[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #32379, #32380, #32381, #32389, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #32379, #32380, #32381, #32389, #32434, #32435, #32436, 
#32437, #32470, #32526, #32700 by gk:


Comment:
No December anymore.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32700 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32700: No need to disable GeckoDriver in Windows mozconfig files
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201912  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R, GeorgKoppen202001 =>
 TorBrowserTeam202001R, GeorgKoppen201912


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor won't open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32710: Tor won't open
--+---
 Reporter:  10Butterfly   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: QR code to install tor and visit given onion site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32837: QR code to install tor and visit given onion site
--+--
 Reporter:  toruser2019   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32586 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32586: Your capcha is as stupid as 99% of them on the Intenet1!!!
--+
 Reporter:  iyyov@…   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Service - trac


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't allow fingerprinting via navigator.userAgent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28290: Don't allow fingerprinting via navigator.userAgent
-+-
 Reporter:  indigotime   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os, user- |  Actual Points:
  feedback, blog |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 #32843 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32843 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Javascript attributes do not match HTTP headers when using TBB 9.0.2 on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32843: Javascript attributes do not match HTTP headers when using TBB 9.0.2 on
Linux
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-9.0, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Duplicate of #28290.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31341 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31341: TorBirdy does not support Thunderbird 68
--+-
 Reporter:  ozozoz|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBirdy, Thunderbird 68  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: wschmidt22 (added)


Comment:

 #32844 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32844 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Please update torbirdy to support new versions of firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32844: Please update torbirdy to support new versions of firefox
---+---
 Reporter:  wschmidt22 |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => sukhbir
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/TorBirdy
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #31341.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32887 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove use of NS() macros to make our code more indentable?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32887: Remove use of NS() macros to make our code more indentable?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've never used those nor know how to properly take advantage of them. I'm
 all for removing code overall :). +1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, memory-safety, security-low,   |  Actual Points:  0.4
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #28745 [Applications/Tor Browser]: THE Torbutton clean-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28745: THE Torbutton clean-up
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  acat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #30506   | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by acat):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam202001 => tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam202001R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:28 gk]:
 > Okay, let's move on with the review process, commit
 8269902a22357697c46c7052c9d946bd874c3f55:
 >
 > Looks mostly good. It misses a `tor-browser` change to remove the
 `extensions.torbutton.updateNeeded` and
 `extensions.torbutton.versioncheck_enabled` pref, now that we moved the
 preferences. Additionally, please remove the `torbutton-update-needed.svg`
 as well. It seems to be obsolete now, too.
 >
 > For 8c0c18a09a30f14dd0b4a99fe67238fec0ad3bac what command did you
 run/tool did you use to check for those errors (and fix them)?

 Hmm, i can't find `8269902a22357697c46c7052c9d946bd874c3f55` commit, I
 assume it was from `torbutton` (I hope it was not `push --force` again).

 In any case, I removed the mentioned prefs and some more that are now
 unused from `000-tor-browser-prefs.js`: https://github.com/acatarineu/tor-
 browser/commit/28745+3. Some are unused because of changes already
 commited, some are due to `torbutton` changes from this ticket not yet
 commited.

 I also rebased the torbutton changes from `28745+4` to current master, and
 removed `torbutton-updated-needed.svg`. Besides, I split the style-
 changing commits into two, the ones automatically done by eslint tool, and
 the remaining ones that had to be addressed manually. Changes are in
 https://github.com/acatarineu/torbutton/commits/28745+5.

 The command to fix `eslint` issues was `./mach lint -l eslint --fix
 toolkit/torproject/torbutton`, run in the `tor-browser` repo with the
 right `torbutton` repo temporarily checked in in
 `toolkit/torproject/torbutton` (this time I also had to run `./mach
 bootstrap --no-system-changes` with Desktop selected before, which is
 new).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32363 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_inet_aton parsing of IPv4 literals is too lax

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32363: tor_inet_aton parsing of IPv4 literals is too lax
--+
 Reporter:  liberat   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Left a comment on the PR. Might be something, might be nothing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32889 [Core Tor/Tor]: Space the a-d unsigned ints in tor_inet_aton()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32889: Space the a-d unsigned ints in tor_inet_aton()
--+-
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged as trivially correct.

