Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into struct msr_domain_policy
On Mon, 2017-10-16 at 15:01 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 16/10/17 08:42, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > + > > +secondary_available = > > +dp->vmx_procbased_ctls.u.allowed_1.activate_secondary_controls; > > + > > +switch (msr) > > +{ > > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM: > > +return true; > > + > > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2: > > +return secondary_available; > > + > > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP: > > +return ( secondary_available && > > + (dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_ept || > > + dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_vpid) ); > > This check can be made more efficient in two ways. First, use a bitwise > rather than logical or, which allows both _ept and _vpid to be tested > with a single instruction, rather than a conditional branch. But it's compiler's job to optimize conditions like that. I'm getting the following asm: if ( dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.allowed_1.enable_ept || 82d08027bc3d: 48 c1 e8 20 shr$0x20,%rax 82d08027bc41: a8 22 test $0x22,%al 82d08027bc43: 74 0d je 82d08027bc52And "test $0x22" is exactly the test for "enable_ept || enable_vpid" with a single instruction. -- Thanks, Sergey ___ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into struct msr_domain_policy
On 16/10/17 08:42, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > On Fri, 2017-10-13 at 16:16 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 13/10/17 13:35, Sergey Dyasli wrote: >>> @@ -210,6 +375,255 @@ struct msr_domain_policy >>> bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */ >>> bool cpuid_faulting; >>> } plaform_info; >>> + >>> +/* 0x0480 MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC */ >>> +struct { >>> +bool available; >> We don't need available bits for any of these MSRs. Their availability >> is cpuid->basic.vmx, and we don't want (let alone need) to duplicate >> information like this. > Andrew, > > What do you think about the following way of checking the availability? Preferably not. You are duplicating a lot of information already available in the guest_{rd,wr}msr(), and visually separating the availability check from the data returned. Worst however, is that you risk having a mismatch between the MSR ranges which fall into this check, and those which are calculated by it. > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > index 2527fdd1d1..828f1bb503 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > @@ -33,6 +33,43 @@ struct msr_domain_policy __read_mostly > raw_msr_domain_policy, > struct msr_vcpu_policy __read_mostly hvm_max_msr_vcpu_policy, > __read_mostly pv_max_msr_vcpu_policy; > > +bool msr_vmx_available(const struct domain *d, uint32_t msr) > +{ > +const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr; > +bool secondary_available; > + > +if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(d) || !d->arch.cpuid->basic.vmx ) > +return false; For now, we do need to double up the d->arch.cpuid->basic.vmx with nestedhvm_enabled(d), but rest assured that nestedhvm_enabled(d) will be disappearing in due course. (It exists only because we don't have fine grain toolstack control of CPUID/MSR values yet). > + > +secondary_available = > +dp->vmx_procbased_ctls.u.allowed_1.activate_secondary_controls; > + > +switch (msr) > +{ > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM: > +return true; > + > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2: > +return secondary_available; > + > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP: > +return ( secondary_available && > + (dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_ept || > + dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_vpid) ); This check can be made more efficient in two ways. First, use a bitwise rather than logical or, which allows both _ept and _vpid to be tested with a single instruction, rather than a conditional branch. Secondly, the CPUID infrastructure has logic to flatten dependency trees, so we don't need to encode logic paths like this. In practice however, you only read into the policy for details which match the dependency tree, so you can drop the secondary_available check here, as you know that if secondary_available is clear, dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.raw will be 0. ~Andrew > + > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS ... MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS: > +return dp->vmx_basic.u.default1_zero; > + > +case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: > +return ( secondary_available && > + dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_vm_functions ); > + > +default: break; > +} > + > +return false; > +} > + > static void __init calculate_raw_vmx_policy(struct msr_domain_policy *dp) > { > if ( !cpu_has_vmx ) > ___ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into struct msr_domain_policy
On Fri, 2017-10-13 at 16:16 +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 13/10/17 13:35, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > > @@ -210,6 +375,255 @@ struct msr_domain_policy > > bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */ > > bool cpuid_faulting; > > } plaform_info; > > + > > +/* 0x0480 MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC */ > > +struct { > > +bool available; > > We don't need available bits for any of these MSRs. Their availability > is cpuid->basic.vmx, and we don't want (let alone need) to duplicate > information like this. Andrew, What do you think about the following way of checking the availability? diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 2527fdd1d1..828f1bb503 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -33,6 +33,43 @@ struct msr_domain_policy __read_mostly raw_msr_domain_policy, struct msr_vcpu_policy __read_mostly hvm_max_msr_vcpu_policy, __read_mostly pv_max_msr_vcpu_policy; +bool msr_vmx_available(const struct domain *d, uint32_t msr) +{ +const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = d->arch.msr; +bool secondary_available; + +if ( !nestedhvm_enabled(d) || !d->arch.cpuid->basic.vmx ) +return false; + +secondary_available = +dp->vmx_procbased_ctls.u.allowed_1.activate_secondary_controls; + +switch (msr) +{ +case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM: +return true; + +case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2: +return secondary_available; + +case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP: +return ( secondary_available && + (dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_ept || + dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_vpid) ); + +case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS ... MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS: +return dp->vmx_basic.u.default1_zero; + +case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC: +return ( secondary_available && + dp->vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.allowed_1.enable_vm_functions ); + +default: break; +} + +return false; +} + static void __init calculate_raw_vmx_policy(struct msr_domain_policy *dp) { if ( !cpu_has_vmx ) -- Thanks, Sergey ___ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into struct msr_domain_policy
On 13/10/17 13:35, Sergey Dyasli wrote: > @@ -210,6 +375,255 @@ struct msr_domain_policy > bool available; /* This MSR is non-architectural */ > bool cpuid_faulting; > } plaform_info; > + > +/* 0x0480 MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC */ > +struct { > +bool available; We don't need available bits for any of these MSRs. Their availability is cpuid->basic.vmx, and we don't want (let alone need) to duplicate information like this. The PLATFORM_INFO and MISC_FEATURES_ENABLE are special, because they have no architecturally defined indication of availability. > +union { > +uint64_t raw; > +struct { > +uint32_t vmcs_revision_id:31; > +bool mbz:1; /* 31 always zero */ > +uint32_t vmcs_region_size:13; > +uint32_t :3; /* 45:47 reserved */ > +bool addresses_32bit:1; > +bool dual_monitor:1; > +uint32_t memory_type:4; > +bool ins_out_info:1; > +booldefault1_zero:1; > +uint32_t :8; /* 56:63 reserved */ > +}; > +} u; The code will be rather shorter if you drop this .u and make the union anonymous. ~Andrew ___ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
[Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/6] x86/msr: add VMX MSRs into struct msr_domain_policy
New definitions provide a convenient way of accessing contents of VMX MSRs: every bit value is accessible by its name and there is a "raw" 64-bit msr value. Bit names match existing Xen's definitions as close as possible. Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli--- xen/arch/x86/msr.c| 42 + xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h | 414 ++ 2 files changed, 456 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 9737ed706e..24029a2ac1 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -216,6 +216,48 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) return X86EMUL_EXCEPTION; } +static void __init __maybe_unused build_assertions(void) +{ +struct msr_domain_policy p; + +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_basic.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_basic.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_pinbased_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_pinbased_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_procbased_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_procbased_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_exit_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_exit_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_entry_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_entry_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_misc.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_misc.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_cr0_fixed0.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_cr0_fixed0.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_cr0_fixed1.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_cr0_fixed1.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_cr4_fixed0.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_cr4_fixed0.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_cr4_fixed1.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_cr4_fixed1.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_vmcs_enum.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_vmcs_enum.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_procbased_ctls2.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_procbased_ctls2.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_ept_vpid_cap.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_ept_vpid_cap.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_true_pinbased_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_true_pinbased_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_true_procbased_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_true_procbased_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_true_exit_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_true_exit_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_true_entry_ctls.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_true_entry_ctls.u.raw)); +BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(p.vmx_vmfunc.u) != + sizeof(p.vmx_vmfunc.u.raw)); +} + /* * Local variables: * mode: C diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h index 751fa25a36..fc99612cca 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr.h @@ -202,6 +202,171 @@ void write_efer(u64 val); DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, ler_msr); +union vmx_pin_based_exec_control_bits { +uint32_t raw; +struct { +bool ext_intr_exiting:1; +uint32_t :2; /* 1:2 reserved */ +bool nmi_exiting:1; +uint32_t :1; /* 4 reserved */ +bool virtual_nmis:1; +boolpreempt_timer:1; +bool posted_interrupt:1; +uint32_t :24; /* 8:31 reserved */ +}; +}; + +union vmx_cpu_based_exec_control_bits { +uint32_t raw; +struct { +uint32_t:2; /* 0:1 reserved */ +boolvirtual_intr_pending:1; +bool use_tsc_offseting:1; +uint32_t:3; /* 4:6 reserved */ +bool hlt_exiting:1; +uint32_t:1; /* 8 reserved */ +bool invlpg_exiting:1; +bool mwait_exiting:1; +bool rdpmc_exiting:1; +bool rdtsc_exiting:1; +uint32_t:2; /* 13:14 reserved */ +boolcr3_load_exiting:1; +bool cr3_store_exiting:1; +uint32_t:2; /* 17:18 reserved */ +boolcr8_load_exiting:1; +bool cr8_store_exiting:1; +bool tpr_shadow:1; +bool virtual_nmi_pending:1; +bool mov_dr_exiting:1; +bool uncond_io_exiting:1; +bool activate_io_bitmap:1; +uint32_t:1; /* 26 reserved */ +bool monitor_trap_flag:1; +bool activate_msr_bitmap:1; +bool monitor_exiting:1; +bool pause_exiting:1; +bool activate_secondary_controls:1; +}; +}; + +union vmx_vmexit_control_bits { +uint32_t raw; +struct { +uint32_t:2; /* 0:1 reserved */ +bool save_debug_cntrls:1; +uint32_t:6; /* 3:8 reserved */ +bool