Re: [tor-talk] problem
Can you include your torrc config file? On Wed, Apr 29, 2015 at 2:23 AM, folde38 fold...@gmail.com wrote: 29/4/15 9:21:04.145 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 29/4/15 9:21:04.145 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to /Applications/TorBrowser.app/TorBrowser/Data/Tor/torrc.orig.1 29/4/15 9:21:04.632 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory server 29/4/15 9:21:04.634 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting to directory server. (No route to host; NOROUTE; count 1; recommendation warn; host 7EA6EAD6FD83083C538F44038BBFA077587DD755 at 194.109.206.212:443 ) 29/4/15 9:21:27.933 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%: Connecting to directory server. (No route to host; NOROUTE; count 2; recommendation warn; host BD6A829255CB08E66FBE7D3748363586E46B3810 at 171.25.193.9:80) 29/4/15 9:21:34.121 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 29/4/15 9:21:34.121 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing connections. 29/4/15 9:21:34.122 [NOTICE] Closing old Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9150 29/4/15 9:21:34.632 [NOTICE] Delaying directory fetches: DisableNetwork is set. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] The Tor-BSD Diversity Project
I am not particularly enlightened but I was under the impression that people do not use BSD for a reason. It's 2015 and FreeBSD is still lacking basic security mechanisms such as ASLR. It also seems to me that the community's ideological licencing crusade is holding the entire project back. They condemn anything GPL and will substitute inferior tools instead, I.e. ksh instead of bash, virtual box instead of xen etc. As a project they seem to spend most of their time rewriting GPL projects just to slap a BSD licence on it (bhyve or whatever they call it for example) which doesn't really help anyone. It's like Canonical dicking around with Unity and Mir. Complete waste of everyone's time. OpenBSD is also a highly emotionally charged community. They completely turn their backs on things like virtualization and mandatory access controls. They spend all their time auditing the base system but as soon as you install a buggy or untrusted application then you're on your own. I don't find this approach very helpful in the real world. Would anyone who knows more care to address these points and correct me where I may be wrong? I like the idea of diversifying the Tor infrastructure, defence in depth and all that but I feel like it would be nice to also have some clear arguments for why another OS should be adopted - not just it exists and it's not Linux. an idea: maybe talk to forums.freebsd.org / www.freebsdforums.org operators about making their sites available also to tor users as well? This would be immensely helpful and appreciated. There is no reason to block even read only access to the forums. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] The Tor-BSD Diversity Project
If you ask me he wrote some valid points. ~Josef Am 30.04.2015 um 15:15 schrieb Nathaniel Goodman: On April 30, 2015 1:27:35 PM GMT+01:00, Apple Apple djjdjdjdjdjdj...@gmail.com wrote: I am not particularly enlightened but I was under the impression that people do not use BSD for a reason. It's 2015 and FreeBSD is still lacking basic security mechanisms such as ASLR. It also seems to me that the community's ideological licencing crusade is holding the entire project back. They condemn anything GPL and will substitute inferior tools instead, I.e. ksh instead of bash, virtual box instead of xen etc. As a project they seem to spend most of their time rewriting GPL projects just to slap a BSD licence on it (bhyve or whatever they call it for example) which doesn't really help anyone. It's like Canonical dicking around with Unity and Mir. Complete waste of everyone's time. OpenBSD is also a highly emotionally charged community. They completely turn their backs on things like virtualization and mandatory access controls. They spend all their time auditing the base system but as soon as you install a buggy or untrusted application then you're on your own. I don't find this approach very helpful in the real world. Would anyone who knows more care to address these points and correct me where I may be wrong? I like the idea of diversifying the Tor infrastructure, defence in depth and all that but I feel like it would be nice to also have some clear arguments for why another OS should be adopted - not just it exists and it's not Linux. an idea: maybe talk to forums.freebsd.org / www.freebsdforums.org operators about making their sites available also to tor users as well? This would be immensely helpful and appreciated. There is no reason to block even read only access to the forums. Here be trolls. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
who wants to use pays, who want to help the network with a exit node receives, simple like that So who wants to have anonymity must be rich ? Just no way :) -- Aeris Protégez votre vie privée, chiffrez vos communications GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222 OTR : 922C97CA EC0B1AD3 https://café-vie-privée.fr/ signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