 FYI, we're planning to start using clang-format to automatically handle
 space issues in our code, so it might not be necessary to do this kind of
 patch in the long term.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31855: Remove End of Year Fundraising Campaign from about:tor
-+-
 Reporter:  pili |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  backported |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201912R, tbb-backport => TorBrowserTeam201912R,
 tbb-backported


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32845 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add UTF-8 validation unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32845: Add UTF-8 validation unit tests
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  043-should, utf-8, Unicode  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 LGTM; squashed and merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32890 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Remember processed files between module runs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32890: Remember processed files between module runs
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The three recently added modules to archive Snowflake statistics, bridge
 pool assignments, and BridgeDB metrics have in common that they process
 any input files regardless of whether they already processed them before.

 The problem is that the input files processed by these modules are either
 never removed (Snowflake statistics) or only removed manually by the
 operator (bridge pool assignments and BridgeDB statistics).

 The effect is that non-recent BridgeDB metrics and bridge pool assignments
 are being placed in the indexed/recent/ directory in the next execution
 after they are deleted for being older than 72 hours. The same would
 happen with Snowflake statistics after the operator removes them from the
 out/ directory.

 The fix is to use a state file containing file names of previously
 processed files and only process a file not found in there. This is the
 same approach as taken for bridge descriptor tarballs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32890 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Remember processed files between module runs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32890: Remember processed files between module runs
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/collector.git/commit/?h=task-32890&id=6b54e950c15c0674e4e131de2f65840e0e9344c2
 commit 6b54e95 in my task-32890 branch].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32891 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge in Denmark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32891: Set up default bridge in Denmark
--+-
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-bridges
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 My former Karlstad University colleague Toke Høiland-Jørgensen generously
 offered to set up a default bridge, which also speaks IPv6. Let's use this
 ticket to coordinate this effort and eventually get the new bridge into
 tor-browser-launcher and tor-android-service.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32846 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32846: Tor Manual: Alphabetize Client Options
-+-
 Reporter:  swati|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, tor-client, manpage,  |  Actual Points:
  gsod   |
Parent ID:  #4310| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 CircuitsAvailableTimeout should go before CircuitStreamTimeout if we're
 alphabetizing ignoring case.

 I think LearnCircuitBuildTimeout can also go immediately after
 CircuitBuildTimeout, or it can go in alphabetic order because
 CircuitBuildTimeout adequately describes LearnCircuitBuildTimeout anyway.

 I'm undecided whether ExcludeExitNodes logically belongs out of order
 after ExcludeNodes; what do other people think?

 The PathBias options could use a comment explaining why they're
 intentionally out of order.

 I can make a branch that fixes up these, unless you want to make the
 changes yourself?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32891 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set up default bridge in Denmark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32891: Set up default bridge in Denmark
--+--
 Reporter:  phw   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tohojo):

 Right, running a v4 and a v6 bridge now with these configs:

 v4:
 {{{
 SocksPort 0
 ExtORPort auto
 ExitPolicy reject *:*

 # memory
 MaxMemInQueues 1 GB

 # more useful statistics
 EntryStatistics 1
 ExtraInfoStatistics 1
 HeartbeatPeriod 1 hour
 AssumeReachable 1

 # obfs4 and parameters
 ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
 ServerTransportOptions obfs4 iatMode=0

 # announce bridges
 BridgeRelay 1
 BridgeDistribution none

 # These ports must be externally reachable.  Avoid port 9001.
 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 45.145.95.6:27015
 OutboundBindAddress [2a0c:4d80:42:702::1]
 OutboundBindAddress 45.145.95.6
 ORPort 45.145.95.6:27018

