Zefram wrote: > In a Platonist system this wouldn't be a problem. In the Platonist model, > Judgements don't actually change the state of anything, they're just meant > to point out what the state actually is. A contradiction of Judgements > isn't a problem then: one of the purported Judgements is wrong and the > other right, neither changes anything, and the game goes merrily on.
I realized upon Zefram's post above that our Judgement system is Platonist by eir definition. Unless a Judge issues an Order, e merely opines on the game state at the time of the CFJ and we abide by the precedent and opinion of what the game state was (or we use the appropriate appeals mechanism if we disagree). In fact, judgements only carry weight as long as we all agree to abide by the precedents set in them. There's nothing to stop a player for continually calling a CFJ on the same statement until e gets the judgement e wants. If we all respect precedent, we would DISMISS or defer later CFJs to the first in such a series, but there's no legal requirement to do so. In the case of two conflicting CFJs which invalidate each others' authority, there is no precedent and the CFJ (arguably) can't be appealed, so the right solution (unless the whole judgement system is broken, which it isn't) is to call the CFJ again and have the new judge, hopefully someone who's authority isn't in question due to the paradox, judge the truth of the CFJ and thus resolve the conflict. (Note that this does not take away Murphy's win: Murphy attempted an action that required resolution of the paradox to determine, and the paradox wasn't resolved at that time). Learn something new every day. Thanks, Zefram!