Allen, Thanks for pointing that out. After reading the website... Whoa. This seems to me a central bank's/Federal Reserve's ultimate wet dream. The government can track and tax who has what where when, but your identity does not have to be revealed to the merchant. Unless of course you actually bought something (corporeal), in which case you need to give a name and address. Super. This seems like the antithesis of a good idea. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Check out OpenLibernet (http://openlibernet.org) They suggest a design for a fee-based mesh network. It's worth some studying, just to grasp the complexity of the problem. Also, you will probably find little enthusiasm from Tor community for this. What actual problem does the fee-based network solve? Free market is the best mechanism* to allocate scarce resources. Bandwidth is not that scarce, while private and pseudonymous or anonymous Internet access is not that desired (which is demonstrated clearly by how almost anyone who knows about benefits of Tor, GNU or PGP doesn't even bother trying). The lack of demand leads to the fact that Tor works fine even without being terribly efficient. Nobody cares about effective free market solution, and it may be that nobody will until it's too late. Thus, with a fee-based network, you target a rather narrow initial audience---which is not bad at all in itself, but, it hence requires a design far elaborate than something that can fit into a short plain-text email message. And a *very* clear understanding why** you'd want something better than Tor in its present state---not just because free market makes things better. Sure it does but 1) lots of engineers currently in the distributed networking will disagree; 2) a better thing will not necessarily survive unless it's so much better that even a blind (which in our case would be a casual user) will see it. - * A thermodynamic term would fit better but I'm close to being ignorant in thermodynamics. ** Some examples: a) Tor is less secure than it could be because it is not attractive enough for users to run its exit nodes; b) it is at mild risk of extinction, for the same reason; c) running a BitTorrent client via Tor is still regarded a bad idea; d) setting up an onion server and advertising it is more difficult than it should be. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.21 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVQnFJAAoJEFrbru/Rghxvpd8H/3TJm8kxDHhkR9ezRs+glRv7 N4QNT/lsp510kjj6ygEY62orXd41yO9BcpIBUNUFCu3iM7kurd9OpW9swqn8HG2P mY7X9Czg9oWsaXDmhZ9S/utjPk6X5FGOEZBiB8+jRiNoVq1BenYuFm5BWUtFe9Rd UjO0QWm0WoquS9+eV3iBpMBYWGn6RReyw3sO5YcVmF5g5t9euhERpv2NRn4LEFU8 8fjGMrxY0VvEIEU08bdrafYJy1eLwM8ZHFuNFVxWmUnvRMyAspPTimRX8Uq/0FMf jBbTkfND1uDTdZDtWBnYaxBag23djGFuhKE55L5AMe7oYQuoMCuhehdkKQfJfuw= =0GHv -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
Unfortunately, I cannot see their signature set. They have it locked down. They claim they are not detecting it by IP address. On 4/30/2015 2:24 PM, Speak Freely wrote: The list of exit nodes is public information. The Tor Project publishes the information, and several spam blocking services also publish them under varying pretenses. What the vendor sees is the IP address of the exit relay hitting their server. If you had more information to provide, we could provide more feedback. :) Hope that helps. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
Thanks for replying. I understand it is a spy vs spy type of situation but what do they see currently? I don't believe they are seeing it by the IP addresses (or so they claim). Is it something in the handshake the is triggering the alert? On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:17 PM, Seth David Schoen sch...@eff.org wrote: Frederick Zierold writes: Hi, I am very curious how a vendor is detecting Tor Project traffic. My questions is what are they seeing to alert upon? I have asked them, but I was told that is in the special sauce. Is the connection from the users computer to the bridge encrypted? Thank you for your insight. Are they detecting non-public bridge traffic, or only normal entry guards? Detection and obfuscation is kind of a big topic that's been around for some years, so there are a lot of possibilities. -- Seth Schoen sch...@eff.org Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- -- Frederick Zierold, CISSP University Information Security Office (UISO) Security Analyst Direct: 202-687-5784 Office: 202-687-3031 Fax: 202-687-1505 UISO Security Services: http://security.georgetown.edu, 202-687-3031 or secur...@georgetown.edu UISO Identity Access Management Services: http://netid.georgetown.edu, 202-687-2999 or ne...@georgetown.edu) https://www.facebook.com/GeorgetownTechnology -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
Hi, I am very curious how a vendor is detecting Tor Project traffic. My questions is what are they seeing to alert upon? I have asked them, but I was told that is in the special sauce. Is the connection from the users computer to the bridge encrypted? Thank you for your insight. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Gmail is blocking sending email from smtp.gmail.com
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 No, Google does not block tor. It happened to me as well with error messages intrusion detected and insecure device. I had to modify Google security settings to make it work. Could you please tell what exactly did you modify? I've been using Thunderbird for Google SMTP successfully for quite some time, until recently. I had to change password to be able to receive mail (had to change it several times actually, which is really stupid) but sending has become really bizarre: it didn't work for some time, then I somehow sent two messages, and now it's dead again. In the end, I had to turn TorBirdy off to write this, as well as the previous message to this list. Looks like something is actually happening (or happened). Note: I'm using different Gmail accounts for mail fetching and sending. I noticed a topic “TorBirdy connects to the same exit node again and again” here but haven't read it yet. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.21 (MingW32) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVQnWHAAoJEFrbru/RghxvmMYH/3EOeYXy/CwoXYPgpiWEcZFM vhy/eMs2RZilnx4PGmZDgQsxxtmY/CKkwa2NNjWN8hOvYof+bbflVR/KUT/p3+Nu 2T1lB4RGSjuDHj5AgCA4YySMKLLJ9KyAxYmVFEodxZmBMMnK3w0zbIKUPF5ISApr lKGwxHTixOG0tLFRzsrla14zfJ+t9//Pemsg1k8caBsU4tk+/sVjIcl6H4abASDK 23FRR+dW/EFKS8wiZnfud72L0JVTRa66qPErIuWrfg1u2AHu4QDFanJYFR5x6o10 5OhnnXdw22KSUMpL64jRs9xb4sf0ILa2Fo3bhNcMSWFJvDXRu0LtYuaMyHrL4uE= =siSd -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
