Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Nic Evans]

More importantly: It'll be two weeks until PLP math changes, which gives
us time to revert it if we'd like. The fix to ballots, however, is an
*critical* concern. I'd rather vote for this in its current form ASAP
and debate PLP later.


On 05/18/17 19:49, Alex Smith wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-05-18 at 05:42 -0400, Publius Scribonius Scholasticus
> wrote:
>> I would still oppose this because it only encourages an increase in
>> the list price and makes it much harder for it to decrease.
> This is mathematically equivalent to the current formula, unless I've
> missed something. (That said, I'm not a huge fan of the current
> formula, and am working on a proposal to replace it.)
>




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Alex Smith]

On Thu, 2017-05-18 at 05:42 -0400, Publius Scribonius Scholasticus
wrote:
> I would still oppose this because it only encourages an increase in
> the list price and makes it much harder for it to decrease.

This is mathematically equivalent to the current formula, unless I've
missed something. (That said, I'm not a huge fan of the current
formula, and am working on a proposal to replace it.)

-- 
ais523

DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Publius Scribonius Scholasticus]

I would still oppose this because it only encourages an increase in
the list price and makes it much harder for it to decrease.

Publius Scribonius Scholasticus


On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 10:33 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-05-15 at 17:28 +0100, Alex Smith wrote:
>> I submit the following proposal, "Close Recent Loopholes", AI 3:
>
> May as well make this as uncontroversial as possible, seeing as it's AI
> 3 and failing to pass would be bad. I retract this proposal, then
> submit the following proposal, "Close Recent Loopholes v2", AI 3.
>
> 
> Amend rule 683, by replacing the last paragraph with:
> {{{
>   A valid ballot is a ballot, correctly submitted, that has not
>   been withdrawn. During the voting period of an Agoran decision,
>   a player CAN by announcement withdraw (syn. retract) a ballot
>   that e submitted on that decision. To "change" one's vote is to
>   retract eir previous ballot (if any), then submit a new one.
> }}}
>
> Amend rule 2445 so that it has the following text:
> {{{
>   Imminence is a switch, tracked by the Promotor, possessed by
>   proposals in the Proposal Pool, whose value is either "pending"
>   or "not pending" (default).
>
>   Pending List Price is an integer switch, tracked by the Promotor,
>   whose default value is 5. At the beginning of every month, the
>   Pending List Price is set to 90% of the mean of the price paid
>   for each proposal pended in the previous month, rounded down. If
>   less than 2 proposals were pended in the previous month, the
>   Pending List Price is set to its default.
>
>   Any player CAN pay Agora a specified amount, which is no less
>   than the Pending List Price, to flip a proposal's imminence
>   to "pending" by announcement. If the specified amount is less
>   than the Pending List Price, then the attempt to pay is
>   INEFFECTIVE, and the proposal's imminence is not flipped.
> }}}
>
> Amend the rule created during the resolution of proposal 7850 by
> deleting all paragraphs that contain the word "imminence", and then
> inserting the following paragraphs at the end:
> {{{
>   ais523 CAN cause a specified player to earn a Black Ribbon by
>   announcement.
>
>   ais523 CAN cause this rule to repeal itself by announcement.
> }}}
> [I already have my Black Ribbon, so I forgot that I might potentially
> need to award them to co-conspirators. Also, give me a way to clean up
> the rule when I'm done giving out rewards. As a reminder to people who
> aren't used to the Ribbon system, the idea of Black Ribbons is that
> they can only be gained via proposal or via scam, and it's standard to
> give a Black Ribbon to all the participants in a scam if it's capable
> of altering the gamestate enough to give Ribbons.]
>
> Then retitle that rule to "Scam Reward".
> 
>
> I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
> Delay".
>
> --
> ais523

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Alex Smith]

On Wed, 2017-05-17 at 21:00 -0700, Kerim Aydin wrote:
> Did the broken extend the voting period issue in from CFJ 3470 ever
> get fixed?
Looking at the ruleset, perhaps not? However, the CFJ judgement was
fairly perfunctory (if I'd been paying more attention, I'd at least
have suggested that the judge consider that a requirement that the
voting period lasts for seven days does not contradict a voting period
of longer than seven days).

I'm pretty sure that my last message was in on time, anyway; CFJ 2058
ruled that the CoE period for a self-ratifying report only starts at
the time when the message is available to other players, and with the
reasonable assumption that this applies to voting periods too, the
voting period was still going when my a-o message arrived.

