Re: Justification of IP message dated "Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:24:43 +0200." message dated "Tue, 25 Jul 2000 07:57:45 +0200." message dated "Wed, 26 Jul 2000 12:43:45 +0200."
"Francois-Rene Rideau <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" wrote: >I admit I'm curious what you think about the on-going flamewar > about IP on the list. Do you have opinions and meta-arguments about > our discussion? Are we ignoring some obvious argument? > Is all the fuss relevant to the list at all? If not, we can stop > (or continue via personal e-mail). I was wondering the same thing, though I would hardly call this a flame war. I would suppose that ethics are a vital underpinning to policy, but we are a bit far afield from policy per se. > > I agree with you that exclusion and first-right are different but > > not necessarily contradictory concepts. > No. My point is that they are _orthogonal_ concepts. Now, I am indeed confused. If they are orthogonal, then are they contradictory as well? Again, not necessarily, but they generate contradictory results in the ethics of intellectual property. > BTW, you can remove "first" from "first right"; > it's a natural property of exclusive objects that only the first > to have it can have a right to it (until he relinquishes it). I shall retain the "first" in "first-right" because it is conveys the notion of discovery. > > However, the basis of property rights should not be > > what is natural for the property, but that which is natural for > > people. > I'm sorry, but this sounds like hogwash to me. > The Universe is One. A is A. There are no two contradictory natural right= > s. > If you see a contradiction, check your assumptions. My statement would be contradictory if property had rights itself. > My point is that at no moment do you have to choose between these > principles. There is no contradiction. A is A. > They have independent premises (work, exclusion) > and independent consequences (right to use, exclusivity). The consequence of work is not "right to use," it is "right to control." This conflicts with the ethics generated by exclusivity when it comes to IP. > _Both_ these principles apply so as to make physical objects > _both_ owned and exclusive. Yes. > _Both_ these principles apply in making ideas _both_ owned and non-exclus= ive. Wrong. If you don't have complete control over something, you aren't owning it. > Wrong wrong wrong. A is A. The Universe is One. All points of view are va= > lid. > Public welfare _is_ a valid point of view on the world, and very relevant= > to > ethics. No. Public welfare is a point of view on the world, but it is not valid for a discussion on the rights of individuals, unless you are a collectivist. > > To consider collectivism and individualism both to be > > equally valid ethical bases is too discard a critical aspect of > > ethics -- universality. > You don't understand collectivism. Collectivism is not a point of view. > It is a _practice_, whereby decisions are taken in common. Okay, it's not a point of view -- whatever you like. As a practice, it is unjust; I want nothing to do with The Masses, if I can help it. > People may very well take collective decisions each so as to maximize > their own narrow interest, or take individual decisions each so as to > maximize their notion of public good; actually, the selection pressure > is exactly towards such kind of decision-making. Sure, but ethics are not a company goal or a team sport -- "collective decisions" to determine the rights of the individual is socio-anarchy. > They _are_ contradictory to each other, > however they are not what you believe they are. > They are about how decisions are taken, > they are not about what values are considered. If rights, and decisions on rights, are not based on values, then what are they based on? > > Exclusion is collectivist because property rights of the individual > > are based on how others are deprived; > Bar! Ever heard of "the liberty of one stops where begins the liberty > of others?" Exclusion is the very reason why material property is > exclusive. Argh. Take N: Exclusion -- Basic Idea: The extent of rights is to do as much as possible without restricting the activity of others. The distinction between positive and negative/neutral/natural rights is decided ad hoc, by a method which depends on the type of government (democracy: popular vote, republic: representative vote, monarchy: royal decree, etc.). Material Property: Say person A possesses a toaster. If person B takes the toaster, then person A can't do stuff with it anymore, including make toast. Hence, it is unethical for person B to take the toaster. Question: What if person B is strange, takes person A's toaster, but gives him an identical replacement? Is this unethical? Intellectual Property: Say person A writes a song, and sells CD. Person B borrows the CD from a friend, rips it, and returns the CD; person A receives no royalties. However, this is not unethical, because person B is in no way depriving person A, or anyone else, of the song data. First-right/value-addition -- Basic Idea: Th
Re: Justification of IP message dated "Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:24:43 +0200." message dated "Tue, 25 Jul 2000 07:57:45 +0200."
