hi Martin:
As you could notice from the paper, KASUMI variation is MUCH easier to break
than original MISTY Paper (Mitsubishi patented algorythm. PM for full paper or
extra info). This is the same idea used to include more ...000... ZEROS on the
GSM protocol at the end of the stream, in order to be easily breaked by
Government equipment IN REAL TIME.
KASUMI could be decoded in less than 2 hours on a standard PC machine, or 2
seconds on a distributed attack or supercomputer.
Governemnt always request to include a crypto that THEY could also break in
real-time (in order to monitor terrorist, criminals, etc.). :)
Javier
> Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2010 16:13:33 +0100
> From: mar...@vuagnoux.com
> To: r...@romab.com
> CC: a51@lists.reflextor.com
> Subject: Re: [A51] The A5/3 paper appear in IACR archieve
>
> This attack is based on related keys, nothing very exploitable in
> practice... It's a theoretical break only.
>
> Martin
>
> Robert Malmgren wrote:
> > Howdy all,
> >
> > I havent seen anyone refer to the actual scientific paper yet, last year
> > there where some mails about the slides.
> >
> > The paper by Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir is now up on the IACR web:
> >
> > http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/013.pdf
> >
> > I picked up the following interesting text from the abstract:
> >
> > "....These complexities are so small that we
> > have actually simulated the attack in less than two hours on a single PC,
> > and experimentally verified its correctness and complexity. Interestingly,
> > neither our technique nor any other published attack can break MISTY
> > in less than the 2^128 complexity of exhaustive search, which indicates
> > that the changes made by the GSM Association in moving from MISTY
> > to KASUMI resulted in a much weaker cryptosystem. "
> >
> > and this from the summary:
> >
> > "....Our main point was to show that contrary to the assurances of its
> > designers, the transition from
> > MISTY to KASUMI led to a much weaker cryptosystem, which should be
> > avoided in any application in
> > which related key attacks can be mounted. "
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > http://lists.lists.reflextor.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/a51
> >
>
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