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PRESS CONFERENCE WITH STATE DUMA COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE VICE CHAIR ALEXEI ARBATOV ON US-RF RELATIONS [RIA NOVOSTI NEWS AGENCY, 11:05, SEPTEMBER 18, 2001] SOURCE: FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (http://www.fednews.ru/) Moderator: Good morning. Alexei Georgiyevich Arbatov needs no introductions. He is a leading specialist on Russian-American relations. And because of the good turnout we foresee a lot of questions Alexei Georgiyevich will make a brief introduction before we go into questions and answers. The topic is the prospects of Russian-American relations in the light of the recent tragic events. Arbatov: Thank you for coming. I understand that in the light of what has happened it is a hectic time for all the journalists. A lot of interviews are being given. So, it is very flattering that you have found time to come here this morning. In the sea of words, forecasts and assessments in Russia and abroad I would like to draw your attention to one area that has not received its due share of attention. It seems to me that the plans of the United States regarding what to do are more or less predictable. The strategy is clear. Of course, the technical details and the tactical details are still unclear. These are secret decisions that are being made at the Pentagon and the National Security Council. But the overall strategy is more or less clear. Likewise, there is more clarity in the Russian position. There is a consensus among the Russian political classes as to what Russia's attitude should be. At least the government rhetoric leaves little room for doubt. But there is one other thing that is getting very little attention. There is no doubt that the barbaric operation in New York and Washington was carefully planned and took a long time to prepare. Naturally, those who prepared it knew that the United States would respond in a robust way, using the most modern weapons excluding perhaps, mass destruction weapons. It stands to reason that these people have given careful thought to the next phase of the operation. They could not have confined themselves to planning just the first series of terrorist acts. Most definitely they have prepared another series of acts. And they have stand-by plans for a series of actions in response to the American strikes. And in line with the logic of escalation these actions should be even more horrible than those carried out at the first phase as an unprecedented provocation with regard to the United States aimed at provoking the United States to some tough actions. I am not sure whether Washington and Moscow are giving enough thought to this. Is the United States prepared well enough, not for air-lifting troops to Southern Asia, but to ensuring its own security and that of its allies at least against the next stage of the escalation which, I suspect, has been prepared by those who have conceived of this diabolical operation which reveals the highest degree of such diabolical skills. Because it is only now that all the aspects of this horrible tragedy are being revealed to us, the aspects that were planned well in advance. And the response of the terrorists to the strike of the United States is what worries me much more than the immediate actions that the US may launch in the region and the immediate position of the Russian leadership. I would like to end my introductory remarks there and I am ready to discuss with you the questions that you care to raise. Q: El Pais. What are the most probable Russian actions in this context? At least elements of these actions. And what are the possible targets of terrorists in Russia? Arbatov: The consensus in Russia, as I see it, is as follows. Total moral support of the United States. That's the first point. Political support of American determination to make the struggle against international terrorism the top priority of American national security policy. That's the second element. And the third element is an appeal to the United States not to resort to massive strikes, to non-selective actions which are unjustified from the moral point of view -- to avenge the death of thousands of innocent people with the death of tens of thousands of other innocent people is wrong, it is immoral. This is what we said when NATO was bombing Yugoslavia. We said that to take revenge for the death of innocent people in Kosovo by killing innocent people in Belgrade and other places was immoral. It's the same here -- the actions should be selective and precisely targeted, they should target the people immediately involved in the preparation and execution of this horrible plan. It should also be targeted at those who may not have been involved directly, but are obviously linked to the network of international terrorism. As for Russian participation in this, there is some lack of unity in the top echelons. It shows that the lack of coordination that had reached a high degree under Yeltsin has not been overcome, but nevertheless the consensus is that Russia will not take part in American military actions at least not until the United States officially asks Russia to contribute and promises Russia that in this case the United States will not take unilateral actions, that is, the actions of the United States will be agreed with Russia. Since Russia makes available its bases and air fields and perhaps even some technical means the United States will in turn have to agree its actions with Russia. And Russia will insist that these actions should be effective and selective and not just symbolic and token. I would also add one other thing which I do not see in the official Russian position. Namely, if Russia becomes directly involved in these operations, Russia should get guarantees of its own security from the United States because