Re: [tor-relays] Running tor in VPS - keep away snooping eyes

2014-07-02 Thread s7r
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Hash: SHA1

On 7/2/2014 9:50 AM, Kali Tor wrote:
 All,
 
 Are there anything special that needs to be done to make sure that
 Tor nodes running inside VMs (VPS) is protected from snooping eyes?
 Since there is hardly any data at rest I am assuming not, but then,
 what do I know!:)
 
 -kali-
 
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Kali

I don't understand what exactly you mean, snooping eyes.Anyone can see
at anytime that the VPS in questions is a Tor relay. 1 method is by
seeing the traffic it generates and second is the consensus data in
the Tor network, where all relays IP addresses are listed. This should
not be a problem whatsoever, Tor is not designed to hide the fact that
you use it or that you run a Tor relay. It is designed to offer
anonymity and privacy in activity, not if you use it or not.

If you are asking how to secure  your box better, indeed the public IP
address list of relays is often scanned and brute forced. That is why
I recommend:

- - if you run only Tor on that box is best, if not make sure your apps
are properly secured (mysql not listening on public IP if it's not a
remote mysql server, strong passwords for mysql, ftp, etc.).
- - make sure only ports used by Tor are open. There is no need for
anything else.
- - if you use ssh for administration that is fine, just change the port
from 22 in /etc/ssh/sshd_config to some custom port, anything, like
2988 or whatever.
- - permanently disabled plain password authentication or rhost
authentication in sshd_config and only allow key-based authentication
for better security and protection against weak password probing.
- - do not allow any other users for SSH access.

Let me know if you have any other questions.


- -- 
s7r
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Re: [tor-relays] Running tor in VPS - keep away snooping eyes

2014-07-02 Thread Kali Tor
Hi,


 
 If you are asking how to secure  your box better, indeed the public IP
 address list of relays is often scanned and brute forced. That is why
 I recommend:
 
 - - if you run only Tor on that box is best, if not make sure your apps
 are properly secured (mysql not listening on public IP if it's not a
 remote mysql server, strong passwords for mysql, ftp, etc.).
 - - make sure only ports used by Tor are open. There is no need for
 anything else.
 - - if you use ssh for administration that is fine, just change the port
 from 22 in /etc/ssh/sshd_config to some custom port, anything, like
 2988 or whatever.
 - - permanently disabled plain password authentication or rhost
 authentication in sshd_config and only allow key-based authentication
 for better security and protection against weak password probing.
 - - do not allow any other users for SSH access.
 
 Let me know if you have any other questions.

I have done all that, so covered on that aspect. Was wondering if disk 
encryption and use of something like TRESOR would be useful?

-kali-
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Re: [tor-relays] Bandwidth usage for an established relay node

2014-07-02 Thread Christian Dietrich

(rx / tx / total / avg. rate) - tor only:
Jun '14179.69 TiB |  188.55 TiB |  368.24 TiB |1.18 Gbit/s

Limited by CPU (Core i5-3570 /w AES-NI), multithreaded tor relay 
software would help to improve bandwidth utilization.


Am 01.07.2014 23:24, schrieb Tom van der Woerdt:

Hi Kali,

It depends on your network speed. Expect it to use roughly 80% of your 
maximum speed on average, so if you have a 50Mbit/s up/down connection 
you will be uploading 13TB and downloading 13TB.


For high speed relays this might differ a bit if your bottleneck 
becomes the CPU.


Tom



Kali Tor schreef op 01/07/14 23:16:

Hi all,

Curious as to how much bandwidth a stable, well established relay 
node will chew through in a month on an average?



Anyone has any figures?

-kali-

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Re: [tor-relays] Running tor in VPS - keep away snooping eyes

2014-07-02 Thread grarpamp
On Wed, Jul 2, 2014 at 7:46 AM, Kali Tor kalito...@yahoo.com wrote:
 I have done all that, so covered on that aspect. Was wondering if disk 
 encryption and use of something like TRESOR would be useful?

The private keys for the node are sensitive, and even the
.tor/state file for the guard nodes could be if the attacker
does not already have that info, same for any non default
node selection stuff in torrc. Tor presumably validates
the disk consensus files against its static keys on startup
so that's probably ok yet all easily under .tor anyway.

There was a thread on this some time ago you can find.
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Re: [tor-relays] Running tor in VPS - keep away snooping eyes

2014-07-02 Thread s7r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 7/2/2014 2:46 PM, Kali Tor wrote:
 Hi,
 
 
 
 If you are asking how to secure  your box better, indeed the
 public IP address list of relays is often scanned and brute
 forced. That is why I recommend:
 
 - - if you run only Tor on that box is best, if not make sure
 your apps are properly secured (mysql not listening on public IP
 if it's not a remote mysql server, strong passwords for mysql,
 ftp, etc.). - - make sure only ports used by Tor are open. There
 is no need for anything else. - - if you use ssh for
 administration that is fine, just change the port from 22 in
 /etc/ssh/sshd_config to some custom port, anything, like 2988 or
 whatever. - - permanently disabled plain password authentication
 or rhost authentication in sshd_config and only allow key-based
 authentication for better security and protection against weak
 password probing. - - do not allow any other users for SSH
 access.
 