The list of exit nodes is public information. The Tor Project publishes the information, and several spam blocking services also publish them under varying pretenses. What the vendor sees is the IP address of the exit relay hitting their server. If you had more information to provide, we could provide more feedback. :) Hope that helps. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
Frederick Zierold writes: Hi, I am very curious how a vendor is detecting Tor Project traffic. My questions is what are they seeing to alert upon? I have asked them, but I was told that is in the special sauce. Is the connection from the users computer to the bridge encrypted? Thank you for your insight. Are they detecting non-public bridge traffic, or only normal entry guards? Detection and obfuscation is kind of a big topic that's been around for some years, so there are a lot of possibilities. -- Seth Schoen sch...@eff.org Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
On 30 Apr 2015, at 11:57, Allen allen...@gmail.com wrote: If you want anonymous transactions then you want a blind-signing based currency like Taler Surely you jest... From http://www.taler.net/governments Taler is an electronic payment system that was built with the goal of supporting taxation. With Taler, the receiver of any form of payment is known, and the payment information comes attached with details about what the payment was made for. Thus, governments can use this data to tax buisnesses and individuals based on their income, making tax evasion and black markets less viable. In an RSA blind-singing based currency, like Taler, a mint who issues the currency can track how much money a particular account sends or receives, but cannot discover the actual transfers. And deanonymizing one transaction does not impact a user's anonymity overall. In Bitcoin, et al., everyone can track everything about every account at any point in the past. Accounts are pseudonymous and creation is distributed, but deanonymizing a single transaction destroys the anonymity of the whole account. And advanced attacks can be brought to bear on identifying sock puppet accounts. Yes, RSA blind-sinigng assumes the buyer remains anonymous to the seller, like say buying server time for an anonymous website. Anytime you deanonymize yourself to a seller, like by buying physical goods, then you’re trusting them, this goes for Bitcoin too. In fact, deanonymizing yourself like this is much worse in Bitcoin. Jeff -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
Thank you Matt. I'm sorry if I didn't have a good idea, you were convincing. I figured it could have implications for anonymity but imagined could exist a solution (there is always). About the numbers, it was just a totally random number, I'm sorry, I could used more real numbers as example. The problem in charge (too much) an exit node is that no one would use that. Imagine if all users set the max spending to zero. In this case, it would be useless to charge a exit node even with 1 Satoshi / MB because no one would use it anyway. The market would find a good number, and my guess is that would be ridiculously cheap to have a good number of exit nodes and free would give almost the same experience as today we have. It is not a matter of poor is less important, but create proper incentives. For example: I'd like to run an exit node, but I'm pretty sure if I do that the government here in Brazil will hunt me. It is very dangerous to do that in Brazil. So, for me, it does not worth to risk it for free. I'd put a very expensive price to my exit node because I want little flow. Remember: I don't run an exit node anyway. Well, if this is not good for Tor as it was designed, I guess I could make a fork in Tor project and implement that, couldn't I? Thank you! On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 12:14 PM, Speak Freely when2plus2...@riseup.net wrote: There are tons of problems with the suggestion, IMMHO. Good read: https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/bitcoin I have very strong reservations about anyone suggesting internet fast lanes, or pay to play lanes. I run my relays for everyone, equally. If someone is poor, that doesn't mean they are any less important. For the purposes of Tor, chances are poor people match more closely to Tor's project goals. Based entirely on nothing but a guess, I would expect a poor person to be more willing, or more inclined to be a whistle blower, or more interested in political change, or more dedicated to social improvement, over a debutante dilettante. A very well off white guy in middle America suburbia has nothing to lose provided the status quo remains. A very poor person has nothing to gain from the status quo, so would tend to try to improve themselves, and others. It would also introduce fascinating attack vectors, as it would be relatively easy to determine who the poor people are vs who the rich people