 # identity
 Nickname dktoke
 ContactInfo ab...@toke.dk
 }}}

 v6:
 {{{
 SocksPort 0
 ExtORPort auto
 ExitPolicy reject *:*

 # memory
 MaxMemInQueues 1 GB

 # more useful statistics
 EntryStatistics 1
 ExtraInfoStatistics 1
 HeartbeatPeriod 1 hour
 AssumeReachable 1

 # obfs4 and parameters
 ServerTransportPlugin obfs4 exec /usr/bin/obfs4proxy
 ServerTransportOptions obfs4 iatMode=0

 # announce bridges
 BridgeRelay 1
 BridgeDistribution none

 # These ports must be externally reachable.  Avoid port 9001.
 ServerTransportListenAddr obfs4 [2a0c:4d80:42:702::1]:27015
 OutboundBindAddress [2a0c:4d80:42:702::1]
 OutboundBindAddress 45.145.95.6
 ORPort [2a0c:4d80:42:702::1]:27018

 # identity
 Nickname dktoke6
 ContactInfo ab...@toke.dk
 }}}

 Bridge lines:
 {{{
 obfs4 45.145.95.6:27015 C5B7CD6946FF10C5B3E89691A7D3F2C122D2117C
 cert=TD7PbUO0/0k6xYHMPW3vJxICfkMZNdkRrb63Zhl5j9dW3iRGiCx0A7mPhe5T2EDzQ35+Zw
 iat-mode=0
 obfs4 [2a0c:4d80:42:702::1]:27015 EFEBBDE5685DDF3E268A8E1D6CE6837C4910D4B3
 cert=zLXgiAK19V3FYc8cKsSyO0bZwhUBw37ZVhLyP1sH5SeMwdfXZURyEcF3DUesMNzsY7JseQ
 iat-mode=0
 }}}

 Also available in DNS as {{{tor-bridge.toke.dk}}}.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32870 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump version of pion webrtc in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32870: Bump version of pion webrtc in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cohosh|  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam202001R |  Actual Points:  .7
Parent ID:  #31971| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor28
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam202001R


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #30368 [Circumvention/Snowflake]: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#30368: Run some tests to check reachability of snowflake proxies
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  anti-censorship-roadmap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  phw  |Sponsor:  Sponsor28-can
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, I'm going to go ahead and close this ticket since we have #32657
 currently open.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32712 [Applications/GetTor]: gettor host fills up storage space when updating files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32712: gettor host fills up storage space when updating files
-+
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in `fa922cc17`:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/gettor.git/commit/?id=21138997b6718ad92277786d348a72afa922cc17

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32778 [Core Tor/Tor]: pubsub_pub_

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32778: pubsub_pub_
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.4.2.5
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-backport 042-backport extra- |  Actual Points:  .1
  review |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Is anyone who encountered this problem willing to verify that this patch
 works for them?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31597 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 and 68 (inclusive)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31597: Go over all closed bugs/bugs where patches landed between Firefox 61 
and 68
(inclusive)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff68-esr, tbb-9.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:  12.5
  TorBrowserTeam202001   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 12.5


Comment:

 What I actually used for looking over the bugs was:

 Mozilla:
 a) fixed:
 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?product=Core&query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=mozilla61&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0

 b) reopened:
 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?resolution=---&query_format=advanced&product=Core&target_milestone=mozilla61

 Firefox:
 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?product=Firefox&query_format=advanced&resolution=FIXED&target_milestone=Firefox%2061&order=priority%2Cbug_severity&limit=0

 Fennec:
 
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/buglist.cgi?resolution=FIXED&classification=Client%20Software&query_format=advanced&bug_status=RESOLVED&product=Firefox%20for%20Android&target_milestone=Firefox%2061

 And then replacing the "61" with the respective version to double-check.

 I think we are good and don't need to fix up our current esr68 code, yay!
 (There are some tickets for ff76-esr I filed, though, but nothing that's
 critical right now)

 Oh, and 1.5 points per release is waaay more realistic than the total 5
 points I assumed first. :) :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32173 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update signing infrastructure to work with Apple's notarization process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32173: Update signing infrastructure to work with Apple's notarization process
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sign, TorBrowserTeam202001  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  gk => boklm


Comment:

 I am not the one driving this ticket anymore but I made a proposal on what
 options we have which needs to get pushed further now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32892 [Core Tor/Tor]: chan: Remove dead function command_process_var_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32892: chan: Remove dead function command_process_var_cell()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-chan
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 With `channel_set_cell_handlers()`, two handlers are set in a channel
 which are for fixed size cell and variable length cell.

