Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread Robin Hanson

Bryan Caplan wrote:
  Yes, I think: people are basically afraid of someone taking their kids,
  and people are not in fact very comfortable with trans-racial adoption.

But when people hear about kids being sent back to abusive natural
parents, do they really say/think It's unfortunate, but on average it's
better?  I doubt many people have that reaction.

As for trans-racial adoption, many people wouldn't want to do it
themselves, but how many actually want to prevent other people from
doing it?

Yes, I'd say most people think protecting natural parents is better on
average, and that many people want to prevent trans-racial adoption.

Robin Hanson  [EMAIL PROTECTED]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323



Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread Bryan Caplan

Fred Foldvary wrote:
 
 --- Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 
  I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations.  Simple
  reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are
  in fact *popular*.  Adoption laws seem like a case where existing
  policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count.
 
 Cato's Policy Analysis 420 (Dec 12, 2001) studied voter initiatives and
 found that tax-and-expediture limitations passed by voters are more
 restrictive than such legislation by representatives, and they cause
 per-capita state spending to decrease.  At least in this respect, the
 interests of the voters do not seem to coincide with the legislation by the
 reps.

There is a huge and probably higher quality academic literature on this
point.  John Matsusaka for example finds that the effect of initiatives
is pro-government before 1950 and anti-government after, or something to
that effect.

 Also, it does not seem to me that if they knew about it, most voters would
 approve of agriculture subsidies and price supports.  Why would the median
 voter want a higher price for sugar and subsidies for the owners of sugar
 beet farms?

When I was a kid I remember my mom explaining why farm programs were a
good idea while she was buying produce.  I haven't seen polls on this
exact point, but I strongly suspect a majority wants what we have. 
Why?  They're interventionists across the board, why would they be any
different here?

-- 
Prof. Bryan Caplan
   Department of Economics  George Mason University
http://www.bcaplan.com  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the
   true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to 
   enlighten and uplift him.  But no sooner had he thought out what he 
   should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei, 
   with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings, 
   and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule 
   what he cherished and held sacred. 
   Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*



Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread fabio guillermo rojas


You are misinterpreting the function of these little issues.
Little issues don't build up. Little issues tend to be signals to
certain constituencies. For example, nobody has ever lost the vote due to
rap music, but Clinton in 1992 signalled to many in the democratic party
that he wouldn't be held hostage by the Civil Rights wing of the party by
bashing rap star Queen Latifah. It's a low cost signal. Nobody will really
care if you bash a rap musician. Same for the community investment
act (I forget what this even is). I'd guess that few people
are explicitely against it, and it's a cheap way to signal to 
political moderates that urban issues won't be forgotten by
either Gore or Bush.

Consider a similar move for adaoption law. Unlike rap, adoption workers
are considered experts in their field. They could bash you on the talk
shows. A politician who goes for adoption law as an issue might get
smeared as someone breaking up black families. How do you counter
that? Well, you could argue that having any parents is better than no
parents, but then you'd get into an emotional, difficult argument with
people who think that children get unintentially hurt by different
ethnicity parents, and that adoptions are moves by wealthy whites to steal
kids from blacks in financial straits. Basically, like most family issues,
it's messy and emotional issue that probably wouldn't yeild easy points
for a politician.

Fabio

 But politicians spend a lot of energy working on issues that no one has
 ever lost an election on.  To take one tiny example, both Bush and Gore
 made a loud point about their support for the Community Reinvestment
 Act.  Who votes on that?  The logic, I presume, is that positions on a
 lot of little issues add up.  And it isn't the absolute size of the
 issue, but the size relative to the effort that counts.
 Prof. Bryan Caplan




Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread James Haney

I suspect interracial adoption may have an asymmetry in the intensity of
public opinion.  Those of us who feel that interracial adoption is no big
deal are probably less passionate than those who are troubled by it.

James




Re: Little Issues Building Up

2002-01-08 Thread James Haney



fabio guillermo rojas wrote:

 You are misinterpreting the function of these little issues.
 Little issues don't build up. Little issues tend to be signals to
 certain constituencies.

Well, the Contract with America was a set of 10 proposals, each supported by
something like 70 percent of voters (at the time and for a significant period
of time before 1994) that the Democrats refused to enact.  I would say that
it is often the case that when a new party comes to power after a long period
of opposition, there are usually quite a lot of popular reforms that they can
enact that have built up over time.

