Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-07 Thread Heiko Schocher

Hello Simon,

Am 05.05.2014 20:31, schrieb Simon Glass:

Hi Wolfgang,

On 5 May 2014 11:55, Wolfgang Denkw...@denx.de  wrote:

Dear Simon,

In messageCAPnjgZ2-qC8YK8t2DvmzXWKy3Wd+=7VY1Ti=jm98lf96plf...@mail.gmail.com  
you wrote:



Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
env variable.

What Do you think?


There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
but it may not be comprehensive.


But what about legacy uImage files?  It appears nothing would stop
booting one of those?


That's right, there is nothing to stop that at present. The
verification happens either on each image (for per-image signing) or
on the selected configuration as a whole (in fit_image_load() when it
sees the kernel being loaded).

One simple solution might be to check a CONFIG option in
boot_get_kernel() and disable support for IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.


The question is here, do we introduce a new config option for this,
or do we use for example CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE to disable it?

I prefer to check CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE, and disable IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY
complete.

bye,
Heiko
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, MD: Wolfgang Denk  Detlev Zundel
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
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Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-07 Thread Simon Glass
Hi Heiko,

On 7 May 2014 01:06, Heiko Schocher h...@denx.de wrote:

 Hello Simon,

 Am 05.05.2014 20:31, schrieb Simon Glass:

  Hi Wolfgang,

 On 5 May 2014 11:55, Wolfgang Denkw...@denx.de  wrote:

 Dear Simon,

 In messageCAPnjgZ2-qC8YK8t2DvmzXWKy3Wd+=7VY1Ti=Jm
 98lf96plf...@mail.gmail.com  you wrote:


  Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
 CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
 Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
 env variable.

 What Do you think?


 There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
 support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
 verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
 but it may not be comprehensive.


 But what about legacy uImage files?  It appears nothing would stop
 booting one of those?


 That's right, there is nothing to stop that at present. The
 verification happens either on each image (for per-image signing) or
 on the selected configuration as a whole (in fit_image_load() when it
 sees the kernel being loaded).

 One simple solution might be to check a CONFIG option in
 boot_get_kernel() and disable support for IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.


 The question is here, do we introduce a new config option for this,
 or do we use for example CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE to disable it?

 I prefer to check CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE, and disable IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY
 complete.


I suggest a new CONFIG option, like CONFIG_DISABLE_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY or
possible a device tree option, since if you force disable of the legacy
format you are actually removing functionality. At present
CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is a capability, and one capability should not
normally preclude another.

Regards,
Simon
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[U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-05 Thread Heiko Schocher

Hello Simon,

just talked with Wolfgang about the booting process from signed images,
as it is described in:

doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt
doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt

If we see it correct, then it is still possible to boot an uImage
or a FIT image without signature with bootm when CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
is defined.

The question raised, if this is a good behaviour.

Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
env variable.

What Do you think?

Thanks in advance

bye,
Heiko
--
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, MD: Wolfgang Denk  Detlev Zundel
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
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Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-05 Thread Simon Glass
HI Heiko,

On 5 May 2014 01:35, Heiko Schocher h...@denx.de wrote:
 Hello Simon,

 just talked with Wolfgang about the booting process from signed images,
 as it is described in:

 doc/uImage.FIT/verified-boot.txt
 doc/uImage.FIT/signature.txt

 If we see it correct, then it is still possible to boot an uImage
 or a FIT image without signature with bootm when CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
 is defined.

 The question raised, if this is a good behaviour.

 Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
 CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
 Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
 env variable.

 What Do you think?

There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
but it may not be comprehensive.

Regards,
Simon
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Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-05 Thread Wolfgang Denk
Dear Simon,

In message CAPnjgZ2-qC8YK8t2DvmzXWKy3Wd+=7VY1Ti=jm98lf96plf...@mail.gmail.com 
you wrote:
 
  Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
  CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
  Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
  env variable.
 
  What Do you think?
 
 There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
 support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
 verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
 but it may not be comprehensive.

But what about legacy uImage files?  It appears nothing would stop
booting one of those?

Best regards,

Wolfgang Denk

-- 
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, MD: Wolfgang Denk  Detlev Zundel
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-10 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: w...@denx.de
Accident: A condition in which presence of mind is good, but  absence
of body is better.
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Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-05 Thread Simon Glass
Hi Wolfgang,

On 5 May 2014 11:55, Wolfgang Denk w...@denx.de wrote:
 Dear Simon,

 In message 
 CAPnjgZ2-qC8YK8t2DvmzXWKy3Wd+=7VY1Ti=jm98lf96plf...@mail.gmail.com you 
 wrote:

  Should we not prevent booting uImages or not signed FIT Images when
  CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is defined?
  Or at least prevent booting such unsigned images through an U-Boot
  env variable.
 
  What Do you think?

 There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
 support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
 verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
 but it may not be comprehensive.

 But what about legacy uImage files?  It appears nothing would stop
 booting one of those?

That's right, there is nothing to stop that at present. The
verification happens either on each image (for per-image signing) or
on the selected configuration as a whole (in fit_image_load() when it
sees the kernel being loaded).

One simple solution might be to check a CONFIG option in
boot_get_kernel() and disable support for IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.

Regards,
Simon
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Re: [U-Boot] booting signed Images

2014-05-05 Thread Wolfgang Denk
Dear Simon,

In message capnjgz3okq8uzmorq7m7zwdwsfa2yzqct2f69skwgjdymoz...@mail.gmail.com 
you wrote:

  There is a 'required' property in the public keys which is intended to
  support this. If you mark a key as 'required then it will need to be
  verified by any image that is loaded. There is a test for this case,
  but it may not be comprehensive.
 
  But what about legacy uImage files?  It appears nothing would stop
  booting one of those?
 
 That's right, there is nothing to stop that at present. The
 verification happens either on each image (for per-image signing) or
 on the selected configuration as a whole (in fit_image_load() when it
 sees the kernel being loaded).
 
 One simple solution might be to check a CONFIG option in
 boot_get_kernel() and disable support for IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.

This makes sense to me.  Thanks!

Best regards,

Wolfgang Denk

-- 
DENX Software Engineering GmbH, MD: Wolfgang Denk  Detlev Zundel
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Phone: (+49)-8142-66989-10 Fax: (+49)-8142-66989-80 Email: w...@denx.de
I haven't lost my mind -- it's backed up on tape somewhere.
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