bridge
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, technical-debt, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328 =>
 tor-hs, prop224, technical-debt, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328
 * parent:  #23605 =>


Comment:

 Un-parenting, and marking with technical-debt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27299 [Core Tor/Tor]: hsv3: Clarify timing sources around hsv3 code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27299: hsv3: Clarify timing sources around hsv3 code
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hsv3 refactoring easy |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:  #23764   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-hs hsv3 refactoring easy => tor-hs hsv3 refactoring easy
 technical-debt
 * sponsor:  Sponsor8-can =>
 * parent:  #23605 => #23764


Comment:

 We won't do this as part of sponsor 8, but we'll need this for #23764.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28380 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Oreo adaptive icon shape

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28380: Oreo adaptive icon shape
--+--
 Reporter:  cepxuo|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Android] Tor-enable Apps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25187: [Android] Tor-enable Apps
--+--
 Reporter:  dovanvu1792@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gesturify 2.x does not work with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27867: Gesturify 2.x does not work with Tor Browser 8
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by Thorin):

 Upstream Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1448848

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10303 [Applications/Orbot]: modernize native build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10303: modernize native build system
+-
 Reporter:  hans|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28191 [Applications/Tor Browser]: orfox isnt working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28191: orfox isnt working
--+--
 Reporter:  turnipdick|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Orfoxisdead):

 * owner:  n8fr8 => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Applications/Orbot => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28825 [Core Tor/Tor]: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28825: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1
--+
 Reporter:  gander2001|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 So, we bumped Tor to 0.3.4.9 for this release and picked up OpenSSL 1.0.2q
 which both does seem to be unproblematic at first glance.

 Please try running the application from a shell prompt and let us know
 what messages you see. Open Terminal and type this:

 /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox

 (assuming you have installed Tor Browser into /Applications).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28719 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clicking on embedded links seems to cause FPI mismatch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28719: Clicking on embedded links seems to cause FPI mismatch
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-8.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> Starting with Tor Browser 8 if one clicks on a link to, say, an image on
> a different domain, one sees first Torbutton log output about a request
> to the old domain in the URL bar and then to the new one. For instance if
> one clicks on the image link on
>
> https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/image_pdf_fpi.html
>
> the result is something like
> {{{
> [12-04 09:21:38] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
> https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif via
>torproject.org:b1e105e74a9fc3a64a2ce2ac582c0640
> [12-04 09:21:38] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
> https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif via
>w3schools.com:81afd299054bcc8fc31c931087161bfe
> GET https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif
> [HTTP/2.0 200 OK 1787ms]
> }}}
> Note, there is only one get request actually issues which could be a hint
> for a similar logging-only issue like #18762 and #16324.
>
> This got noted on our blog:
> https://blog.torproject.org/comment/278684#comment-278684 (and similar
> comments on the 8.5a5 blog post).

New description:

 Starting with Tor Browser 8 if one clicks on a link to, say, an image on a
 different domain, one sees first Torbutton log output about a request to
 the old domain in the URL bar and then to the new one. For instance if one
 clicks on the image link on

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/tests/image_pdf_fpi.html

 the result is something like
 {{{
 [12-04 09:21:38] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif via
torproject.org:b1e105e74a9fc3a64a2ce2ac582c0640
 [12-04 09:21:38] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif via
w3schools.com:81afd299054bcc8fc31c931087161bfe
 GET https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif
 [HTTP/2.0 200 OK 1787ms]
 }}}
 Note, there is only one GET request actually issued which could be a hint
 for a similar logging-only issue like #18762 and #16324.

 This got noted on our blog:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/278684#comment-278684 (and similar
 comments on the 8.5a5 blog post).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28549 [Webpages/Support]: Add missing FAQ questions to support.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28549: Add missing FAQ questions to support.tpo
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  faq   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by emmapeel):

 * owner:  traumschule => emmapeel


Comment:

 ill have a look at this

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3799 [Community/Translations]: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3799: Investigate methods for translating strings in Unixoid shell scripts
+--
 Reporter:  rransom |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Translations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  emmapeel|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Concatenate strings and move \n out of to be translated strings:
 https://github.com/traumschule/torbrowser-
 localized/commit/ec0258e8f7e21bd2e30da4a1e5bb132f333e91a7

 For reference emmapeel's helpful links:
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 
US/docs/Mozilla/Localization/Localization_content_best_practices#Don't_assume_grammar_structures
 https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2012/07/12-commandments-software-
 localization/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28191 [Applications/Tor Browser]: orfox isnt working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28191: orfox isnt working
--+--
 Reporter:  turnipdick|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 If this is actually about the VPN mode, then having this be a Tor Browser
 ticket doesn't much so much sense: I hear that Tor Browser for Android
 doesn't do, or doesn't do well, the VPN mode from Orbot.

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[tor-bugs] #28827 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Add wordlist to the styleguide

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28827: Add wordlist to the styleguide
-+--
 Reporter:  emmapeel |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Related to the glossary, and maybe as a subset of it, we discussed the
 idea of having a wordlist for the Tor Project on the Styleguide.

 This list would have rules for writing, and thus translating Tor related
 terms.

 It will help to save time with discussions related to terms, and to have
 consistency across our project. It may help to understand the terms, but
 is not like the glossary the Community team compiled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28805 [Core Tor/Tor]: ControlPort has undocumented behavior

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28805: ControlPort has undocumented behavior
+--
 Reporter:  wagon   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, easy, tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-control,easy, doc => tor-control, easy, tor-doc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28807 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Ask authority operators to set `MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 0` in their torrcs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28807: Ask authority operators to set `MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 0` in their 
torrcs
-+
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-dirauth, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 wagon]:
 > > Authorities are only chosen as middle nodes, because they don't have
 any other relevant flags.
 > What forbids DA to become guard? As I know, usual fast relay with big
 uptime doesn't have an option to continue to be just a middleman, i.e., to
 not get guard flag.

 They don't have the Guard flag.

 > > Only one of the 10 (dizum) has the Fast flag. So the others will be
 ignored by most clients.
 > Good point. As I remember, nodes without Fast flag are not used for data
 transfer. Do you mean there can be some old clients which behaves
 differently?

 Yes, and some custom clients, and some clients that are configured
 differently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24213 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ORFOX - No Tor related settings/addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24213: ORFOX - No Tor related settings/addon
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Should be a nonä-issue with Tor Browser for Android. And we don't fix
 Orfox anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28380 [Applications/Orbot]: Oreo adaptive icon shape

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28380: Oreo adaptive icon shape
+--
 Reporter:  cepxuo  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Orbot


Comment:

 No, #28381 is for Tor Browser, this is meant to be for Orbot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28824 [Applications/Tor Check]: Thor Is Being Hacked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28824: Thor Is Being Hacked
+--
 Reporter:  Valientthor |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Tor Check


Comment:

 I assume this is one of the false positives we have with check.tpo?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1969 [Applications/Orbot]: Full i18n in preference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1969: Full i18n in preference
+--
 Reporter:  pen9u1n |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  i18n|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Orbot


Comment:

 That's not a Tor Browser ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a def

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27845: Tor Browser 8.0.1 - on MacOS desktop platforms, the default Tor Browser
window size is 1000 Wide x 0998 High, not 1000 Wide x 1000 High. Is this a
defect?
-+-
 Reporter:  monmire  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Glad that it works for you. We did not implement a fix directly. But maybe
 switching to the Rust based style system somehow solves that? Closing this
 for now. Please reopen if the problem comes back/still persists. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28825 [Core Tor/Tor]: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28825: update to 8.04 causes immediate crash on MacOS 10.14.1
--+
 Reporter:  gander2001|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28823 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28823: Every web page crashes on Windows 7 with Tor Browser 8
--+---
 Reporter:  testcy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Can you try to uninstall Comodo Internet Security 11 (just for testing
 purposes) and restart your computer? It's often not enough to just disable
 antivirus software to stop it from interfering with other programs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25187 [Applications/Orbot]: [Android] Tor-enable Apps

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25187: [Android] Tor-enable Apps
+--
 Reporter:  dovanvu1792@…   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Orbot


Comment:

 Seems to be an Orbot ticket, if at all.

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[tor-bugs] #28818 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please increase RAM on meronense from 4G to 8G

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28818: Please increase RAM on meronense from 4G to 8G
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The daily update on meronense has become quite slow recently. I'd like to
 try giving the process more memory to see if that makes things better.

 Can you please increase RAM on meronense from 4G to 8G? Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28749 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor on flash drive won't run on other computers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28749: Tor on flash drive won't run on other computers
--+---
 Reporter:  pericles  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 pericles: Are the both to Tor Browser on both computers the same? Does the
 problem go away if you delete the `extensions.json` file in your Tor
 Browser directory on your flash drive? (It should be located
 inpath\to\torbrowser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Browser\profile.default)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28750 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB freezes with Script: chrome://global/content/bindings/notification.xml:74

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28750: TBB freezes with Script:
chrome://global/content/bindings/notification.xml:74
--+---
 Reporter:  bo0od |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Some steps to reproduce would be handy. What do you mean with "with
 allowing HTML5 + some JS"? How are you doing that in your Tor Browser?

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[tor-bugs] #28820 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Tor Browser Manual: Add Android specific details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28820: Tor Browser Manual: Add Android specific details
--+---
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Once we have a good stable version of TBA, we should start adding Android
 specific data to the Tor Browser Manual.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28819 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser can't be installed on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28819: Tor Browser can't be installed on Windows 7
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 justmeee: can you give us your Windows version information? E.g. what do
 you get if you press Windows logo key + R, type `winver`, then select OK?