 Turns out that the `channel->var_cell_handler` is never used since all var
 cell are processed through the channel TLS layer directly:

 `connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()`
  -> `channel_tls_handle_var_cell()`.

 Which means we can remove a good 70+ lines of dead code.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31873 [Circumvention/BridgeDB]: Create new bridge distribution mechanisms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31873: Create new bridge distribution mechanisms
+---
 Reporter:  phw |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s30-o23a1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #31280  | Points:  20
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor30-can
+---

Comment (by sigvids):

 For #32781 "Investigate alternative method to share bridges and Tor
 Browser bundles based on social network protocols" and #31873 "Create new
 bridge distribution mechanisms":

 There is a trade-off between publicity and privacy.

 If the distribution of bridges is **''too public''**, the bridges become
 known to the censors.

 If the distribution is **''too private''**, only insiders get to use them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32892 [Core Tor/Tor]: chan: Remove dead function command_process_var_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32892: chan: Remove dead function command_process_var_cell()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-chan  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `ticket32892_043_01`
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/1642

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32893 [Community/Training]: Automating the remote training cycle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32893: Automating the remote training cycle
+--
 Reporter:  ggus|  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Training  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 For the last few months I've been organizing the remote trainings for Tor
 and centralizing everything via email has been limiting and confusing.

 For the public launch, it would be important to scale this work. These are
 the main points:

 a) a way to receive new partnership requests that is not linked to my
 personal email
 b) easily follow the ongoing trainings
 c) have templates for each step of the partnership, for example, welcome
 and introduction, partnership agreement, training materials, scheduling
 online meeting, user feedback report
 d) have a history of who the organizations are and what was discussed

 Possible solution:

 1. Create a new alias: training@tpo redirecting to a queue in RT, so we
 can track the requests by status 'New', 'Open', 'Closed'.
 2. Create templates in different languages (ES, PT_BR, EN) in RT.
 3. Use Gitlab kanban to have an overview.
 4. For now, since this program is not for public participation, we could
 host the partnership agreement in Nextcloud.
 5. An IRC private channel to receive notifications about new emails in
 training@tpo.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31239 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: automate installs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31239: automate installs
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 i created a "discussion" section in the
 [https://help.torproject.org/tsa/howto/new-machine/#index3h1 new machine
 wiki page] where i copied the alternatives listed earlier here and added a
 few. documentation on those tools should be done over there from here on.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: Onion-location: increasing the use of onion services through automatic
redirects and aliasing
-+-
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  acat
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, network-team-   |  Actual Points:  9
  roadmap-november, tbb-9.5, |
  TorBrowserTeam202001R  |
Parent ID:  #30024   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  pospeselr, mcs, brade|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor27-must
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 **Backend**

 So one weird thing that stands about the changes to nsHttpChannel.cpp is
 that the new {{{Onion-Location}}} code seems to supersede all logic
 surrounding the returned HTTP Status. Whether that's okay or not kind of
 depends on the {{{Onion-Location}}} spec.

 How are properly configured web-servers meant to use the {{{Onion-
 Location}}} header? Is it meant to be there in every HTTP response sent to
 the client, or only in certain situations? The spec is unclear about which
 HTTP status codes it is meant to be used with. It does state that
 {{{Onion-Location}}} has the same restrictions and semantics as
 {{{Location}}} which according to [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Location Mozilla] only has meaning for {{{3XX}}}
 and {{{201}}} responses.

 If we are only supposed to redirect in those contexts then the checks for
 that block checking for and getting the {{{Onion-Location}}} header could
 (probably?) go down into {{{nsHttpChannel::AsyncProcessDirection}}}.

 We don't seem to check if we are *already* on the Onion site the {{{Onion-
 Location}}} header suggests we redirect to.

 **Frontend**

 The frontend logic seems good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20969 [Core Tor/DocTor]: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20969: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27416 [Core Tor/DocTor]: Automatc tickets for malformed descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27416: Automatc tickets for malformed descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Hi teor. I'm in the process of moving DocTor tickets to GitHub, but
 honestly I don't think there's much impetus to implement the 'file
 automatic tickets for malformed descriptors' check mentioned above. If I'm
 incorrect and there is a significant interest by the Network Team in
 having this then please file a ticket for this at
 https://github.com/torproject/doctor/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32842 [Core Tor/DocTor]: Give notifications if tor26 is missing from the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32842: Give notifications if tor26 is missing from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Hi starlight. I'm in the process of moving DocTor tickets to GitHub
 (https://github.com/torproject/doctor/). Your skipping mechanism is great,
 but at the end of the day it is a tool for DocTor's operator and as such
 their decision if they want it.

 Would you like responsibility for running and administering DocTor? I
 wrote DocTor as a favor to Karsten, and I'm willing to transfer ownership
 if you want it. If you do then please file a ticket at
 https://github.com/torproject/doctor/issues and I'll discuss it with the
 dirauth operators.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #32894 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: DIsable DocTor trac component

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32894: DIsable DocTor trac component
--+-
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Hi qbi. Like [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32832 Stem
 and Nyx] I'm [https://github.com/torproject/doctor moving DocTor to
 GitHub].

 Could we please archive its trac component (Core Tor > DocTor)?

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31701 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31701: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, measurement  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cohosh):

 * Attachment "obfs4-reachability-2020-01-07.pdf" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31701 [Circumvention/Obfs4]: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31701: Reachability tests for new obfs4 bridges
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Circumvention/Obfs4|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  reachability, measurement  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cohosh):

 Well this is a bit weird. I just re-ran these tests and looks like at
 least 2 bridges that were previously unreachable in China are now
 reachable again.

 So perhaps the block list populated by BridgeDB scraping is not static.

 It also looks like there are some bridges that are no longer reachable in
 North America. Might be worth checking into that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #31669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#31669: Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired
--+---
 Reporter:  a_p   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.4.1.5
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, log   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arma):

 toralf hit this one again today on their relay. It sounds like the
 plausible theory is that an onion service with a wrong clock could trigger
 it. And since there's nothing the relay can, or ought to, do in response,
 we should turn this into a protocol-warn or the like.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20969 [Core Tor/DocTor]: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20969: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  network-health   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * keywords:   => network-health
 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 letting gk know about this ticket so we can accumulate some scope guidance
 for the network health team.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32879 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Jenkins tests now require python 3.6+

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32879: Jenkins tests now require python 3.6+
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 Ok, this means it will no longer work on jessie, stretch, and xenial.

 I will remove those from the stem-ci-linux job matrix.

 Additionally, stem-tor-ci-base and stem-tor-ci will move to build on
 buster rather than stretch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove relays that fail to rotate onion keys from the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20055: Remove relays that fail to rotate onion keys from the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-dirauth, security, |  Actual Points:
  key-rotation, network-health   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, tor-dirauth, security, key-rotation => tor-spec,
 tor-dirauth, security, key-rotation, network-health
 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20969 [Core Tor]: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20969: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * component:  Core Tor/DocTor => Core Tor
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 Sounds like a thing we actually want to do. Re-opening for the time being.
 There is no network-health sub component yet (maybe we don't even want
 one), so leaving that one empty for now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20969 [Core Tor]: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20969: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.
+
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => new


Comment:

 I guess we should talk to the network team about prio and scope of this
 bug, though, given that this tiket "rotted" for 3 years.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20969 [Core Tor]: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20969: Detect relays that don't update their onion keys every 7 days.
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  network-health  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  atagar => gk


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #32588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#32588: Setting ORPort [ipv6]:auto mistakenly advertises port 94
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, memory-safety, security-low,   |  Actual Points:  0.6
  035-backport, 040-backport, 041-backport,  |
  042-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:  0.4 => 0.6


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 dgoulet]:
 > Hmmm CI exploded for _one_ specific builds with interesting stacktrace:
 >
 > https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/627571176

 I forgot to check for a NULL IPv6 address.

 I re-did the patch, and split the commits into:
 * bug fix (and code movement)
 * refactoring

 I still need to write some tests, but I'd like a review :-)
 I also need to fix up #32822, because it's based on this branch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs