Re: [zapps-wg] checking the attestations

[Eric L. Stromberg via zapps-wg]

for mine, a (verbose index) search on pgp.mit.edu  for 
“Eric L. Stromberg” should suffice.

Fingerprint: CCEF F87C E027 A1FE CE09  0E8D 4C01 C779 6E27 F50B

Perhaps the subkey is creating an issue?

Fingerprint: F2E7 FD82 C6A8 79AA 5002  39E2 4CD9 B95F 2A73 66B4

Search results for 'stromberg l eric'
Type bits/keyID cr. time   exp time   key expir
pub  4096R/6E27F50B 
 2013-06-04 
   
 Fingerprint=CCEF F87C E027 A1FE CE09  0E8D 4C01 C779 6E27 F50B 

uid Eric L. Stromberg 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-06-04 __ 2017-06-04 [selfsig] 

sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-06-13 __ __ [selfsig] 

sig  sig   98832223 
 
2013-06-22 __ __ Alan C. Reiner (Offline Signing Key) 
 

sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-07-28 __ __ [selfsig] 

sig  sig3  63E647B8 
 
2013-08-08 __ __ Vincent Mele  

sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2014-01-21 __ __ [selfsig] 


uid Eric L. Stromberg 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2017-11-13 __ __ [selfsig] 


uid Eric L. Stromberg 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2017-11-18 __ __ [selfsig] 


uid Eric L. Stromberg (sfbitcoins) 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-09-08 __ __ [selfsig] 


uid Eric L. Stromberg (Armory Technologies) 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-07-27 __ __ [selfsig] 

sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2013-07-28 __ __ [selfsig] 

sig  sig3  63E647B8 
 
2013-08-08 __ __ Vincent Mele  


uid Eric L. Stromberg (Enchanted Bitcoins) 
sig  sig3  6E27F50B 
 
2014-01-21 __ __ [selfsig] 


sub  4096R/2A7366B4 2013-06-04
sig sbind  6E27F50B 
 
2013-06-04 __ 2017-06-04 [] 

sig sbind  6E27F50B 
 
2017-07-02 __ 2019-07-03 [] 


> On Nov 17, 2017, at 3:59 PM, Tommaso Pellizzari via zapps-wg 
>  wrote:
> 
> Hi there,
> I was checking the attestations through gpg (GnuPG/MacGPG2) 2.2.0
> I'm able to verify all of them apart the one from Koby Burn that seems to 
> have a bad signature:
> 
> gpg: Signature made Fri Nov 17 13:34:50 2017 CET
> gpg: using RSA key 11F398CFBFBA58C2
> gpg: BAD signature from "Cody W Burns ()  >" [unknown]
> 
> For eric I'm not able to find the public key on gpg servers
> 
> can you please have a look?
> Thank you

Re: [zapps-wg] Powers of Tau Ceremony Proposal

[Eric L. Stromberg via zapps-wg]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-Hash: SHA512Powers of Tau Operational writeup=Round: 7Date: 2017-11-16Name: Eric L. StrombergLocation: San Francisco area, USChallenge: 2ae068fbe1a9d0e070844047f3032432e86b822f593da3fcd6fc0ee8bed2f30caac587a1d5e68ea6fcdcf1a40213de7d41ded05cf9be934e4c6d617e201caa1aResponse: 1ad851c65b4fcf3ca0bce6b366c40c48b65f611044731faf2b5fc90f987eda3f3240ea25c555e516ff73de2855369fd2da77a7055529b6f72ac3225b07fd8585 Preparation steps=UBUNTUBuild VM & compute node OS from: ubuntu-16.04.3-desktop-amd64.isoSHA256: 1384ac8f2c2a6479ba2a9cbe90a585618834560c477a699a4a7ebe7b5345ddc1  Build VM, create compute binary:Created new Ubuntu 16.04.3 VM from ISOFollowed instructions indicated in repository Readme to build “compute” binaryhttps://github.com/ebfull/powersoftau [commit 9e1553c437183540392a7231d0788318a19b18a3]Formatted fresh 8GB USB stick, copied compute binary to it.BLAKE2b-64 (./compute) = 7af5d31bbb215eab40753043523790483cdda67aef1d6e317f4269fb042dbc8608feaa0db8d17df82bef28f021509871635a56052de1370f4b90dc6322a8a962Setup minimal compute node (ASUS 1015E laptop, 2GB RAM, Celeron 847, 320GB HDD):Flash BIOS with latest (2013/05/23) from: http://dlcdnet.asus.com/pub/ASUS/nb/1015E/1015EAS304.zipSHA256: 9ee3256bbc7116388a6c5079773d8ac28471f0cfbb2db8784e403c36c3bbd9bb  Install ubuntu 16.04.3 from DVD: erase and reinstall, no network, no updates.Copy compute binary and challenge file from USB stick.MAC OSXBuild VM, create compute binary:Used “Install macOS Sierra 10.12.app” from Apple.Followed same steps as above to create “compute” binary.BLAKE2b-64 (./compute) = 88565a9e84c9ee69818e78909b7f6b05ef46a88780b8378d44a037be7e8fd50c7c601e8340455be2ed9e703095baf3f9104fded0086576c9c43c36fb6bf9Installed MacOS on external SSD drive with “Install macOS High Sierra 10.13.0.app” from Apple.To be used as boot image for MacBook Pro laptop, second compute node  (Internal disk is encrypted).Copied compute binary and challenge to SSD drive.Workspace preparation:An interior closet containing a heavy gauge steal gun safe was lined with multiple layers of foil shielding to allow access to the compute node keyboard with the safe door open and still limit EM leakage.  Compute node, USB stick and 8 hexadecimal dice in a dice box placed in safe, with a power cord routed through the safe door opening: https://www.dropbox.com/s/ysfmhre0cjkhe1g/tinfoilsafe.jpeg?dl=0Procedure=For each of 3 compute runs, door to closet closed to effectively create a faraday room with safe containing the compute node (laptop) inside.  Safe door open to allow access to keyboard and screen.  Ran ./compute and when prompted, provided 64 bytes of entropy with 4 rolls of 8 hexadecimal dice in a box used to both randomize them and to order them unambiguously.  Once compute process was underway, closed and locked safe until completion of the compute process.Sidechannel defensesThe ASUS compute node is a 4 year old device, ordered by me through Amazon with 2-day shipping, with Ubuntu 12.04 factory installed; reimaged with w/16.04.3 for this exercise.  Was previously turned on once to set it up / verify and not otherwise used or connected to any network.  Node has been air gapped at all times since purchase.  The MAC compute node is a personal device and well used.  The Mac OS image created on an external drive for this exercise was never network connected and erased immediately afterwards.  The internal drive is encrypted and was not accessible to the boot image used.  All 3 production compute runs were performed in a rural area with no other structures or public roads within 100 yards in any direction.  The compute nodes were operated in a heavy gun safe within an interior closet shielded with foil to control EM leakage even when the safe door was open for keyboard access.  The safe was kept closed and locked during computation.  One of 3 results was randomly selected for submission without attribution.Postprocessing==ASUS: copied hash and response file to USB stick.  Battery removed from compute node.  Copied hash and response to personal laptop then securely erased USB and overwrote with random data.  I did not destroy the node, but it will remain unpowered and locked in a safe for at least one month and will either never be used again (and be destroyed) or will be used only as an offline signing device, securely stored and never connected to any network. MAC: after each of the 2 compute runs, copied hash onto SSD drive.  Powered off Mac.  Copied hash and response files to personal laptop then securely erased SSD (boot drive) and overwrote with random data.  Will continue to use SSD and Mac for other purposes.  A roll of hexadecimal dice was used to select 1 of the 3 response files.  50% probability given to result generated on the ASUS node and 25% probability given to each result from the MAC node.  The randomly selected result was verified and submitted -