Re: [tor-relays] What happens with the time on turtles 76.73.17.194?
On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 12:19:42PM +0200, tor-admin wrote: Hi Mike, I am seeing many of these messages in the logs of torland1/torland2: Sep 21 12:09:34.000 [warn] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from server at 76.73.17.194:9090. It seems that our clock is ahead by 15969 days, 10 hours, 9 minutes, or that theirs is behind. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time and date settings. Can you please check turtles. Thanks regards, https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002887.html https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9798 False alarm, they'll go away once Mike upgrades. --Roger ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] What happens with the time on turtles 76.73.17.194?
Thanks. Sorry for the noise. Should have checked trac first. On Saturday 21 September 2013 06:21:50 Roger Dingledine wrote: On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 12:19:42PM +0200, tor-admin wrote: Hi Mike, I am seeing many of these messages in the logs of torland1/torland2: Sep 21 12:09:34.000 [warn] Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from server at 76.73.17.194:9090. It seems that our clock is ahead by 15969 days, 10 hours, 9 minutes, or that theirs is behind. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: please check your time and date settings. Can you please check turtles. Thanks regards, https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-September/002887.html https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9798 False alarm, they'll go away once Mike upgrades. --Roger ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators
On Friday 20/09/2013 at 6:37 am, Moritz Bartl wrote: I don't think exit relay operators are in a position to have anonymity in the first place. It is fine if you manage to pay for and run your relay anonymously, but I doubt it will survive more than a few LEA inquiries where they end up with a fake name instead of a real contact. I get the sense that there are some exit node operators who can't attempt it or deliberately aren't for reasons related to the direct ownership of abuse complaints. But there are some where there could be ambiguity. It is not always clear-cut who the end-user of each service is. Things like leased servers with multiple sub-users, roommate/shared internet, shared VPNs, shells given away to friends, etc, are a part of it. How is the method of transferring funds relevant to liability or risk in that respect? What method of transfer would change anything about that? It's not all about the method. Thoughts are: - One way to damage Tor would be to mess things up for exit node operators either personally or professionally. IMO the less 'they' know about exit operators, the less damage they can do with that kind of approach. That would include information obtained from getting to know someone on IRC in this context, as you don't really know who you are talking to or if you're being monitored. - If authorities can ever build a case where Tor can be accused of being a dirty little network which hosts criminal content and profits from it, it seems that it could be fucked. I already saw Tor identified by one media source as simply being an internet network that criminals use. We know that this isn't a fair description but I'm not sure that would make a difference if certain cards get played? - When you can be demonstrated to have received money, depending upon what that money was sent for, it can be used against you. If money was to be sent, it seems better if it were done as a consulting sort of agreement? It would be invoiced like any other internet consulting service you are willing to provide (and it wouldn't be the only service offered). It wouldn't involve personal-feeling chats on IRC, it would be a professional relationship. What do you think? I don't want to scare anyone away with this stuff. Just feel like we should be more careful than what I was reading. Doesn't feel right to encourage exit node operators to show up on IRC with their bank account #s ready to go. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators
On 09/21/2013 01:48 PM, t...@t-3.net wrote: - If authorities can ever build a case where Tor can be accused of being a dirty little network which hosts criminal content and profits from it, it seems that it could be fucked. That's exactly why we encourage exit operators to defend the right for anonymity in the clear, instead of hiding. I feel much better knowing who runs the high bandwidth relays. If the alternative is to not know who and why exactly does it, and if the financial flows are disguised, this would make me and others uncomfortable, right? I don't want to scare anyone away with this stuff. Just feel like we should be more careful than what I was reading. Doesn't feel right to encourage exit node operators to show up on IRC with their bank account #s ready to go. I believe you misunderstand the relationships we're having with the exit relay operators that are currently partners. All of them are public, non-profit, registered entities, and usually already list their bank account on their websites for donations. See https://www.torservers.net/partners.html for a list and links. All our partners speak up in the public, on events, on Cryptoparties, in the European parliament and whatnot. It's not like they can or want to hide themselves. When I talk of a personal relationship, I ask for more than simply popping up on IRC and giving me your bank account details. We don't hire consultants or exit relay operators. We reimburse part of the costs that occur when you operate a high bandwidth relay, mainly traffic costs. In an ideal world, more people would run exits and donate spare bandwidth. Unfortunately, the minority that abuses Tor mostly destroys this option. Many ISPs don't want to deal with the abuse, you should use dedicated hardware and IPs for exits, etc. 1 Gbit/s in USA and Germany is 500 Euro, 1 Gbit/s in Denmark is 1000 Euro, 1 Gbit/s in Hong Kong is 8000 Euro. I think it is fair to - give people and organizations that want to contribute the ability to do so with donations - help operators with some of the costs Yes, this could be even more professional. Some people see a business model here. From the start, we've been offering the we will run your relay model, where you can choose relay name, exit policy and customize the website that shows up on the relay IP. Since Tor relays can and will be used by all users and you don't exactly buy a personal service, it makes sense to do it as a non-profit rather than a for-profit (the literal translation from the German equivalent, and more fitting in my eyes, is beneficial to the public). Remember that you can still perfectly well pay people for their work as a non-profit if you want to. The most important thing to remember here is that we really don't want to change the economics of the current network. We want to add to it. -- Moritz Bartl https://www.torservers.net/ ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Relay bandwidth usage drop
About 2 days ago, around midnight of September 20, bandwidth usage on my relay dropped from averaging a bit over 100KB/s to around 20KB/s. It's been low ever since. Consensus weight dropped accordingly. You can see on the graphs on atlas and globe. My relay is named jobiwan. There seems to be nothing wrong with my relay. Log is pretty clean and handshake and heartbeat reports indicate normal operation (just not much of it). From time to time I have bits of normal throughput. I have no indication that I'm being throttled or traffic shaped. Is there anything I should look into? Thanks, -Job ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
