Re: Nobels
I'd be curious to know where the researchers were when they actually did the work for which they won the prize. For example, Smith was at Purdue when he began doing experiments in experimental economics. http://reason.com/hod/fe.ml.smith.shtml > > > >>I think Harsanyi is still at Berkeley. Also, I think Friedman is now at >>Stanford. - - Bill >> >> > >The Nobel site lists Harsanyi as having passed on in 2000. You're right >about Friedman though -- he's currently at Hoover. Updated list below. > >Eric > >Chicago: 5 Coase, Becker, Fogel, Lucas, Heckman > >Stanford: 4Scholes, Spence, Arrow, Friedman > >Berkeley: 3Debreu, McFadden, Akerlof > >MIT: 3 Samuelson, Modigliani, Solow > >George Mason: 2Buchanan, Smith > >Princeton: 2Nash, Kahneman > >Cambridge:2Sen, Mirrlees > >Columbia: 2Mundell, Stiglitz > >Baruch, CUNY: 1Markowitz > >Harvard Business School: 1 Merton > >Washington, St. Louis: 1 North > >Penn: 1Klein > > >> >> >> >> >> > > > > >
Re: (book review)The Case against Government Science
I was given to the impression that one of the benefits of gov't funded science was that it creates separating equilibria such that the okay, but not ground breaking, scientists don't muck-up the works at ground breaking institutions by misrepresenting themselves and getting hired. That the expense of cushy jobs for okay scientists was more than offset by the gains from getting only the best scientists to go to Bell Labs, or MIT, or wherever. The review didn't seem to indicate that that was addressed. -jsh --- Alypius Skinner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/pinc/apr2000/books/ff_govscience.html > > The Case against Government Science > The Economic Laws of Scientific Research > Terence Kealey > St. Martin's, New York, 1997 > 382 pp, paper ISBN 0-312-17306-7 > Reviewed by Frank Forman > > > Ayn Rand dramatized the case against government > funding of science in Atlas Shrugged, but a > dramatization is not evidence. The problem is that, > according to standard economic theory, research is > almost a perfect example of a "pure public good," a > good that once produced can be consumed by all > without any possibility of exclusion by way of > property-rights delimitation. Such goods will be > underproduced in the market, since the producers can > capture only the benefits of the research that they > themselves use. Rational citizens, all of them, > might very well empower the state to provide for the > provision of research and other public goods. Not > every citizen would actually benefit from each good > so provided, but under a well-designed constitution, > each citizen would presumably be better off as a > result of constitutionally limited state provision > of public goods than without it. This would mean > unanimity of agreement-a social contract-and hence > no initiation of force. > > But what about government funding of science? Nearly > every scientific paper, it is true, seems to > conclude with an appeal for funds for "further > research," but even so the case for public funding > is accepted by nearly everyone except a few > ideological extremists. Along comes a bombshell of a > book by Terence Kealey, The Economic Laws of > Scientific Research, that argues that government > funding of science at best displaces private funding > and in fact diverts research into less productive > channels. I am surprised that this book has not > gotten much more attention from the free-market > community. > > The book is essentially a history of science and its > funding, with the number of pages per century > increasing up to the present. The author argues that > technology drives science, even basic science, just > as much as the reverse, which is awfully reminiscent > of John Galt and his motor. Kealey describes the > work of several engineers and other practical men > turned scientists, such as Carnot, Torricelli, > Joule, Pasteur, and Mendel. He argues that most new > technology comes from old technology. The book is > highly instructive on matters of history and greatly > entertaining to read. To wit: > > "Laissez-faire works. The historical (and > contemporary) evidence is compelling: the freer the > markets and the lower the taxes, the richer the > country grows. But laissez-faire fails to satisfy > certain human needs. It fails the politician, who > craves for power; it fails the socialist, who craves > to impose equality on others; it fails the > businessman, who craves for security; and it fails > the anally fixated, who craves for order. It also > fails the idle, the greedy, and the sluttish, who > crave for a political system that allows them to > acquire others' wealth under the due process of law. > This dreadful collection of inadequates, therefore, > will coalesce on dirigisme, high taxes and a strong > state" (p. 260). > > Here are the three Laws of Funding for Civil R&D, > based upon comparing different countries and across > time: > > 1.. "The percentage of national GDP spent > increases with national GDP per capita. > 2.. "Public and private funding displace each > other. > 3.. "Public and private displacements are not > equal: public funds displace more than they do > themselves provide" (p. 245). > But it is not just the funds that are displaced; so > is their effectiveness, as a rule, from projects > that have a promise to become useful to those that > only keep scientists busy. Furthermore, many wealthy > men generously fund science and are free to choose > genuine innovators and not those merely expert in > filling out grant applications. Kealey describes > many gentleman amateurs, the greatest being Darwin. > And he compares the quality of private and public > medical research in England during this century in > detail, with the advantage going to the former. > > Kealey also notes that businesses have to fund their > own science departments even if they would rather > let other businesses perform the research and > fre
