Re: [webkit-dev] Request for position on the Origin-Isolation header

2020-12-11 Thread Domenic Denicola via webkit-dev
Hi again webkit-dev,

I'm just pinging this thread to let you know that in the HTML Standard 
repository (and Chrome implementation), we're working to rename this feature 
from "origin isolation" to "origin-keyed agent clusters", with the header going 
from Origin-Isolation to Origin-Agent-Cluster. This is due to people thinking 
that the "origin isolation" name implied security guarantees, like Chrome's 
"site isolation" term or the HTML Standard's "cross-origin isolation" term.

You can read more about the reasoning at 
https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/6192 and see the renaming pull request at 
https://github.com/whatwg/html/pull/6214.

Thanks!
-Domenic
___
webkit-dev mailing list
webkit-dev@lists.webkit.org
https://lists.webkit.org/mailman/listinfo/webkit-dev


Re: [webkit-dev] Request for position on the Origin-Isolation header

2020-08-21 Thread Domenic Denicola
Thanks Ryosuke!

From: Anne van Kesteren  

> On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 2:41 AM Ryosuke Niwa  wrote:
>> I feel like I saw some discussions of also differentiating based on 
>> protocol (treating http://webkit.org and https://webkit.org 
>> differently). Do you know you've already had such a discussion and if 
>> so what the outcome of that discussion was?
>
> The scheme is already part of an origin so that is definitely a boundary for 
> this feature. However, I guess you're asking about the "normal" website 
> security boundary, which is site (roughly scheme + registrable domain, exact 
> definition in HTML). Site historically lacked scheme, but that was changed. 
> There are still some features (primarily cookies) that compare sites and 
> ignore the scheme (this operation is also defined in HTML), but those too 
> have proposals to move away from that.

In addition to this, I'll note that the feature is currently specced to only 
work on secure contexts; on non-secure contexts the header is ignored. So, 
non-secure pages will always end up in the site-keyed agent cluster, i.e. there 
is no way to use this header to isolate http://example.com from 
http://sub.example.com/ like you can do for the https: counterparts.
___
webkit-dev mailing list
webkit-dev@lists.webkit.org
https://lists.webkit.org/mailman/listinfo/webkit-dev


Re: [webkit-dev] Request for position on the Origin-Isolation header

2020-08-21 Thread Anne van Kesteren
On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 2:41 AM Ryosuke Niwa  wrote:
> I feel like I saw some discussions of also differentiating based on
> protocol (treating http://webkit.org and https://webkit.org
> differently). Do you know you've already had such a discussion and if
> so what the outcome of that discussion was?

The scheme is already part of an origin so that is definitely a
boundary for this feature. However, I guess you're asking about the
"normal" website security boundary, which is site (roughly scheme +
registrable domain, exact definition in HTML). Site historically
lacked scheme, but that was changed. There are still some features
(primarily cookies) that compare sites and ignore the scheme (this
operation is also defined in HTML), but those too have proposals to
move away from that.
___
webkit-dev mailing list
webkit-dev@lists.webkit.org
https://lists.webkit.org/mailman/listinfo/webkit-dev


Re: [webkit-dev] Request for position on the Origin-Isolation header

2020-08-20 Thread Ryosuke Niwa
Hi,

On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 8:51 AM Domenic Denicola  wrote:
>
> Hello webkit-dev,
>
> I've been working on a new header called Origin-Isolation, which is a way of 
> allowing origins  to opt-out of using document.domain and cross-origin 
> sharing of WebAssembly.Module, and thus allowing the browser to put them into 
> an origin-keyed agent cluster instead of a site-keyed one. This could in turn 
> allow the browser to make better behind-the-scenes decisions for process 
> isolation, or other resource allocation decisions, since sites no longer have 
> any ways to synchronously communicate cross-origin.
>

We haven't had a chance to fully review the proposal but we didn't
find anything we'd immediately object to. It seems like a reasonable
idea.

I feel like I saw some discussions of also differentiating based on
protocol (treating http://webkit.org and https://webkit.org
differently). Do you know you've already had such a discussion and if
so what the outcome of that discussion was?

- R. Niwa
___
webkit-dev mailing list
webkit-dev@lists.webkit.org
https://lists.webkit.org/mailman/listinfo/webkit-dev


[webkit-dev] Request for position on the Origin-Isolation header

2020-08-20 Thread Domenic Denicola
Hello webkit-dev,



I've been working on a new header called Origin-Isolation, which is a way of 
allowing origins  to opt-out of using document.domain and cross-origin sharing 
of WebAssembly.Module, and thus allowing the browser to put them into an 
origin-keyed agent cluster instead of a site-keyed one. This could in turn 
allow the browser to make better behind-the-scenes decisions for process 
isolation, or other resource allocation decisions, since sites no longer have 
any ways to synchronously communicate cross-origin.



Relevant links:



* Explainer: https://github.com/WICG/origin-isolation

* HTML spec PR: https://github.com/whatwg/html/pull/5545

* Test suite: 
https://github.com/web-platform-tests/wpt/tree/master/origin-isolation

* Gecko "worth prototyping" standards position: 
https://mozilla.github.io/standards-positions/#domenic-origin-isolation



A natural question one might ask is how this relates to COOP+COEP? The 
explainer has that covered: https://github.com/WICG/origin-isolation#coop--coep



Thanks for your time!

-Domenic

___
webkit-dev mailing list
webkit-dev@lists.webkit.org
https://lists.webkit.org/mailman/listinfo/webkit-dev