Russia is far more vulnerable to terrorist strikes than the United States because of geographic, political, economic and other reasons. If Russia joins the US and becomes a target for terrorists, no matter what forms their activities take, then Russia will have every right to seek US obligation to ensure its security. Otherwise these relations will not work. If for example, in reply for Russia's agreement to participate in US operations, a massive attack is launched against our 201st Division in Tajikistan or our border troops, we will demand that the US give us direct military support. Q: Article 5. Arbatov: Basically, we will have to develop allied relations in one form or another, at least for the duration of the separation, that will require both countries to assume reciprocal obligations to ensure each other's security. Nothing like this has so far been offered to Russia by the United States. The US expects support from Russia but thinks that this support should have the form of carte blanche. In other words, the US will decide what it should do, and Russia will have to automatically give it every support. I am afraid that such relations will not develop between our countries. If the US sticks to this position, Russia will provide moral support and big political support, but nothing else that goes beyond this framework. Q: CNN. Last year Russia threatened to take its own military action against the Taliban. However, it decided against it. But if Russia has once threatened to do this, why can't it participate now, since they have done it and are threatening now? Arbatov: Gil, there is strong logic in your question. The difference is that back then Russia threatened to take this action in response to very close ties between the Taliban and the armed opposition in Chechnya and the North Caucasus in general. So, Russia, seeking to reduce this support, directed its threats against the Taliban. The Taliban responded to these threats the same way it is responding now to the US threats, that if something happens, they will take such action against Russia that will cause it a lot of damage. I understand that Russia has drifted away from this position very quickly. You may remember that in the West, including the US, the reaction to these statements was quite negative. At that time the US and the West did not support Russia's threats, although Russia did not demand any help from the West. But the West gave Russia neither moral nor political support. If we call things by their proper names, I assume that Russia simply fears, or to use professional language, worries about a response from the Taliban that may cause a lot of trouble and damage to Russian citizens, facilities and enterprises in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, as well as in Russia itself. We are simply not ready to open the second front. We are quite busy with Chechnya and everything related to it. You have seen the latest events. According to our leadership, the war is over but fighting is going on there. Russia was not prepared to open the second front against the Taliban at that time, and it fears to do it now. This explains the big conditions I have mentioned above, on which Russia could join the US in practical measures against terrorists. We have to understand that anti-terrorist actions, if we leave out law enforcement agencies and special services, mean actions against a certain country because the armed forces cannot act against some abstract organizations or safe houses. Armed forces always act against a certain country on the territory of which there are certain targets that may be hit. In this connection, it is not incidental that the US position changed at lightning speed in a matter of days from threats to international terrorism and bin Laden to threats to the Taliban, because the Taliban, no matter what you think about them, and I personally think very badly of them, irrespective of these assessments, the Taliban is something at which military strikes may be directed. But terrorists, that's where arrests may be made, but not strikes delivered. So, Russia finds itself in a very difficult situation because Afghanistan is a very unstable neighbor. Its instability spills into Central Asia and the Caucasus. Of course, it's not an agreement that has been reached but may be some sort of unofficial modus vivendi with the Taliban: as long as the Taliban do not act directly against Russia in Central Asia, do not cross into Tajikistan, do not attack our border guards and the 201st Division, do not carry out terrorist acts in Russia itself and limit themselves only to cooperation with Maskhadov's armed rebels, Russia will not deliver strikes on the Taliban. What happened in the past week, puts everything upside down and makes Russia face a very difficult choice. This explains why Russia does not rule out its practical participation in the US operation at the military level -- unlike some of our high-ranking officials in the Defense Ministry, I cannot rule out Russia's participation in these operations and the provision by Russia of not only information but some of its material resources as well. However, if this happened, this would be conditioned on very serious terms. Q: Are these terms being negotiated now? Do you know if there is any discussion of the terms on which Russia could participate in some military action against Afghanistan? And my second question. Much can be gained and much can be lost in the situation. The scenario you have described leads to Russia's admission to NATO.Is this possible? Arbatov: As for negotiations on terms, I hope yes. The visit by Under Secretary of State Bolton will apparently be devoted to a preliminary discussion of these possible terms. It would be strange if this was not discussed. To ensure the success of the US operation against the Taliban -- let's