are, based simply on what a particular relay charges for it's service. The reduced anonymity set would present interesting problems. Assuming your numbers, at today's rate, 0.001BTC would be $0.23USD/MB ($0.28 for us Canadians). $0.23/MB@100GB/day = $23,000/day $0.23/MB@3TB(100GB*30)/month = $690,000/month That's a disturbingly good ROI, considering the cost for the operator would be anywhere between $3-15/month. (For a rich person to download a 1GB file, it would cost them $230.) Finally, attempting to monetize a system that is currently free as in beer, would not necessarily bring out the best in people. Sure, some operators would run their relays for free, but many wouldn't. When certain people realize that they could monetize the relay, what's to stop them from sniffing the data to make even more money? BUT, what do I know. Read the blog, it's much better written than my gibberish regarding this topic. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Gmail is blocking sending email from smtp.gmail.com
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Akater: No, Google does not block tor. It happened to me as well with error messages intrusion detected and insecure device. I had to modify Google security settings to make it work. Could you please tell what exactly did you modify? I've been using Thunderbird for Google SMTP successfully for quite some time, until recently. In my case, not sure about the one who replied. - - 2FA activated - - Using application password for Thunderbird Haven't had any Gmail problem with Tor I would recommend trying to log in Gmail using TorBrowser. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVQoQjAAoJEELfPuRPJIB7Be0IAMgMcZ23q7K3RWCzXPfcuWQQ M0utI7gmPbfA/ygBQP1WJxbK8S/+UMPCQ7QieOJlx3+F7rU01e/HQE/v6CA/etL2 ZT72ARpx7ajjrtHBkqnGHaRl7T7VMyN0OH/Hij2KDOBCuoc3qj87mWDb09b1pfxP 5OaIsOctgHK2WEYZPAi6e8gvjkD0bSV29Cl5Rltnxbl8DJVDEffLZ6BzAYQdkqXm IjMScDK3052FlTDAV3+YTiNu3epPUO0bUFYFcw9G69fpq7EJ0irjJiNF3Z+OzDpc LKbYrdh3LNHxm+RDZZAVCE7iZ1Vpm5OcJdhbfIuiZIlgkz1E7jowl23p54Q06H0= =O9zN -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
On 04/30/2015 09:15 PM, Frederick Zierold wrote: Hi, I am very curious how a vendor is detecting Tor Project traffic. My questions is what are they seeing to alert upon? I have asked them, but I was told that is in the special sauce. Is the connection from the users computer to the bridge encrypted? Thank you for your insight. Special Sauce, I'll buy that for a dollar .. At a minimum, there are different kinds of detection for Tor within the Snort Emerging Threats Free-version signatures. So, this isn't even 'hard' necessarily. One rules file is dedicated to it (emerging-tor.rules), that file has all the Tor IP addresses hardcoded into it. Additionally, there are other, non-IP-address related detections for Tor within other rules files (do an egrep in the directory for Tor to see those). If you run Snort with the emerging threats ruleset, but disable the emerging-tor.rules (removing its awareness of the IP addresses of tor nodes), it still gives 3 alerts when Tor starts up. ET POLICY TLS possible TOR SSL traffic. That's with a regular Tor connection, I don't know if bridges would change anything. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] The Tor-BSD Diversity Project
I apologise for my previous message. My finger slipped. On 30 Apr 2015 21:03, Yuri y...@rawbw.com wrote: Bash can't be considered superior to anything... I am not particularly interested in arguing the merits of bash vs sh. I agree that there are some definite cases where adopting alternative technology has been the right step forward for the FreeBSD project, migrating from GCC to LLVM for example. My point is that there has also been unnecessary suffering and wasted effort caused by rejecting code based entirely on licencing ideology. As a pragmatic user with no interest in selling other people's work, this ideology gives me no benefit but costs a lot. And here goes the credibility of your opinion for me. http://www.logicallyfallacious.com/index.php/logical-fallacies/87-fallacy-of-composition http://www.logicallyfallacious.com/index.php/logical-fallacies/99-genetic-fallacy I would like a serious discussion, please. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
Hi Felipe, It's an issue that is relevant to Tor, and in many online communities. So please don't think it's a bad idea, it's just a very complicated one. Incentivizing (part of) the system is not necessarily a bad thing. Something to encourage bigger and better relays is good. One potential work-around would be to allow up to X% of any given relay to be used for the express lane, but to always have the rest completely open. I could envision up to 10% of total throughput to be dedicated to paying customers, and 90% for everyone else. If every exit relay's express quota is full, you wouldn't pay. At most I think $10USD/TB would be acceptable - though I'm not a fan of this anyway. Personally, I'm a fan of badges and social rewards. I've read quite a few books and many blogs and studies on the topic. For several varying reason, people like to collect things, regardless of actual monetary value - and in fact sometimes directly because of the lack of monetary value. A reward that must be earned and cannot be purchased. The social standing badges and awards create is fascinating. I fully appreciate this may not work given the current community atmosphere, but I mention it nonetheless because it is interesting. Regarding forking the system, of course you could! But that leads to so many other issues... --- Akater, BT on Tor is bad for at least 2 reasons. 1) BT will do what it what it can to connect to peers, including bypassing Tor, which could leak information about you, which negates the reason for downloading off Tor. This isn't Tor's fault. 2) It's just mean! :) I find the BT/Tor problem to be... BT. This is beyond the scope of this discussion, however. A good blog post is https://blog.torproject.org/blog/bittorrent-over-tor-isnt-good-idea Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] The Tor-BSD Diversity Project