James




RE: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread jsamples

Bryan,

Why probably?

John Samples
Cato Institute

-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of
Bryan Caplan
Sent: Tuesday, January 08, 2002 11:44 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law


Fred Foldvary wrote:

 --- Bryan Caplan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

  I'm highly dissatisfied with interest group explanations.  Simple
  reason: Most of the policies traditionally blamed on interest groups are
  in fact *popular*.  Adoption laws seem like a case where existing
  policies are not popular, though perhaps I'm wrong on that count.

 Cato's Policy Analysis 420 (Dec 12, 2001) studied voter initiatives and
 found that tax-and-expediture limitations passed by voters are more
 restrictive than such legislation by representatives, and they cause
 per-capita state spending to decrease.  At least in this respect, the
 interests of the voters do not seem to coincide with the legislation by
the
 reps.

There is a huge and probably higher quality academic literature on this
point.  John Matsusaka for example finds that the effect of initiatives
is pro-government before 1950 and anti-government after, or something to
that effect.

 Also, it does not seem to me that if they knew about it, most voters would
 approve of agriculture subsidies and price supports.  Why would the median
 voter want a higher price for sugar and subsidies for the owners of sugar
 beet farms?

When I was a kid I remember my mom explaining why farm programs were a
good idea while she was buying produce.  I haven't seen polls on this
exact point, but I strongly suspect a majority wants what we have.
Why?  They're interventionists across the board, why would they be any
different here?

--
Prof. Bryan Caplan
   Department of Economics  George Mason University
http://www.bcaplan.com  [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  He was thinking that Prince Andrei was in error and did not see the
   true light, and that he, Pierre, ought to come to his aid, to
   enlighten and uplift him.  But no sooner had he thought out what he
   should say and how to say it than he foresaw that Prince Andrei,
   with one word, a single argument, would discredit all his teachings,
   and he was afraid to begin, afraid to expose to possible ridicule
   what he cherished and held sacred.
   Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*




Re: The Median Voter Theorem and Adoption Law

2002-01-08 Thread fabio guillermo rojas


Build-up has two meanings in this context. 1)Politicians could
send a series of signals to win small groups of voters. 2) Politicians
could send a series of signals to large group of voters who need
repeated re-assurances that the politician really means what he
says. Ie, build up of votes vs. build up of perception. My claim is that
the adoption of campaign issues a) does not build up the # of  votes
because the class of people for whom this is the most pressing issue is
small and b) if you try to build up perception on the adoption issue,
there is a very good chance you will get whacked because adoption workers
can easily mobilize to change public opinion, since they are recognized
experts on adoption.

 And the point of sending that low cost signal is to ... get more votes! 
 And if you send a lot of them, that adds up.  

  care if you bash a rap musician. Same for the community investment
  act (I forget what this even is). I'd guess that few people
  are explicitely against it, and it's a cheap way to signal to
  political moderates that urban issues won't be forgotten by
  either Gore or Bush.
 
 So do the political moderates care or not?!

A little. You claim Gore/Bush made a big deal over the Community act,
although I see very little compared to other issues. I think they could
care less.
  
 Translation: Pre-public debate, the median voter wants a different
 policy; post-public debate, the median voter will want the status quo? 
 That's an interesting story, but it's different from your earlier ones.
 Prof. Bryan Caplan

Incorrect interpretation of what I said. My claim was that adoption
workers are well established authorities over adoption, thus it requires
effort to combat them. I also claimed that because they are well
established experts, they can smear politicians, imposing high costs
over them. They change the terms of the debate from does the child
have a home? to are we breaking up black families and damaging
the child's identity? 

This is NOT a claim about changing preferences, it's a claim that  
adoption workers are quite able to change the terms of the debate.

I know economists are genetically incapable of understanding the role
that rhetoric plays in politics, but adoption is a great example.
If you ask a voter if a black orphans should have white parents when
there aren't enough black parenets, they'd say yes. If you ask a voter
whether black orphan's personality be messed up because his white
parents can't relate to him, then many will say no.

A lot of politics is jockeying for the median voter, but remember 
that the median voter is defined by preferences defined over a set
of issues. But of course, you can always try to argue with what the
choices are, and that's what I'm talking about.

Fabio