[tor-commits] [tpo/staging] Update content

2020-07-20 Thread gus
commit 8bf0e1b0bd349dd10d7c33f00ca695790d4355f2
Author: Antonela 
Date:   Mon Jun 1 17:40:15 2020 -0300

Update content
---
 content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr | 24 +++-
 templates/release.html  |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr 
b/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
index 6297ade1..74f51ee0 100644
--- a/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
+++ b/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ body:
 
 ## This new Tor Browser release is focused on helping users understand onion 
services.
 
+
 Tor's onion routing remains the best way to achieve end-to-end anonymous 
communication on the Internet. With onion services (.onion addresses), website 
administrators can provide their users with anonymous connections that are 
metadata-free or that hide metadata from any third party. Onion services are 
also one of the few censorship circumvention technologies that allow users to 
route around censorship while simultaneously protecting their privacy and 
identity.
 
 For the first time, Tor Browser users will be able to opt-in for using onion 
sites automatically whenever the website makes them available. For years, some 
websites have invisibly used onion services with alternative services, and this 
continues to be an excellent choice. Now, there is also an option for websites 
that want their users to know about their onion service to  invite them to 
opt-in to use their .onion address.
@@ -20,30 +21,43 @@ For the first time, Tor Browser users will be able to 
opt-in for using onion sit
 
 Website publishers now can advertise their onion service to Tor users by 
adding an HTTP header. When visiting a website that has both an .onion address 
and Onion Location enabled via Tor Browser, users will be prompted about the 
onion service version of the site and will be asked to opt-in to upgrade to the 
onion service on their first use.
 
-![Tor Browser 9.5 Onion 
Location](https://blog.torproject.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_retina/public/image/tor-browser_0_43_5_0.png)
+
+
 
 **Onion Authentication**
 
-Onion services administrators who want to add an extra layer of security to 
their website can now set a pair of keys for access control and authentication. 
Tor Browser users can save keys and manage them via about:preferences#privacy 
in the Onion Services Authentication section.
+Onion services administrators who want to add an extra layer of security to 
their website can now set a pair of keys for access control and authentication.
+
+
+
+Tor Browser users can save keys and manage them via about:preferences#privacy 
in the Onion Services Authentication section.
+
+
+
 
 **Improved URL Bar Security Indicators**
 
 Browsers traditionally rendered sites delivered via a secure transport 
protocol with a green lock icon. But in mid-2019, the formerly green lock icon 
became gray, intending to de-emphasize the default (safe) connection state and 
instead of putting more emphasis on broken or insecure connections. Major 
browsers as Firefox and Chrome understood that it is a benefit for the entire 
user base if they deploy familiar experiences for both users. We are following 
Firefox on this decision, and have we updated Tor Browser security indicators 
to make it easier for users to understand when they are visiting an non-secure 
website.
 
+
+
+
 **Error pages for onion services**
 
 Sometimes users have a hard time reaching onion sites. In previous version of 
Tor Browser, when there was an error connecting to an onion service, users 
received a standard Firefox error message, with no information about why they 
were unable to connect to the onion site.
 
 In this release, we have improved the way Tor Browser communicates with users 
about service-, client-, and network-side errors that might happpen when they 
are trying to visit an onion service. Tor Browser now displays a simplified 
diagram of the connection and shows where the error occured. We want these 
messages to be clear and informative without being overwhelming.
 
+
+
+
 **Onion Names**
 
 Because of cryptographic protections, onion service URLs are not easy for 
humans to remember (ie, torproject.org vs. expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion). This makes 
it hard for users to discover or return to an onion site. We found that 
organically, developers have approached this problem in different ways, mostly 
with solutions tailored for their service. Given that there is no solution that 
works perfectly for all our user groups, we also approached this problem from a 
broad angle. For this release, we partnered with the [Freedom of the Press 
Foundation](https://freedom.press/) and [HTTPS 
Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere) to develop the first 
proof-of-concept for human-memorable names for onion services addresses.
 
-**Known Issues**
-
-Tor Browser 9.5 comes with a number of 

[tor-commits] [tpo/staging] Update content

2020-07-20 Thread gus
commit 8e2322b594e603e2494644480b9d7b544422a1ae
Author: Antonela 
Date:   Mon Jun 1 15:16:48 2020 -0300

Update content

The template is working now \o/
---
 .../tor-browser/tor-browser-95/contents.lr | 99 ++
 templates/release.html | 50 +++
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/releases/tor-browser/tor-browser-95/contents.lr 
b/content/releases/tor-browser/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
index 5188e689..83c5713a 100644
--- a/content/releases/tor-browser/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
+++ b/content/releases/tor-browser/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 section: What is new
 ---
-html: release.html
+_template: release.html
 ---
 color: primary
 ---
@@ -19,114 +19,31 @@ For the first time, Tor Browser users will be able to 
opt-in for using onion sit
 ### What is new?
 
 **Onion Location**
+
 Website publishers now can advertise their onion service to Tor users by 
adding an HTTP header. When visiting a website that has both an .onion address 
and Onion Location enabled via Tor Browser, users will be prompted about the 
onion service version of the site and will be asked to opt-in to upgrade to the 
onion service on their first use.
 
 **Onion Authentication**
+
 Onion services administrators who want to add an extra layer of security to 
their website can now set a pair of keys for access control and authentication. 
Tor Browser users can save keys and manage them via about:preferences#privacy 
in the Onion Services Authentication section.
 