-- 
ais523

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Kerim Aydin]

On Thu, 18 May 2017, Alex Smith wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-05-18 at 04:06 +0100, Alex Smith wrote:
> > The whole issue with quorum actually makes the timing irrelevant. You
> > could still have blocked the scam even after the "end of the voting
> > period"; the proposal was clearly inquorate at the scheduled end of the
> > voting period, which causes the voting period to be extended (rule
> > 2168, and formerly a very common occurrence in Agora, until the quorum
> > rule changed in 2014). As such, any votes or withdrawals would count
> > even if they were late, up until the Assessor ended its voting period
> > by announcement (e did so in the resolution message); I was kind-of
> > terrified that someone would notice this and lead to another timing
> > fight (even though it'd be one that could be easily won with the
> > Assessor's help), but luckily nobody did.
> 
> Oh, and this reminds me. H. Assessor nichdel: there are still a few
> days left, but you theoretically still need to send a Humiliating
> Public Reminder (rule 2168) in respect of the decisions in question,
> even though it's way too late to vote on them now and it doesn't serve
> much of a purpose. (Now I'm wondering if the

Did the broken extend the voting period issue in from CFJ 3470 ever get fixed?

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Nic Evans]

I'd be happy to write a more formal argument if a CFJ is called, but I
pretty much agree with ais523 on this. I've been aware of the resolution
re-arrangement for a while. It's a quite powerful ability considering
everything it can do. Also note that that resolution was titled "Attempt
1" not because I thought that there was any possibility that the
proposal would fail to pass, but because I thought a CoE on Quazie's
votes could change the quorum (from 1 to 0) and I'd have to re-resolve it.


On 05/17/17 22:06, Alex Smith wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-05-17 at 19:57 -0700, Aris Merchant wrote:
>> On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Alex Smith >> wrote:
>>>
>>> I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
>>> Delay".
>> I can't distribute these until you convince a judge that your
>> non-dictatorship exists. The technical evidence alone is convoluted,
>> and that's ignoring quorum. I don't want to violate the SHALL NOT on
>> distributing proposals that aren't pending. Hmm. Maybe you could say
>> that you pend them by the regular method if they're not already
>> pending. On the other hand, that might create more bookkeeping for
>> the Secretary...
> If you think it's at all controversial, you should call a CFJ. I
> thought it was pretty much uncontroversial, though. (Note also that if
> you reasonably believe the proposal to be pending, distributing it is
> not considered unreasonable and, under most previous rulesets, would
> not be something that you could be punished for. Right now, punishments
> are decided by Referee fiat, but I can't see a reasonable Referee
> punishing you for that.)
>
> The whole issue with quorum actually makes the timing irrelevant. You
> could still have blocked the scam even after the "end of the voting
> period"; the proposal was clearly inquorate at the scheduled end of the
> voting period, which causes the voting period to be extended (rule
> 2168, and formerly a very common occurrence in Agora, until the quorum
> rule changed in 2014). As such, any votes or withdrawals would count
> even if they were late, up until the Assessor ended its voting period
> by announcement (e did so in the resolution message); I was kind-of
> terrified that someone would notice this and lead to another timing
> fight (even though it'd be one that could be easily won with the
> Assessor's help), but luckily nobody did.
>
> Finally, just before the scam proposal was resolved, a different
> proposal was resolved (in a separate message) with four votes (I'd
> intentionally withdrawn ballots from it so that it would have four
> votes exactly, disguising that as a panicked attempt to stop it passing
> in an attempt to hide my ulterior motive), which set quorum to 1,
> meaning that the scam proposal couldn't possibly be inquorate if it had
> any votes at all. (This is a clear bug in the quorum rule, and one that
> I'd dropped in there intentionally back in 2014; my other fix proposal
> is intended to close that loophole now that I've made it public by
> using it, because leaving it around seems like a bad idea.)
>




signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Aris Merchant]

