Re: Audit Exceptions on Apache

2013-09-19 Thread Michael-O

Am 2013-09-18 11:04, schrieb Joy Obba:

Hello Team,

Some security issues were raised by our audit team and these issues were
forwarded to secur...@apache.org.
We got a response from Mark Thomas from the Security team
Theses issues are listed below:

1. Banner Disclosure
  We observed that the GTApplication web server disclosed the Apache Coyote
version in its HTTP response. The extracted version is: Apache-Coyote/1.1
*Risk *
   This information might help an attacker gain a greater understanding of
the systems in use and potentially develop further attacks targeted at the
specific version of Apache.

***Response *

   Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. Every currently supported version
  of Apache Tomcat includes that information in the header. All it tells
  an attacker is that you are running Apache Tomcat.

  If you really want to change it, a configuration option to do that is
  available on the connector.


I absolutely agree with Mark. Security by obscurity has never worked out 
and you should not rely on.


Michael


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Audit Exceptions on Apache

2013-09-18 Thread Obba Joy
Hello Team,

Some security issues were raised by our audit team and these
  issues were forwarded to secur...@apache.org.
We got a response from Mark Thomas from the Security team
Theses issues are listed below:

1. Banner Disclosure 
    We observed that the GTApplication web server disclosed the
  Apache Coyote version in its HTTP response. The extracted version
  is: Apache-Coyote/1.1
    Risk 
 This information might help an attacker gain a greater understanding of 
the systems in use and potentially develop further attacks targeted at the 
specific version of Apache.
    
    Response 

Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. Every currently supported version of 
Apache Tomcat includes that information in the header. All it tells an attacker 
is that you are running Apache Tomcat. If you really want to change it, a 
configuration option to do that is available on the connector. 
2. The Character Set was not set. 
    The Character set (Charset) was not explicitly set by the
  server.
    Risk
 There is a risk that characters in content are incorrectly
  interpreted by the server. Lack of charset can cause the browser
  to guess the encoding type and this could lead to Cross-site
  Scripting by encoding the payload in   
  encoding types like UTF-7. 
  
    Response

Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. RFC2616 requires clients to treat 
responses without a character encoding as being encoding with ISO-8859-1. 
Clients that try to guess the charset are in breach of RFC2616. Further that 
they might do so in an unsafe manner is a security vulnerability in those 
clients and should be reported to the appropriate vendor. If the vendor(s) of 
the vulnerable client(s) are unwilling to fix this vulnerability there are 
multiple ways that it could be mitigated. For example, with a filter that 
always sets the character set. 

 Kindly send documents that will assist us in resolving these
  vulnerabilities

Kind Regards


Re: Audit Exceptions on Apache

2013-09-18 Thread David kerber

On 9/18/2013 5:04 AM, Joy Obba wrote:

Hello Team,

Some security issues were raised by our audit team and these issues were
forwarded to secur...@apache.org.
We got a response from Mark Thomas from the Security team
Theses issues are listed below:

1. Banner Disclosure
 We observed that the GTApplication web server disclosed the Apache
Coyote version in its HTTP response. The extracted version is:
Apache-Coyote/1.1
*Risk *
  This information might help an attacker gain a greater
understanding of the systems in use and potentially develop further
attacks targeted at the specific version of Apache.

***Response *

  Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. Every currently supported version
 of Apache Tomcat includes that information in the header. All it tells
 an attacker is that you are running Apache Tomcat.

 If you really want to change it, a configuration option to do that is
 available on the connector.

2. The Character Set was not set.
 The Character set (Charset) was not explicitly set by the server.
*  Risk*
  There is a risk that characters in content are incorrectly
interpreted by the server. Lack of charset can cause the browser to
guess the encoding type and this could lead to Cross-site Scripting by
encoding the payload in
encoding types like UTF-7.

*   Response*

 Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. RFC2616 requires clients to treat
 responses without a character encoding as being encoding with
 ISO-8859-1. Clients that try to guess the charset are in breach of
 RFC2616. Further that they might do so in an unsafe manner is a security
 vulnerability in those clients and should be reported to the appropriate
 vendor.

If the vendor(s) of the vulnerable client(s) are unwilling to fix this
vulnerability there are multiple ways that it could be mitigated. For
example, with a filter that always sets the character set.


  Kindly send documents that will assist us in resolving these
vulnerabilities


I think Mark's responses above tell you what you need to know in order 
to resolve these.  Just look in the documentation for the implementation 
details.


