Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Roger Dingledine]

On Thu, Jul 21, 2016 at 02:28:24PM +1000, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote:
> Also, old Tor clients won't be able to get updated bridge descriptors from 
> the new authority, but as far as I know, bridge descriptor updates aren't 
> essential for clients to continue to use a bridge.

Yes, correct.

See also https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/19728

--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Jason]

I could run one here in Iceland if it would help.

-Jason


On 7/21/2016 4:22 PM, simon wrote:

On 21.07.2016 17:36, Marina Brown wrote:

Maybe i am out of line for suggesting this but i will suggest anyway.
Might i suggest that the next bridge authority be hosted on tor inc ip
space and perhaps be 2 hosts instead of one.

It looks like this was a single point of failure. It would be easy
enough to have a volunteer bgp announce a specific ip address. If they
decided to drop out then it would not cause this type of consternation
in the future. Having more than one bridge auth has obvious benefits.

While hijacking the bridge authority does not directly and immediately
harm the Tor network, and an evil BGP entry could most probably not be
upheld for more than 24h worst-case, I still support the idea of
introducing more authority nodes than just a single one.

But then again, I don't have much knowledge about the related source
code either.
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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[simon]

On 21.07.2016 17:36, Marina Brown wrote:
> Maybe i am out of line for suggesting this but i will suggest anyway.
> Might i suggest that the next bridge authority be hosted on tor inc ip
> space and perhaps be 2 hosts instead of one.
> 
> It looks like this was a single point of failure. It would be easy
> enough to have a volunteer bgp announce a specific ip address. If they
> decided to drop out then it would not cause this type of consternation
> in the future. Having more than one bridge auth has obvious benefits.

While hijacking the bridge authority does not directly and immediately
harm the Tor network, and an evil BGP entry could most probably not be
upheld for more than 24h worst-case, I still support the idea of
introducing more authority nodes than just a single one.

But then again, I don't have much knowledge about the related source
code either.
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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Marina Brown]

On 07/21/2016 11:23 AM, Alex Chang-Lam wrote:
> I believe also being highly known and trusted by the Tor project leads,
> likely the current dirauths, and the community as a whole.
> 
> On Jul 21, 2016, at 6:03 AM, Sanjeev Gupta  > wrote:
> 
>> Hi.
>>
>> What are the requirements, apart from long-term stability, for this?
>>
>>
>> On 21 Jul 2016 12:18 pm, "Sebastian Hahn" > > wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 21 Jul 2016, at 05:20, Me > > wrote:
>> > So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge
>> Authority server next month? Will it have a serious effect, or
>> will there be any apparent issues or slowdowns?
>>
>> We'll have to act before that. We're currently looking for
>> a new operator for the bridge authority and a suitable hosting
>> location, which we will want to include in Tor releases asap.
>> For a while we will feed the data from the two concurrently
>> running bridge authorities to the bridge database for
>> distribution to users, then when Tonga (Lucky's auth) is shut
>> down the new one will have taken over. We will lose the data
>> about all bridges that aren't updated after the time Tonga is
>> shut off. This means fewer bridges for bridge db to give out and
>> potentially a drop in counted (not necessarily actual) bridge
>> users of Tor.
>>
>> Cheers
>> Sebastian
>>
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Maybe i am out of line for suggesting this but i will suggest anyway.
Might i suggest that the next bridge authority be hosted on tor inc ip
space and perhaps be 2 hosts instead of one.

It looks like this was a single point of failure. It would be easy
enough to have a volunteer bgp announce a specific ip address. If they
decided to drop out then it would not cause this type of consternation
in the future. Having more than one bridge auth has obvious benefits.

Flame me away for my ignorance. It has been years since i last poured
over the tor source code.

--- Marina Brown



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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Alex Chang-Lam]

I believe also being highly known and trusted by the Tor project leads, likely 
the current dirauths, and the community as a whole.

On Jul 21, 2016, at 6:03 AM, Sanjeev Gupta  wrote:

> Hi.
> 
> What are the requirements, apart from long-term stability, for this? 
> 
> On 21 Jul 2016 12:18 pm, "Sebastian Hahn"  wrote:
>> 
>> > On 21 Jul 2016, at 05:20, Me  wrote:
>> > So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge Authority 
>> > server next month? Will it have a serious effect, or will there be any 
>> > apparent issues or slowdowns?
>> 
>> We'll have to act before that. We're currently looking for
>> a new operator for the bridge authority and a suitable hosting
>> location, which we will want to include in Tor releases asap.
>> For a while we will feed the data from the two concurrently
>> running bridge authorities to the bridge database for
>> distribution to users, then when Tonga (Lucky's auth) is shut
>> down the new one will have taken over. We will lose the data
>> about all bridges that aren't updated after the time Tonga is
>> shut off. This means fewer bridges for bridge db to give out and
>> potentially a drop in counted (not necessarily actual) bridge
>> users of Tor.
>> 
>> Cheers
>> Sebastian
>> 
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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Sanjeev Gupta]

Hi.

What are the requirements, apart from long-term stability, for this?

On 21 Jul 2016 12:18 pm, "Sebastian Hahn"  wrote:

>
> > On 21 Jul 2016, at 05:20, Me  wrote:
> > So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge Authority
> server next month? Will it have a serious effect, or will there be any
> apparent issues or slowdowns?
>
> We'll have to act before that. We're currently looking for
> a new operator for the bridge authority and a suitable hosting
> location, which we will want to include in Tor releases asap.
> For a while we will feed the data from the two concurrently
> running bridge authorities to the bridge database for
> distribution to users, then when Tonga (Lucky's auth) is shut
> down the new one will have taken over. We will lose the data
> about all bridges that aren't updated after the time Tonga is
> shut off. This means fewer bridges for bridge db to give out and
> potentially a drop in counted (not necessarily actual) bridge
> users of Tor.
>
> Cheers
> Sebastian
>
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>
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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Sebastian Hahn]

> On 21 Jul 2016, at 05:20, Me  wrote:
> So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge Authority server 
> next month? Will it have a serious effect, or will there be any apparent 
> issues or slowdowns?

We'll have to act before that. We're currently looking for
a new operator for the bridge authority and a suitable hosting
location, which we will want to include in Tor releases asap.
For a while we will feed the data from the two concurrently
running bridge authorities to the bridge database for
distribution to users, then when Tonga (Lucky's auth) is shut
down the new one will have taken over. We will lose the data
about all bridges that aren't updated after the time Tonga is
shut off. This means fewer bridges for bridge db to give out and
potentially a drop in counted (not necessarily actual) bridge
users of Tor.

Cheers
Sebastian


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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Sean Greenslade]

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 11:20:33PM -0400, Me wrote:
> So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge Authority server
> next month? Will it have a serious effect, or will there be any apparent
> issues or slowdowns?
> 
> Me

Please don't hijack an existing thread for a completely unrelated topic.
Start a new thread instead of replying to an existing thread.

--Sean

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Re: [tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[I]

One source said the code will have to be rewritten to adapt and the intervening 
month Green has allowed will be the time to do that.


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[tor-relays] Bridge Authority closure

[Me]

So what are we going to do when Green shuts down the Bridge Authority 
server next month? Will it have a serious effect, or will there be any 
apparent issues or slowdowns?


Me
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