This commentary represents a fundamental misunderstanding of both the
paper I wrote and the background literature on the hard problem of
consciousness.
Richard Loosemore
Ed Porter wrote:
I respect the amount of thought that when into Richard’s paper
“Consciousness in Human and
From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
Um...
John G. Rose wrote:
From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
Matt,
Although Richard's paper places considerable focus the zombie/non-zombie
distinction, its pronouncements do not appear to be so limited. For
example, its discussion of the analysis of qualia bottoming out is not so
limited, since presumably qualia and their associated conscious
Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- On Sat, 11/15/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- On Sat, 11/15/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
This is equivalent to your prediction #2 where connecting the
output of neurons that respond to the sound of a cello to
Ed Porter wrote:
Richard,
You have provided no basis for your argument that I have misunderstood
your paper and the literature upon which it is based.
[snip]
My position is that we can actually describe a fairly large number of
characteristics of our subjective experience consciousness
I think the reason that the hard question is interesting at all is that
it would presumably be OK to torture a zombie because it doesn't actually
experience pain, even though it would react exactly like a human being
tortured. That's an ethical question. Ethics is a belief system that
exists
Ed / Richard,
It seems to me that Richard's propsal is in large part a modernization of
Peirce's metaphysical analysis of awareness.
Peirce introduced foundational metaphysical categories of First, Second and
Third ... where First is defined as raw unanalyzable awareness/being ...
Richard:The precise definition of qualia, which everyone agrees on, and
which
you are flatly contradicting here, is that these things do not involve
anything that can be compared across individuals.
Actually, we don't do a bad job of comparing our emotions/sensations - not
remotely perfect,
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Ed / Richard,
It seems to me that Richard's propsal is in large part a modernization
of Peirce's metaphysical analysis of awareness.
Peirce introduced foundational metaphysical categories of First, Second
and Third ... where First is defined as raw unanalyzable
Mike Tintner wrote:
Richard:The precise definition of qualia, which everyone agrees on,
and which
you are flatly contradicting here, is that these things do not involve
anything that can be compared across individuals.
Actually, we don't do a bad job of comparing our emotions/sensations -
not
Three things.
First, David Chalmers is considered one of the world's foremost
researchers in the consciousness field (he is certainly now the most
celebrated). He has read the argument presented in my paper, and he has
discussed it with me. He understood all of it, and he does not share
On Mon, Nov 17, 2008 at 10:47 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I will not be replying to any further messages from you because you are
wasting my time.
Welcome to the Internet.
Trent
---
agi
Archives:
From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Three things.
First, David Chalmers is considered one of the world's foremost
researchers in the consciousness field (he is certainly now the most
celebrated). He has read the argument presented in my paper, and he
has
discussed it
Sorry to be negative, but no, my proposal is not in any way a modernization
of Peirce's metaphysical analysis of awareness.
Could you elaborate the difference? It seems very similar to me. You're
saying that consciousness has to do with the bottoming-out of mental
hierarchies in raw
Richard,
After reading your paper and contemplating the implications, I
believe you have done a good job at describing the intuitive notion of
consciousness that many lay-people use the word to refer to. I
don't think your explanation is fleshed out enough for those
lay-people, but its
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
Hi Richard,
I don't have any comments yet about what you have written, because I'm
not sure I fully understand what you're trying to say...
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