Colin: right or wrong...I have a working physical model for
consciousness.
Just so. Serious scientific study of consciousness entails *models* not
verbal definitions. The latter are quite hopeless. Richard opined that
there is a precise definition of the hard problem of consciousness.
There
Comment on Marketwatch forum today:
Lots of talk about the New World Order (MWO)... what really bothers me about
the NWO is that there are bound to be lots of robots involved. I hate robots.
---
agi
Archives:
--- On Sun, 11/16/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I wrote:
I think the reason that the hard question is
interesting at all is that it would presumably be OK to
torture a zombie because it doesn't actually experience
pain, even though it would react exactly like a human being
2008/11/17 Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
Comment on Marketwatch forum today:
Lots of talk about the New World Order (MWO)... what really bothers me
about the NWO is that there are bound to be lots of robots involved. I hate
robots.
The way I look at it, once we have robots with
How do you propose grounding ethics?
Ethics is building and maintaining healthy relationships for the betterment
of all. Evolution has equipped us all with a good solid moral sense that
frequently we don't/can't even override with our short-sighted selfish
desires (that, more frequently
John G. Rose wrote:
From: Richard Loosemore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Three things.
First, David Chalmers is considered one of the world's foremost
researchers in the consciousness field (he is certainly now the most
celebrated). He has read the argument presented in my paper, and he
has
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Sorry to be negative, but no, my proposal is not in any way a
modernization of Peirce's metaphysical analysis of awareness.
Could you elaborate the difference? It seems very similar to me.
You're saying that consciousness has to do with the bottoming-out of
Trent Waddington wrote:
Richard,
After reading your paper and contemplating the implications, I
believe you have done a good job at describing the intuitive notion of
consciousness that many lay-people use the word to refer to. I
don't think your explanation is fleshed out enough for those
Benjamin Johnston wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
Hi Richard,
I don't have any comments yet about what you have written, because I'm
not sure I fully understand
Colin Hales wrote:
Dear Richard,
I have an issue with the 'falsifiable predictions' being used as
evidence of your theory.
The problem is that right or wrong...I have a working physical model for
consciousness. Predictions 1-3 are something that my hardware can do
easily. In fact that kind
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How do you propose testing whether a model is correct or not?
By determining whether it is useful and predictive -- just
like what we always do when we're practicing science (as
opposed to spouting BS).
An ethical model tells you
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
What I am claiming (and I will make this explicit in a
revision of the paper) is that these notions of
explanation, meaning, solution
to the problem, etc., are pushed to their breaking
point by the problem of consciousness. So
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
For example, in
fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some
confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not,
and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Okay, let me phrase it like this: I specifically say (or
rather I should have done... this is another thing I need to
make more explicit!) that the predictions are about making
alterations at EXACTLY the boundary of the analysis
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Ed,
BTW on this topic my view seems closer to Richard's than yours, though
not anywhere near identical to his either. Maybe I'll write a blog post
on consciousness to clarify, it's too much for an email...
I am very familiar with Dennett's position on consciousness, as
I have no doubt that if you did the experiments you describe, that the
brains would be rearranged consistently with your predictions. But what
does that say about consciousness?
What are you asking about consciousness?
- Original Message -
From: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
On 11/14/2008 9:27 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
Good paper.
A
Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Okay, let me phrase it like this: I specifically say (or rather I
should have done... this is another thing I need to make more
explicit!) that the predictions are about making alterations at
EXACTLY the
Harry Chesley wrote:
On 11/14/2008 9:27 AM, Richard Loosemore wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real.
What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes
pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some
abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our
Matt,
First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real,
at least subjectively real. If I zap you will a horrible electric shock of
the type Sadam Hussein might have used when he was the chief
interrogator/torturer of Iraq's Baathist party, it is not clear exactly how
much
An excellent question from Harry . . . .
So when I don't remember anything about those towns, from a few minutes
ago on my road trip, is it because (a) the attentional mechanism did not
bother to lay down any episodic memory traces, so I cannot bring back the
memories and analyze them, or (b)
Thanks Richard ... I will re-read the paper with this clarification in mind.
On the face of it, I tend to agree that the concept of explanation is
fuzzy and messy and probably is not, in its standard form, useful for
dealing with consciousness
However, I'm still uncertain as to whether your
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
First, it is not clear people
are free to decide what makes pain real, at least
subjectively real.
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a
scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a
scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the
eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the
biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be
simulated soon
On 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to
make it less likely. Please explain how this is different
from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one
is human and the other is a simple program, because...
