On 7/21/16 3:48 PM, Michael StJohns wrote:
> Without unique source identification (and for that matter role
> identification either inband or implicit) any compromised device
> results in your attacker being able to act as a controller for the
> group. Again, not a large problem (but a problem
Hi Kathleen,
On 7/26/16 4:52 PM, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
> What is the bigger threat model?
>
> Lights turning on/off in large buildings could result in increased
> energy costs.
> Lights turning on/off could result in safety issues (they could be
> extreme).
It's also a matter of changing
Hi Hannes,
On 7/25/16 5:47 PM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
> In order for the attack to work a luminary and a door lock need to be in
> the same group and share the same group key.
>
> For me the question is (from an authorization point of view) why the
> door lock as well as a luminary belong to
Hi Mike,
Just one clarification:
On 9/26/16 5:41 PM, Michael StJohns wrote:
>
> With respect to Eliot's comment, it doesn't really matter if the key
> management protocol is asymmetric if the multicast session keys are
> symmetric and used for control.
This doesn't really capture my position
I think this is a good idea.
Eliot
On 11/21/16 3:00 PM, Kumar, Sandeep wrote:
> Dear ACE members
>
> Peter van Stok gave a short overview during the ACE f2f meeting on the work
> related to EST (RFC 7030) over DTLS secured CoAP
>
On 12/22/16 11:36 PM, Michael StJohns wrote:
>
>
> On 12/22/2016 3:42 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> This working group has been in a state of indecision about this draft
>> for quite some time and I would like to gain some clarity on the matter.
>&
Hi,
This working group has been in a state of indecision about this draft
for quite some time and I would like to gain some clarity on the matter.
On the one hand, we have a draft that there seems to be unanimous
agreement would be useful to the lighting people. On the other hand, we
have some
+1.
On 3/7/17 9:33 AM, peter van der Stok wrote:
> After reading Jim's statement, my position is a bit different.
> Multicast security is severely needed.
> Not making it a WG document augments the risk that the subject is
> frozen and no progress is made.
> To guarantee progress, adoption seems
Hi,
Is this ready for publication as a WG draft?
Eliot
On 22.01.18 09:38, peter van der Stok wrote:
> Hi Ace, WG-chairs,
>
> This new version of coap-est takes into account the remarks made by
> Hannes; thanks Hannes.
>
> This version looks appropriate for acceptance by the WG.
>
> Greetings,
Hi Jim,
I agree that this document should be adopted. I am willing to review
and comment.
Eli
On 30.01.18 21:23, Jim Schaad wrote:
> This is the start of a two week call for input on the adoption of the WG of
> the document draft-vanderstok-ace-est. The document has been presented at
> the
Hi Hannes,
> On 9 May 2019, at 16:42, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I am still a bit unhappy about this paragraph:
>
> "
> Constrained devices sometimes do not have the necessary hardware to
> generate statistically random numbers for private keys and DTLS
> ephemeral keys.
I think at least one of the draft authors is away until the 8th. Can we push
out a week?
Eliot
On Jan 13, 2017, at 6:01 PM, Kepeng Li
> wrote:
Oh, sorry, my mistake.
I made a mistake between you and Mike Jones.
Let's change our
Reviewer: Eliot Lear
Review result: On the Right Track
This draft provides a means for EAP authentication via CoAP. This is
an evolution on top of EAPoL/EAP so as to not require 802.1X on
certain classes of devices. The general goal of reusing existing EAP
methods – and code – is admirable.
I
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