[tor-relays] Some ContactInfo Spec Adoption Stats

[nusenu]

Hi,

it is great to see that just 2-3 months after publishing version 2 of the 
ContactInfo Information Sharing Spec [1]
there are already over 100 tor relays (>10% exit probability) making use of it,
to allow for automated verification of the url field in the ContactInfo.

If you are still using version 1 of the spec I'd encourage you to update to 
version 2,
which usually isn't a big effort.

Due to the adoption I also started to add stats for it to OrNetStats, but
since the proofs and ContactInfo strings are public, everyone can verify it:

https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/#verified-operator-domains

Currently it does only consider the well-known URI proofs (the DNS proof will 
also be added).

It is also important to note that a verified domain does not say anything about
the intentions of an operator, it just prevents things like [2]
where a malicious entity claimed to be some other operator by using their 
ContactInfo
without a good automated method to tell them appart, especially if MyFamily is 
not properly set.

And it will also make things easier when tagging relays as "known" or "unknown" 
[3],
since it allows tagging on an operator level instead of trying to figure out 
who the real operator behind
each and every relay is, by using unverified ContactInfo claims manually.

In the near future I'd like to make use of the data to generate 
operator level time series graphs and overall stacked graphs.

If you would like to play with the ContactInfo strings yourself, 
here is an early parser:
https://github.com/erans/torcontactinfoparser

In the past we had a small error in the generator (field name "gpg:..." was 
used instead of "pgp:...")
this has been fixed:
https://torcontactinfogenerator.netlify.app/

kind regards,
nusenu

[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-October/019024.html
[2] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2020-October/019045.html
[3] https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/metrics/relay-search/-/issues/40001

-- 
https://mastodon.social/@nusenu



OpenPGP_signature
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] consensus

[Roger Dingledine]

On Wed, Jan 06, 2021 at 09:29:32AM +0100, Felix wrote:
> When I try
>   http://authorityip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
> it's
>  'failed: Operation timed out'
> What works is:
>   http://relayip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
> 
> Am I missing something and is everything good? A glitch?

You can follow the chaos in more detail at
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-consensus-health/

But the very short answer is that it appears the overload from
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/33018
is back.

It appears that somebody has made their own Tor client implementation
and it fetches its dir info in a very rude way. If anybody knows details
of it, please do let us know.

moria1 is running the what-I-think-is-smarter behavior described in
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/33072#note_2709867
but in terms of getting that patch merged, I think we're in a "somebody
should" situation.

tl;dr "the network is still working but things could be better"

--Roger

___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

[tor-relays] consensus

[Felix]

Hi

https://consensus-health.torproject.org/consensus-health shows:

Consensus was published 2021-01-06 05:00:00 UTC.
Unusual Authorities:
  moria1  Consensus could not be retrieved
  dizum  Consensus could not be retrieved
  gabelmoo  Consensus could not be retrieved
  maatuska  Consensus could not be retrieved
  faravahar  Consensus could not be retrieved
  longclaw  Consensus could not be retrieved
  bastet  Consensus could not be retrieved

When I try
  http://authorityip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
it's
 'failed: Operation timed out'
What works is:
  http://relayip:dirport/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z

Am I missing something and is everything good? A glitch?

--
Cheers, Felix
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays