Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: don't run transparent proxies at exits
> Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 01:04:58 -0500 > From: grarpamp > To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > >>> On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Drake Wilson wrote: >>> eric gisse wrote: >>> Plus the logic starts to get warped when you wonder "So do you BadExit >>> every node that runs on an ISP that caches traffic?" >>> > > As far as http caching, it would be relatively fine IF the cache > truly did good practice, and IF the site truly did good design > for the cache to follow. However those two necessary truths > are often false, whether by AND or XOR context. So to be > true, a cache shouldn't be deployed, but in the interest of > bandwidth they are, more commonly at small end-tier user > access ISPs (including exits) for that purpose. > > I'd suggest best practice is for > - users to use https to bypass > - caches to insert their tagline in http headers so > users can bitch to the owner. > - Tor exits? Well, they're volunteer paid diversity, so which is > more valuable to you? The IF's above, or TCP truth at > potential cost to diversity? > > I prefer TCP truth, but if I was a constrained operator > I'd do my best research into setting up a quality cache. > Provided caching images of ill repute on disk were not > an overriding concern. > I can imagine two strategies to avoid caching images on-disk: 1. Use an in-memory cache 2. Don't cache images While these strategies might not technically/legally offer much more protection (IANAL): 1. If the cache disappears as soon as the machine shuts down, it's much harder to prove the possession of anything illegal. (However, the proxy headers, live imaging, or an insecure/subverted server might give away what was being cached.) 2. And if images aren't being cached, while textual material could still be illegal, it's less likely to be specifically targeted by law enforcement. In my opinion, if you use HTTP over the internet, you are essentially consenting to caching, inspection, or worse. And most people know that by now. And if you use HTTP over Tor, you should be much more aware of this. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR C3C57B23 349825DE 929A1DEF C3531C25 A32287ED___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: don't run transparent proxies at exits
On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Drake Wilson wrote: > eric gisse wrote: >> Plus the logic starts to get warped when you wonder "So do you BadExit >> every node that runs on an ISP that caches traffic?" >> >> What about ISP's (and openDNS) that NXDOMAIN trap to insert advertising? > > These, I think, are more general points that have not adequately been > resolved anywhere, though I think the vague consensus has been that the > latter merits a BadExit at the moment. Indeed the basic idea of "exits An external NX ad trap is a bit tertiary since the exit is truly representing its view of the net. As far as http caching, it would be relatively fine IF the cache truly did good practice, and IF the site truly did good design for the cache to follow. However those two necessary truths are often false, whether by AND or XOR context. So to be true, a cache shouldn't be deployed, but in the interest of bandwidth they are, more commonly at small end-tier user access ISPs (including exits) for that purpose. I'd suggest best practice is for - users to use https to bypass - caches to insert their tagline in http headers so users can bitch to the owner. - Tor exits? Well, they're volunteer paid diversity, so which is more valuable to you? The IF's above, or TCP truth at potential cost to diversity? I prefer TCP truth, but if I was a constrained operator I'd do my best research into setting up a quality cache. Provided caching images of ill repute on disk were not an overriding concern. Last, the badexit projects should probably try to assess the current state of caching quality in order to further suggest practices for operators. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Reminder: exit nodes probably shouldn't be using Google's DNS servers
On Sat, Jan 10, 2015 at 10:58 PM, Richard Johnson wrote: > It is especially a good idea to have your own local DNS resolver if you run > Tor exits at an institution that's required to otherwise log DNS queries. > > Tor needs a separate (and non-logging) DNS resolution system to prevent the > institution from being presumed aware of Tor users' lookups. > > That this also protects Tor users from having their DNS queries logged is > good as well, but that isn't necessarily the driver for the institution. ;) Do not presume that pointing dns locally prevents passive monitors anywhere along your network graph of clearnet hops from seeing your dns queries there. And ultimately, exit IP can be observed and correlated from the roots down with increasing difficulty. That said, yes, local is still better, and often more performant, than pointing to a privacy joke like google. ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] eventdns: Address mismatch on received DNS packet.
Hi List, I'm seeing these messages in one of my relays. Pretty often, too. eventdns: Address mismatch on received DNS packet. Apparent source was : I've searched this and found references[1] to a faulty resolver of some type and torservers.net ignores the message[2]. I use my ISPs resolvers which are physically close to the server. In an attempt to fix this, I've added a caching local resolver to my server and configured resolv.conf properly (problem persists). Then I switched to Google DNS with caching in front (problem persists). Can anyone clarify what the problem may be? Or is it no problem at all? [1]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2013-July/002209.html [2]: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2011-December/001034.html Thanks! -Jeremy ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hi,
chutney can be used to setup a large test tor network running solely on a
single machine, with no outside network access required.