Why
Matt,
With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however,
qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with
people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we
directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel
pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does
not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Eric Burton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the
biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be
simulated soon
When we start simulating people, there will be ethical debates about that. And
Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe
precisely what you are looking for.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Harry Chesley wrote:
A related question: How do you explain the fact that we sometimes
are aware of qualia and sometimes not? You can perform the same
actions paying attention or on auto pilot. In one case, qualia
manifest, while in the other they do not. Why is that?
Richard Loosemore wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
One other point: Although this is a
Matt,
Matt,
Although different people (or even the same people at different times)
define consciousness differently, there as a considerable degree of overlap.
I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans
feel our minds are directly aware of, including
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 9:03 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans
feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses,
emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what
Richard
[so who's near Berkeley to report back?]:
UC Berkeley Cognitive Science Students Association presents:
Pain and the Brain
Wednesday, November 19th
5101 Tolman Hall
6 pm - 8 pm
UCSF neuroscienctist Dr. Howard Fields and Berkeley philosopher John Searle
represent some of the most
Harry Chesley wrote:
Richard Loosemore wrote:
I completed the first draft of a technical paper on consciousness the
other day. It is intended for the AGI-09 conference, and it can be
found at:
http://susaro.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/draft_consciousness_rpwl.pdf
One other point:
Mark Waser wrote:
An excellent question from Harry . . . .
So when I don't remember anything about those towns, from a few
minutes ago on my road trip, is it because (a) the attentional
mechanism did not bother to lay down any episodic memory traces, so I
cannot bring back the memories and
Trent,
No, it is not easy to implement.
I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we
are conscious of something. Some of the studies we have on the neural
correlates of consciousness indicate humans only report being consciously
aware of things that receive
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 10:21 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we
are conscious of something.
You must talk to different humans to me. I've not had anyone use the
word conscious around me in decades.. and usually
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think a good enough definition
to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware
of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts.
You are describing episodic memory, the ability to recall
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Dear Richard,
I have an issue with the 'falsifiable predictions' being used as
evidence of your theory.
The problem is that right or wrong...I have a working physical model
for consciousness. Predictions 1-3 are something that my hardware can
Richard,
This is probably covered elsewhere, but help me on this, just some thoughts at
the end.
Many humans don't share the full complement of sensory apparatus: blind, deaf,
cannot feel pain, taste, vestibular sense of motion, body sensation, etc;
either through damage or congenitally. So
This is a subject on which I have done a lot of talking to myself, since as
Richard's paper implies, our own subjective experiences are among the most
real things to us. And we have the most direct access to our own
consciousness, and is since of richness, simultaneity, and meaning. I am
also
See the post I just sent to Matt Mahoney. You have a much greater access to
your own memory than just high level episodic memory. Although your
memories of such experience are more limited than their actual experience,
you can remember qualities about them, that include their sense of richness,
Sorry for the late reply. Got interrupted.
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
(I'm sorry that I make some unclear statements on semantics/meaning,
I'll probably get to the description of this perspective later on the
blog (or maybe it'll become obsolete before that), but it's a long
story, and writing
Colin Hales wrote:
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Dear Richard,
I have an issue with the 'falsifiable predictions' being used as
evidence of your theory.
The problem is that right or wrong...I have a working physical model
for consciousness. Predictions 1-3 are something
Colin:Qualia generation has been highly localised into specific regions in
cranial brain material already. Qualia are not in the periphery. Qualia are not
in the spinal CNS, Qualia are not in the cranial periphery eg eyes or lips
Colin,
This is to a great extent nonsense. Which
Mike Tintner wrote:
Colin:Qualia generation has been highly localised into specific
regions in *cranial *brain material already. Qualia are not in the
periphery. Qualia are not in the spinal CNS, Qualia are not in the
cranial periphery eg eyes or lips
Colin,
This is to a great extent
Colin:YESBrains don't have their own sensors or self-represent with a
perceptual field. So what? That's got nothing whatever to do with the matter at
hand. CUT cortex and you can kill off what it is like percepts out there in
the body (although in confusing ways). Touch appropriate exposed
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Richard Loosemore wrote:
Colin Hales wrote:
Dear Richard,
I have an issue with the 'falsifiable predictions' being used as
evidence of your theory.
The problem is that right or wrong...I have a working physical
model for consciousness.
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 2:50 PM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Intelligence was
clearly at first *distributed* through a proto-nervous system throughout the
body. Watch a sea anemone wait and then grab, and then devour a fish that
approaches it and you will be convinced of that. The
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