On 30 Apr 2015 21:03, Yuri y...@rawbw.com wrote: Bash can't be considered superior And here goes the credibility of your opinion for me. Yuri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] The Tor-BSD Diversity Project
On 04/30/2015 05:27, Apple Apple wrote: It's 2015 and FreeBSD is still lacking basic security mechanisms such as ASLR. It also seems to me that the community's ideological licencing crusade is holding the entire project back. They condemn anything GPL and will substitute inferior tools instead, I.e. ksh instead of bash, virtual box instead of xen etc. As a project they seem to spend most of their time rewriting GPL projects just to slap a BSD licence on it (bhyve or whatever they call it for example) which doesn't really help anyone. It's like Canonical dicking around with Unity and Mir. Complete waste of everyone's time. Bash can't be considered superior to anything due to its instability. It is in forever-work-in-progress mode, without gaining any stability over time. Last week I found another bug in bash just by pressing backspace button in the middle of some command. Bash team officially refuses to maintain any bug tracking tools, and uses the mailing list instead. So the bugs I reported years ago are still not fixed, and there is no formal record of them that can be easily searched. Bash departed from the very stable and solid Bourne shell, and turned into a mess. Today Bourne shell in FreeBSD is far superior to the current bash for the reason of its stability, among other reasons. I have spent an extensive time with both, and wrote thousands of lines in shell, and this is my conclusion. And here goes the credibility of your opinion for me. Yuri -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 02:20:34PM -0400, Frederick Zierold wrote: Thanks for replying. I understand it is a spy vs spy type of situation but what do they see currently? I don't believe they are seeing it by the IP addresses (or so they claim). Is it something in the handshake the is triggering the alert? Here's how the Great Firewall does it: http://www.cs.kau.se/philwint/gfw/ And here are some thoughts on TLS handshake signatures that can be used to fingerprint traffic: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/projects/Tor/TLSHistory Cheers, Philipp -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Speak Freely: BT will do what it what it can to connect to peers, including bypassing Tor I put c) into the list assuming BT is not recommended because of traffic overload, which then would be one real life case of scarce bandwidth. Is heavy traffic not the issue anymore? (Last time I checked was a year and a half ago.) Fine then. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVQoF7AAoJEFrbru/RghxvekEIAIsBsorsTvu5//KxA/7urv9X EzofHO7fRgx7szOdu3nn8BpRdkRVwD5BzyeENQ5kSvvQrFYlM1NQLdbNIa+GmREF laNT1kqY9GxekBT7JerggEUEtt5fEEgRTNGtr/nLe1b1ZHwtMNwY9PZQESmkGLAX Q/6REKb5QI9s5WxEMu3NwdtV8i9mreSRNXpItX9wGMS6ls2PtxSxtKnyoA1n1Hak FjGsf4kFGbopF1dWf7X91cj7QBXvSN9KcW1BX1kq5MmVzBKyUjDHGSEibNb3yaNC xJs9rQDe5suJCJih1AUmBN/w/OfkEwVxyQGZoKlaKEBSXIrej1TKDsqgs3VHR5A= =/gH3 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
Hi Akater, Traffic overload is still an issue, yes. This causes problems for everyone. That was my #2, being mean. Sorry for not clarifying that. Good read: https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf It's a few years old, but covers a lot and still relevant. But the reason for not using BT over Tor is IMHO more than anything a security/anonymity issue. Let's look at the reason why someone thinks they would want to use BT over Tor. - They believe it will provide them anonymity. What benefit would Tor be to the user if their BT client of choice provided their actual IP address to the tracker and to each peer? The answer is mostly none. (There are certain circumstances where that's not completely true, for example ISPs that do DPI to throttle torrent traffic.) Unless your ISP does DPI and throttles you, you will almost certainly always download slower, for several reasons I won't elucidate. This just gives interested parties more time to find you. If your ISP does do DPI, there are better ways around that. Tor is slow. BT uses UDP and TCP. Tor doesn't do UDP, but it does TCP very well. There are ways to block the UDP, but most people would never think/know about that, and many users find that disabling UDP/DHT makes their peer count drop which makes them re-enable it immediately out of fear their download may take a little longer. So, with a BT client that exposes your real IP address to the tracker and peers, and DHT through UDP being sent over clearnet, any concept of privacy/anonymity is broken. Yes, you can disable DHT. You can block UDP connections. You could find a BT client that doesn't expose your real IP address. But then certain mis-steps and limitations within Tor also provide attack vectors for de-anonymizing torrent users. https://hal.inria.fr/file/index/docid/471556/filename/TorBT.pdf ... The reasons I say this is because I know someone who used Tor to download torrents, and his ISP kindly let him know that HBO provided them detailed logs that he downloaded specific episodes of one of their most popular shows. He thought he was being very smart and protecting himself, and was dumbfounded when his ISP contacted him. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