RE: estimating "defense" demand curve
Actually, my hope is to make it an individually-based subscription service. On that account, The Woodlands Community Service Corporation owns lots of property in The Woodlands (parks, pathways, pools, tennis courts, etc.). That would be a worthwhile contract to pursue. Also, if I have good market penetration with residences and a reasonable contract for the parks and pathways, there will be more pressure (as there already is) to privatize the roads in The Woodlands. Extending authority to roads will allow for even better production of defense. My own little ancap paradise? Maybe... Gil Guillory, P.E. Process Design and Project Engineering KBR, KT-3131B email [EMAIL PROTECTED] phone 713-753-2724(w) or 281-362-8061(h) or 281-620-6995(m) fax 713-753-3508 or 713-753-5353 > -Original Message- > From: Fred Foldvary [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 3:24 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: estimating "defense" demand curve > > > Gil, > Would the Woodlands association finance the patrol part as a > community-wide service? You could then sell the insurance > individually. Fred > > --- Gil Guillory <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > As some of you may know, I am writing a business plan for a > patrol and > > restitution company in my hometown, The Woodlands, Texas > > = > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > smime.p7s Description: application/pkcs7-signature
Re: (book review)The Case against Government Science
Gosh, I guess Canada is in a very bad way according to this author. Shirley - Original Message - From: Alypius Skinner To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, October 10, 2002 11:36 AM Subject: (book review)The Case against Government Science http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/pinc/apr2000/books/ff_govscience.html The Case against Government ScienceThe Economic Laws of Scientific ResearchTerence KealeySt. Martin's, New York, 1997382 pp, paper ISBN 0-312-17306-7 Reviewed by Frank Forman Ayn Rand dramatized the case against government funding of science in Atlas Shrugged, but a dramatization is not evidence. The problem is that, according to standard economic theory, research is almost a perfect example of a "pure public good," a good that once produced can be consumed by all without any possibility of exclusion by way of property-rights delimitation. Such goods will be underproduced in the market, since the producers can capture only the benefits of the research that they themselves use. Rational citizens, all of them, might very well empower the state to provide for the provision of research and other public goods. Not every citizen would actually benefit from each good so provided, but under a well-designed constitution, each citizen would presumably be better off as a result of constitutionally limited state provision of public goods than without it. This would mean unanimity of agreement-a social contract-and hence no initiation of force. But what about government funding of science? Nearly every scientific paper, it is true, seems to conclude with an appeal for funds for "further research," but even so the case for public funding is accepted by nearly everyone except a few ideological extremists. Along comes a bombshell of a book by Terence Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, that argues that government funding of science at best displaces private funding and in fact diverts research into less productive channels. I am surprised that this book has not gotten much more attention from the free-market community. The book is essentially a history of science and its funding, with the number of pages per century increasing up to the present. The author argues that technology drives science, even basic science, just as much as the reverse, which is awfully reminiscent of John Galt and his motor. Kealey describes the work of several engineers and other practical men turned scientists, such as Carnot, Torricelli, Joule, Pasteur, and Mendel. He argues that most new technology comes from old technology. The book is highly instructive on matters of history and greatly entertaining to read. To wit: "Laissez-faire works. The historical (and contemporary) evidence is compelling: the freer the markets and the lower the taxes, the richer the country grows. But laissez-faire fails to satisfy certain human needs. It fails the politician, who craves for power; it fails the socialist, who craves to impose equality on others; it fails the businessman, who craves for security; and it fails the anally fixated, who craves for order. It also fails the idle, the greedy, and the sluttish, who crave for a political system that allows them to acquire others' wealth under the due process of law. This dreadful collection of inadequates, therefore, will coalesce on dirigisme, high taxes and a strong state" (p. 260). Here are the three Laws of Funding for Civil R&D, based upon comparing different countries and across time: "The percentage of national GDP spent increases with national GDP per capita. "Public and private funding displace each other. "Public and private displacements are not equal: public funds displace more than they do themselves provide" (p. 245). But it is not just the funds that are displaced; so is their effectiveness, as a rule, from projects that have a promise to become useful to those that only keep scientists busy. Furthermore, many wealthy men generously fund science and are free to choose genuine innovators and not those merely expert in filling out grant applications. Kealey describes many gentleman amateurs, the greatest being Darwin. And he compares the quality of private and public medical research in England during this century in detail, with the advantage going to the former. Kealey also notes that businesses have to fund their own science departments even if they would rather let other businesses perform the research and free-ride off it: it takes pretty good scientists to be able to understand what the really good ones are up to. And those that have an talent for science will demand at least a small lab as part of the perks of the job. The Economic Laws of Scientific Research belongs on a growing s