On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 8:06 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-05-17 at 19:57 -0700, Aris Merchant wrote:
>> On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Alex Smith > > wrote:
>> >
>> > I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
>> > Delay".
>>
>> I can't distribute these until you convince a judge that your
>> non-dictatorship exists. The technical evidence alone is convoluted,
>> and that's ignoring quorum. I don't want to violate the SHALL NOT on
>> distributing proposals that aren't pending. Hmm. Maybe you could say
>> that you pend them by the regular method if they're not already
>> pending. On the other hand, that might create more bookkeeping for
>> the Secretary...
>
> If you think it's at all controversial, you should call a CFJ. I
> thought it was pretty much uncontroversial, though. (Note also that if
> you reasonably believe the proposal to be pending, distributing it is
> not considered unreasonable and, under most previous rulesets, would
> not be something that you could be punished for. Right now, punishments
> are decided by Referee fiat, but I can't see a reasonable Referee
> punishing you for that.)
>
> The whole issue with quorum actually makes the timing irrelevant. You
> could still have blocked the scam even after the "end of the voting
> period"; the proposal was clearly inquorate at the scheduled end of the
> voting period, which causes the voting period to be extended (rule
> 2168, and formerly a very common occurrence in Agora, until the quorum
> rule changed in 2014). As such, any votes or withdrawals would count
> even if they were late, up until the Assessor ended its voting period
> by announcement (e did so in the resolution message); I was kind-of
> terrified that someone would notice this and lead to another timing
> fight (even though it'd be one that could be easily won with the
> Assessor's help), but luckily nobody did.
>
> Finally, just before the scam proposal was resolved, a different
> proposal was resolved (in a separate message) with four votes (I'd
> intentionally withdrawn ballots from it so that it would have four
> votes exactly, disguising that as a panicked attempt to stop it passing
> in an attempt to hide my ulterior motive), which set quorum to 1,
> meaning that the scam proposal couldn't possibly be inquorate if it had
> any votes at all. (This is a clear bug in the quorum rule, and one that
> I'd dropped in there intentionally back in 2014; my other fix proposal
> is intended to close that loophole now that I've made it public by
> using it, because leaving it around seems like a bad idea.)
>
> --
> ais523
I think I missed that. It's all very reasonable logic. I'll be happy
to distribute them with my next run unless someone else cares to call
a CFJ presenting some novel argument.

-Aris

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Alex Smith]

On Thu, 2017-05-18 at 04:06 +0100, Alex Smith wrote:
> The whole issue with quorum actually makes the timing irrelevant. You
> could still have blocked the scam even after the "end of the voting
> period"; the proposal was clearly inquorate at the scheduled end of the
> voting period, which causes the voting period to be extended (rule
> 2168, and formerly a very common occurrence in Agora, until the quorum
> rule changed in 2014). As such, any votes or withdrawals would count
> even if they were late, up until the Assessor ended its voting period
> by announcement (e did so in the resolution message); I was kind-of
> terrified that someone would notice this and lead to another timing
> fight (even though it'd be one that could be easily won with the
> Assessor's help), but luckily nobody did.

Oh, and this reminds me. H. Assessor nichdel: there are still a few
days left, but you theoretically still need to send a Humiliating
Public Reminder (rule 2168) in respect of the decisions in question,
even though it's way too late to vote on them now and it doesn't serve
much of a purpose. (Now I'm wondering if the 

-- 
ais523

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Alex Smith]

On Wed, 2017-05-17 at 19:57 -0700, Aris Merchant wrote:
> On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Alex Smith  > wrote:
> > 
> > I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
> > Delay".
> 
> I can't distribute these until you convince a judge that your
> non-dictatorship exists. The technical evidence alone is convoluted,
> and that's ignoring quorum. I don't want to violate the SHALL NOT on
> distributing proposals that aren't pending. Hmm. Maybe you could say
> that you pend them by the regular method if they're not already
> pending. On the other hand, that might create more bookkeeping for
> the Secretary...

If you think it's at all controversial, you should call a CFJ. I
thought it was pretty much uncontroversial, though. (Note also that if
you reasonably believe the proposal to be pending, distributing it is
not considered unreasonable and, under most previous rulesets, would
not be something that you could be punished for. Right now, punishments
are decided by Referee fiat, but I can't see a reasonable Referee
punishing you for that.)

The whole issue with quorum actually makes the timing irrelevant. You
could still have blocked the scam even after the "end of the voting
period"; the proposal was clearly inquorate at the scheduled end of the
voting period, which causes the voting period to be extended (rule
2168, and formerly a very common occurrence in Agora, until the quorum
rule changed in 2014). As such, any votes or withdrawals would count
even if they were late, up until the Assessor ended its voting period
by announcement (e did so in the resolution message); I was kind-of
terrified that someone would notice this and lead to another timing
fight (even though it'd be one that could be easily won with the
Assessor's help), but luckily nobody did.

