>
> Bullshit or not?
>
> Assumption 1: There is a trade off between welfare state spending and
> military spending.
>
> Assumption 2: The more you spend on military, the more a gov't can project
> power abroad.
>
> Assumption 3: The Median European voter prefers more welfare state than
> Americans, who prefer more military spending.
>
> Conclusion 1: Americans per capita get more military than Europeans.
> Conclusion 2: Americans per capita are more able to project their
> millitary across the globe.
> Conclusion 3: Preferences for welfare state drives the power imbalance
> between Europe and America.
>
> Fabio
>
>
Probably not "bullshit," but I think it is an oversimplification. In
addition to the points raised by the other posters, I would also add that
the conclusion seems to assume a conflict between American and "European"
foreign policy. Notwithstanding the EU, different European states can have
different national interests in foreign affairs, and probably would not
often be able to project a unified military power in foreign affairs. Thus,
one cannot often speak of a "European" foreign policy. Europe would rarely
be unified enough to match America in the projection of power.
But if Europe were a unitary state, it's geographical proximity to Africa
and much of Asia might give it an edge over America, and probably at lower
cost.
Yet more to the point, I really think Europe's preference for a welfare
state over superpower status is a minor element in our disparity of force.
Japan could easily be the world's number 2 superpower if it so desired, and
it's welfare state is smaller than ours in the US. However, both Japanese
(especially) and also European foreign policies tend to be policies of
national self-interest, and self-interest does not always require the
imperial projection of force. The Swiss would not necessarily be better off
if they sought to dominate militarily as many other countries as possible,
and we in the US are not necessarily better off either. But US foreign
policy for the last century has tended to be a messianic policy motivated
by the visionary ambitions of our foreign policy elites, and with the
necessary sacrifices of the American taxpayers and soldiers and their
families viewed as a form of noblesse oblige. Much of this messianic
foreign policy ultimately derives from the original Puritan cultural
heritage of the American northeast, which dominates the rest of the country
in semi-imperial fashion (which is why one rarely if ever hears
northeasterners talk of secession, unless of course they are speaking of
preventing some other state's or region's potential secession; nor can one
imagine any other region of America seeking to stop the northeast if it
decided to secede! Many would say, "Good riddance.").
Whether the sacrifices US citizens make for the alleged good of the world
are really appreciated or even desired by the rest of humanity is another
question. I think many of them, especially outside western Europe, tend to
feel toward the United States much the way that American Southerners feel
toward northeasterners. But most of my fellow Americans seem to have
difficulty understanding why the bulk of the human race does not appreciate
our sacrifices on their behalf. "Why do they hate us?" they ask. After
all, virtually everyone in the world would really like to be an American.
All those millions of thirdworlders aren't lined up to get into the US just
because they want to make money after all. It's because they want to share
in our superior American values and culture. But since we don't quite have
room for all of them in America, we can do the next best thing and bring
Americanism to them, like we did in Germany and Japan and are now doing in
Haiti, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. And Iraq is the next nation we aim to
liberate and modernize. That's what nation-building is all about. What
we're about to do to them is for their own good, and they should be
grateful, or at least the survivors should. After all, it is well known
that America is a benevolent nation which has nothing but the best interest
of all the world at heart. Where would the world be if we returned to being
like all those other narrow, money-grubbing countries that think of nothing
but their own welfare?
Enough sarcasm. Debating matters raised in the above paragraph is
pointless, since one's conclusions ultimately depend on one's
values--"national greatness" or national self-interest? In both American
political parties, the national greatness school has outmaneuvered and
largely banished (especially among Republicans) the national self-interest
school. But now I wish to raise some questions that can be discussed on a
practical rather than value system basis. Now that we have decided to
substitute a policy of conquest and direct control for diplomacy and
influence, for how many years, decades, or centuries will we have to occupy
these lands? What will it eventually cost us? What is our ultimate goal? To
acquire the remainder of their oil at the lowest possible prices? To
westernize them? To destroy terrorism? To end Islamicism? All of the above?
How will we know when our mission is complete? What is our exit strategy? If
the disciples of Muhammad continue to struggle against our influence for the
next 500 years, do we have both the will and the means to stay the course?
What happens if Europe is predominantly Muslim in 200 years (by which time
we will certainly be predominantly Latin American)? Will they deprive us of
their bases and cooperation? Or will we have to occupy that continent too as
a hostile power then? Will the culture of our new majority Latino population
even have an interest in pursuing a "new world order" then? If not, what is
the point of pursuing one now (since we could obtain our oil by trade with
much less risk, and since Iraq poses no credible threat to the west--in
fact, when Iraq was our client state, it was quite cooperative; it was
Bush's daddy, not Saddam, who ended that arrangement when his administration
promised to look the other way when Saddam invaded Kuwait and then
changed(?) its mind)? Baby Bush and his advisors clearly do not agree with
the old Chess adage that "the threat is stronger than the execution." Have
they unleashed a course of events which will lead to our demise as a global
power? Since the end of the cold war, we have rapidly frittered away the
world's goodwill. What have we gotten in exchange? Was it worth the trade?
Do our leaders even think in economic terms or do they think only of how to
get their own chapter in the history books? If our chief executives and
state department personnel thought more like economists, would we have a
wiser foreign policy? Do economists tend to prefer national interest over
national greatness policies? So many questions, so few answers.
~Alypius
