Re: lobbying as a public goods problem
Wei wrote "Reading Jonathan Rauch's _Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working_ (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1891620495) made me wonder how special-interest lobbies solved the public goods problem." See Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Fall of Nations, both of which are about precisely this question and the implications of the answer. Alex -- Dr. Alexander Tabarrok Vice President and Director of Research The Independent Institute 100 Swan Way Oakland, CA, 94621-1428 Tel. 510-632-1366, FAX: 510-568-6040 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
lobbying as a public goods problem
Reading Jonathan Rauch's _Government's End: Why Washington Stopped Working_ (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1891620495) made me wonder how special-interest lobbies solved the public goods problem. Why does an individual contribute to a lobbying organization when he can let someone else contribute and just free-ride? The explanation that occured to me is that many special-interest organizations are like monopolies owned by their customers. They charge profit-making prices for membership (which people purchase for the membership benefits) and then use the profits to produce public goods (including lobbying) for their members. Does this explanation seem plausible? If it is correct it suggests a way to reduce the power of special interests in government: force all organizations to offer their members the option of taking the portion of their membership fee that would have gone into lobbying as a refund or discount. This can also apply to companies and their shareholders, so that each shareholder must be allowed to independently decide whether to take an extra dividend or to apply it to lobbying efforts. If most people are rational and selfish, this should substantially reduce the amount of resources organizations can devote to lobbying. Anyone think this may be a good idea? Is it desirable and/or practical?