 Let me know if you have any other questions.
 
 I have done all that, so covered on that aspect. Was wondering if
 disk encryption and use of something like TRESOR would be useful?
 
 -kali- ___ tor-relays
 mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org 
 https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
 

Full disk encryption on a Tor relay, if it's just a Tor relay it's
overkill. It will just increase the HDD I/O rate and resource
consumption.

Also, most important, if you use full disk encryption and your vm gets
somehow rebooted (migrated to another cluster by your provider, update
to the host OS or hardware, etc.) and you are not around to enter the
passphrase for full disk encryption your operating system will not
boot and cause you long downtime, until you are available to manually
enter the passphrase. this can cause you to lose flags in the
consensus, because of extended downtime.

Important to say that Tor does not have any files which need to
encrypted. Tor, by design protects each relay by not knowing both the
original source and the final destination of the traffic. It just has
some cache of the consensus data, which anyone can publicly get from
the Tor network without needing to break your box or hack your full
disk encryption.

Only things which are secret are your onion keys, which give your
relay's fingerprint. Make sure you back those up, in case you need to
re-install this relay.

If you use that vm for something else too and you have some sensitive
data there, it is always a good idea to encrypt everything... but in
your scenario full disk encryption will not help since you are exposed
to physical attacks (e.g. someone caching your files while your
virtual machine is RUNNING, making full disk encryption useless).


- -- 
s7r
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Re: [tor-relays] FYI: Tor-Ops Meeting in Vienna

2014-07-02 Thread Geri
What a pity, that i have heard so late from the meeting. I would really
love to attend but im not sure if i can make it tomorrow.
As im operating a few guards this is in very high interest of me. I also
had some conversations with some guys regarding an austrian tor
organisation which i would love to contribute.

Hopefully i get my calender fixed so that im able to attend.

Cheers from Vienna!


2014-07-02 16:57 GMT+02:00 MacLemon t...@maclemon.at:

 Hoi!

 Yes, this is a crosspost of tor-talk, please be gentle.

 There will be a Tor-ops meeting on Thursday, 2014-07-03, 19:00 at the
 Metalab[0] in Vienna/Austria.

 The meeting was planned way before the recent rulings in Austria became
 known but they will be discussed for certain.

 The actual purpose of the meeting shall be to finally found a
 Torservers.at organisation (German word: Verein) in Austria that works on
 running nodes in the public interest as well as exchange know-how and best
 practice on running relays, bridges and exits.

 So in case you're in Vienna, please join!

 Best regards
 MacLemon

 [0]: http://metalab.at/wiki/Lage How to get to Metalab

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Re: [tor-relays] FYI: Tor-Ops Meeting in Vienna

2014-07-02 Thread Elrippo
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Same from here. If I would have known earlier, I would have booked me a Ticket!

But I got the fqdn!
Is there a funding also to participate?

On 02. Juli 2014 19:24:38 MESZ, Geri toxir...@gmail.com wrote:
What a pity, that i have heard so late from the meeting. I would really
love to attend but im not sure if i can make it tomorrow.
As im operating a few guards this is in very high interest of me. I
also
had some conversations with some guys regarding an austrian tor
organisation which i would love to contribute.

Hopefully i get my calender fixed so that im able to attend.

Cheers from Vienna!


2014-07-02 16:57 GMT+02:00 MacLemon t...@maclemon.at:

 Hoi!

 Yes, this is a crosspost of tor-talk, please be gentle.

 There will be a Tor-ops meeting on Thursday, 2014-07-03, 19:00 at the
 Metalab[0] in Vienna/Austria.

 The meeting was planned way before the recent rulings in Austria
became
 known but they will be discussed for certain.

 The actual purpose of the meeting shall be to finally found a
 Torservers.at organisation (German word: Verein) in Austria that
works on
 running nodes in the public interest as well as exchange know-how and
best
 practice on running relays, bridges and exits.

 So in case you're in Vienna, please join!

 Best regards
 MacLemon

 [0]: http://metalab.at/wiki/Lage How to get to Metalab

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Encrypted messages are welcome.
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Re: [tor-relays] FYI: Tor-Ops Meeting in Vienna

2014-07-02 Thread Elrippo
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Provide me your PGP key, than we can talk :)

On 02. Juli 2014 21:27:49 MESZ, Martin Kepplinger mart...@posteo.de wrote:
Am 2014-07-02 21:06, schrieb Elrippo:
 Same from here. If I would have known earlier, I would have booked me
a Ticket!

 But I got the fqdn!
 Is there a funding also to participate?


If there'll be too many people, it'll mainly be get-to-know people.
It'll most likely be off-topic discussion as well.

If you're really interested in doing boring work for free, write me
your
phone number and when you have time to talk and I can send you the
slides and the date of a gründungstreffen when we make one.