The tor/src/test/test-network.sh script will configure an entire test tor
network and verify connectivity from each client through the network.
This works best with tor 0.2.6.2-alpha due to some bootstrap speed
improvements, although with larger networks you may need to use --delay to
increase the bootstrap time.
I suggest you start with --flavour basic-min, and move through the sizes to
--flavour basic-100 (my machine can barely run basic-100).
You can also manually modify the amount of random data sent while verifying
connectivity (look for "Octets" in chutney's TorNet.py). It would be nice if
this amount was configurable (patches gladly accepted).
It would also be nice if these connections were done in parallel, but I don't
think that's the case (clarification or patches gladly accepted).
teor
> Date: Sun, 11 Jan 2015 14:18:01 +0100
> From: webmaster
>
> Hi Julien,
>
> thats exactly the setup I'm actually using. I use my relay as a client.
> From my point of view it seems that the relay is used as a entry point
> (without guard flag) in this constellation (correct me if I'm wrong).
>
> Torsocks could solve my problem.
>
> My goal is to examine the influence of a high traffic load on my relay
> to perhaps adjust my server settings (number of open file descriptors,
> ...).
>
>
>
>> Am 11.01.2015 um 13:05 schrieb Julien ROBIN:
>> Hi,
>>
>> If you are on a dedicated high Bandwidth server you can maybe use your relay
>> as client, an idea could be to open a lot of "wget" commands.
>>
>> sudo apt-get install torsocks
>> usewithtor wget URL
>>
>> But it's not guaranteed that the selected circuits will be super-fast (first
>> reason to open lot of wgets simultaneously)
>>
>> Of course, doing that you consume some useful bandwidth for users (but if
>> it's quick, after all you're a Tor user like another!)
>>
>> And it's not totally the same that relaying data as server, since it's using
>> the client part of the tor process (but starting from here, I cannot help
>> you anymore since I don't know what is written in the code ;)
>>
>> So if anybody have another better idea
>> Something that would generate a full customized circuit for example, or
>> reduce the amount of used hop for the test.
>>
>> It already exists "EntryNodes" and "ExitNodes" commands for your torrc file,
>> but no server can be used as EntryNode if it's not Guard already, and I'm
>> not sure that some "MiddleNodes" command exists.
>>
>>
>> Last things, you can also make you machine's CPU working hard on a lot of
>> threads simultaneously, and watch if Tor is suffering or not (like "too many
>> circuit creation request!" in the log).
>>
>> Or make some tests with Iperf for high bandwidth load in parallel ("iperf
>> -s" on a fast machine, "ipers -c Ip -t TimeInSeconds -p port -P
>> ParallelsTcpConnexions" on the other machine - this one will send data
>> (chains of 1234567890123...) to the server)
>>
>> Good luck ! By curiosity, I'm interested also, but I would understand if
>> this kind of easiness in creating bandwidth statistics and degraded path
>> (for analysis, for example) is not really sought by developers.
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Julien ROBIN
>>
>>
>>
>> - Mail original -
>> De: "webmaster"
>> ?: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>> Envoy?: Dimanche 11 Janvier 2015 11:59:12
>> Objet: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
>>
>> Hey Folks,
>>
>> is there a common procedure for testing a tor server for a high load?
