I haven't seen it personally

However others are reporting it as separate investigations they have seen
the loader execute:
https://www.todyl.com/blog/post/threat-advisory-3cx-softphone-telephony-campaign
https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/3cx-desktop-app-vulnerability-security-group-contact.119930/
- Reports ESET detected it - possibly using signature / hash from S1
https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/threat-alerts-from-sentinelone-for-desktop-update-initiated-from-desktop-client.119806/post-558449
-  Cortex xdr Paloalto
https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/threat-alerts-from-sentinelone-for-desktop-update-initiated-from-desktop-client.119806/post-558708
- CrowdStrike
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-compromise-3cx-desktop-app-in-a-supply-chain-attack/
- References Sophos


I am pretty confident that if this isn't a malicious actor doing this then
3CX has performed the mother of all response tests on its customers over
the past week and should have had a better reply than silence when they
were asked about it.

Regards
Alexander

Alexander Neilson
Neilson Productions Limited

alexan...@neilson.net.nz
021 329 681
022 456 2326


On Thu, 30 Mar 2023 at 17:57, Matthew Mace <matt...@htsol.com.au> wrote:

> Can anyone definitively confirm that they’ve personally seen it get picked
> up by anything else than S1?
>
>
>
> In addition to  this anyone that has had it installed at a site and also
> run a premium DNS filtering service (Umbrella, DNS Filter etc.) and/or
> premium routers with DPI (Sonicwall, Firebox etc.), do you know if they
> picked up this traffic and stopped it? I would be hoping so.
>
>
>
> Definitely curious to know either way.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Matthew Mace*
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-boun...@lists.ausnog.net> *On Behalf Of *Nathan
> Brookfield
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 30, 2023 2:51 PM
> *To:* Christopher Hawker <ch...@thesysadmin.dev>; Greg Lipschitz <
> glipsch...@summitinternet.com.au>; Rob Thomas <xro...@gmail.com>; <
> ausnog@lists.ausnog.net> <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net>
> *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Critical 3CX Windows/Mac hack.
>
>
>
> To be fair, they likely don’t know much yet and things are probably pretty
> hectic…. Give them time, crisis management is probably only kicking in now.
>
>
>
> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-boun...@lists.ausnog.net> *On Behalf Of *Christopher
> Hawker
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 30, 2023 3:31 PM
> *To:* Greg Lipschitz <glipsch...@summitinternet.com.au>; Rob Thomas <
> xro...@gmail.com>; <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net> <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net>
> *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Critical 3CX Windows/Mac hack.
>
>
>
> It appears their sales team have no info regarding this. Just rang our
> Senior AM at 3CX and they've advised that they have no information, and
> that they are referring anyone who calls to their technical teams via
> support tickets in the 3CX portal.
>
>
>
> Not a good look for them.
>
>
>
> CH
>
>
>
> Get Outlook for Android <https://aka.ms/AAb9ysg>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-boun...@lists.ausnog.net> on behalf of Greg
> Lipschitz <glipsch...@summitinternet.com.au>
> *Sent:* Thursday, March 30, 2023 3:09:45 PM
> *To:* Rob Thomas <xro...@gmail.com>; <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net> <
> ausnog@lists.ausnog.net>
> *Subject:* Re: [AusNOG] Critical 3CX Windows/Mac hack.
>
>
>
> Here is a list of commands (or make a shell script) to stop it phoning
> home and getting more payload.
>
>
>
> # Disable 3CX Unattended-Upgrades Service
>
> systemctl stop unattended-upgrades
>
>
>
> # Collect the version of 3CX Desktop Apps on the Server
>
>
>
> cd /var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Data/Http/electron
>
> ls -la * > /root/3cx-desktop-versions.log
>
>
>
> # Remove the files
>
>
>
> rm -rf /var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Data/Http/electron/osx/*.dmg
>
> rm -rf /var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Data/Http/electron/osx/*.zip
>
> rm -rf /var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Data/Http/electron/windows/*.msi
>
> rm -rf /var/lib/3cxpbx/Instance1/Data/Http/electron/windows/*.nupkg
>
>
>
>
>
>
> https://www.3cx.com/community/threads/threat-alerts-from-sentinelone-for-desktop-update-initiated-from-desktop-client.119806/page-5
>
>
>
>
>
> Sadly, 3CX haven't even acknowledged this yet.
>
> It would seem that their whole CI-CD pipeline has been compromised
>
>
>
> Greg.
>
>
>
>
>
> *Greg Lipschitz**​*
>
>  |
>
> *Founder & CEO*
>
>  |
>
> *Summit Internet*
>
> *glipsch...@summitinternet.com.au* <glipsch...@summitinternet.com.au>
>
> *summitinternet.com.au* <http://summitinternet.com.au>
>
> *1300 049 749* <1300%20049%20749>
>
> *Unit 2, 31-39 Norcal Road, Nunawading VIC 3131*
> <https://www.google.com/maps?cid=12522583051503623677&_ga=2.149009334.1057584350.1554770858-1081443428.1554770858>
>
> [image: Summit Internet] <http://summitinternet.com.au/>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* AusNOG <ausnog-boun...@lists.ausnog.net> on behalf of Rob Thomas <
> xro...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* 30 March 2023 14:54
> *To:* <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net> <ausnog@lists.ausnog.net>
> *Subject:* [AusNOG] Critical 3CX Windows/Mac hack.
>
>
>
> As no-one's mentioned it here yet, I just thought I'd bring up the
> zero-day, in the wild, active RIGHT NOW, trojan 3CX Windows and Mac apps.
>
>
>
> If you, or you have clients, running 3CX, make sure they ARE NOT using the
> app. If they are, their machines are probably already owned, and all their
> stored credentials and session cookies have been leaked.
>
>
>
>
> https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-compromise-3cx-desktop-app-in-a-supply-chain-attack/amp/
> <https://aus01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com%2Fnews%2Fsecurity%2Fhackers-compromise-3cx-desktop-app-in-a-supply-chain-attack%2Famp%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cglipschitz%40summitinternet.com.au%7C5134fed0ee3f4dbc894808db30d2a12f%7C0838a12f226e43dfa6e4bb63d2643a7e%7C0%7C0%7C638157453430051909%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=UvNTww7E05nvQnaDQ25Qc8XytZFC%2FhIseT3MHYckCNM%3D&reserved=0>
>
>
>
> This is really bad. Sorry 8-(
>
>
>
> --Rob
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> AusNOG mailing list
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>
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