Re: [tor-relays] Revised Opt-In Trial: Fallback Directory Mirrors

2016-01-14 Thread Paul Staroch

Hi,


Am 2016-01-12 um 05:35 schrieb Tim Wilson-Brown - teor:

Here's the latest list of fallback directory candidates:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/15775/fallback_dirs.inc.20160112



Since my relay "rueckgrat" (0756B7CD4DFC8182BE23143FAC0642F515182CEB) is 
on the new candidate list, I'd like to opt-in for using that relay as a 
fallback directory mirror.



Regards,
Paul

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Re: [tor-relays] onionoo backend seems to be down.

2015-04-21 Thread Paul Staroch

Hi,


Am 2014-08-24 um 02:29 schrieb ja...@icetor.is:

Anyone else notice onionoo and the tools that rely on it
(globe.torproject.org atlas.torproject.org) seem to be down?
-Jason


It seems that onionoo.torproject.org is down once more, it's returning 
HTTP 500 to every request since several hours.


I would appreciate it if someone could fix that.


Regards,
Paul
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Re: [tor-relays] hardening a tor relay

2014-05-22 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2014-05-22 02:23, schrieb Contra Band:
 # Allow incoming 9050
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9050 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j 
 ACCEPT
 iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 9050 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

 # Allow outgoing 9050
 iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 9050 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j 
 ACCEPT
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 9050 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

 # Allow incoming 9051
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 9051 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j 
 ACCEPT
 iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 9051 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

 # Allow outgoing 9051
 iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport 9051 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j 
 ACCEPT
 iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 9051 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

Do you actually need remote access to ports 9050 (Socks proxy) and 9051 
(control port)? By default, Tor opens these ports on the loopback interface 
only.


Paul






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Re: [tor-relays] Grouping cloud relays running within same provider

2014-04-18 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2014-04-18 21:31, schrieb mr.cur...@urssmail.org:
 Is there any way currently to do this, or are there already some
 safeguards in place?

In its default configuration, Tor ensures that each relay in a circuit belongs 
to another /16 subnet (cf. Tor Path Specification [1], section 2.2. Path 
selection and constraints). However, in the case of Amazon EC2, this 
constraint does not suffice as Amazon uses IP addresses from several different 
/16 subnets.


Paul


[1] 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git?a=blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=path-spec.txt

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Re: [tor-relays] (no subject)

2013-12-25 Thread Paul Staroch
Hi,

Am 2013-12-25 20:55, schrieb Sebastian Urbach:
 Since i switched to 0.2.4.19 a few days ago i noticed some strange behaviour. 
 Sometimes the data seems to he corrupted i see on torstatus.info. The atlas 
 data seems to be right though. Afaik only the contact and family data seems 
 to be wrong.

 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/3C82285FAC2171FA5178340A82B05F2190AB68E9

 http://torstatus.info/router_detail.php?FP=3c82285fac2171fa5178340a82b05f2190ab68e9

 Im not sure what to make of it right now. A bitcoin for your thoughts ...

This is a bug in the old TorStatus software. The update script periodically 
obtains its data from the Tor process and gets confused by the strings 
onion-key and ntor-onion-key. This is something that needs to be fixed by 
the operator of the respective TorStatus page.

Fot instance, the TorStatus page at torstatus.blutmagie.de and mine at 
torstatus.rueckgr.at get it right:

http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/router_detail.php?FP=3c82285fac2171fa5178340a82b05f2190ab68e9
http://torstatus.rueckgr.at/router_detail.php?FP=3c82285fac2171fa5178340a82b05f2190ab68e9


In my TorStatus installation, I fixed that problem by replacing

if ($line =~ /onion-key/)

by

if ($line =~ /onion-key/  $line !~ /ntor-onion-key/)

in tns_update.pl.


Regards,
Paul


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Re: [tor-relays] Unsub me please?

2013-09-02 Thread Paul Staroch
Hi,


Am 2013-09-02 19:17, schrieb Susan Harbison:
 Thank you.

Please follow the link in the signature of this mail. On the bottom of this 
page you find instructions about how to unsubscribe yourself from the list.


Paul

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Re: [tor-relays] Someone is trying to overrun the Network

2013-09-01 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2013-09-01 10:48, schrieb elrippo:
 Warning: Network TCP port 60922 is being used by /usr/sbin/tor. Possible 
 rootkit: zaRwT.KiT
  Use the 'lsof -i' or 'netstat -an' command to check this.

 I guess this is a false positive in conjucntion to the massive raid of 
 traffic 
 increase in the past 3 weeks, were Tor opens these Ports to manage the 
 massive 
 circuit building requests.

I had similar warnings several times, even before the recent increase in the 
number of users.

As I'm pretty sure it's a false positive, I whitelisted tor in rkhunter's 
configuration file (/etc/rkhunter.conf):

PORT_WHITELIST=/usr/sbin/tor


Paul

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Re: [tor-relays] new relays

2013-08-22 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2013-08-22 17:28, schrieb Lukas Erlacher:
 You could put a censoring proxy in front of your exit node. But that
 would defeat the purpose of Tor entirely...

... and will eventually lead to your relay being flagged as a bad exit node. 
Tampering with exit traffic is strongly discouraged [1].



Paul


[1] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays
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Re: [tor-relays] Running exit-node in Germany

2013-08-01 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2013-08-01 15:22, schrieb Eugen Leitl:
 experience with running a Tor-Relay in Germany( Bavaria)?
 A Tor relay is a non-exit, and completely unproblematic
 but for potential traffic issues.

Unfortunately, this is not completely true.

I'm running a non-exit Tor relay on a dedicated server at EUserv [1], an 
Internet provider from Hermsdorf, Thuringia, Germany. Last fall that hoster 
received an abuse complaint regarding my Tor relay. eco -- Verband der 
deutschen Internetwirtschaft e.V. [2] reported child pornography being 
accessible via that relay. The example URLs they provided contained .onion 
domain names.

Obviously they knew how to run Tor, but they did not know or understand how 
hidden services work. They accessed hidden services providing child pornography 
and used my relay as entry node.

eco informed me that they already had informed the division SO 12 of the 
German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) which is responsible for cases of child 
pornography. eco asked me to make the content containing child pornography 
inaccessible and to cooperate with the BKA.

As I am unable to make the content inaccessible through my server without 
shutting my relay down, I decided to provide a detailled explanation. I wrote a 
lengthy email explaining what Tor is, how hidden services work and why I run a 
Tor relay. I also explained that shutting down my server would not remove the 
child pornographic content from the Tor network and that there is no currently 
known way to deanonymize the person behind a hidden service.

Since then, I have never heard of eco or BKA again.


Paul


[1] http://www.euserv.de/
[2] http://www.eco.de/
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Re: [tor-relays] Out of the mailing list

2012-01-10 Thread Paul Staroch
Am 2012-01-10 13:40, schrieb Bruno Kitzis:
 I don't want to receive the TOR-mail anymore.

Just unsubscribe yourself. If you have a look into the headers of a mail
coming from the list, you'll find this:

List-Unsubscribe: 
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/options/tor-relays,
mailto:tor-relays-requ...@lists.torproject.org?subject=unsubscribe



Regards,
Paul

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