Finally, just before the scam proposal was resolved, a different
proposal was resolved (in a separate message) with four votes (I'd
intentionally withdrawn ballots from it so that it would have four
votes exactly, disguising that as a panicked attempt to stop it passing
in an attempt to hide my ulterior motive), which set quorum to 1,
meaning that the scam proposal couldn't possibly be inquorate if it had
any votes at all. (This is a clear bug in the quorum rule, and one that
I'd dropped in there intentionally back in 2014; my other fix proposal
is intended to close that loophole now that I've made it public by
using it, because leaving it around seems like a bad idea.)

-- 
ais523

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Owen Jacobson]

> On May 17, 2017, at 10:57 PM, Aris Merchant 
>  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
>> 
>> I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
>> Delay".
> 
> I can't distribute these until you convince a judge that your
> non-dictatorship exists. The technical evidence alone is convoluted,
> and that's ignoring quorum. I don't want to violate the SHALL NOT on
> distributing proposals that aren't pending. Hmm. Maybe you could say
> that you pend them by the regular method if they're not already
> pending. On the other hand, that might create more bookkeeping for the
> Secretary…

Frankly, that’s work I’d happily undertake in return for getting this closed 
unambiguously.

-o



signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP

DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Aris Merchant]

On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 7:33 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
>
> I pend that proposal, using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
> Delay".

I can't distribute these until you convince a judge that your
non-dictatorship exists. The technical evidence alone is convoluted,
and that's ignoring quorum. I don't want to violate the SHALL NOT on
distributing proposals that aren't pending. Hmm. Maybe you could say
that you pend them by the regular method if they're not already
pending. On the other hand, that might create more bookkeeping for the
Secretary...

-Aris

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Publius Scribonius Scholasticus]

I concur with o regarding both the list price issue and the fact that
your payment does not affect the list price.

Publius Scribonius Scholasticus


On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 10:45 PM, Owen Jacobson  wrote:
>
>> On May 15, 2017, at 12:28 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
>>
>> I transfer 10 Shinies to Agora. (The victory from this scam seems like
>> enough of a reward without trying to cheat on pending costs at the same
>> time.)
>
> I believe this transfer should not affect the pending list price, but I’m not 
> completely sure of that. Anyone want to weigh in?
>
>> Amend rule 2445 so that it has the following text:
>> {{{
>>   Imminence is a switch, tracked by the Promotor, possessed by
>>   proposals in the Proposal Pool, whose value is either "pending"
>>   or "not pending" (default).
>>
>>   Pending List Price is an integer switch, tracked by the Promotor,
>>   whose default value is 5. At the beginning of every month, the
>>   Pending List Price is set to the mean of the price paid for each
>>   proposal pended in the previous month, rounded down. If less
>>   than 2 proposals were pended in the previous month, the Pending
>>   List Price is set to its default.
>>
>>   Any player CAN pay Agora a specified amount, which is no less
>>   than the Pending List Price, to flip a proposal's imminence
>>   to "pending" by announcement. If the specified amount is less
>>   than the Pending List Price, then the attempt to pay is
>>   INEFFECTIVE, and the proposal's imminence is not flipped.
>> }}}
>
> I’d prefer if you didn’t change the dynamics of the pend price like this. 
> There’s a subtle feature you’re removing, which was in nichdel’s original 
> system, that allows the pending price to drift downwards (by up to 10% per 
> week) even if we continue to pend proposals. Raising the minimum to the list 
> price means that the list price can only go up, until it climbs so high that 
> we can no longer pend proposals, at which point we have two months of 
> stagnation (or emergency actions to pend proposals) followed by a price reset.
>
> Allowing the price to move in either direction means that there’s at least 
> some hope that it’ll settle towards some commonly-agreed-upon value, but if 
> the price can only go up, there’s a strong incentive to never pay more than 
> the list price in case you need to pend a proposal later, unless you need to 
> lock someone else out of the pending process for a couple of months.
>
> If you feel strongly that the list price should be the minimum, can you 
> separate this into a proposal that’s not tied to fixing the scam?
>
> -o
>
>

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Nicholas Evans]

On May 16, 2017 23:33, "Alex Smith"  wrote:

As such, I went for the simpler option (especially as IIRC there was a
proposal to simplify the pending price system floating around already,
and I didn't want to accidentally reverse it). If you strongly feel
that allowing a drift down is likely to make a positive difference to
gameplay, I can change it.


Said proposal didn't change the math (except for rounding differences), it
just removed the unnecessary distinction between list price and minimum.
That said I'm not particularly attached to that element of the economy.