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[tor-bugs] #28819 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser can't be installed on Windows 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28819: Tor Browser can't be installed on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In #28690 a user on Windows 7 experienced the issue that they can't
 install Tor Browser on it (the installer complains with "You need Windows
 7") while updating from an older version seems to work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28690 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problems running, installing and updating Torbrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28690: Problems running, installing and updating Torbrowser
--+---
 Reporter:  justmeee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 justmeee]:
 > More info:
 >
 > After many tires, I got it to update in a different location, though it
 took numerous attempts.  However even though it updated, unlike before,
 the hang problem is back now too from the original ticket.  I can't work
 on it, so I'm not posting from someone else's machine.
 >
 > So the noted problems:
 > 1) Can't install because it tells me I need to have Windows 7 installed
 even though I do have windows 7 64 bit installed

 Okay, I opened #28819 for that particular problem to not clutter this bug
 report any more.

 > 2) Could only get that one version to install, 8.0a8 , and it should be
 noted that it never gives you any notice that the install is complete, it
 just disappears, so you don't know if it's done or if it stopped, or what.
 It needs a completion dialog.

 Okay, let's revisit that once we solved #28819 and are using the latest
 version we provide.

 > Additionally, updates are a problem.
 >  a) The browser updates trigger the Trend Micro virus but even after
 telling antivirus to allow the components that triggered it, which also
 adds it to the exception list,  the program still won't even run anymore -
 even after turning off antivirus, it still will not work and a fresh copy
 won't install/work right after that in the same location.
 >  b)  a fresh install in a different location with antivirus turned
 off allowed for a fresh install.  It still had trouble updated per the
 above notes, so it took a long time and many tries.

 I am afraid there is not much we can do to fix this situation. You could
 try to contact the Trend Micro folks to fix their software or get rid off
 it. Moreover, just turning it off might not be enough to actually stop it.
 You might want to be sure about the Trend Mirco software not interfering
 by removing it (and be it just temporarily).

 > However, after the updates completed, we're back to square one where
 it's hanging so badly I can't use it.
 >
 > Screen shots of some of the hangs attached, the names of the files note
 the condition and when.  The first one happened when I was just trying to
 type an address in the bar as you can see.  The second was after the first
 stopped hanging, I just closed that tab and then tried to click on the
 NoScript icon for another webpage, as you can see, that's it, and it hung
 up again.  Three and four are labeled.  Note the last one, it had been
 hanging for several minutes with no change.  Then later then when it
 finally stopped hanging, it only functioned for about 15 seconds then hung
 up like that again.  So it's back to not usable for me.

 You have a bunch of extra extensions installed. Please use only Tor
 Browser as we ship it, at least for debugging purposes. Does the problem
 continue if you make sure you run Tor Browser without any modifications?
 On which security slider level are you? And how are you disabling
 JavaScript?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28145 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Add support/Tor Browser Manual links (was: TBA: Add link to frontdesk)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28145: TBA: Add support/Tor Browser Manual links
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201812,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a3 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by pili):

 If that is what we do for desktop then we should do the same for android,
 and if this is already done then we should close this ticket :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28820 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Tor Browser Manual: Add Android specific details

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28820: Tor Browser Manual: Add Android specific details
--+---
 Reporter:  pili  |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by emmapeel):

 Also related: #28475 updates to the support portal

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28639 [Core Tor/sbws]: After several days, most of the circuits timeout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28639: After several days, most of the circuits timeout
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:12 teor]:
 > This issue is an instance of #27049: sbws does not open any 3-hop
 circuits, so it stalls when all 3-hop circuits time out.

 I don't understand this sentence.
 I guess the 3-hop circuits are open by Tor to download descriptors and
 network status documents?.
 Wouldn't new 3-hop circuits be created when other 3-hop circuits timeout?.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28549 [Webpages/Support]: Add missing FAQ questions to support.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28549: Add missing FAQ questions to support.tpo
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  emmapeel
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  faq   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 Thanks! So far i have unpushed branches for the Legal, Abuse and Trademark
 FAQ. The Onion Services answer may not be worth to carry over. If you list
 parts that should (not) be migrated i can take care of the formatting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23888 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23888: Creating a Snowflake WebExtension addon
---+---
 Reporter:  oarel  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


Comment:

 Added to ux-team roadmap

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28818 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please increase RAM on meronense from 4G to 8G

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28818: Please increase RAM on meronense from 4G to 8G
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ln5):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28551 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor's Travis should print the python version after installation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28551: Tor's Travis should print the python version after installation
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-ci, travis, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 lgtm too; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28007 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: scan-build.sh issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28007: shellcheck: scan-build.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Patches work for me; merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27402 [Core Tor/Tor]: stop reporting "internal paths" during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27402: stop reporting "internal paths" during bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, tor-spec,  |  implemented
  035-deferred-20180930  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, fallback,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-removed-20180711, 035-roadmap  |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged!

 Please close or un-parent child tickets as appropriate, and then close
 this ticket? :)

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