Re: [tor-relays] Connectivity issues; disabling my relay

2017-02-15 Thread grarpamp 
Steven wrote:
> So, I've concluded that these little bursts of packet loss are really
> just some failed equipment of the backhaul carrier, and that it isn't
> fixed yet is most simply explained by incompetence.

At first all I read in your graph was the latency drop.
But yes now I see the underlying loss shift from green to
a darker base. It can be crap hardware / connection or
bandwidth overload. In those cases you can open a ticket
with whatever data you can find and see what comes back.
If you hit gold, ask them for a job if you want one :)

Latency drops are usually cutting legacy routers and
needless layers out of the path, or more direct physical
routes. Fewer hops are also sometimes seen with mpls or
enabled by longer range optics layers in place of routers.

If there are any "stupid" adversaries left, they might show
up as increase in latency / loss / hop count, rarely a
decrease, unless their TTL editing is broken.

It's also will never be seen as a bad move to shut down
a relay if adversary action is suspected until explained
otherwise. Reasonable caution and consideration and
input sought, whether public or private, is a good thing
in this game.

>>  Short bursts of packet loss like this, if someone
>> was doing that deliberately with a set pattern, would have been an ideal
>> way to watermark streams going in and out of the Tor network, to do some
>> timing correlations.
>
> Actually, there's a really interesting research subfield on *undetectable*
> watermarks -- that is, injecting a signal that is essentially noise
> unless you know the key that generated it, and then detecting that signal
> elsewhere in the network.
>
> For papers in this area, check out
> https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ndss09-rainbow
> https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ndss11-swirl
> https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#pets13-flow-fingerprints

Roger points out some good papers, and has listed others
previously that you can look for in the archives.

I often submit [reasonably or not] that, and as suggested in at least
one of those papers...
1) if an adversary can inject / mod undetectables into, or
otherwise unrevertably data tag, your encrypted datastream,
you need to rethink that stream.
2) you can defeat network traffic analysis / timing / correlation by GPA's,
including active fill / loss and modulation attacks upon the wire itself,
by establishing fulltime dynamic fill traffic in place of otherwise
voids in user
demand load, and by enforcing strict expected and negotiated channel
parameters with peers upon penalty of rejection, and by reclocking traffic
that you pass. (This is meant p2p parameters, not a solution to rogue
nodes otherwise privy to or generating underlying encryption layers over
user cleartext content.)

I think the research and development fields on this topic regarding
application to potential [overlay] networks (not just necessarily tor)
are still very much wide open for those who would like to take them up :)

[cc: tor-talk, for the non relay ops aspect]
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread John Ricketts 
Thank you for your service to the community!  

> On Feb 15, 2017, at 14:05, "tor-ad...@torland.is"  
> wrote:
> 
> reduced
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread Moritz Bartl 
Hi TorLand!

On 15.02.2017 22:55, tor-ad...@torland.is wrote:
> I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs 
> your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge. 

Hope you enjoyed the time! :-) As you will know, running exits can be
quite educational -- in a positive sense.

-- 
Moritz Bartl
https://www.torservers.net/
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

[tor-relays] Proselytizing Tor at the General Strike

2017-02-15 Thread Kenneth Freeman 
On February 17, the day before Presidents Day, a general strike shall be
held against any and all things Trump. If Boise is having an activists
workshop, then there are plenty of tranches of fertile ground nationwide
to plant Tor browsers, relays, and exit nodes.

http://sfist.com/2017/02/02/nationwide_general_strike_gains_tra.php

http://strike4democracy.com/

https://www.facebook.com/events/1756631744665376/

There's activism, and then there's activism. I would steer clear of
actual OpSec unless you're in the right milieu.

I have been told in introducing Tor that it can be difficult to
conceptualize. I always tell people that your privacy is more
configurable than you may realize, and that privacy horizons differ.

Get down. Get encrypted.






0xDD79757F.asc
Description: application/pgp-keys


signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread David Goulet 
On 15 Feb (21:55:48), tor-ad...@torland.is wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1 
> (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
>  
> on February 17 2017. 
> 
> During the time of operation it pumped almost 6 PetaByte of exit traffic. 
> Compared to the amount of traffic, the number of complains were quite low. 
> Around 1-2 complains per week with a reduced exit policy. Two times I was 
> contacted by LE via email. 
> 
> When I started the exit relay there were around 20-30 high capacity relays 
> available. Today compass shows 180 95+ MBit/s exits. TorLand1 was operated 
> and 
> paid by me without an organization like torservers, nos onions, etc. 
> 
> I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs 
> your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge. 

HUGE thanks for your contribution! It's is really unaccountable how much
that helped the network and thus the world :).

Again, BIG thanks!
David

> 
> Regards,
> 
> torland
> ___
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

-- 
gcUatLyGglBJOYXuAioeOQaDTvKomulP8VedNkVNqAo=


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread Tor 
On 16/02/2017 08:55, tor-ad...@torland.is wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1 
> (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
>  
> on February 17 2017. 

Thank you for 5 years of service.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread Dirk Eschbach 
Hi torland,

thank you very much for all your efforts.

best regards
Dirk

On 15.02.2017 22:55, tor-ad...@torland.is wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1 
> (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
>  
> on February 17 2017. 
>
> During the time of operation it pumped almost 6 PetaByte of exit traffic. 
> Compared to the amount of traffic, the number of complains were quite low. 
> Around 1-2 complains per week with a reduced exit policy. Two times I was 
> contacted by LE via email. 
>
> When I started the exit relay there were around 20-30 high capacity relays 
> available. Today compass shows 180 95+ MBit/s exits. TorLand1 was operated 
> and 
> paid by me without an organization like torservers, nos onions, etc. 
>
> I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs 
> your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge. 
>
> Regards,
>
> torland
> ___
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays


___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread Volker Mink 
N :(
Why?

> Am 15.02.2017 um 22:55 schrieb tor-ad...@torland.is:
> 
> Hi all,
> 
> after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1 
> (https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
>  
> on February 17 2017. 
> 
> During the time of operation it pumped almost 6 PetaByte of exit traffic. 
> Compared to the amount of traffic, the number of complains were quite low. 
> Around 1-2 complains per week with a reduced exit policy. Two times I was 
> contacted by LE via email. 
> 
> When I started the exit relay there were around 20-30 high capacity relays 
> available. Today compass shows 180 95+ MBit/s exits. TorLand1 was operated 
> and 
> paid by me without an organization like torservers, nos onions, etc. 
> 
> I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs 
> your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge. 
> 
> Regards,
> 
> torland
> ___
> tor-relays mailing list
> tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays


smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

[tor-relays] Shutdown of TorLand1

2017-02-15 Thread tor-admin 
Hi all,

after 5 years of operation I will shutdown TorLand1 
(https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/E1E922A20AF608728824A620BADC6EFC8CB8C2B8)
 
on February 17 2017. 

During the time of operation it pumped almost 6 PetaByte of exit traffic. 
Compared to the amount of traffic, the number of complains were quite low. 
Around 1-2 complains per week with a reduced exit policy. Two times I was 
contacted by LE via email. 

When I started the exit relay there were around 20-30 high capacity relays 
available. Today compass shows 180 95+ MBit/s exits. TorLand1 was operated and 
paid by me without an organization like torservers, nos onions, etc. 

I hope others will step up and run high capacity exits. The Tor network needs 
your help. I will continue to run a meek bridge. 

Regards,

torland
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays