Re: insanity vs. irrationality
On Wed, Mar 24, 2004 at 10:54:25AM -0500, Stephen Miller wrote: I'm confused. How does one decide whether the younger version's preferences are more right than the elder's? When considering whether or not to return stolen goods to its original owner, how does one decide whether the original owner's preferences are more right than the thief's? In this case, the elder (mentally ill) version is an interloper who has stolen the younger version's body, so involuntary treatment just returns the body back to its rightful owner. Economically, this can be justified by the argument that people would be more likely to invest in the future if we reduce their risk of losing that investment to someone with radically different preferences.
Re: insanity vs. irrationality
On Mar 24, 2004, at 8:33 AM, Wei Dai wrote The paper makes the point that what psychology views as mental diseases in many cases can be interpreted simply as extreme or unusual preferences, and in those cases involuntary psychiatric treatment can not be justified as a benefit for the patient. Stephen Miller: It seems to me that a clear exception may be where there's an extreme preference to harm others. Depends on where you put the emphasis in Wei's last sentence. This might be an exception to the can not be justified part, but not an exception to the as a benefit for the patient part. In other words, in the case of a preference to harm others, involuntary treatment might be justified as a benefit to others even if it is not a benefit (i.e., is a cost) to the patient. One thing I think is missing from all this is a discussion of how these extreme preference -- or indeed, any preferences -- arise. Normally in economics we tend to take preferences as given and view the formation of preferences as outside the scope of economics. But we also normally assume preferences to be stable, when clearly they can change. Why is this relevant? Well, many psychiatric illnesses appear in previously normal people. If we are going to interpret psychiatric illnesses as extreme or unusual preferences then the onset of the illness has to be interpreted as a change in preferences. So we are necessarily dropping the usual assumption of stable preferences, and it's worth thinking about why these preferences change radically and suddenly. Likewise, for some of these illnesses there are treatments -- in other words, drugs or something that change preferences back to normal, or at least appear to move them back to normal range. Again, it is worth thinking about why these preferences change. --Robert
Re: insanity vs. irrationality
What about the person, like an alcoholic or schizophrenic, who hates his extreme preferences, as they destroy his life? Setting aside the issue of involuntary treatment for the benefit of others, as we really talking only about a case of extreme preference? David Levenstam In a message dated 3/24/04 12:22:13 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Mar 24, 2004, at 8:33 AM, Wei Dai wrote The paper makes the point that what psychology views as mental diseases in many cases can be interpreted simply as extreme or unusual preferences, and in those cases involuntary psychiatric treatment can not be justified as a benefit for the patient. Stephen Miller: It seems to me that a clear exception may be where there's an extreme preference to harm others. Depends on where you put the emphasis in Wei's last sentence. This might be an exception to the can not be justified part, but not an exception to the as a benefit for the patient part. In other words, in the case of a preference to harm others, involuntary treatment might be justified as a benefit to others even if it is not a benefit (i.e., is a cost) to the patient. One thing I think is missing from all this is a discussion of how these extreme preference -- or indeed, any preferences -- arise. Normally in economics we tend to take preferences as given and view the formation of preferences as outside the scope of economics. But we also normally assume preferences to be stable, when clearly they can change. Why is this relevant? Well, many psychiatric illnesses appear in previously normal people. If we are going to interpret psychiatric illnesses as extreme or unusual preferences then the onset of the illness has to be interpreted as a change in preferences. So we are necessarily dropping the usual assumption of stable preferences, and it's worth thinking about why these preferences change radically and suddenly. Likewise, for some of these illnesses there are treatments -- in other words, drugs or something that change preferences back to normal, or at least appear to move them back to normal range. Again, it is worth thinking about why these preferences change. --Robert
Re: insanity vs. irrationality
I can try, and hope that people will correct me where I'm wrong. Thin rationality: purposiveness; adopting means to achieve given ends. Another aspect is having *some* level of sensitivity to costs and benefits. A violation of thin rationality would be if you knew that blinking didn't change channels on your TV, yet every time you want to change channels, you try to do so by blinking, instead of, say, using the remote. Thick rationality: thin rationality plus transitivity, and by some definitions, rational expectations. Violations of thick rationality are usually what behavioral economists are always freaking out about, like being generous to strangers in a single-shot game, betting more on horse races at the end of the day, etc. Meta-rationality is something I know less about, but from reading Hanson and Cowen, I think it's something along the lines of adopting the best means to achieve your highest, or most important ends. Or choosing the ends that themselves will provide the most satisfaction... or something. As for hearing voices, Bryan's paper has a good section on that. It's not clear to me that hearing voices isn't something experienced by everyone, and the question is what voices you listen to. Steve On Mar 24, 2004, at 3:04 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: In a message dated 3/24/04 1:09:35 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I think that many people exhibit at least thin rationality while arguably not being meta-rational. Could someone please explain the difference between thick rationality, thin rationality and meta-rationiality. Referring to the schizophric, it's hard to imagine that he actually likes hearing the voices that tell him to kill people and that he merely wished to reduce the costs of his preferences.
