[tor-relays] New GPG key for Mike Perry
Hi everyone, I've finally made a new GPG key (after a scant 7 years!). This new key will be used to sign email from me going forward, and will be used to sign software releases until such time as I get around to creating a second set of keys on a hardware token for that purpose. While I dislike the Web of Trust for a number of reasons*, my plan is to cross-certify these two sets of new keys, and also sign both with my old key. Hence I will not immediately be issuing a revocation for my old key. The new key is attached, and is available on the keyservers (with a signature from my old key) at: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x29846B3C683686CC Here's the fingerprint and current subkey information for reference: pub 8192R/29846B3C683686CC 2013-09-11 Key fingerprint = C963 C21D 6356 4E2B 10BB 335B 2984 6B3C 6836 86CC uid Mike Perry (Regular use key) sub 4096R/717F1F130E3A92E4 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11] sub 4096R/A3BD8153BC40FFA0 2013-09-11 [expires: 2014-09-11] This message should also be signed by my previous key, which was used extensively to sign my email and my source code releases prior to today. * Ensuing flamewars about the Web of Trust should reply only to tor-talk. -- Mike Perry -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- mQQNBFIvu6sBIADC1JsxXSWd1k+cHamS0L5/dfcGQ3AaVbTAM+82JEO5drL3E5xD 9nO2KujNIRqYClCt395S9zIZuMPTo+r5UtKQhP3g+ZxxTuZeYu0pH/7iewyE477o QzkPp04rwmMpmPxvgov9jVmtshoVu1ae+IgIr0AvcIApIcUy7q4+yT9TJwVrvF/Y xJ+rUIVIZc2MkisxmSaE4q45w0kUYxnCW0FUiO7T6G1cfRhTnLv0NipfOnpKnqm1 PEwZKru7JiopuSPK1gRpdsOzGSVk8OFmuojFkl4rymA1T+HOEEA7xyD8ZDpuedGt u0JM3GFS29/4f6qoEBTQNV2OaSKB89a4KI+BFwVe9XuLEqaeYUd2RPnQhanTWPO0 s3+K5ccn2TnV8HBEGKJgU7EKuWy++k2Svspt2oAqPip6GKrhP66i40p1mcKjcVyw VB7NmyR1pse/yKInzmuuuD6csFbOnPCUYVwPyyjEC5IpqZe5hPszPL1XXUwipxk/ pDyDI5KzKYJxR+wuPTY9YV3tHWE9FyZDHFYOHgpQVDxlyiBxDVUHeI6hu39WzUN3 yYAssaRz9GaqQEjp0iN++X2BMmmgjkBrHSHpN7mbjtf84hMilQ7McWOeQKudedE1 /z65TheUtiYS60Ybq4FIv9FOrHJt/pzHPzuv7jcdOlsLl6SbWkwwS1y+GmMRpND5 8ZeJMTStHcZhWxxu9DC4fNsTEPHO44yxaIdJYkasawcf87gPSYrqeUJP/1xJDwdz zPY6wbfXQJg7w5j8qlQ7lomRuU384szOvjaN9QIboR6zvxPVZcGcUX40BVQOlglH qBIchVQQ2vROs2wkvV9qSfnauBKf8dM/LKUgQvoNCSHqkmS+siOij19moclsvH7x Rgfft3WhMapygCBNFNLRqw5iXJwlWQZ4mvwbro3KWelWzm5FqQdCfP2fMA5n53bC cOS308KllDAFK/Ljnm938PEyh4rNA9eyEazCA9WCuE+zEeIMgQPr1K/lFgGldftL 7oWAtfCae+jYWyXS+1zAxEQ3QGqHLmUDYumzc30paHaGeapldkcySOc9SLWDdpvH 0V91vU17WeytQD9pGBUNURc+/v1ZNG7fRm+Ulp6K0i/eh/3rKWybx8aanu3YvcNP Uyom/CA5gBmzIATlhD8vpc95YQpV+Jv4TN4crD0EIUZDzzv1Eg5Pix8qk4R4jZ81 oVvvqlOAFYq96SyPWGUL5mAMrGD+RSmzLpTNH8LUEIQ7RosFQjcHNFzF6sPuG7HR 03R/aNdexFqfjsK/qntSk+vL0jtu++lp18U6UFxbHQVr32vxFybNJwAZCmK8K+Ur 2kezKkWqcQrV9jXNA4IAz+H+KPRi2+T3Jss5ABEBAAG0N01pa2UgUGVycnkgKFJl Z3VsYXIgdXNlIGtleSkgPG1pa2VwZXJyeUB0b3Jwcm9qZWN0Lm9yZz6JBDgEEwEC ACIFAlIvu6sCGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJECmEazxoNobM CM8f/iLOQEZk362/aUixdi/BBli1dTNjzQBU61lt4xo2U9UOCiR5o3tcON4eLboU Nt/H9VNFGgc3udwtG8fI3LcI+OhCPobVVbsZQO44cN8+FOx0w1iD4DOvVhrlpar+ kIO5KOpf+zo6nkfd6WxaZQXziqTVWEeQbfvmBnlLx+ea3C9xPWOVVbesYFVnRSLD WLgIo3HGhXjQBJ4dGvJULbBdQueEfZpSG7pscFITd3QX9Wk3N27CoYt66eM2YCl5 vN094p7fSn+2w0SZXYte/rqcklvSE7uH7h0K2eqdg+uwYkkq7bLXEamgbcrVZwsF NLH6zgVZtzkJJikmqSPwHq88cgclXWne+MdAjEATa5YKPfjnX83dgJZo1N2fgtqR f6ieLnhWGPdaHPENDnU2ADhGQKADXqM4h1HiY3giS66eVzYFUN0yOrL7rp8d0ePz xZLUIxJN/fdIGEIEjuWciW4i8VLlIQDUGEDs6ULYhSmc86bd3eVSpEEi562f6knj /TZelcxu3C+CHTee/961iaefd5c+Mp5bIt+VAC5YHyZ29MUX8GXfiQdbtuJGOrrB T/V99SvyG2Rq8I+6v0oE7MeU7QBU3LzWsZfZvQ3APOFth0d4fLqU9H/TQAt+8lK2 xcHynz7I6JW8xi6iLvA+sftb7vdO0WGOaFbHfPeL7ErlVMMF8W5ed5gTBimRm0Px V19Rq56y6v8B6DoGg9u34JetQ2odUiAy2/ttqfGohYdGSzBuP5VamF25tBeTYChL gW6L6utARQtmf8Q2ONdyPzNStrv6rVj2bMwtuPurBIx727LPgaUO6ZUMo7lC59bv R2pn4vEvx2aXdqjL3dfNs5UJ1UEvx0PNELFHZ5bStpMt3fGgh8ZDgcUrzsY9ine6 0qR/ujCLLMrD8RmZezT4/v0CkF0RJ1hEW4jjCaOT/an4dVxnqIPoNc9g/msTmYHE QusGrrVx7cmjy5ph/HJe83tqhv3TUj2UYwIllKpgTP0azu9xIvVH3qAWgnHdonSJ CQi5GjPN3h0Xfk/9+nywP4R1YIuMehmZo0RQk96aPhds2C14bBykh4gtbuVewuj6 GlciAtO7VZr/ZKeAaO5gph7XVC+4jxhdsTOSYDi+uMuZ48NmkZQRTIA82O3GagTa 3WYuu4JPPmSn4C6zAZMLnpXL6gLGDIQ/HlJht/X/+ZduFB3UmfnQEeqo0Y2kxgqv pX9p4oMHKw5nkOb+T1r/f5ulGX0u2z2pPobQLas6F13wRKvg78cjbVES7BrREwl+ egljA2xEh0NYjR8y8U4bpZrseisbsju3FiaVXW/YxEVaXFdIqA9chkYBn4hNmyup hfdiSwmfhxuCFeOstFwTB0Kp2AGISgQQEQIACgUCUkUV1QMFC3gACgkQGwyjDN3G wK1vWgCfQrWCwHXM30r48jFUakPrm2UacmEAnRe6I7zj2CVyzog4Ll98bfg+ZsSn uQINBFIvvI0BEADuWK4crs6xahu1/gW0sAYhOU5x7oIQtOAGbCdd0crb/M+bbYYs hj1NN/D53q38r45mHEM/TyuR6dqxUrbEBFzDWS95T9IYVKtkm1zHHttrdpms/tDH KzQ024wkVDPDSlqpSrbjNgwODdlp3ZqYsDGEbK9aFypC469GvfaWk8Z8JuTY9ucU 7IPCSq0LlYfcunJO3P81d7BhVVUHzOIecQ8h/WEUhrNiYoLBksvYl39LEzYfGCcx 6LYjkMenF6n3Xr2n9rbFeMxIkCr66DL+J0WwE/kCaVJAZXQ3hp4FinGQf0nCc4Vt Ik+fFZjwruBE7WwEuLyBjot++aJcxPXCDmjyn592AasxmfA5iG2Py79AN3rxC3N8 MmoJoOn7+W4F4zxKsYc/FiWoWvI3llwiDIsFtWjJ4XUZZOlvBsRLrJVnxe338LQG BYH6srMy6tp1qBrmA2KBuT5zwqzsfUAC8UQwL9ljUo42KxkSQxrBF6tAXlhy/yqa NEAnuXZC0G+iPCfq0ijHtcE65r4VwcXguLc0gOIKZn9JESpmT+tdYzoYVdAxnhHN 8mCznewvFSZps+BxTG+sBCLXUoq1XiNBgemYv+ID
Re: [tor-relays] Relay bandwidth usage drop
Over the past week, consensus weight fraction and bandwidth usage have been gradually ramping up again. For the past 2 days, bandwidth maxes out from time to time but most of the time it hovers around 50% of my advertised rate. If it stays like this for a few more days, I may advertise a bit more. Occasionally I see crypto errors. Maybe one per 3 days on average. I also see relay unresponsive/relay resumed messages in arm. I have 1 or 2 per day on average and they last for 15~20 seconds. That seems worrisome. Uptime now 3 weeks on 0.2.4.17-rc, all looks healthy otherwise. No sign of memory leakage. CPU averages 50% (out of 200% - 1.6 Ghz Atom single core with hyperthreading) and follows a wave pattern that peaks around 90% at 8pm and bottoms around 30% at 6am (CET). -Job On Sep 22, 2013, at 12:38 , Christian Dietrich wrote: > Same here, midnight of September 20 bandwidth drop from 153.97 Mbit/s to > 134.81 Mbit/s. > And then, midnight of September 22 bandwidth drop from 136.91 Mbit/s to 95.50 > Mbit/s. > Non exit relay. Low CPU usage. Full bandwidth available. >> About 2 days ago, around midnight of September 20, bandwidth usage on my >> relay dropped from averaging a bit over 100KB/s to around 20KB/s. It's been >> low ever since. Consensus weight dropped accordingly. You can see on the >> graphs on atlas and globe. My relay is named jobiwan. There seems to be >> nothing wrong with my relay. Log is pretty clean and handshake and heartbeat >> reports indicate normal operation (just not much of it). From time to time I >> have bits of normal throughput. I have no indication that I'm being >> throttled or traffic shaped. >> Is there anything I should look into? >> Thanks, >> -Job >> ___ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] (no subject)
Uhhh, wut? On 27/09/2013 14:23, ابوصالح wrote: > > Android > > مرسل من الهاتف المحمول Samsung > > > ___ tor-relays mailing > list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] (no subject)
