On Thu, Aug 9, 2018 at 12:32 PM Sean Turner wrote:
> 5) General: Okay so I’m no cryptographer, but should the hash algorithm used
> in the challenge correspond to the hash algorithm used in the PRF/HKDF? I
> mean if I’m going to use TLS 1.3 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 should I really
> use
Okay two PRs:
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/432
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/pull/433
And three issues:
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/issues/434
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/issues/435
https://github.com/ietf-wg-acme/acme/issues/436
spt
> On Aug 8, 2018, at
Couple of comments:
0) s2: Use the update text:
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only
A couple of comments:
0) abstract: r/exposed to an attacker/exposed to an unauthorized user
It’s not just attackers, you could unwittingly disclose your key and still need
to revoke it.
1) abstract and s1.2: in abstract: r/short-
term and automatically renewed (STAR) certificates/short-
Without looking at them in context that seem pretty reasonable. Happy to
review a PR.
On Wed, Aug 8, 2018, 21:03 Sean Turner wrote:
> These are all minor so I didn’t send them to i...@ietf.org. Also, once
> we settle on whether these are okay, I can submit a PR if you’d like (or
> not if