Dear Armchair economists, I admit I'm curious what you think about the on-going flamewar about IP on the list. Do you have opinions and meta-arguments about our discussion? Are we ignoring some obvious argument? Is all the fuss relevant to the list at all? If not, we can stop (or continue via personal e-mail). >: Sourav K. Mandal > I agree with you that exclusion and first-right are different but > not necessarily contradictory concepts. No. My point is that they are _orthogonal_ concepts. BTW, you can remove "first" from "first right"; it's a natural property of exclusive objects that only the first to have it can have a right to it (until he relinquishes it). > Indeed, the nature of an > apple is to be exclusive, while the nature of digital data is to be > non-exclusive. I'm glad you admit it. > However, the basis of property rights should not be > what is natural for the property, but that which is natural for > people. I'm sorry, but this sounds like hogwash to me. The Universe is One. A is A. There are no two contradictory natural rights. If you see a contradiction, check your assumptions. > In other words, property rights should be founded more upon > concepts germane to demarcating the property claims of people, than > on the physical dispostion of that which is to be claimed. These are one and the same. > This, I > believe, is best done by first-right/value-addition. > The two different principles of ownership create the same result for > physical entities, but have different results in ethics for > intellectual/abstract entities. My thesis is that first-right is a > more sound basis for property rights in general, and so should be > adhered to for intellectual property rights as well, since it > applies. You seem to have completely failed to understand my point. Beware: I don't mean "fail to agree" -- it is your right to disagree. My point is that at no moment do you have to choose between these principles. There is no contradiction. A is A. They have independent premises (work, exclusion) and independent consequences (right to use, exclusivity). _Both_ these principles apply so as to make physical objects _both_ owned and exclusive. _Both_ these principles apply in making ideas _both_ owned and non-exclusive. > On collectivism: > > While Adam Smith, Hayek and Bastiat have given us all great food for > thought, "public good" is a collectivist object, plain and simple. > While public welfare or consumer benefit are valid concepts of > result in studies like economics, they are inamicable to discussions > of ethics. Wrong wrong wrong. A is A. The Universe is One. All points of view are valid. Public welfare _is_ a valid point of view on the world, and very relevant to ethics. > To consider collectivism and individualism both to be > equally valid ethical bases is too discard a critical aspect of > ethics -- universality. You don't understand collectivism. Collectivism is not a point of view. It is a _practice_, whereby decisions are taken in common. Individualism is not a point of view. It is a _practice_, whereby decisions are taken individually. People may very well take collective decisions each so as to maximize their own narrow interest, or take individual decisions each so as to maximize their notion of public good; actually, the selection pressure is exactly towards such kind of decision-making. > As far as I can tell, in the space of > ethics, collectivism and individualism are both irreducible > principles, so there is not much to argue over. They _are_ contradictory to each other, however they are not what you believe they are. They are about how decisions are taken, they are not about what values are considered. > And this might be where we are mired. > Exclusion is a collectivist principle of ownership, > while first-right is an egoistic principle. Foo! That's pure hogwash. > Exclusion is collectivist because property rights of the individual > are based on how others are deprived; Bar! Ever heard of "the liberty of one stops where begins the liberty of others?" Exclusion is the very reason why material property is exclusive. > first-right is egoistic > because property rights for the individual are based on the > individual, with no a priori regard to others. Baz! The very notion of "first" is actually an application of the above exclusion principle, that you call "collectivist" just because it the notion of "other people" is relevant to it (and that only applies to material things). Check your assumptions! > Until our ethical > principles have converged, we cannot possibly agree on the question > of intellectual property. Indeed. I more and more think you are deeply confused, and unable to apply your own principles. Check your assumptions! BTW: your .signature appears twice in your e-mail. Yours freely, [ François-René ÐVB Rideau | Reflection&Cybernethics | http://fare.tunes.org ] [ TUNES project for a Free Reflective Computing System | http://tunes.org ] In
Re: Justification of IP message dated "Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:24:43 +0200." message dated "Tue, 25 Jul 2000 07:57:45 +0200."
