Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread tor 
> Doesn't a lot of it depend on context anyway?

Yes.

> How can we quantify something like this?

We can't. We don't have all the data. We have to assume the worst and plan 
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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread Duncan 
dawuud:
> 
>> I think it is worth remembering that there isn't evidence there is a
>> global passive adversary at the moment, even if certain agencies and
>> organizations clearly aspire to be one.
> 
> Quite so. It is well established that these so called agencies do not
> aspire to be passive. Or perhaps you simply typed the word "passive" by
> shear force of habit and instead meant to convey "suffiently global 
> adversary". :)
> 

I was mostly commenting on the use of the word "passive", but I agree
with you that "sufficiently global adversary" is perhaps a better word.

Doesn't a lot of it depend on context anyway? How can we quantify
something like this?
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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread John Ricketts 
Roger,

Thank you.  Thats the concise answer I was looking for and I will hold at 5% 
and coordinate from there.

I will be in Seattle mid-October, hoping I can connect with folks in Seattle 
area that do Tor and also visit the office to get some shirts and say hi!

Any takers, Seattle Tor people?

John

On Sep 26, 2017, at 19:31, Roger Dingledine > 
wrote:

On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 01:04:28PM +, John Ricketts wrote:
I am about to fire up more Exit Relays  and if I do so I will jump from my 
roughly 3% of Exit Probability to what technically could easily reach 6-8%.

I would like to know everyone???s opinion on having an individual operator have 
that much exit share.  In my case, all the traffic would be coming from the 
same AS as well, but distributed over four different cities with different 
upstream carriers.

Hi John,

I think 5% exit share is fine, and 10% is probably a bit too high.

That means as you grow past 5%, you should work with the other big exit
relay operator groups -- torservers, Nos Oignons, DFRI, Fr?mailto:tor-relays@lists.torproject.org>
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread Roger Dingledine 
On Fri, Sep 22, 2017 at 01:04:28PM +, John Ricketts wrote:
> I am about to fire up more Exit Relays  and if I do so I will jump from my 
> roughly 3% of Exit Probability to what technically could easily reach 6-8%.
> 
> I would like to know everyone???s opinion on having an individual operator 
> have that much exit share.  In my case, all the traffic would be coming from 
> the same AS as well, but distributed over four different cities with 
> different upstream carriers.

Hi John,

I think 5% exit share is fine, and 10% is probably a bit too high.

That means as you grow past 5%, you should work with the other big exit
relay operator groups -- torservers, Nos Oignons, DFRI, Frënn vun der
Ënn, Hart Voor Internetvrijheid, NoiseTor, and the many more out there --
to get them to pick up the pace on their side. :)

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread grarpamp 
>> :> what the current value of "global" is but I should hope it's well above 
>> 5%...

>> :I'm curious about what you mean by "global" here, and how it relates to
>> :[potentially] malicious operators (suspicious relays of which are
>> :frequently thrown off the Tor network).
>>
>> "global" as in a global passive adversary

Global is relative, it can mean at a scale having wide enough coverage
physical or logical, to achieve your goals, against from 1 to all users,
in sufficient time. It probably doesn't mean 1 node or tap, or quite 10,
but up towards 100 / 500 / 1000 becomes interesting to think about.
Similarly probably not for $5000, yet $5 to $10M becomes a project.
Physical may mean literally distributed about the Earth.
Logical may mean piled in one datacenter taking part in the
random functions of a target network, such as DHT abuse.

>> though I suppose running nodes is an active adversary.

Depends on what's being done with those Sybil nodes.
Listening, traffic analysis, recording, decryption... that's passive.
Modification, inject / drop, perturb, exploit... that's active.

There are successful attacks in both modes of operation.

> If an adversary is a global passive adversary, surely that would mean
> that they are for all intents and purposes seeing pretty much all of the
> traffic?
>
> I think it is worth remembering that there isn't evidence there is a
> global passive adversary at the moment, even if certain agencies and
> organizations clearly aspire to be one.

If anyone seriously thinks that GPA / GAA scale adversaries
do not exist, or are not actively in effect and growing with intent,
they need to get their head out of their ass and digest the news
dating back to at least Snowden.

Even simple University level research groups have published
effective production low cost small scale Sybil attacks on tor.

(Sybil may also include infiltration of global code repositories.)

Learn about how internet backbones work, lack of per link
level encryption and fill traffic, Tier-1 vantage points,
dozens of suspect hops in a traceroute, etc.

How entities and people bend over backwards to give data
away under the legal or $dollar table with wink and nod.