Android مرسل من الهاتف المحمول Samsung___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] MaxOnionQueueDelay
Hello, there is a Tor setting "MaxOnionQueueDelay" in torrc (see https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.en) with a default of "1750 msec". As operator of a Tor relay 0.2.4.17-rc (on Debian) I would like to know were I can find the current processing time for onionskins to set "MaxOnionQueueDelay" different from its default value (1750) in the torrc. Where can I find the current processing time? -- http://www.fastmail.fm - Choose from over 50 domains or use your own ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Relay security, re: local network
Cook: > On 26.9.2013 23:25, Roger Dingledine wrote: >> EFF recommends against it in their Legal FAQ: >> "Should I run an exit relay from my home?" >> https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq >> >> Their recommendation comes from dealing with one too many distraught >> relay operators who had confused DEA agents show up at their house and >> take everything including their toaster "because it might be evidence". >> >> In general we've been doing pretty well at teaching law enforcement in >> the US about how Tor works: >> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/trip-report-october-fbi-conference >> but a) there are many other countries out there, and b) all it takes is >> one guy who didn't read his "there's this thing called Tor" briefing, >> or didn't believe it, to ruin your day/week/month. >> >> So, feel free to do it, but also be aware there's a >> tiny-but-hard-to-actually-estimate chance of getting to spend a lot of >> time teaching people about Tor. >> >> Thanks! >> --Roger >> >> ___ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > So exits are desperately needed, but not badly enough to recommend > running them where it would be the most convenient to set up, easiest to > troubleshoot and manage, and most cost-effective to run (my personal > experience and opinion, may not reflect that of others)? Granted, many, > if not most consumer connections are capped too low to be of much > individual value in terms of output volume, but i recall reading > somewhere on these mailing lists and/or the Tor Project FAQs about how > important diversity is, as opposed to clustering most exits to a handful > of physical locations with fat cables. > > I don't mean to sound rude, i just hate the way the world works with > these things. Don't we all? > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays Well yes. The thing is, even if you wouldn't have legal issues (which is also not garanteed when you run an exit that shares it's IP with real laptops and PCs people use), you would be annoyed and create a hard time for those laptops and PCs in that network. Webservices will at some point block your IP and even if it's temporarily, if it's the one service you need _now_ you regret running that exit node. You won't have any such problem running a middle relay. And it helps as well. And you'll get the traffic you set in your torrc over time. Running an exit is not hard. Just make sure it's the only machine behind a (real) IP. Rent a vserver with root access for about 10 bucks a month, you wont even need a machine yourself. Or find some "housing" service where you can put your own little machine that get's its own IP. And keep the installation simple. Run tor only. And read the 2 or 3 pages on the website on running an exit. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
