Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Yes. I cannot stop thinking that operators of DAs publish all past logs when they shutdown their DAs! :D -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
I checked similar increases of relay users in other countries. Iranian type: United Arab Emirates https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-13=2019-06-11=ae=points Romania https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-13=2019-06-11=ro=points Iraq https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-13=2019-06-11=iq=points Syrian Arab Republic https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-13=2019-06-11=sy=points Russian type: Kazakhstan https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-13=2019-06-11=kz=points -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Yes. It's odd that one in a hundred (1%) people is using Tor. I checked percentages of users/population in countries. They may be less than 0.3%. https://pastebin.com/nbbBhJ5h Country users population (users/population) United States 379893329,351,255 (0.12%) Russia 340244146,877,088 (0.23%) Iran167544 82,520,788 (0.20%) Germany 165168 82,979,100 (0.20%) France 103279 66,998,000 (0.15%) Indonesia93620268,074,600 (0.03%) United Kingdom 70214 66,040,229 (0.11%) Ukraine 68156 42,101,650 (0.16%) India56620 1,348,295,550 (0.004%) Netherlands 47914 17,323,928 (0.28%) referenced: https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-table.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_population_density -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Thanks for helpful comments and references! I may have understood that there are: - Research Safety Board - AS number approach - Nine (10?) individuals who run the directory authorities and are independent of the control of torproject - Privcount approach - Tor design: It doesn't hide using Tor. It hides what users do. Tor developers are making efforts to protect privacy of users, I can understand it at least. In truth, I didn't worry about whether the directory authorities could do dangerously or not. I hope that operators of the directory authorities will provide analyses or thoughts about the rapid increase of relay users from their own viewpoints when they can. BTW, I didn't expect that you -- who is an operator of one of the directory authorities, and who is an original developer of Tor -- would reply to my question. Great place here is! Is it free of charge for me to use this place? :D Thanks, Iwanlegit -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
On Fri, Jun 07, 2019 at 01:01:38PM +, iwanle...@cock.li wrote: > Can Directory Authorities analyze hostnames of relay users and publish them? They could, but I don't think that would be a good idea, at least until somebody has thought through how to do it in a safe way. As a start for that thinking, I would point people to: https://research.torproject.org/safetyboard/ But I think this would be a hard one to make properly safe. > If the hostnames or organization names associated with the users are > available, we could know what type of users are increasing, and probably we > could guess why. In Iran and Russia, are the increases being made by > individuals, companies, and/or governments? I want to know that. In my experience, spot-checking these things in the distant past, the hostnames and IP addresses don't tell me as much as I'd like. Maybe if I were an expert in the network topology for these countries, I could understand things better. As another approach, learning the autonomous system (AS) number of connecting users would be another way to measure diversity within the country. I expect in some situations it would give too much precision (too much granularity) for us to be comfortable publishing it though. > https://metrics.torproject.org/reproducible-metrics.html#relay-users > Directory Authorities (DAs) can see IP addresses of relay users and are > reporting countries associated with the addresses for torproject. Yep. > So DAs may > be under control of torproject. No, the directory authorities are run by nine individuals who are part of the Tor community but are not 'under the control of torproject'. They make decisions on their own, and for most security choices a majority or threshold of them need to decide on something before it becomes so. > Can torproject let DAs report hostnames of > the users? No. We can ask, but they should push back unless the request comes with a solid plan on how the measurements will be safe enough. > Should rapid increases of the users be clear for Tor overall? I > would like torproject to decide to do that! Yeah, I would also like the world to figure out a way to do safer measurements like this. The Privcount approach seems like a useful building block here, because it does network-wide aggregation and because it uses differential privacy techniques to avoid publishing any counts that are too precise: https://www.robgjansen.com/publications/privcount-ccs2016.pdf https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/PrivCountInTor and if we had more developer time (aka more funding), we'd be able to get there faster. > But if torproject can let DAs report them, I won't be able to use Tor with > security. Even now, can DAs collect our personal information including IP > addresses and leak them in theory? :D Careful there -- the Tor design doesn't try to prevent every person in the world from learning that you're using Tor. It tries to prevent every person in the world from being able to learn _what you do_ using Tor. If you want to prevent the directory authorities from knowing your location, you'll need to take some further step. But most of these possible steps (use a bridge, use a pluggable transport, use a VPN) just shift the ability to count you to some other point in the network. So there is no magic answer, and it comes down to "it depends what you're worried about more". Hope that helps, --Roger -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 01:21:09PM +0300, Van Gegel wrote: > Take into account that statistics are number of unique user's IPs >connected to bridges per day. My cellular provider change my local GPRS >IP exactly every hour and my external IP also changed to random value of >provider's pool. Each time IP was changed my Tor rebuild 3 new circuits >to introduction points of mounted HS. So one mobile app with HS can >generate 24*3 connecting events per day. No, this is not right. Bridges and relays collect two kinds of aggregated statistics -- total IP addresses they've seen over the time period, and total consensus fetches they've seen over the time period. Clients fetch a new consensus networkstatus document every couple of hours, so you can get a count of the number of Tor clients that are running, no matter how many different IP addresses they have, or how many entry guards they use. It's still not perfect, (a) because you'll overcount users like Tails who don't keep state, if they reboot many times per hour, and (b) because you'll undercount users who don't stay online for the whole day, which is potentially a huge undercounting for countries like Iran where a good chunk of users are using dialup or internet cafes or other transient connections. See also https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-web.git/tree/src/main/resources/doc/users-q-and-a.txt as linked from https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html and there's lots more at https://research.torproject.org/techreports/ And for that second category of undercounting, see this totally different method for estimating the total number of Tor users, which at the time estimated a much larger 8 million daily Tor users compared to the 2 million daily users that our older metrics approach estimated: https://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/tor-usage-imc18.pdf --Roger -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