If interested in implementing this, please check out ethereum.org, it's derived from bitcoin and much more suitable to creating these constrains. On Apr 30, 2015 5:14 PM, Aymeric Vitte vitteayme...@gmail.com wrote: I did not read this thread completely but keep it in my TODO list. Your analysis is correct but can be summarized in one sentence: using bt over Tor is a non sense because the size of the Tor network is completely ridiculous compared to the size of the bt network. As ridiculous as using bt over a VPN, which the bt VPN trolls don't like to hear. Disabling the DHT and allowing trackers only is at the opposite of any privacy protection, because trackers are trivial to monitor and fake, it's a little bit more difficult with the DHT, but still easy for someone that can crawl it. I have tried to explain all this in the FAQs here: http://torrent-live.org and here: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live, and related study, which for once does not focus on trackers and monitoring the users, but focuses on the DHT and monitoring/blocking the monitors, showing also how easily you can protect using the DHT only, assuming that your bt client is willing to (like torrent-live)... Tor does not handle UDP but you can tunnel UDP through Tor to some SOCKS proxies, which, again, is ridiculous but just works. And, again, a possible solution is the Peersm project (which before using the DHT does envision new means for peers/content discovery) or something similar, a P2P using the Tor protocol, not the Tor network. Le 30/04/2015 22:18, Speak Freely a écrit : Hi Akater, Traffic overload is still an issue, yes. This causes problems for everyone. That was my #2, being mean. Sorry for not clarifying that. Good read: https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf It's a few years old, but covers a lot and still relevant. But the reason for not using BT over Tor is IMHO more than anything a security/anonymity issue. Let's look at the reason why someone thinks they would want to use BT over Tor. - They believe it will provide them anonymity. What benefit would Tor be to the user if their BT client of choice provided their actual IP address to the tracker and to each peer? The answer is mostly none. (There are certain circumstances where that's not completely true, for example ISPs that do DPI to throttle torrent traffic.) Unless your ISP does DPI and throttles you, you will almost certainly always download slower, for several reasons I won't elucidate. This just gives interested parties more time to find you. If your ISP does do DPI, there are better ways around that. Tor is slow. BT uses UDP and TCP. Tor doesn't do UDP, but it does TCP very well. There are ways to block the UDP, but most people would never think/know about that, and many users find that disabling UDP/DHT makes their peer count drop which makes them re-enable it immediately out of fear their download may take a little longer. So, with a BT client that exposes your real IP address to the tracker and peers, and DHT through UDP being sent over clearnet, any concept of privacy/anonymity is broken. Yes, you can disable DHT. You can block UDP connections. You could find a BT client that doesn't expose your real IP address. But then certain mis-steps and limitations within Tor also provide attack vectors for de-anonymizing torrent users. https://hal.inria.fr/file/index/docid/471556/filename/TorBT.pdf ... The reasons I say this is because I know someone who used Tor to download torrents, and his ISP kindly let him know that HBO provided them detailed logs that he downloaded specific episodes of one of their most popular shows. He thought he was being very smart and protecting himself, and was dumbfounded when his ISP contacted him. Matt Speak Freely -- Check the 10 M passwords list: http://peersm.com/findmyass Anti-spies and private torrents, dynamic blocklist: http://torrent-live.org Peersm : http://www.peersm.com torrent-live: https://github.com/Ayms/torrent-live node-Tor : https://www.github.com/Ayms/node-Tor GitHub : https://www.github.com/Ayms -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 02:57:01PM -0400, t...@t-3.net wrote: One rules file is dedicated to it (emerging-tor.rules), that file has all the Tor IP addresses hardcoded into it. That's probably not very effective because the Tor network has quite a bit of churn, which would lead to plenty of false positives and false negatives. You would have to update this list pretty much hourly. Cheers, Philipp -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Thank you for this detailed exposition! Actually, I never gave any thought about how BT, being a distributed network itself, would interact with Tor---which was pretty stupid of me, since the flaw is quite obvious. My item c) should have been just you can't share heavy media content efficiently with Tor. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVQqBvAAoJEFrbru/RghxvTcUH/2F0W7JHVRHVei7RQJKpjJO1 MLkk33lMxQIpd0Sr2tGTXEFOxrc3K1d7Xa4c5bMHuBALbzNFY8eYZWWHFlf3FOO/ lzHW9iU/Fe5YyS2IqZdMJERfhgMRldRLZ62qTHzDTsx2uEsxOFbb8y7EqPdJp7v+ L2TKFmNcPUyhvqsI9Cj8do7nGvUeUdQ4Iw3jjXssTPZ543NRsiPVK1AMwdqvm/WJ Ew/ldnXcivMfjLgA6larhSgmBcLuGbTL+JwsRq9bDtxNFQwgOo7ILEtDIAy9rSdT IOk+u2NeQLr5IyJ8cEOrKAxKGqiZP8s0yAI7PgruMXcZe1SSP9upAkdahXqSGW0= =TXD+ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What happened to Tor's Bridges?
