Re: [tor-talk] Exits: In Crossfire on the Front Lines

[grarpamp]

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:26 PM, Karsten N.  wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Am 05.01.2017 um 05:23 schrieb grarpamp:

No, what you're replying to was written by someone else, not me.

> Ohhh my dear - have a look at the website of TorProject.org and look at
> "Who is using Tor":
> using Tor, why not Russians too? It is an open network for everybody.

Yep everybody using open overlay networks is interesting.
Appeal to all is an idea of such things.

Note the list of "who is using tor" doesn't include every user, entity,
use case or activity etc... particularly any of the controversial ones.
Parhaps that is some 'better philosophy' type of thing happening there.

> By the way:

Off topic in context, and re OP linked article.
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Re: [tor-talk] Exits: In Crossfire on the Front Lines

[Karsten N.]

Hello,

Am 05.01.2017 um 05:23 schrieb grarpamp:
> Ultimately the weaponization and militarization of the Tor network by
> Russian cyber aggressors 

Ohhh my dear - have a look at the website of TorProject.org and look at
"Who is using Tor":

> Militaries and law enforcement use Tor to protect their
> communications, investigations, and intelligence

Yes - militaries and especially intelligence agencies around the world
are using Tor and this is not a secret and it is not new. If NATO is
using Tor, why not Russians too? It is an open network for everybody.

By the way:

> The Ruskies have successfully completed a major full-scope
> information operation aimed at installing the next leader of the free
> world.

Like others I can not see any proof or evidence for this story. Some
emails were leaked because somebody used the password "PASSWORD" for his
email account and was tricked together with others by a phishing attack
- thats clear, but nothing more.

You may have a look at the leaked emails (at the content of the emails)
and may be, you can read, how the "leaders of the free world" tried to
manipulate the US-election. Why we don't talk about the content of the
leaked emails? But this question is not Tor-related and off-topic here.

Best regards
Karsten N.
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Re: [tor-talk] Exits: In Crossfire on the Front Lines

[grarpamp]

Maybe blind but I'm not really seeing much if any difference,
nor in your illuminated version.

The Govt reports and the games behind them have many issues.
Micah's article in defense of Tor is appropriate and shared.
And the point of movrcx's article clearly lies elsewhere.
Hopefully people don't miss it while debating lumens.

Tor et al are now publicly recognized tools for all manner of
activities spanning a range of legitimacies as interpreted by
whichever users activists and analysts. They're going to have more
serious adversarial threats deployed against them, and more games
played with them. Tor, crypto, users etc... they're all in the [geo]political,
legal and LE big leagues now. And at risk. It's not the 90's anymore.

From philosophy to tech to deployment to defense, be ready, be better.
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Re: [tor-talk] Exits: In Crossfire on the Front Lines

[Seth David Schoen]

grarpamp writes:

> [quoting movrcx]
> In today’s cyberwar, Tor exit nodes represent the front line of
> battle. At this location it is possible to directly observe attacks,
> to launch attacks, and to even gather intelligence. An alarming figure
> disclosed by The Intercept’s Micah Lee attributed 40% of the network
> addresses used in the Grizzly Steppe campaign are Tor exit nodes. And
> this is not a good thing.

This is a fairly different angle on what Micah originally wrote.

https://theintercept.com/2017/01/04/the-u-s-government-thinks-thousands-of-russian-hackers-are-reading-my-blog-they-arent/

(His article says that, while it's plausible that these attacks were
sponsored by the Russian government, the IP addresses involved don't
tend to prove that because many of them -- being Tor exit nodes --
could have been used by any attacker.)

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[tor-talk] Exits: In Crossfire on the Front Lines

[grarpamp]

https://medium.com/@movrcx/russian-crossfire-on-the-tor-project-ec65b7b8b52f

Russian Crossfire on the Tor Project

Welcome to the first quarter of 2017. The Ruskies have successfully
completed a major full-scope information operation aimed at installing
the next leader of the free world. And it’s no secret; numerous top
cyber-security firms have placed direct attribution of the attack on
the combined Russian Intelligence Services using the Tor network to
mask their point of origin.

As a shocked and dazed United States regains its consciousness we can
expect to see direct measures to mitigate this breed of cyberattacks
in the near future. This response will lead to increased
surveillance/compromise of Tor network infrastructure and leaves
common Tor users caught in the midst of cyberwarfare.

In today’s cyberwar, Tor exit nodes represent the front line of
battle. At this location it is possible to directly observe attacks,
to launch attacks, and to even gather intelligence. An alarming figure
disclosed by The Intercept’s Micah Lee attributed 40% of the network
addresses used in the Grizzly Steppe campaign are Tor exit nodes. And
this is not a good thing.

The concept of collateral damage does not escape the reality of cyber
warfare. We can expect Tor users to be impacted tremendously as cyber
frontlines are militarized. Those users seeking refuge within the Tor
network can expect to be caught in the crossfire with no end in sight.

The funding and resources that will be used to increase capabilities
with regard to Tor networking will be tremendous.

We can expect massive IDS arrays to capture traffic on the wire or
even as native exit nodes. Additionally we can expect nation-states to
operate a larger proportion of exit nodes as they allow for
significantly enhanced information operation capabilities versus line
tapping.

We can also expect to see additional research on executing de-cloaking
attacks against both hidden services and end-users. Some of this
research may be done openly and in public but for sure not all of it
will be.

Ultimately the weaponization and militarization of the Tor network by
Russian cyber aggressors will leave a large pool of human refugees
with no home.

It’s 2017. Welcome to the frontlines comrade.
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