Re: estimating "defense" demand curve
Gil, Would the Woodlands association finance the patrol part as a community-wide service? You could then sell the insurance individually. Fred --- Gil Guillory <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > As some of you may know, I am writing a business plan for a patrol and > restitution company in my hometown, The Woodlands, Texas = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Nobels
Princeton econ really has 0. Kahneman is in the psych department, and Nash is a "senior research mathematician." -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] "He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not necessary that anyone but himself should understand it." Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
(book review)The Case against Government Science
http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/pinc/apr2000/books/ff_govscience.html The Case against Government ScienceThe Economic Laws of Scientific ResearchTerence KealeySt. Martin's, New York, 1997382 pp, paper ISBN 0-312-17306-7 Reviewed by Frank Forman Ayn Rand dramatized the case against government funding of science in Atlas Shrugged, but a dramatization is not evidence. The problem is that, according to standard economic theory, research is almost a perfect example of a "pure public good," a good that once produced can be consumed by all without any possibility of exclusion by way of property-rights delimitation. Such goods will be underproduced in the market, since the producers can capture only the benefits of the research that they themselves use. Rational citizens, all of them, might very well empower the state to provide for the provision of research and other public goods. Not every citizen would actually benefit from each good so provided, but under a well-designed constitution, each citizen would presumably be better off as a result of constitutionally limited state provision of public goods than without it. This would mean unanimity of agreement-a social contract-and hence no initiation of force. But what about government funding of science? Nearly every scientific paper, it is true, seems to conclude with an appeal for funds for "further research," but even so the case for public funding is accepted by nearly everyone except a few ideological extremists. Along comes a bombshell of a book by Terence Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, that argues that government funding of science at best displaces private funding and in fact diverts research into less productive channels. I am surprised that this book has not gotten much more attention from the free-market community. The book is essentially a history of science and its funding, with the number of pages per century increasing up to the present. The author argues that technology drives science, even basic science, just as much as the reverse, which is awfully reminiscent of John Galt and his motor. Kealey describes the work of several engineers and other practical men turned scientists, such as Carnot, Torricelli, Joule, Pasteur, and Mendel. He argues that most new technology comes from old technology. The book is highly instructive on matters of history and greatly entertaining to read. To wit: "Laissez-faire works. The historical (and contemporary) evidence is compelling: the freer the markets and the lower the taxes, the richer the country grows. But laissez-faire fails to satisfy certain human needs. It fails the politician, who craves for power; it fails the socialist, who craves to impose equality on others; it fails the businessman, who craves for security; and it fails the anally fixated, who craves for order. It also fails the idle, the greedy, and the sluttish, who crave for a political system that allows them to acquire others' wealth under the due process of law. This dreadful collection of inadequates, therefore, will coalesce on dirigisme, high taxes and a strong state" (p. 260). Here are the three Laws of Funding for Civil R&D, based upon comparing different countries and across time: "The percentage of national GDP spent increases with national GDP per capita. "Public and private funding displace each other. "Public and private displacements are not equal: public funds displace more than they do themselves provide" (p. 245). But it is not just the funds that are displaced; so is their effectiveness, as a rule, from projects that have a promise to become useful to those that only keep scientists busy. Furthermore, many wealthy men generously fund science and are free to choose genuine innovators and not those merely expert in filling out grant applications. Kealey describes many gentleman amateurs, the greatest being Darwin. And he compares the quality of private and public medical research in England during this century in detail, with the advantage going to the former. Kealey also notes that businesses have to fund their own science departments even if they would rather let other businesses perform the research and free-ride off it: it takes pretty good scientists to be able to understand what the really good ones are up to. And those that have an talent for science will demand at least a small lab as part of the perks of the job. The Economic Laws of Scientific Research belongs on a growing shelf of books about the general futility and perversity of government activity. The perversity is better known: we all know about Charles Murray's thesis on the perversity of poverty programs from his Losing Ground (New York: Basic Books, 1984). What is less known is the futility of attempts to increase redistribution though government. Gordon Tullock, in Economics of Income Redistribution (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhof, 1983),