D


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Re: Audit Exceptions on Apache

2013-09-18 Thread Obba Joy
Hello David,
 
Kindly assist with the documentation I need to use
 
Regards
 


 From: David kerber dcker...@verizon.net
To: Tomcat Users List users@tomcat.apache.org 
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 2:09 PM
Subject: Re: Audit Exceptions on Apache
  

On 9/18/2013 5:04 AM, Joy Obba wrote:
 Hello Team,

 Some security issues were raised by our audit team and these issues were
 forwarded to secur...@apache.org.
 We got a response from Mark Thomas from the Security team
 Theses issues are listed below:

 1. Banner Disclosure
      We observed that the GTApplication web server disclosed the Apache
 Coyote version in its HTTP response. The extracted version is:
 Apache-Coyote/1.1
 *Risk *
       This information might help an attacker gain a greater
 understanding of the systems in use and potentially develop further
 attacks targeted at the specific version of Apache.

 ***Response *

       Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. Every currently supported version
      of Apache Tomcat includes that information in the header. All it tells
      an attacker is that you are running Apache Tomcat.

      If you really want to change it, a configuration option to do that is
      available on the connector.

 2. The Character Set was not set.
      The Character set (Charset) was not explicitly set by the server.
 *  Risk*
       There is a risk that characters in content are incorrectly
 interpreted by the server. Lack of charset can cause the browser to
 guess the encoding type and this could lead to Cross-site Scripting by
 encoding the payload in
 encoding types like UTF-7.

 *   Response*

      Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. RFC2616 requires clients to treat
      responses without a character encoding as being encoding with
      ISO-8859-1. Clients that try to guess the charset are in breach of
      RFC2616. Further that they might do so in an unsafe manner is a security
      vulnerability in those clients and should be reported to the appropriate
      vendor.

     If the vendor(s) of the vulnerable client(s) are unwilling to fix this
     vulnerability there are multiple ways that it could be mitigated. For
     example, with a filter that always sets the character set.


   Kindly send documents that will assist us in resolving these
 vulnerabilities

I think Mark's responses above tell you what you need to know in order 
to resolve these.  Just look in the documentation for the implementation 
details.

D


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Re: Audit Exceptions on Apache

2013-09-18 Thread Daniel Mikusa
On Sep 18, 2013, at 9:00 AM, Obba Joy joyo...@yahoo.com wrote:

 Hello Team,

Please don't post the same message to the list twice.  This list is made up of 
volunteers who will respond to your request as they have time.  If you need a 
faster response or more hand holding, please consider purchasing a support 
contract from one of the many companies that offer this service.

 Some security issues were raised by our audit team and these
  issues were forwarded to secur...@apache.org.
 We got a response from Mark Thomas from the Security team
 Theses issues are listed below:
 
 1. Banner Disclosure 
 We observed that the GTApplication web server disclosed the
  Apache Coyote version in its HTTP response. The extracted version
  is: Apache-Coyote/1.1
 Risk 
  This information might help an attacker gain a greater understanding of 
 the systems in use and potentially develop further attacks targeted at the 
 specific version of Apache.
 
 Response 
 
 Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. Every currently supported version of 
 Apache Tomcat includes that information in the header. All it tells an 
 attacker is that you are running Apache Tomcat. If you really want to change 
 it, a configuration option to do that is available on the connector. 

Have you looked at the connector docs?

   https://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-7.0-doc/config/http.html

HINT:  Search for the server attribute.

 2. The Character Set was not set. 
 The Character set (Charset) was not explicitly set by the
  server.
 Risk
  There is a risk that characters in content are incorrectly
  interpreted by the server. Lack of charset can cause the browser
  to guess the encoding type and this could lead to Cross-site
  Scripting by encoding the payload in   
   encoding types like UTF-7. 
   
 Response
 
 Not a vulnerability in Apache Tomcat. RFC2616 requires clients to treat 
 responses without a character encoding as being encoding with ISO-8859-1. 
 Clients that try to guess the charset are in breach of RFC2616. Further that 
 they might do so in an unsafe manner is a security vulnerability in those 
 clients and should be reported to the appropriate vendor. If the vendor(s) of 
 the vulnerable client(s) are unwilling to fix this vulnerability there are 
 multiple ways that it could be mitigated. For example, with a filter that 
 always sets the character set. 

Again, docs are your friend.

  
https://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-7.0-doc/config/filter.html#Add_Default_Character_Set_Filter

Dan

 
  Kindly send documents that will assist us in resolving these vulnerabilities
 
 Kind Regards


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