put it this way - in Afghanistan, its effectiveness will largely depend on the position of Russia, both directly through its participation and indirectly through Russia's influence on such neighboring countries as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Iran. In this sense, it would be strange if no such negotiations were conducted. As for NATO, it's a much broader and long-term question. If the US reaches an agreement with its allies or decides to transform NATO into an international organization to fight international terrorism -- NATO has been looking for a new purpose all these years and could not find it. So, if it finds this purpose finally, which will presuppose a radical transformation of NATO in all respects, then Russia's direct membership in such organization could be considered. Actually, it will be even strange if Russia, which is most vulnerable of all major countries to international terrorism, stayed away from such an organization. Q: So, you think that the US will strike back anyway, be it a massive or pinpoint strike, even if bin Laden were extradited to the US by the Taliban, which I think is quite unlikely. Arbatov: Some inconclusive reports were heard to the effect that there may be handover, that something along these lines may happen. But I don't think that the issue can be closed, in substance or from the political point of view, by the handover of bin Laden. The handover of one person and the start of investigation into the case of bin Laden is disproportionate to the events that changed the entire international situation, namely, the enormous tragedies. I think strikes will be delivered in any case if only because the extradition of bin Laden does not solve the issue. In place of one bin Laden there will come ten bin Ladens. And without liquidating the infrastructure of international terrorism, at least starting from the territory of Afghanistan, this issue cannot be solved. Imagine that bin Laden is extradited. They will then start hijacking planes, killing people, taking hostages demanding that bin Laden be released. It will mark a new phase of this terrible saga. So, strikes will be delivered in any case. How do I see the strategy of the United States? It will not be a one-off action as in the case of Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the explosions of American embassies. Most probably it will be a prolonged campaign of strikes not only on terrorist targets in Afghanistan, but also on the Taliban forces and targets. Such a campaign can be fairly effective because the terrain favors air raids on ammunition dumps and bases and after several months of such a campaign the Taliban may emerge greatly weakened and may switch to guerrilla warfare. Then the Northern Alliance will gain a huge advantage over them. If they manage to find a replacement for Ahmad Shah Massood, the Northern Alliance may regain all or the largest part of the territory of Afghanistan and take it under control. Simultaneously, pressure in Pakistan cuts the Taliban off from supplies across the Pakistani border and from weapons and from the training camps where Pakistani and other instructors were training the Taliban and deprives the Taliban of air support. It is no secret that the Taliban fought the Northern Alliance enjoying air support of the Pakistani air force. This is one reason why such actions were by and large so successful. The Taliban will be deprived of much of what they had before and will most probably suffer a defeat. But of course it is a very risky thing to make forecasts for that part of the world. But given a favorable attitude on the part of Iran and stepped-up actions of the Northern Alliance the Taliban can be defeated. Moderator: According to our chiefs of security services, they have repeatedly warned the Americans and their Western allies about the terrorist acts that were being planned. But they said that the Americans took these warnings lightly. You know the Americans well. How do you account for such reaction? Is it due to the American character or mistrust of the information coming from our special services? Arbatov: It's both. It's partly due to arrogance and confidence of its superior force and invulnerability. But it is on the other hand common practice because a lot of diverse information keeps flowing in, including warnings about actions being prepared. And, like in the fable about crying wolf, people gradually get used to such false alarms and when it happens in reality people turn out to be unprepared. Think about history when for decades there were numerous warnings about an imminent attack and eventually when the attack came it caught even large states by surprise. Q: Regarding ABM and all this debate, Russia says that the developments will take the edge off this discussion. And there is some talk of this in the United States already. And the people I have talked to say that on the contrary, that desire of the United States will be strengthened because the Americans are thinking about any ways of defending their country. What do you think about this argument? Arbatov: Well, attention is now focused on other things. But very soon the question will back on the agenda and I think support for NMD will grow in the United States, although it has been broad enough anyway. Why? First, one cannot be sure that terrorists will not acquire some missiles which can inflict terrible damage even without the use of mass destruction weapons as the use of hijacked planes has demonstrated. But this is not the most important factory. More important is the fact that the strikes on terrorists if they persist in their actions will be aimed at certain countries which harbor terrorists and give them support. And there is more probability that these countries have ballistic missiles, including missiles carrying mass destruction weapons. In that case these countries which possess such weapons will have acquired a deterrent potential in relations with the United States. In order to reserve the right to deliver retaliation strikes the United States will need an anti-missile defense system that could neutralize the threat from a small quantity of ballistic missiles that may fall into the hands of countries which offer their territories for the actions of terrorists. Previously this was not an obvious scenario. The options discussed spoke about a direct clash. For example, Iraq once again attacks Kuwait or Saudi Arabia and the United States steps in and it needs it anti-missile defense to counter the missiles that Iraq may have. Now the link is a little more complicated. It is now focussed on the struggle against international terrorism. Nevertheless, ballistic missiles are part of the equation and accordingly, anti-missile defense. The only difference is as follows. Up until now everyone assumed that citing rogue states as a justification for anti-missile defense was a pretext and not the real goal of the NMD program. In the foreseeable future the real target of the NMD program is China and the Chinese strategic forces and it is against them that the United States is trying to protect itself. And subsequently it may also be against Russia if the program acquires a great scale and proves to be technically effective and Russia continues unilateral reductions of its strategic forces. Now it seems to me that this program will be targeted mainly not against China or Russia, but against rogue states or any countries that may give support to international terrorism and simultaneously have its missile programs and mass destruction weapons programs. Q: Can Russia help by sharing its experience of the war in Afghanistan, its knowledge in the terrain? Arbatov: Definitely so. In such cases I should say that negative experience may be more useful than positive experience. And the experience of Russian failures and setbacks in Afghanistan could be invaluable to the US in planning its operation, maybe even more so than the experience of success, the knowledge of terrain, connections with various groups in Afghanistan, or intelligence. As a minimum, Russia's experience in Afghanistan already has big influence on the US because the US is not planning, and I am convinced that it will never plan, a deployment of a large contingent of ground forces there in order to occupy and hold the territory of Afghanistan. So, the experience of the Soviet Union is already playing a big role for the US. If it is planning to use some other armed forces and fighting services besides aircraft and missiles, it will most likely be one-time special operations, perhaps, involving paratroopers or crack units, but anyway, these operations will pursue very specific goals and evacuation rather than to seize and hold certain facilities. Q: Some Russian politicians have put Georgia on the list of pariah states that harbor terrorists. Not so long ago Nemtsov and Shuster said that Georgia harbors terrorists and does not extradite them, and if it does not extradite them, Russia can act on this territory as it sees fit, cross the border and destroy them or something like that. The Taliban has been asked to extradite bin Laden or somebody else, Georgia has been asked to extradite Gelayev or I don't know who else they mean. If the Taliban does not extradite bin Laden, America will bomb Afghanistan, and if Georgia does not extradite Gelayev, so Russia will bomb Georgia, or how should we understand this, in your view? Arbatov: We made and make complaints about the Georgian leadership regarding what is happening in Georgia, particularly in the Pankisi Gorge. I have recently visited these places myself, actually last May, and there are camps and bases there where militants who are fighting in Chechnya can rest. But I think that such statements -- First of all, it's formal logic that can never be used in international relations. There are no such rules. Second, these are musings, but not an official position of Russia. I do not even allow a thought that Russia can deliver strikes on Georgia just because the US will be distracted by its operations in Afghanistan. As for the pressure on Georgia, yes, it may increase. But we should understand that Georgia's position regarding what is happening in the region is underlain by two things. First, Georgia can't do anything about this because it has no sufficient resources. And this is quite explainable. If the Russian army has so far been unable to stabilize Chechnya, what can we expect from the Georgian army, which is much weaker, in these hard-to-access mountainous areas? Second, Georgia is not eager to open another front in the North as it already has Abkhazia and South Ossetia. By the way, we know that Georgia is very displeased with Russia's position with regard to these unresolved conflicts, especially in Abkhazia. So, Georgia has its own reasons for being dissatisfied. So, it would be wrong to draw such an analogy. Secondly, it's very unlikely. Moderator: Any more questions? If there are no more questions, let's ... Arbatov: Many people but few questions. Moderator: Apparently, you have explained everything very clearly. Thank you very much. ------------------------------------------------- This Discussion List is the follow-up for the old stopnato @listbot.com that has been shut down ==^================================================================ EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.a9spWA Or send an email To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] This email was sent to: archive@jab.org T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail! http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register ==^================================================================