michael ball transcribed 0.4K bytes: I'm having issues requesting bridges by email (from a gmail account). Hey, michaelballriseup! [This is an automated message; please do not reply.] Here are your bridges: (no bridges currently available) Hello, Thanks to both of you for pointing this out. There is a known issue with the BridgeAuthority causing this bug, see https://bugs.torproject.org/15866. The fix should be deployed soon. Regards, -- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What is being detected to alert upon?
a connection to a Tor bridge looks kind of like regular TLS traffic. Question: I recompiled OpenSSL to remove a bunch of features that look unnecessary and might present a security risk, such as SSL2, SSL3 and DTLS. (In case it matters, it is OpenSSL v1.0.2a and the specific configure options are no-ssl2 no-ssl3 no-idea no-dtls no-psk no-srp no-dso no-npn no-hw no-engines -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -DOPENSSL_USE_IPV6=0). I'm using this rebuilt DLL with Tor. Does this compromise Tor's TLS handshake so that it no longer looks like Firefox? If so, what so I need to do to allow Tor to mimic Firefox's TLS handshake? -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Gmail is blocking sending email from smtp.gmail.com
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Thanks. I haven't tried 2FA yet but without it, switching identities seems to help: apparently, Gmail dislikes some exit nodes. Note: being logged in via Tor browser didn't help. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVQqY4AAoJEFrbru/Rghxv35cIAMxitW+4TaNaUUnyV2d3u0dv 4w/pklfVuPOPotMRZ0WnMdjp+6PajgW68BZkY5051KUgWCtUFdgZzrtykcg3Tr1t C6zYzV4UtCuar1sOftEIrmbuBMKOlkhks8JWg5AQvMFvX9IiAPp7IlOqHrfEF42I 64w7sEp0HcZAvPcrDS1cikNesuYAxTnOGJZkihlpsy1LCs+wQ6t0e1HuSHpnm0s6 Vmi9w2efSBRGDh17uiJk7UHjD4eJ8Yht2kJh4Oc1X8Jw9IKBwT1Vkd0sPQ1UPUz4 CY/h4hAVi+0OGi11dGn2GN7lklUBFLouD0xwLHbEtfULY84jboJAZSNPRfqTwPU= =03zY -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
I think that maidsafe is what the OP really wants to look for, hosting hidden services and traffic isn't free, maidsafe is a distributed cdn that implements an altcoin. On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Akater nuclearsp...@gmail.com wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Thank you for this detailed exposition! Actually, I never gave any thought about how BT, being a distributed network itself, would interact with Tor---which was pretty stupid of me, since the flaw is quite obvious. My item c) should have been just you can't share heavy media content efficiently with Tor. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQEcBAEBCgAGBQJVQqBvAAoJEFrbru/RghxvTcUH/2F0W7JHVRHVei7RQJKpjJO1 MLkk33lMxQIpd0Sr2tGTXEFOxrc3K1d7Xa4c5bMHuBALbzNFY8eYZWWHFlf3FOO/ lzHW9iU/Fe5YyS2IqZdMJERfhgMRldRLZ62qTHzDTsx2uEsxOFbb8y7EqPdJp7v+ L2TKFmNcPUyhvqsI9Cj8do7nGvUeUdQ4Iw3jjXssTPZ543NRsiPVK1AMwdqvm/WJ Ew/ldnXcivMfjLgA6larhSgmBcLuGbTL+JwsRq9bDtxNFQwgOo7ILEtDIAy9rSdT IOk+u2NeQLr5IyJ8cEOrKAxKGqiZP8s0yAI7PgruMXcZe1SSP9upAkdahXqSGW0= =TXD+ -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
If you want anonymous transactions then you want a blind-signing based currency like Taler Surely you jest... From http://www.taler.net/governments Taler is an electronic payment system that was built with the goal of supporting taxation. With Taler, the receiver of any form of payment is known, and the payment information comes attached with details about what the payment was made for. Thus, governments can use this data to tax buisnesses and individuals based on their income, making tax evasion and black markets less viable. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
[tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
Hi! Why not make a fully true integration with bitcoin in the network? Bitcoin could be the fuel: who wants to use pays, who want to help the network with a exit node receives, simple like that. The exit nodes could define a minimum to receive, for example: 0.001 BTC / MB or 0.01 BTC / MB or for free, and the user could define a maximum to pay, like 0.0005 BTC / MB or even free. Then, the network would find the right matches / patches. In a free market more you pay, more you get in speed and reliability. The networks could continue free but slow and faster if paid. Forget the intermediate nodes for now, think in this situation: - A, B and C is final user. - D, E and F are exit nodes. A is poor and set his configuration to spend max of 0 BTC / MB. B set max pend of 0.001 BTC / MB, and C is rich, so he set max to 0.01 BTC / MB. D is a very nice guy, and rely a exit node for free. E has a few network resources, so he set min. to 0.001 BTC / MB. F is even more poor, and he wouldn't be a exit node anyway, so he set the min. to 0.01 BTC / MB. A would use D as exit node, with the rate of 0 BTC / MB. B would use D and E as exit node, with the avg. rate of 0.0005 BTC / MB. C would use D, E and F as exit node, with the avg. rate of 0.00367 BTC / MB. F won't earn too much because he is very expensive and few users would use that. But E could make more money even charging less. The market will decide the equilibrium. Thanks! -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