On Friday, June 7, 2019 at 3:01 PM, iwanle...@cock.li wrote: Can Directory Authorities analyze hostnames of relay users and publish them? If the hostnames or organization names associated with the users are available, we could know what type of users are increasing, and probably we could guess why. In Iran and Russia, are the increases being made by individuals, companies, and/or governments? I want to know that. https://metrics.torproject.org/reproducible-metrics.html#relay-users Directory Authorities (DAs) can see IP addresses of relay users and are reporting countries associated with the addresses for torproject. So DAs may be under control of torproject. Can torproject let DAs report hostnames of the users? Should rapid increases of the users be clear for Tor overall? I would like torproject to decide to do that! But if torproject can let DAs report them, I won't be able to use Tor with security. Even now, can DAs collect our personal information including IP addresses and leak them in theory? :D -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk Of course it is possible for Directory Authorities to collect the IPs of connecting clients and publish them. Yet they could only do it once because they would lose the trust of their users for ever. ;) So there have to be other ways to guess what type of new users use the network. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Can Directory Authorities analyze hostnames of relay users and publish them? If the hostnames or organization names associated with the users are available, we could know what type of users are increasing, and probably we could guess why. In Iran and Russia, are the increases being made by individuals, companies, and/or governments? I want to know that. https://metrics.torproject.org/reproducible-metrics.html#relay-users Directory Authorities (DAs) can see IP addresses of relay users and are reporting countries associated with the addresses for torproject. So DAs may be under control of torproject. Can torproject let DAs report hostnames of the users? Should rapid increases of the users be clear for Tor overall? I would like torproject to decide to do that! But if torproject can let DAs report them, I won't be able to use Tor with security. Even now, can DAs collect our personal information including IP addresses and leak them in theory? :D -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
However, there can be multiple cell providers, each with their own IP allocation scheme. Your cell provider may be the dominant provider in a monopolistic market, or it may only have a fraction of the market if you have competition. In the latter scenario, most mobile Tor clients in your country may not change their IP very often if they aren't on the cell provider you described. Even then, one could count as multiple users as well even if their IP is mostly static (e.g. sticky IP). For instance, my laptop goes between my work network and home, counting as two networks. I also have a smartphone which may change its IP based on Wi-Fi or LTE data, and a server running an onion service (to be decommissioned soon, nothing interesting however). -Neel === https://www.neelc.org/ On 2019-06-06 06:21, Van Gegel wrote: Take into account that statistics are number of unique user's IPs connected to bridges per day. My cellular provider change my local GPRS IP exactly every hour and my external IP also changed to random value of provider's pool. Each time IP was changed my Tor rebuild 3 new circuits to introduction points of mounted HS. So one mobile app with HS can generate 24*3 connecting events per day. BR, Van. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
bo0od: > no secure TLS or onion connection to the website, first insecurity note. Now the web page is under construction and project is only alpha. Although I do not quite understand the role of https for real security. It is more reliable to sign all related products with a PGP key, and this will necessarily be done when a relatively stable version appears: PGP PKI seems much better then web sertificates with private keys placed on remote web servers. The illusion of security is even more harmful than lack. Onion, of course, is much better in all respects. BR, Van. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Take into account that statistics are number of unique user's IPs connected to bridges per day. My cellular provider change my local GPRS IP exactly every hour and my external IP also changed to random value of provider's pool. Each time IP was changed my Tor rebuild 3 new circuits to introduction points of mounted HS. So one mobile app with HS can generate 24*3 connecting events per day. BR, Van. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
no secure TLS or onion connection to the website, first insecurity note. Van Gegel: > Maybe after publication on popular Russian resource Habr: > https://habr.com/ru/post/448856/ > This is Android app for talking over Tor: > http://torfone.org/download/Torfone.apk > http://torfone.org/download/Torfone_Android_howto.pdf > https://github.com/gegel/torfone > https://github.com/gegel/torfone/blob/master/white.pdf > BR, Van Gegel > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
On Tue, 04 Jun 2019 19:14:12 +0300 Van Gegel wrote: > Maybe after publication on popular Russian resource Habr: > https://habr.com/ru/post/448856/ > This is Android app for talking over Tor: > http://torfone.org/download/Torfone.apk > http://torfone.org/download/Torfone_Android_howto.pdf > https://github.com/gegel/torfone > https://github.com/gegel/torfone/blob/master/white.pdf > BR, Van Gegel Cool development, but it is unlikely to be the reason, the Habr article currently has 28k views, and Russia's user count now fluctuates by 150k users, following a strong correlation with workday schedule. https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-05-01=2019-06-10=ru=points Extra 100 to 150 thousand users during Monday to Friday (May 13-17, 20-24, 27-31), then dropping during weekends. A massive botnet on office PCs? -- With respect, Roman -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
Maybe after publication on popular Russian resource Habr: https://habr.com/ru/post/448856/ This is Android app for talking over Tor: http://torfone.org/download/Torfone.apk http://torfone.org/download/Torfone_Android_howto.pdf https://github.com/gegel/torfone https://github.com/gegel/torfone/blob/master/white.pdf BR, Van Gegel -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] Surge in Users
> Do you know why relay users have increased rapidly? What do you think? > > The increase mostly came from Iran and Russia. > 700K of the increase happend in Iran. > https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2019-03-04=2019-06-02=ir=points Are those actually relay users? It doesn't look that way. That hockey-stick graph simply does not look like organic growth. There's 82 million people in Iran which means that one in a hundred people is now using Tor in Iran - according to that chart. That's highly unlikely unless the state media announced explicitly told people to use Tor time and time again. It seems much more likely that there is something else going on. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