Re: DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Alex Smith]

On Tue, 2017-05-16 at 22:45 -0400, Owen Jacobson wrote:
> > On May 15, 2017, at 12:28 PM, Alex Smith 
> > wrote:
> > 
> > I transfer 10 Shinies to Agora. (The victory from this scam seems like
> > enough of a reward without trying to cheat on pending costs at the same
> > time.)
>
> I believe this transfer should not affect the pending list price, but
> I’m not completely sure of that. Anyone want to weigh in?

It doesn't, it was just a donation. (Especially as I pend two proposals
in the post; it was intended as a donation of 5 Shinies for each.)

> > Amend rule 2445 so that it has the following text:
> > {{{
> >   Imminence is a switch, tracked by the Promotor, possessed by
> >   proposals in the Proposal Pool, whose value is either "pending"
> >   or "not pending" (default).
> > 
> >   Pending List Price is an integer switch, tracked by the Promotor,
> >   whose default value is 5. At the beginning of every month, the
> >   Pending List Price is set to the mean of the price paid for each
> >   proposal pended in the previous month, rounded down. If less
> >   than 2 proposals were pended in the previous month, the Pending
> >   List Price is set to its default.
> > 
> >   Any player CAN pay Agora a specified amount, which is no less
> >   than the Pending List Price, to flip a proposal's imminence
> >   to "pending" by announcement. If the specified amount is less
> >   than the Pending List Price, then the attempt to pay is
> >   INEFFECTIVE, and the proposal's imminence is not flipped.
> > }}}
> 
> I’d prefer if you didn’t change the dynamics of the pend price like
> this. There’s a subtle feature you’re removing, which was in
> nichdel’s original system, that allows the pending price to drift
> downwards (by up to 10% per week) even if we continue to pend
> proposals. Raising the minimum to the list price means that the list
> price can only go up, until it climbs so high that we can no longer
> pend proposals, at which point we have two months of stagnation (or
> emergency actions to pend proposals) followed by a price reset.
> 
> Allowing the price to move in either direction means that there’s at
> least some hope that it’ll settle towards some commonly-agreed-upon
> value, but if the price can only go up, there’s a strong incentive to
> never pay more than the list price in case you need to pend a
> proposal later, unless you need to lock someone else out of the
> pending process for a couple of months.
> 
> If you feel strongly that the list price should be the minimum, can
> you separate this into a proposal that’s not tied to fixing the scam?

I suspect it won't make a huge difference either way; there's never a
reason to overpay for pending a proposal even at present, unless you
want to try to lock other people out of the proposal system; and this
means that there's no tendency for the price to drift towards an agreed
value (in fact, if the value drifts up, it'll most likely be due to a
scam or an attempt to enforce an unpopular value on the rest of Agora).
As such, I went for the simpler option (especially as IIRC there was a
proposal to simplify the pending price system floating around already,
and I didn't want to accidentally reverse it). If you strongly feel
that allowing a drift down is likely to make a positive difference to
gameplay, I can change it.

(Note also that the delay isn't two months, but one month, and one
proposal can be pended during that time.)

-- 
ais523

DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Owen Jacobson]

> On May 15, 2017, at 12:28 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
> 
> I transfer 10 Shinies to Agora. (The victory from this scam seems like
> enough of a reward without trying to cheat on pending costs at the same
> time.)

I believe this transfer should not affect the pending list price, but I’m not 
completely sure of that. Anyone want to weigh in?

> Amend rule 2445 so that it has the following text:
> {{{
>   Imminence is a switch, tracked by the Promotor, possessed by
>   proposals in the Proposal Pool, whose value is either "pending"
>   or "not pending" (default).
> 
>   Pending List Price is an integer switch, tracked by the Promotor,
>   whose default value is 5. At the beginning of every month, the
>   Pending List Price is set to the mean of the price paid for each
>   proposal pended in the previous month, rounded down. If less
>   than 2 proposals were pended in the previous month, the Pending
>   List Price is set to its default.
> 
>   Any player CAN pay Agora a specified amount, which is no less
>   than the Pending List Price, to flip a proposal's imminence
>   to "pending" by announcement. If the specified amount is less
>   than the Pending List Price, then the attempt to pay is
>   INEFFECTIVE, and the proposal's imminence is not flipped.
> }}}

I’d prefer if you didn’t change the dynamics of the pend price like this. 
There’s a subtle feature you’re removing, which was in nichdel’s original 
system, that allows the pending price to drift downwards (by up to 10% per 
week) even if we continue to pend proposals. Raising the minimum to the list 
price means that the list price can only go up, until it climbs so high that we 
can no longer pend proposals, at which point we have two months of stagnation 
(or emergency actions to pend proposals) followed by a price reset.

