Re: [tor-dev] Proposal for improving social incentives for relay operators
On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 05:26:28PM -0700, Virgil Griffith wrote: I propose the following system for harnessing warm glow and reputation for Tor relay operators. Hi Virgil, I agree with your direction here, and I'd love to see some more work on it. In fact, the per relay page idea is nearly in place -- I think if we add some elements to the atlas and globe pages for relays, to show their total contribution, ranking, etc, we will be a lot closer to your goal. The overall ranking page idea has gotten lost lately though. We used to have the torstatus pages (e.g. blutmagie), but they've been unmaintained for a long time. Tools like Atlas and Globe don't replace that public reward aspect because there's no master page where you can see at a glance who you should be impressed by. Compass is a bit closer, but still not quite it. So I'd suggest the following next steps: * Figure out what metrics we should use to quantify useful contribution, and make sure Karsten's onionoo can tell them to us. Add entries for them to the atlas/globe pages. * Make some new pages where you can get a list of relays sorted by those metrics. This is the sort of topic where it would be best to get some excited new people involved, rather than trying to load down e.g. Karsten more. Also, don't underestimate the difficulty of choosing the right metrics. And also try to avoid the trap where somebody writes something and then disappears and then you realize you wanted a slightly different metric but nobody knows how to modify the code. :) --Roger ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] I have a group at internet archive that are interested in buying a lot of OnionPi's
On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 10:11:24PM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote: On 06/27/2014 09:44 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote: What is the current state of the art on this, and if it is ready for larger deployment want to buy about 50-100 of them. In my eyes, an access point that has a captive portal that teaches people about Tor and facilitates the download of Tor Browser etc is much better than transparent proxying. Right. Using a transparent torifying box as a client is dangerous, because your Internet Explorer or other normal browser will probably introduce surprising privacy problems compared to using Tor Browser. Using your middlebox as a firewall to prevent non-Tor traffic from transiting, i.e. to make sure you are using only Tor, is much safer but also much less sexy. And the onionpi boxes don't have enough cpu to be a useful relay. They do have enough cpu to be useful bridges, but vanilla bridges aren't very useful in the world these days: all the places where you need a bridge you probably need one of the somewhat recent pluggable transports, like obfs3, too. I wonder what the state is of easy-to-install images that include modern pluggable transports and are maintained. Sounds like another volunteers needed situation. :) --Roger ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] I have a group at internet archive that are, interested in buying a lot of OnionPi's
Roger wrote: And the onionpi boxes don't have enough cpu to be a useful relay. I'm not sure what the definition of 'useful relay' is, but I am running an exit relay with 900KB/s and between 1000-1500 consensus weight. This is the limit for the pi, but definitively above the 100KB/s I read somewhere else. Also, although I know it is nowhere near decent security, I do get a warm feeling from the fact that all my non-tor home traffic gets mixed/emitted along with tor exit traffic. I'm not running an onionpi because I prefer TorBrowser for all the good reasons, but the pi makes a nice little relay I think. R. ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] I have a group at internet archive that are interested in buying a lot of OnionPi's
Martin Kepplinger: Am 2014-06-29 08:57, schrieb Roger Dingledine: On Sat, Jun 28, 2014 at 10:11:24PM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote: On 06/27/2014 09:44 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote: What is the current state of the art on this, and if it is ready for larger deployment want to buy about 50-100 of them. In my eyes, an access point that has a captive portal that teaches people about Tor and facilitates the download of Tor Browser etc is much better than transparent proxying. Right. Using a transparent torifying box as a client is dangerous, because your Internet Explorer or other normal browser will probably introduce surprising privacy problems compared to using Tor Browser. Using your middlebox as a firewall to prevent non-Tor traffic from transiting, i.e. to make sure you are using only Tor, is much safer but also much less sexy. what would be an approach to build that? the accesspoint would need a list of current entry nodes, which is, all public relays, right? (from the February 19th, 2014 of Tor Weekly News:) Rusty Bird announced [16] the release of corridor [17], a Tor traffic whitelisting gateway. corridor will turn a Linux system into a router that “allows only connections to Tor relays to pass through (no clearnet leaks!)”. However, unlike transparent proxying solutions, “client computers are themselves responsible for torifying their own traffic.” [16]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2014-February/032152.html [17]: https://github.com/rustybird/corridor -- Lunar lu...@torproject.org signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
Re: [tor-dev] I have a group at internet archive that are interested in buying a lot of OnionPi's
Roger et al, I'm interested in something like onion-pi to be a Tor relay. Is there something with enough COU to be viable? I know nothing about this embedded scene. -V ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