Read up what NSA, GCHQ, FVEY, DEA, et al are doing
with $Billions, PATRIOT partnerships, manganese nodules, etc.

In a sense, "global" may sometimes distill down to meaning
the same "global amounts of money" spread at a problem via
various vectors to achieve similar results.

Threats involving large scale deployment of $money, nodes,
and actors against tor and other networks are real and secretive.

Secrecy requires gauging their effectiveness by analysis of leaks,
court cases, parallel construction, whispers and canaries,
whitepapers, human resources, code and deltas, and news media.

The fun part beyond that is in figuring out how to defeat them
and then doing exactly that :)
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Re: [tor-relays] On some differences after upgrade to latest tor for Jessie

2017-09-26 Thread Torix 
I am running jesse, too.  Yes, it runs systemd; I find (at least some) tor info 
in:
/var/log/daemon.log
Having no experience with tor on an earlier debian, I don't know if that's all 
there is.
HTH,
--torix

Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

>  Original Message 
> Subject: Re: [tor-relays] On some differences after upgrade to latest tor for 
> Jessie
> Local Time: September 24, 2017 6:12 PM
> UTC Time: September 24, 2017 10:12 PM
> From: nusenu-li...@riseup.net
> To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
>
> a tor op:
>> One thing that puzzles me is the log
>> /var/log/tor/log
>>
>> I used to always see some useful info there, like number of connecting 
>> clients during the last 6 hours etc.
>
> Tor (from deb.tpo) on Debian logs to syslog (/var/log/syslog) by default
> - but check your configuration to verify your configuration.
>
> --
> https://mastodon.social/@nusenu
> https://twitter.com/nusenu_
>
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[tor-relays] MaxMemInQueues defends against 375000 circuits in 9 secs

2017-09-26 Thread Felix 
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256

Hi everybody

Another circuit storm, right ?

- 

MaxMemInQueues 2 GB

- 

2017-09-26_17-55-00:
 PID JID USERNAME THR PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE C TIME CPU COMMAND
84847 2 256 6 20 0 484M 427M uwait 0 907:02 11.77% tor


2017-09-26_18-59-00:
 PID JID USERNAME THR PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE C TIME CPU COMMAND
84847 2 256 6 20 0 2437M 2380M uwait 0 917:03 18.26% tor

- 

On Tor 0.3.2.1-alpha 290274dbb5428bc5

Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 4 days 18:59
hours, with 13714 circuits open. I've sent 2459.48 GB and received
2422.58 GB.
Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time:
4635/4635 TAP, 113271/113271 NTor.
Sep 26 18:24:37.000 [notice] Since startup, we have initiated 0 v1
connections, 0 v2 connections, 3 v3 connections, and 214559 v4
connections; and received 886 v1 connections, 24624 v2 connections,
60722 v3 connections, and 354411 v4 connections.
Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits
with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.)
Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] Removed 106528 bytes by killing 14408
circuits; 0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 0 non-linked directory
connections.
Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits
with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.)
Sep 26 18:59:28.000 [notice] Removed 528 bytes by killing 7 circuits;
0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 0 non-linked directory connections.

...



2500 x removed some bytes by killing between single and 300 circuits
(constantly increasing sawtoothy, average 150 circuits)
average 150 circuits x 2500 = 375000 circuits avoided in 9 seconds



...

Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [notice] We're low on memory. Killing circuits
with over-long queues. (This behavior is controlled by MaxMemInQueues.)
Sep 26 18:59:37.000 [notice] Removed 4624 bytes by killing 115
circuits; 0 circuits remain alive. Also killed 1 non-linked directory
connections.

[] https://
 lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-July/012624.html

- -- 
Cheers, Felix
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Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-26 Thread Scott Bennett 
dawuud  wrote:

>
> > I think it is worth remembering that there isn't evidence there is a
> > global passive adversary at the moment, even if certain agencies and
> > organizations clearly aspire to be one.
>
> Quite so. It is well established that these so called agencies do not
> aspire to be passive. Or perhaps you simply typed the word "passive" by
> shear force of habit and instead meant to convey "suffiently global 
> adversary". :)

 Curiouser and curiouser!  So, dawuud, you imply that habit has a
velocity vector(!) and that it changes over distance(!!) in one or more
dimensions, and thus exerts a shear force on...what?  A typist's fingers
and hand placed within the volume where shear is present?  Strong enough,
perhaps, to roll them up and maybe even break a wrist?  Well, I guess one
lives and learns!  (Hint:  you misplaced a homonym.:)


  Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
**
* Internet:   bennett at sdf.org   *xor*   bennett at freeshell.org  *
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* "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good  *
* objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *
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*-- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 *
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