>>
>> Thanks in advance
>
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[tor-relays] Extreme Overclocking / Relay Performance
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Having discussed this with my partner earlier today, I am curious as to what knowledge the community might have on overclocking a CPU or using other speciality hardware to create an ultra fast Tor relay. I am aware of what IPredator have done but I feel confident better can be done. Has anyone looked into FPGA's at all or know what features, other than AES-NI enabled CPUs could bring big performance boosts? T - -- Activist, anarchist and a bit of a dreamer. Mirror & Keys: http://bb6qtmqg65g6.onion PGP Keys: key.thecthulhu.com Current Fingerprint: E771 BE69 4696 F742 DB94 AA8C 5C2A 8C5A 0CCA 4983 Key-ID: 0CCA4983 Master Fingerprint: DDEF AB9B 1962 5D09 4264 2558 1F23 39B7 EF10 09F0 Key-ID: EF1009F0 Twitter: @CthulhuSec XMPP: thecthulhu at jabber.ccc.de XMPP-OTR: 4321B19F A9A3462C FE64BAC7 294C8A7E A53CC966 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJUspxJAAoJEFwqjFoMykmDAIEP/28IkrYhjvcnF2jPrt4AL7St 0uXbnTlWbe7KcbnDykXoKGoHwS5jYY7kK9wUo/wKxjxW8MjBlMQdbBiyrpGmc+CY Zk5LyfGkWpSG36KM1L4euK7DMOB5vucFwh4qdt4MEWcB5RZvO2BsuADiMqKQ+Ysz lcdnAmZuFlt+FxoS0O76FEpmahPoVKB5rC8i+pvRxRW14sliIJqVB3JKuE4SA66e 4bT+AGw6btddMO+uW6tDEJeib+fjkvcmCFKMcElr7YcUisJMQrxe8l/CxfrO2WvK nvlt0UMbg2WpPNVueW3uk//fKCZJJryOlo0fx3Mjg/DLAG6to9g0oBE1jQ740Qmz 0pzkxLodQ+FqnJONUgx+QY0spK4gUHXpBEv0lbKqzLSuhK47Nqd3KGd1eRPcpU// NM1tLXosYLHkaLnM98Cz6Bw1cxfMuO36KzLPXEuH2+6hhYTA4mABc4itAA6iRvw4 Ck8ohAlc6KYWqGL64nvOtIPUDYpQPkwLTClVf7PxJZP/CPaNTyI2fOuxM2ObW5Ca qGiCOPzvG1BtzP52IlGF3yfB9+711DvpgnUH4l/jS4KP4jsM2uFte/Z7DuRJXWi4 O0xfnZtqI4lWnNGV6RsbC8avJCrvou3XrWvMSzmU7AaEBQY0UoOK8eRXv/Em/Pv6 sQCc5pBSZgNQMTgunvxE =lX1H -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Relays not listed
What an interesting coincidence, tor-specific load is down to about 1/3 of its' normal which is in the 20mb/s range usually. I was worried my experimentation got me dinged as a badexit but that's not the case, and otther people are seeing odd things... On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 7:40 AM, ZEROF wrote: > Hi Felix, > > Same here, atlas and globe went down for me at that period. > > On 11 January 2015 at 11:40, Felix wrote: >> >> Hi >> >> most of my relays are no longer listed on Torstatus* and Consensus**. >> But they perform like they should. >> >> out $E388F7BD196F5195AEF114552585152EA6942329 >> out $2691AE47D3E1D5702520F2792951927C9FE82C67 >> out $8d1a618c523a8cc761b7253e96c6d19285c47029 >> out $05d54acea361a57b16cd461340bd32f39383470e >> out $1E64DACE137A4A6223E7A4A73060A22ECA46D7B3 >> out $772C86361E276271665579621815F43311A29DA6 >> out $A53F5920B86F8190569BDFD59F7818BA73966CC3 >> out $9FBD26A8EB88126FCEF76205255571E450170949 >> out $BF4FFC4EE4D56AD6506D6FA96BA9EBD8001744BB >> in $5B3B9A0EA1DC16F6348C57FCC83BBB43D1013F4A >> >> I found Atlas was down between 21:30 ans 01:30 yesterday night. >> Any ideas ? >> >> Cheers, Felix >> >> * http: jlve2y45zacpbz6s.onion/index.php >> ** https: consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html >> ___ >> tor-relays mailing list >> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org >> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > > > > > -- > http://www.backbox.org > http://www.pentester.iz.rs > > > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Relays not listed
Hi Felix, Same here, atlas and globe went down for me at that period. On 11 January 2015 at 11:40, Felix wrote: > Hi > > most of my relays are no longer listed on Torstatus* and Consensus**. > But they perform like they should. > > out $E388F7BD196F5195AEF114552585152EA6942329 > out $2691AE47D3E1D5702520F2792951927C9FE82C67 > out $8d1a618c523a8cc761b7253e96c6d19285c47029 > out $05d54acea361a57b16cd461340bd32f39383470e > out $1E64DACE137A4A6223E7A4A73060A22ECA46D7B3 > out $772C86361E276271665579621815F43311A29DA6 > out $A53F5920B86F8190569BDFD59F7818BA73966CC3 > out $9FBD26A8EB88126FCEF76205255571E450170949 > out $BF4FFC4EE4D56AD6506D6FA96BA9EBD8001744BB > in $5B3B9A0EA1DC16F6348C57FCC83BBB43D1013F4A > > I found Atlas was down between 21:30 ans 01:30 yesterday night. > Any ideas ? > > Cheers, Felix > > * http: jlve2y45zacpbz6s.onion/index.php > ** https: consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html > ___ > tor-relays mailing list > tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays > -- http://www.backbox.org http://www.pentester.iz.rs ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hi Julien,
thats exactly the setup I'm actually using. I use my relay as a client.