To Francois-Rene: On exclusion v. first-right: I agree with you that exclusion and first-right are different but not necessarily contradictory concepts. Indeed, the nature of an apple is to be exclusive, while the nature of digital data is to be non-exclusive. However, the basis of property rights should not be what is natural for the property, but that which is natural for people. In other words, property rights should be founded more upon concepts germane to demarcating the property claims of people, than on the physical dispostion of that which is to be claimed. This, I believe, is best done by first-right/value-addition. The two different principles of ownership create the same result for physical entities, but have different results in ethics for intellectual/abstract entities. My thesis is that first-right is a more sound basis for property rights in general, and so should be adhered to for intellectual property rights as well, since it applies. On collectivism: While Adam Smith, Hayek and Bastiat have given us all great food for thought, "public good" is a collectivist object, plain and simple. While public welfare or consumer benefit are valid concepts of result in studies like economics, they are inamicable to discussions of ethics. To consider collectivism and individualism both to be equally valid ethical bases is too discard a critical aspect of ethics -- universality. As far as I can tell, in the space of ethics, collectivism and individualism are both irreducible principles, so there is not much to argue over. And this might be where we are mired. Exclusion is a collectivist principle of ownership, while first-right is an egoistic principle. Exclusion is collectivist because property rights of the individual are based on how others are deprived; first-right is egoistic because property rights for the individual are based on the individual, with no a priori regard to others. Until our ethical principles have converged, we cannot possibly agree on the question of intellectual property. Sourav Sourav K. Mandal [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.ikaran.com/Sourav.Mandal/ "In enforcing a truth we need severity rather than efflorescence of language. We must be simple, precise, terse." -- Edgar Allan Poe, "The Poetic Principle" Sourav K. Mandal [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.ikaran.com/Sourav.Mandal/ "In enforcing a truth we need severity rather than efflorescence of language. We must be simple, precise, terse." -- Edgar Allan Poe, "The Poetic Principle"
Re: Justification of IP message dated "Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:24:43 +0200."
Dear Sourav, dear Armchair Economists, I've cut through the previous argument and went directly to the summary, for everyone's benefit. >: Sourav K. Mandal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Anyway, in summary: > > We have not resolved our dichotomy on the general concept of > property, let alone IP. You continue to assert the > hoarding/exclusion principle, and I continue to assert > value-addition/first-right. If we continue our discussion, it > should be on this particular philosophical disagreement. > I think you're mistaken here, both in your own position and in your belief of what mine is. You believe that the two arguments are contradictory one from the other, that you have to choose one point of view, and that the other is wrong. But that is not. They are complementary, with independent assumptions and independent conclusions. And all different points of views on the Universe are valid, even though different, because they look at the same Universe. The Universe is One. A is A. Ownership is Ownership, independently from Exclusion. Exclusion is Exclusion, independently from Ownership. If I earn something by my work, that thing is mine to use and abuse, independently from its being exclusively mine or not. If something is exclusive in its nature, it will be exclusive in fact, whether owned by you, I, anyone else, or nobody. If I make an apple, for me to eat or give or otherwise dispose of, this ownership will be exclusive, not by the nature of ownership, but by the nature of the apple; as long as I keep it, no matter how hard you try, you won't be able to earn it at the same time. If I learn english, for me to speak or teach or otherwise make use of, this ownership will be not exclusive, not by the nature of ownership, but by the nature of the english language; you may learn it too and make use of it, not only without harming me, but even without my noticing it, thousands of miles away from me. It is as wrong to pretend that ownership is ownership+exclusion, as you do, as it would be to pretend that exclusion is ownership+exclusion, as I don't. Finally, as for your accusations of Bastiat and I being "collectivists" because we consider public good, you must also include in the lot people like Hayek and Turgot, and Adam Smith, and all other political economists who ever considered the Wealth of Nation and proved that liberty was the best political way to improve it. But once again, you are misled by a belief that points of view are exclusive. Public good is as valid a point of view as natural rights, and leads to as valid conclusions on the surrounding Universe. The Universe is One, A is A. Of course, some people have abused the public good point of view, but so have some people abused the natural rights point of view. The essence of collectivism is not in its point of view, but in its reality; it is centralized decision-making by a few for the everyone, which deprives most people from the liberty to decide how to act, and shields the chiefs from the responsibility of undergoing the consequences of their decisions. You admit that freedom of information makes for better software. This is another point of view to the same Universe. Freedom makes for better public welfare; because it doesn't infringe natural rights, and thus allows optimal use of information by society. Thus, the Economic Harmonies: the Universe is One and all the valid points of views on it coincide exactly. Yours freely, [ François-René ÐVB Rideau | Reflection&Cybernethics | http://fare.tunes.org ] [ TUNES project for a Free Reflective Computing System | http://tunes.org ] I know that most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabric of their lives." -- Tolstoy
Re: Justification of IP message dated "Mon, 24 Jul 2000 15:24:43 +0200."