On 30 Apr 2015, at 10:42, Aeris aeris+...@imirhil.fr wrote: who wants to use pays, who want to help the network with a exit node receives, simple like that So who wants to have anonymity must be rich ? Just no way :) Worse, it’s a catastrophic weakening of the anonymity provided by Tor, as Bitcoin is only pseudonymous, not anonymous. If you want anonymous transactions then you want a blind-signing based currency like Taler http://www.taler.net/ as opposed to a blockchain based currency like BTC. I’m not in favor of paying for Tor relays using even that for political reasons, but blind-signing is necessary to build a transaction model that’s no weaker than Tor. Jeff p.s. Leif talked about a proof-of-onion altcoin idea in which “mining” required fetching data through onion routing nodes determined by the spinning nonce, etc. and both the miner and any nodes forwarding data earned mining payouts. In this way, forwarding is paid for by the occasional fake mining circuits, not by users. You need nodes to sign some traffic, which potentially creates new weaknesses, so not suitable for Tor. It relevant if you’re trying to launch a different sort of onion routing network though, like maybe a high-bandwidth fail shortage/sharing network, as the coin speculators might help bolster the bandwidth and anonymity. signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
The networks could continue free but slow and faster if paid. Never thought I'd see a suggestion of paid fast lanes on Tor, thought that was largely limited to the dreams of greedy ISPs You'd probably attract more exit operators if it were possible to be paid, but I'm not sure it'd be a good idea overall. On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 3:42 PM, Aeris aeris+...@imirhil.fr wrote: who wants to use pays, who want to help the network with a exit node receives, simple like that So who wants to have anonymity must be rich ? Just no way :) -- Aeris Protégez votre vie privée, chiffrez vos communications GPG : EFB74277 ECE4E222 OTR : 922C97CA EC0B1AD3 https://café-vie-privée.fr/ https://xn--caf-vie-prive-dhbj.fr/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- Ben Tasker https://www.bentasker.co.uk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Full integration with bitcoin (suggestion / feature request)
There are tons of problems with the suggestion, IMMHO. Good read: https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/bitcoin I have very strong reservations about anyone suggesting internet fast lanes, or pay to play lanes. I run my relays for everyone, equally. If someone is poor, that doesn't mean they are any less important. For the purposes of Tor, chances are poor people match more closely to Tor's project goals. Based entirely on nothing but a guess, I would expect a poor person to be more willing, or more inclined to be a whistle blower, or more interested in political change, or more dedicated to social improvement, over a debutante dilettante. A very well off white guy in middle America suburbia has nothing to lose provided the status quo remains. A very poor person has nothing to gain from the status quo, so would tend to try to improve themselves, and others. It would also introduce fascinating attack vectors, as it would be relatively easy to determine who the poor people are vs who the rich people are, based simply on what a particular relay charges for it's service. The reduced anonymity set would present interesting problems. Assuming your numbers, at today's rate, 0.001BTC would be $0.23USD/MB ($0.28 for us Canadians). $0.23/MB@100GB/day = $23,000/day $0.23/MB@3TB(100GB*30)/month = $690,000/month That's a disturbingly good ROI, considering the cost for the operator would be anywhere between $3-15/month. (For a rich person to download a 1GB file, it would cost them $230.) Finally, attempting to monetize a system that is currently free as in beer, would not necessarily bring out the best in people. Sure, some operators would run their relays for free, but many wouldn't. When certain people realize that they could monetize the relay, what's to stop them from sniffing the data to make even more money? BUT, what do I know. Read the blog, it's much better written than my gibberish regarding this topic. Matt Speak Freely -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] What happened to Tor's Bridges?
I'm having issues requesting bridges by email (from a gmail account). Hey, michaelballriseup! [This is an automated message; please do not reply.] Here are your bridges: (no bridges currently available) -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