 **Improved URL Bar Security Indicators**
+
 Browsers traditionally rendered sites delivered via a secure transport 
protocol with a green lock icon. But in mid-2019, the formerly green lock icon 
became gray, intending to de-emphasize the default (safe) connection state and 
instead of putting more emphasis on broken or insecure connections. Major 
browsers as Firefox and Chrome understood that it is a benefit for the entire 
user base if they deploy familiar experiences for both users. We are following 
Firefox on this decision, and have we updated Tor Browser security indicators 
to make it easier for users to understand when they are visiting an non-secure 
website.
 
 **Error pages for onion services**
+
 Sometimes users have a hard time reaching onion sites. In previous version of 
Tor Browser, when there was an error connecting to an onion service, users 
received a standard Firefox error message, with no information about why they 
were unable to connect to the onion site.
 
 In this release, we have improved the way Tor Browser communicates with users 
about service-, client-, and network-side errors that might happpen when they 
are trying to visit an onion service. Tor Browser now displays a simplified 
diagram of the connection and shows where the error occured. We want these 
messages to be clear and informative without being overwhelming.
 
 **Onion Names**
+
 Because of cryptographic protections, onion service URLs are not easy for 
humans to remember (ie, torproject.org vs. expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion). This makes 
it hard for users to discover or return to an onion site. We found that 
organically, developers have approached this problem in different ways, mostly 
with solutions tailored for their service. Given that there is no solution that 
works perfectly for all our user groups, we also approached this problem from a 
broad angle. For this release, we partnered with the [Freedom of the Press 
Foundation](https://freedom.press/) and [HTTPS 
Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere) to develop the first 
proof-of-concept for human-memorable names for onion services addresses.
 
 **Known Issues**
+
 Tor Browser 9.5 comes with a number of known issues. The most important ones 
are:
 
 **Give Feedback**
-If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, 
please let us know. Thanks to all of the teams across Tor, and the many 
volunteers, who contributed to this release.
 
-**Full Changelog**
-The full changelog since Tor Browser 9.0.10 is:
-
- * All Platforms
-   * Update Firefox to 68.9.0esr
-   * Update HTTPS-Everywhere to 2020.5.20
-   * Update NoScript to 11.0.26
-   * Update Tor to 0.4.3.5
-   * Translations update
-   * Bug 21549: Disable wasm for now until it is properly audited
-   * Bug 27268: Preferences clean-up in Torbutton code
-   * Bug 28745: Remove torbutton.js unused code
-   * Bug 28746: Remove torbutton isolation and fp prefs sync
-   * Bug 30237: Control port module improvements for v3 client authentication
-   * Bug 30786: Add th locale
-   * Bug 30787: Add lt locale
-   * Bug 30788: Add ms locale
-   * Bug 30851: Move default preferences to 000-tor-browser.js
-   * Bug 30888: move torbutton_util.js to modules/utils.js
-   * Bug 31134: Govern graphite again by security settings
-   * Bug 31395: Remove inline script in aboutTor.xhtml
-   * Bug 31499: Update libevent to 2.1.11-stable
- * 

[tor-commits] [tpo/staging] update content

2019-02-11 Thread hiro
commit a0e956ac2e0c6d651d5767dd8fcbdcc44f8193d2
Author: Antonela 
Date:   Sat Feb 9 17:27:01 2019 +0100

update content
---
 templates/contact.html  | 6 +++---
 templates/download-options.html | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/templates/contact.html b/templates/contact.html
index 8416122..e4dcc18 100644
--- a/templates/contact.html
+++ b/templates/contact.html
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 
 
   
-{{ _('Join an email list') }} 
+https://lists.torproject.org; 
target="_blank">{{ _('Join an email list') }} 
   
   
 {{ _("Our teams collaborate in open channels, including email lists, 
you are welcome to join. If you have a question for a specific team not 
answered on our support portal, you can ask the appropriate list. You're 
welcome to subscribe and just watch, too :)") }}
@@ -54,14 +54,14 @@
 
   
   
-{{ _('Report a bug or give feedback.') }}
+https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/community/HowToReportBugFeedback;
 target="_blank">{{ _('Report a bug or give feedback.') }}
 {{ _('Tor relies on the support of users and 
volunteers around the world to help us improve our software and resources, so 
your feedback is extremely valuable to us (and to all Tor users).') }}
   
   
 
   
   
-{{ _('Tell us about a bad relay.') }}
+https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/ReportingBadRelays; 
target="_blank">{{ _('Tell us about a bad relay.') }}
 {{ _('If you find a relay that you think is 
malicious, misconfigured, or otherwise broken, please check out our wiki page 
and blog post on how to report it.') }}
   
 
diff --git a/templates/download-options.html b/templates/download-options.html
index 28d7ccc..e8c79a7 100644
--- a/templates/download-options.html
+++ b/templates/download-options.html
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 
   
-We need two lines here about why we release alphas, how it works in the 
development cycle and also a link to repos or documentation.
+{{ _('Before we release a stable version of our software, we release an 
alpha version to test features and find bugs. Please only download an alpha if 
you are okay with some things not working properly, want to help us find and 
report bugs, and are not putting yourself at risk.') }}
   
 
 



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