Re: Nobels
On Thu, 10 Oct 2002, William Dickens wrote: > I think Harsanyi is still at Berkeley. Also, I think Friedman is now at > Stanford. - - Bill The Nobel site lists Harsanyi as having passed on in 2000. You're right about Friedman though -- he's currently at Hoover. Updated list below. Eric Chicago: 5 Coase, Becker, Fogel, Lucas, Heckman Stanford: 4 Scholes, Spence, Arrow, Friedman Berkeley: 3 Debreu, McFadden, Akerlof MIT: 3 Samuelson, Modigliani, Solow George Mason: 2 Buchanan, Smith Princeton: 2Nash, Kahneman Cambridge:2 Sen, Mirrlees Columbia: 2 Mundell, Stiglitz Baruch, CUNY: 1 Markowitz Harvard Business School: 1 Merton Washington, St. Louis: 1 North Penn: 1 Klein > > > > >
Re: Nobels
I think Harsanyi is still at Berkeley. Also, I think Friedman is now at Stanford. - - Bill William T. Dickens The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: (202) 797-6113 FAX: (202) 797-6181 E-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED] AOL IM: wtdickens >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 10/10/02 09:27AM >>> This is a rough look at which schools currently have Nobel prize winners on faculty. Do I have any of these wrong? Any additions that need to be made? If this is right, then GMU ties for the 5th highest number of Nobel winners. Eric -- Chicago: 6 Friedman, Coase, Becker, Fogel, Lucas, Heckman Berkeley: 3 Debreu, McFadden, Akerlof MIT: 3 Samuelson, Modigliani, Solow Stanford: 3 Scholes, Spence, Arrow George Mason: 2 Buchanan, Smith Princeton: 2Nash, Kahneman Cambridge:2 Sen, Mirrlees Columbia: 2 Mundell, Stiglitz Baruch, CUNY: 1 Markowitz Harvard Business School: 1 Merton Washington, St. Louis: 1 North Penn: 1 Klein
estimating "defense" demand curve
Title: estimating "defense" demand curve As some of you may know, I am writing a business plan for a patrol and restitution company in my hometown, The Woodlands, Texas, about 30 miles north of Houston. Clients will pay a subscription for patrol of their residences, including call response, and will be indemnified against criminal activity on their property. If a crime occurs, we will investigate at our expense (variable cap) and then attempt to engage the perpetrator in mediation or binding arbitration to obtain restitution to the victim and for our expenses in apprehension. A nagging problem is that no service like this exists, as far as I have found. This makes my marketing section somewhat weak. The closest service (which is well documented by Security magazine) is the home alarm market: ADT, Brinks, and all the others. Market penetration for those is really low (around 6% of homeowners), which would not be very exciting for my business. I estimate that 30% market penetration would be a comfortable level for efficient use of patrol resources. There are two related demand-curve issues. First, there is the obvious question of what market penetration will be had at base subscription rates of $10/mo to $50/mo. Current calculations show that $10/mo. is hard to make, since insurance claims alone could eat up all the profit and apprehension rates would be low, since knowledge of the neighborhood would be less. A solution, if $10/mo is near the sweet spot, is to not offer indemnification for the big stuff like murder, rape, and assault. I'd hate to do that, though, since I see that as a key differentiator. Not only would I like to find the sweet spot on the demand curve, but there is a network effect to consider. If the subscription rate in the area is very low, patrols will be spread out geographically, with lots of down time between patrolling the property of subscribers; plus, the community policing model on which they will patrol will be less cost-effective. As a result, I am considering adopting a pricing scheme that will reward network behavior. For instance, a subscriber might get 10% off his subscription if a property within 1000 feet is also subscribed. Or, we could adopt a more complex sliding-scale scheme; but I'd like to keep the deal to the consumer as simple as possible. We might also offer one-time referral bonuses. So far, the market research techniques about which I have read focus on existing markets. How does one do market research in an undeveloped market such as this? Are surveys and focus group results truly indicative of actual demand schedules? I am skeptical of their worth (especially when I look at the price I will be paying for such). Unfortunately, I can't "test market" the service. Does anyone have suggestions for estimating the demand for such services? Any other comments or suggestions would also be helpful. Thanks, Gil Guillory, P.E. Process Design and Project Engineering KBR, KT-3131B email [EMAIL PROTECTED] phone 713-753-2724(w) or 281-362-8061(h) or 281-620-6995(m) fax 713-753-3508 or 713-753-5353
Nobels
This is a rough look at which schools currently have Nobel prize winners on faculty. Do I have any of these wrong? Any additions that need to be made? If this is right, then GMU ties for the 5th highest number of Nobel winners. Eric -- Chicago: 6 Friedman, Coase, Becker, Fogel, Lucas, Heckman Berkeley: 3 Debreu, McFadden, Akerlof MIT: 3 Samuelson, Modigliani, Solow Stanford: 3 Scholes, Spence, Arrow George Mason: 2 Buchanan, Smith Princeton: 2Nash, Kahneman Cambridge:2 Sen, Mirrlees Columbia: 2 Mundell, Stiglitz Baruch, CUNY: 1 Markowitz Harvard Business School: 1 Merton Washington, St. Louis: 1 North Penn: 1 Klein