>From my point of view it seems that the relay is used as a entry point
(without guard flag) in this constellation (correct me if I'm wrong).
Torsocks could solve my problem.
My goal is to examine the influence of a high traffic load on my relay
to perhaps adjust my server settings (number of open file descriptors,
...).
Am 11.01.2015 um 13:05 schrieb Julien ROBIN:
> Hi,
>
> If you are on a dedicated high Bandwidth server you can maybe use your relay
> as client, an idea could be to open a lot of "wget" commands.
>
> sudo apt-get install torsocks
> usewithtor wget URL
>
> But it's not guaranteed that the selected circuits will be super-fast (first
> reason to open lot of wgets simultaneously)
>
> Of course, doing that you consume some useful bandwidth for users (but if
> it's quick, after all you're a Tor user like another!)
>
> And it's not totally the same that relaying data as server, since it's using
> the client part of the tor process (but starting from here, I cannot help you
> anymore since I don't know what is written in the code ;)
>
> So if anybody have another better idea
> Something that would generate a full customized circuit for example, or
> reduce the amount of used hop for the test.
>
> It already exists "EntryNodes" and "ExitNodes" commands for your torrc file,
> but no server can be used as EntryNode if it's not Guard already, and I'm not
> sure that some "MiddleNodes" command exists.
>
>
> Last things, you can also make you machine's CPU working hard on a lot of
> threads simultaneously, and watch if Tor is suffering or not (like "too many
> circuit creation request!" in the log).
>
> Or make some tests with Iperf for high bandwidth load in parallel ("iperf -s"
> on a fast machine, "ipers -c Ip -t TimeInSeconds -p port -P
> ParallelsTcpConnexions" on the other machine - this one will send data
> (chains of 1234567890123...) to the server)
>
> Good luck ! By curiosity, I'm interested also, but I would understand if this
> kind of easiness in creating bandwidth statistics and degraded path (for
> analysis, for example) is not really sought by developers.
>
> Best regards,
> Julien ROBIN
>
>
>
> - Mail original -
> De: "webmaster"
> À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> Envoyé: Dimanche 11 Janvier 2015 11:59:12
> Objet: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
>
> Hey Folks,
>
> is there a common procedure for testing a tor server for a high load?
>
> Thanks in advance
>
>
--
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Re: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hi,
If you are on a dedicated high Bandwidth server you can maybe use your relay as
client, an idea could be to open a lot of "wget" commands.
sudo apt-get install torsocks
usewithtor wget URL
But it's not guaranteed that the selected circuits will be super-fast (first
reason to open lot of wgets simultaneously)
Of course, doing that you consume some useful bandwidth for users (but if it's
quick, after all you're a Tor user like another!)
And it's not totally the same that relaying data as server, since it's using
the client part of the tor process (but starting from here, I cannot help you
anymore since I don't know what is written in the code ;)
So if anybody have another better idea
Something that would generate a full customized circuit for example, or reduce
the amount of used hop for the test.
It already exists "EntryNodes" and "ExitNodes" commands for your torrc file,
but no server can be used as EntryNode if it's not Guard already, and I'm not
sure that some "MiddleNodes" command exists.
Last things, you can also make you machine's CPU working hard on a lot of
threads simultaneously, and watch if Tor is suffering or not (like "too many
circuit creation request!" in the log).
Or make some tests with Iperf for high bandwidth load in parallel ("iperf -s"
on a fast machine, "ipers -c Ip -t TimeInSeconds -p port -P
ParallelsTcpConnexions" on the other machine - this one will send data (chains
of 1234567890123...) to the server)
Good luck ! By curiosity, I'm interested also, but I would understand if this
kind of easiness in creating bandwidth statistics and degraded path (for
analysis, for example) is not really sought by developers.
Best regards,
Julien ROBIN
- Mail original -
De: "webmaster"
À: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Envoyé: Dimanche 11 Janvier 2015 11:59:12
Objet: [tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hey Folks,
is there a common procedure for testing a tor server for a high load?
