Re: [tor-relays] OrNetStats: Operator Level Graphs added
> Maybe nitpicking but IMO It is irritating, that the 0% value (zero) > of the left y-axis doesn't match the 0 GBit/s at the right y-axis > (per default). I find it actually useful to have distinct scaling and offsets for the two y axis, because this way the available space is used more efficiently, no? After learning that these are not starting at 0, things should be clear. What doesn't make sense for me: negative ranges, which I'll try to address soon. thanks for your input, nusenu ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Introducing new bridge status page
On 1/11/21 9:03 PM, Philipp Winter wrote: FINGERPRINT is your bridge's fingerprint or its hashed fingerprint -- either works. for public bridges ;-) -- Toralf ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Introducing new bridge status page
As part of our ongoing effort to reimplement BridgeDB, we now have a bridge status page that shows if a bridge's pluggable transports work: https://bridges.torproject.org/status?id=FINGERPRINT FINGERPRINT is your bridge's fingerprint or its hashed fingerprint -- either works. The backend tests bridges every 18 hours by making a tor process fetch the bridge's descriptor. Tor bridges will soon log a URL pointing to this status page: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/30477 As of today, 89% of all pluggable transports work. Cheers, Philipp ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] OrNetStats: Operator Level Graphs added
Toralf Förster: > (BTW that doesn't work at all with the current ciissversion if relays > are hosted at different hoster at all, or?) I didn't understand you there, would you like to elaborate? Using multiple hosters is good and recommended and CIISS does not limit that, it supports as many hosters as you like. kind regards, nusenu -- https://nusenu.github.io OpenPGP_signature Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] OrNetStats: Operator Level Graphs added
> - Can I leave my email address as it is [...]?
The use of "[]" is optional ("SHOULD"),
so this is valid:
email:cont...@example.com
Also the example you mentioned is valid.
> I wanted to set up a httpd first. Luckily I left that. I wrote the
> fingerprints in the DNS. Would like to have as little software or
> services as possible on the relays.
just to clarify: there is no requirement to run additional software
on the relay. the url can point to an arbitrary domain that you manage.
kind regards,
nusenu
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Re: [tor-relays] My relay software gets hung up on OVH
On 10.01.2021 22:23, Keifer Bly wrote: Sometimes gets hung up. About every two weeks or so, the relay software gets hung up, causing the relay to go offline. I notice when this happens, the tor log file becomes unreadable, making it difficult Try: journalctl -xe journalctl -u tor.service What means unreadable? Then something is wrong with logrotate or /etc/logrotate.d/tor. to tell what was happening with the tor process when this occurs. It is only when the relay is restarted by running “killall tor” in terminal and then restarting the relay. Don't you run Tor as a normal systemd service? systemctl status tor.service -> shows last errors systemctl reload tor -> 'killall' is only the last resort By the way, don't be surprised if your server is under DDoS. You allow SSH password login for all users! Allow only one or a group. Example: /etc/ssh/sshd_config -> AllowUsers Keifer user2 ... or AllowGroups ssh-users Login is only recommended via ssh key auth, not with a password! Or you only allow access via VPN or certain IP's. Why do you have 'accept 6660-6667' in the torrc? TCP 6660-6667 and 6697 are well known DDoS ports. Even if you don't allow exit traffic, I don't know whether that can be exploited. -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom! ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] Exit node in spain
Hi irr4z, Spaniard relay operator here, sorry I missed the thread until now. El 9/12/20 a les 21:04, li...@for-privacy.net ha escrit: > Catalonia and Basque Country are the most liberal in Spain. Find a > hosting company in Barcelona. Regardless of this assumptions note that: both regions are under the same regulations as the rest of the country AND usually suffer the harshest treatment by Spain's law enforcement system (district attorneys, courts, police forces, etc). I think the key to success is in this previous email: El 2/12/20 a les 22:07, Paul Templeton ha escrit: > I will say I have never had a problem running an exit in Spain. I get 5 to 7 > abuse emails a year. I respond to the complaints within 24 hours and have had > no recourse. > > I'm a resident of Australia and run it in Spain as it is cost effective > compared to here. I think this is it: if you don't live in Spain, feel welcome to safely host your relays in Spain data centers. But regarding the initial message El 2/12/20 a les 9:25, irr4z ha escrit: > Quickly, I write from Barcelona, I am interested in contributing to > tor with exit nodes, but I am concerned about legal issues. > > I see that there is only 1 active exit node in Spain, and I wonder if > it is so dangerous in my country While I think it isn't inherently dangerous to run exit relays in Spain (you won't be severely prosecuted because of some abuse complaints, etc) Spain has an established authoritarian trend specially careless about digital freedoms. This turned out pretty clear at the end of 2017 with the arrest of a sysadmin working at the foundation that manages the .cat TLD, the raid of Catalonia's InfoTech & Telecom Center, the prosecution of random people for forking a website backup in github (not to mention the folk who uploaded it first), the overall censorship conducted by major ISPs, etc. I apology for this rant, there is a ton more info for those who are interested about it, but this facts lead me to this advice: keep a low profile. Don't participate in demonstrations, don't take side in political arguments (very publicly, like in twitter or alike), don't make activism other than the tor relay, don't rant on the king, specially don't join labor or any kind of syndicates nor political parties. Neither run for president. Those are the things you will prosecuted for, the relay will only be a pretext to raid you or arrest you or turn the public against you and probably start a shaming campaign against the Tor network. Rephrased: censorship yourself. So you could argue this is an overall stupid advice. And I wish it was. That said, El 9/12/20 a les 21:23, irr4z ha escrit: > Finally these are my new exit nodes I celebrate your courage and I look forward the day the global pandemic softens so the community can meet again (I missed last Barcelona relay-operator meetup). I'm very much interested in your experiences. I'll try to stay tuned but don't hesitate to update any incident in this list or in private. Salut ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] OrNetStats: Operator Level Graphs added
On 10.01.2021 21:37, Felix wrote: Am 10.01.2021 um 19:08 schrieb li...@for-privacy.net: - Shall we also add the fingerprints from the bridges in 'proof'? https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/torspec/-/blob/master/proposals/326-tor-relay-well-known-uri-rfc8615.md :: No bridge fingerprints :: OK thanks. Possibly @nusenu can mention that here: https://nusenu.github.io/ContactInfo-Information-Sharing-Specification/ at 'dns-rsa' -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom! ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Re: [tor-relays] OrNetStats: Operator Level Graphs added
On 10.01.2021 19:19, Toralf Förster wrote: (BTW that doesn't work at all with the current ciissversion if relays are hosted at different hoster at all, or?) I wanted to set up a httpd first. Luckily I left that. I wrote the fingerprints in the DNS. Would like to have as little software or services as possible on the relays. -- ╰_╯ Ciao Marco! Debian GNU/Linux It's free software and it gives you freedom! ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
[tor-relays] Config question
Hi Recently upgraded to 4.4.6 and noticed new (for me) entry in tor logs: Jan 11 09:24:28.000 [notice] While bootstrapping, fetched this many bytes: This message gets repeated every 6 hours, while there is little extra info added, as it relates to bootstrap / start-up process. I already have "AvoidDiskWrites 1" active in torrc. Is there a way to disable this extra logging? Thanks ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
