Public bug reported:

I think it would be a good idea to upgrade utopic to OpenSSH 6.7p1,
which was released earlier this week.  In particular, I'd like to have
the removal of unsafe ciphers and MACs from the default server
configuration and the support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  I also
finally got round to running the upstream regression tests
automatically, which should be a useful improvement to our QA.

Here's the Debian changelog entry for the package I uploaded to unstable
yesterday.  I included all the significant upstream release notes.

openssh (1:6.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium

  * New upstream release (http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.7):
    - sshd(8): The default set of ciphers and MACs has been altered to
      remove unsafe algorithms.  In particular, CBC ciphers and arcfour* are
      disabled by default.  The full set of algorithms remains available if
      configured explicitly via the Ciphers and MACs sshd_config options.
    - ssh(1), sshd(8): Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding.  A
      remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and
      vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket (closes: #236718).
    - ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1): Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519
      key types.
    - sftp(1): Allow resumption of interrupted uploads.
    - ssh(1): When rekeying, skip file/DNS lookups of the hostkey if it is
      the same as the one sent during initial key exchange.
    - sshd(8): Allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses
      when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family.
    - sshd(8): Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether
      ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys
      option.
    - ssh(1): Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that
      expands to a unique identifer based on a hash of the tuple of (local
      host, remote user, hostname, port).  Helps avoid exceeding miserly
      pathname limits for Unix domain sockets in multiplexing control paths.
    - sshd(8): Make the "Too many authentication failures" message include
      the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the
      authentication success / failure messages.
    - Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is
      available. It considers time spent suspended, thereby ensuring
      timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly (closes:
      #734553).
    - Use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing
      /proc/self/{mem,maps}.
  * Restore TCP wrappers support, removed upstream in 6.7.  It is true that
    dropping this reduces preauth attack surface in sshd.  On the other
    hand, this support seems to be quite widely used, and abruptly dropping
    it (from the perspective of users who don't read openssh-unix-dev) could
    easily cause more serious problems in practice.  It's not entirely clear
    what the right long-term answer for Debian is, but it at least probably
    doesn't involve dropping this feature shortly before a freeze.
  * Replace patch to disable OpenSSL version check with an updated version
    of Kurt Roeckx's patch from #732940 to just avoid checking the status
    field.
  * Build-depend on a new enough dpkg-dev for dpkg-buildflags, rather than
    simply a new enough dpkg.
  * Simplify debian/rules using /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk.
  * Use Package-Type rather than XC-Package-Type, now that it is an official
    field.
  * Run a subset of the upstream regression test suite at package build
    time, and the rest of it under autopkgtest.

 -- Colin Watson <cjwat...@debian.org>  Thu, 09 Oct 2014 14:05:56 +0100

** Affects: openssh (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1379727

Title:
  FFe: openssh 6.7p1

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