 On 02. Juli 2014 19:24:38 MESZ, Geri toxir...@gmail.com wrote:
 What a pity, that i have heard so late from the meeting. I would
really
 love to attend but im not sure if i can make it tomorrow.
 As im operating a few guards this is in very high interest of me. I
 also
 had some conversations with some guys regarding an austrian tor
 organisation which i would love to contribute.

 Hopefully i get my calender fixed so that im able to attend.

 Cheers from Vienna!


 2014-07-02 16:57 GMT+02:00 MacLemon t...@maclemon.at:

 Hoi!

 Yes, this is a crosspost of tor-talk, please be gentle.

 There will be a Tor-ops meeting on Thursday, 2014-07-03, 19:00 at
the
 Metalab[0] in Vienna/Austria.

 The meeting was planned way before the recent rulings in Austria
 became
 known but they will be discussed for certain.

 The actual purpose of the meeting shall be to finally found a
 Torservers.at organisation (German word: Verein) in Austria that
 works on
 running nodes in the public interest as well as exchange know-how
and
 best
 practice on running relays, bridges and exits.

 So in case you're in Vienna, please join!

 Best regards
 MacLemon

 [0]: http://metalab.at/wiki/Lage How to get to Metalab

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Encrypted messages are welcome.
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Re: [tor-relays] Why is UFW bllocking allowed TOR traffic?

2014-07-02 Thread Christopher Sheats

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Hi Jeff

On 06/22/2014 12:43 PM, Jeff Odell wrote:
 I was monitoring UFW today and noticed that it was periodically blocking 
 allowed TOR traffic.  any
ideas why from those with more experience than I?


 toradmin@IrvineTorExit:~$ sudo ufw status
 Status: active

 To Action  From
 -- --  
 22 ALLOW   Anywhere
 9001/tcp   ALLOW   Anywhere
 9030/tcp   ALLOW   Anywhere
 80 ALLOW   Anywhere
 22 (v6)ALLOW   Anywhere (v6)
 9001/tcp (v6)  ALLOW   Anywhere (v6)
 9030/tcp (v6)  ALLOW   Anywhere (v6)
 80 (v6)ALLOW   Anywhere (v6)


 toradmin@IrvineTorExit:~$ sudo tail -f /var/log/syslog | grep DPT=9001

 Jun 22 15:38:12 IrvineTorExit kernel: [ 2159.246977] [UFW BLOCK]
IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=04:01:1b:5e:9a:01:28:8a:1c:64:cf:f0:08:00
SRC=92.108.200.200 DST=188.226.199.250 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=120
ID=10392 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=52000 DPT=9001 WINDOW=16652 RES=0x00 ACK URGP=0
 Jun 22 15:38:12 IrvineTorExit kernel: [ 2159.246988] [UFW BLOCK]
IN=eth0 OUT= MAC=04:01:1b:5e:9a:01:28:8a:1c:64:cf:f0:08:00
SRC=92.108.200.200 DST=188.226.199.250 LEN=52 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=120
ID=10396 DF PROTO=TCP SPT=52000 DPT=9001 WINDOW=16652 RES=0x00 ACK URGP=0

 Regards,
 Jeff
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I see a considerable amount of these in my logs (Ubuntu 14.04 server,
UFW). Some time ago I asked about this on IRC with no resolve. I'm
afraid of it affecting Tor users (I don't know if it is), and I'm afraid
of these logs being created and stored on my exit relay. Because I have
received no answer, yet need to protect my relay with a manageable
firewall, I took the advice of someone on IRC and disabled my UFW logs
(my exit relay isn't used for anything else, and UFW will keep doing
it's job, while protecting the privacy of Tor users).

You can do this too via:

sudo ufw logging off

By the way, you may wish to limit port 22 instead, to prevent SSH
brute force attacks.

sudo ufw limit 22/tcp

(I don't allow 22/udp)

hope this helps a little.

- -- 
Christopher Sheats
yawn...@gmail.com
GnuPG: 8397 7B9F D8BA 3EE5 71EF FDF3 C761 02B0 A531 D73D
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[tor-relays] rejected hit from China

2014-07-02 Thread Larry Brandt
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

Today my router blocked two hits from Chinese server
218.77.79.43:59762 to my 68.66.154.214:21.  I don't listen to port 21.
 I don't listen to 21.
Should I take some action?  Is this normal or academic or...?
glowworm
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Re: [tor-relays] rejected hit from China

2014-07-02 Thread Daniel Case
Sounds like fairly typical background noise to me. Null route the IP
if you're concerned but it's probably a zombie in someone's botnet or
a chinese user trying his luck. If your IP is listed publicly on tor,
expect to be probed every now and then.

On 3 July 2014 04:14, Larry Brandt lbra...@cni.net wrote:
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1

 Today my router blocked two hits from Chinese server
 218.77.79.43:59762 to my 68.66.154.214:21.  I don't listen to port 21.
  I don't listen to 21.
 Should I take some action?  Is this normal or academic or...?
 glowworm
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 Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (MingW32)
 Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/

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