WORD TO OTHER LIST SUBSCRIBERS: If you don't wish to ram through several kilobytes of argumentation, scroll to the bottom for my quickie summary on the debate. "Francois-Rene Rideau <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" wrote: > On Mon, Jul 24, 2000 at 02:58:11AM -0400, Sourav K. Mandal wrote: > > > one has the unenviable task of proving a negative > > in order to make a definition stand on its own legs. > Uh? On the contrary, one has to prove a _positive_ in > order to make a definition stand on its own legs. > That's a well-known property of definitions, as studied in proof theory. > Actually, many mathematicians are firstly interested in constructive proo= Definitions map a word or term to a concept. The reason it is negative is because you must justify that it is precisely that one concept, and no others. > Well, in as much as I accept your definition of IP as consistent, > I reject its merit as unapplicable to anything. That's why we are arguing justification. > My point is that not all "property" is justified. That is obvious. If I steal your computer, it is not my justifiable property. If a monarch provides exclusive rights to trade with India to one company, that is unjustifiable exclusivity. > Homesteading theory: the land is owned by the one who not only claims it, > but can also successfully hoard it, physically. Just saying "everything > west to the mississipi is mine" doesn't count unless you can back your > claim with facts. Again, you assert the exclusion principle; I am saying the exclusion principle is a poor standard for property rights. > >> Yeah, right. As long as you are the one holding the gun, > >> you may get away with it. As long as you also hold the media, > >> you may blank out your utter evil from the minds of most people. > >> But don't you ever put down the gun, and don't you stop your propagand= > a, > >> for the oppressed and the slaves will make you regret it! > > > > I won't dignify this with a response. > > That's funny: I do dignify IP "arguments" with a response, > even though they are the mostest insult to my mind: a gun pointed at it. Well, then I shall give you the benefit of the doubt, and hope that you were being sarcastic. You would agree that ethics has a universal component, and so as ugly as enforcement is, I would have no feelings of guilt if I could point a gun at a thief's head to safeguard my property rights. For every conceivable instance of IP theft this is overkill, but the principle of enforcement is unwavering. > Let me rephrase it, and re-quote the fragment of Bastiat that you quote b= > elow: > "Property does not exist because there are laws, > but laws exist because there is property." > IP is an artefact of law. No one can naturally hoard an idea, > but by secret (which is his own responsibility to preserve), > or violence (which he is not entitled to, but by corrupt governments). > Hence IP isn't property. I am arguing that IP is as much property as your toaster, and so Bastiat's laws are protocols of enforcement for IP. You must re-quote Bastiat *after* you have completed you argument that IP is unnatural. > >>> Ethical Justification of Property: That which itself does not have > >>> rights, can be property. > >> No. That which naturally has the property of exclusion, > >> and is yet unclaimed, can be claimed by homesteading it, > >> i.e. by being first to use the thing. > > > > I say, "can be property", you say "will be your property." Again, > > refer to the delineated argument in defense of (intellectual) > > property for the demarcations of rights here. > > > Ok, so in as much as the "right for X to do Y" can be owned, > I contend that naturally, every X owns his own right to do Y. > To confer to a given looter L the right of X to do Y for every X, > would be to deprive every X (except L) from a right that was naturally hi= > s. > If you pretend that X would have to claim his own right before L, > then I claim that the claim is implicit in the claim of Liberty. Your response is a rehash of Tucker's argument against IP. How can every X have a right to a *creative work* Y, without his mistaken notion of "potentiality?" I must have the same potentiality as Grisham (we are both Xes, after all), I could claim all his writings as mine. > Or else, I will contend that I claim your right to live in 2001, > and since you didn't make that claim before, this right is mine, > and I will withhold it from you, so you must die by December 31, 2000. > BTW, I claim everyone's right to life on tuesday July 25, 2000, > and will demand that my wishes be granted, least I withhold it from you. > Muhahahah! I'm the King of the World! Since when is breathing, eating, sleeping and defecating creative work? Oh, I forgot about that "art" exhibition in New York :-) > Ownership and exclusion are independent. > When you have both at the same time, you have Property. > When you have ownership but not exclusion, you have Kno