Thanks in advance
--
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[tor-relays] Simulate High Tor Load
Hey Folks, is there a common procedure for testing a tor server for a high load? Thanks in advance -- -BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- Version: GnuPG v2.0.17 (MingW32) mQENBFHMmT8BCAC0smvU7Bq1ABxAhvBRn7d4ekkk95aCE4TTQo4wy1z/rGLhQfdt dhiD+Vy61vGrsdK3ei5sW6rBvX2m8+YmBi+8AAgSiZmS0JM3Zz3cmTi5oh0D/yM8 4aDj7wQYfJyzSmYN8InAQ5eA77lwIdqG27kR9wga2szeJwCnWReta0R+7YFkpUW+ zUlf4SWcUx5SmBsaiELQpm+Qcn+fyopo12RX6YVmoNPBvN2nDXDnRhUCKGc+0xhD UrBpCHrApK6sTnMsD34ClCLTL2L1gckQ0AsQqY3PJlx3R8kIJxlmr6R3WnjPMIG0 lqrukB9PcOrHM1MZXK1gK6AtypHBN98lr8Z9ABEBAAG0KndlYm1hc3RlciA8d2Vi bWFzdGVyQGRlZmNvbi1jYy5keW5kbnMub3JnPokBPgQTAQIAKAUCUcyZPwIbIwUJ CWYBgAYLCQgHAwIGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQcN1vxvRQl+0SEwf+KXjf YtiSUSVS11uqeQ/8g46NwmNa91P3toZvEd7vhLSbjnL9bi/vApzNnUTGT3VP4/NA dg9SbR4qKlSr8T+YikRMV3tiuiVq8m7g00qM9y8MIomwJTounz8VdO/aJXFSOxAK Bb6ElREADspCzr2qSZCnozWUzbd+b8owbGeRRq3e33Aa5Nlm/xDRxGDWANbaIA8q Gkibvy3vWEwrxiwsakvHGaEZnPEtlNm3M1xcmFAuyl73qzUMkLN0u9E/2igo4EB5 EdMb5Ab5hfWdljxBqJr0tsvMfSK4VkzMCbKYkTqHZIRPQnhiSBE6Yo1Q6RCl/Hht bkvU4RA0J+NkXMZljrkBDQRRzJk/AQgA0HojJnK0uhEkAnbmszYsf477DV+LD02s ZEAlLGhJlf9qYaDiPMPwaZ3nK8/PYKzPpBWfHgRQP97rLHPIVJYl3BHDa/nWeZ2b e/HzYhpX0djbK9qe6W/CTfGbXmC/y+4dDGB8dvtTAW3JILm7xEdwiWtywozEVy7V lnMK4JQvlfOh+3XO6qv71FXyuRkObvkYzqvxUYHewtvvObcVxXHP0C0O6LB44iAW 2boZVVuiHdudnyNAezJajPMUT8SnI0bwL6+0TgnHL4cKNUEPQljIrrvi+9nCkq7V uBtnsYtyoo2reoxmCbX/Z1zZsxdUcKpeJHlc5AypyN8DUJ+APJ9NnwARAQABiQEl BBgBAgAPBQJRzJk/AhsMBQkJZgGAAAoJEHDdb8b0UJftOY0H/1TChmQrJC/qzefW PK7EqFlBg3TIEXdu8JHjF42ZOgzQRfp7E2wWzEx0Y45lNXMs6Yg15hWCEDaUDF6F 5WZKNrP8xIldyR9Aw7fyKqjZ9UuKovqofHsCiaSO7nWzGM6GF3nBDNI9NcFve/wN wggyjAbohOJrJGal3N0HlG3cakqjEmjBe1gQEMC0ZPlWstb/cqqr49TNPrRmQc4P SyGffh8Xqhw94m1LDBXFEaYe7AxjNk1sPAVfO1rOdLF6GOun/UwgbhDQX/Rb9C3t AhjSgyFEiR/gfrUZ7R6SY51qOUf1lN5ZN85C/x27XoZWYlsNaH3Ei6nG+yeswBMk ZRMbezQ= =Med3 -END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK- 0xF45097ED.asc Description: application/pgp-keys ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Relays not listed
Hi most of my relays are no longer listed on Torstatus* and Consensus**. But they perform like they should. out $E388F7BD196F5195AEF114552585152EA6942329 out $2691AE47D3E1D5702520F2792951927C9FE82C67 out $8d1a618c523a8cc761b7253e96c6d19285c47029 out $05d54acea361a57b16cd461340bd32f39383470e out $1E64DACE137A4A6223E7A4A73060A22ECA46D7B3 out $772C86361E276271665579621815F43311A29DA6 out $A53F5920B86F8190569BDFD59F7818BA73966CC3 out $9FBD26A8EB88126FCEF76205255571E450170949 out $BF4FFC4EE4D56AD6506D6FA96BA9EBD8001744BB in $5B3B9A0EA1DC16F6348C57FCC83BBB43D1013F4A I found Atlas was down between 21:30 ans 01:30 yesterday night. Any ideas ? Cheers, Felix * http: jlve2y45zacpbz6s.onion/index.php ** https: consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health.html ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