Allowing the price to move in either direction means that there’s at least some 
hope that it’ll settle towards some commonly-agreed-upon value, but if the 
price can only go up, there’s a strong incentive to never pay more than the 
list price in case you need to pend a proposal later, unless you need to lock 
someone else out of the pending process for a couple of months.

If you feel strongly that the list price should be the minimum, can you 
separate this into a proposal that’s not tied to fixing the scam?

-o




signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP

DIS: Re: BUS: Time to close the loopholes

[Publius Scribonius Scholasticus]

Thank you, oh powerful and benevolent dictator.

Publius Scribonius Scholasticus


On Mon, May 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Alex Smith  wrote:
> I transfer 10 Shinies to Agora. (The victory from this scam seems like
> enough of a reward without trying to cheat on pending costs at the same
> time.)
>
> I submit the following proposal, "Close Recent Loopholes", AI 3:
> 
> Amend rule 683, by replacing the last paragraph with:
> {{{
>   A valid ballot is a ballot, correctly submitted, that has not
>   been withdrawn. During the voting period of an Agoran decision,
>   a player CAN by announcement withdraw (syn. retract) a ballot
>   that e submitted on that decision. To "change" one's vote is to
>   retract eir previous ballot (if any), then submit a new one.
> }}}
>
> Amend rule 2445 so that it has the following text:
> {{{
>   Imminence is a switch, tracked by the Promotor, possessed by
>   proposals in the Proposal Pool, whose value is either "pending"
>   or "not pending" (default).
>
>   Pending List Price is an integer switch, tracked by the Promotor,
>   whose default value is 5. At the beginning of every month, the
>   Pending List Price is set to the mean of the price paid for each
>   proposal pended in the previous month, rounded down. If less
>   than 2 proposals were pended in the previous month, the Pending
>   List Price is set to its default.
>
>   Any player CAN pay Agora a specified amount, which is no less
>   than the Pending List Price, to flip a proposal's imminence
>   to "pending" by announcement. If the specified amount is less
>   than the Pending List Price, then the attempt to pay is
>   INEFFECTIVE, and the proposal's imminence is not flipped.
> }}}
>
> Amend the rule created during the resolution of proposal 7850 by
> deleting all paragraphs that contain the word "imminence", and then
> inserting the following paragraphs at the end:
> {{{
>   ais523 CAN cause a specified player to earn a Black Ribbon by
>   announcement.
>
>   ais523 CAN cause this rule to repeal itself by announcement.
> }}}
> [I already have my Black Ribbon, so I forgot that I might potentially
> need to award them to co-conspirators. Also, give me a way to clean up
> the rule when I'm done giving out rewards. As a reminder to people who
> aren't used to the Ribbon system, the idea of Black Ribbons is that
> they can only be gained via proposal or via scam, and it's standard to
> give a Black Ribbon to all the participants in a scam if it's capable
> of altering the gamestate enough to give Ribbons.]
>
> Then retitle that rule to "Scam Reward".
> 
>
> I submit the following proposal, "Close Ancient Loopholes", AI 3:
> 
> Amend rule 879 so that it has the following text:
> {{{
>   Each Agoran Decision has a quorum. This is a number set when the
>   decision is created, and thereafter cannot be changed. When a
>   person initiates an Agoran Decision, that person SHALL state the
>   quorum of that decision. However, incorrectly stating the quorum
>   of a decision does not invalidate the initiation, nor does it
>   actually change the quorum of the decision.
>
>   The quorum that an Agoran Decision gains as it is created can be
>   defined by other rules of power 2 or greater. If no other rule
>   defines the quorum of an Agoran Decision, the quorum for that
>   decision is equal to the number of players who voted on the
>   Agoran Decision to adopt a proposal that had been most recently
>   resolved at the time of that decision's initiation, minus 2.
>
>   As an exception to the previous paragraph, the quorum of an
>   Agoran Decision can never be less than 2. If the rules would
>   attempt to set the quorum of an Agoran Decision to less than 2,
>   it is set to 2 instead.
> }}}
>
> Amend rule 955 by replacing the text:
> {{{
>   - If there is more than one option, and the number of valid
> ballots is less than quorum, the outcome is instead FAILED
> QUORUM.
> }}}
> with:
> {{{
>   - If there is more than one option, and the number of valid
> ballots is less than the quorum of that decision, the outcome
> is instead FAILED QUORUM.
> }}}
> 
>
> I pend these two proposals using the mechanism in the rule "Reward and
> Delay".
>
> --
> ais523